PEOPLE v. BROWN

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Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department, New York.

The PEOPLE, etc., Respondent, v. Andrew BROWN, Appellant.

Decided: September 21, 1998

Before BRACKEN, J.P., ROSENBLATT, RITTER and FLORIO, JJ. Stephen W. Dicker, New York, N.Y., for appellant. Charles J. Hynes, District Attorney, Brooklyn, N.Y. (Roseann B. MacKechnie, Joyce Slevin, and James M. McCarthy of counsel), for respondent.

Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Gary, J.), rendered April 26, 1995, convicting him of robbery in the first degree (two counts), upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.

ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed.

 Contrary to the defendant's contention, the trial court did not improvidently exercise its discretion in denying his request to substitute counsel on the eve of trial, where counsel had provided representation since the prior year at pretrial hearings without complaint by the defendant (see, People v. Sides, 75 N.Y.2d 822, 823, 552 N.Y.S.2d 555, 551 N.E.2d 1233;  People v. Arroyave, 49 N.Y.2d 264, 265, 425 N.Y.S.2d 282, 401 N.E.2d 393;  People v. Murray, 245 A.D.2d 531, 666 N.Y.S.2d 716 [2d Dept.1997] ).   The defendant failed to demonstrate good cause for the substitution, and it appears that the purpose of his request was to delay the court proceedings and the orderly administration of justice (see, People v. Sides, supra, at 823, 552 N.Y.S.2d 555, 551 N.E.2d 1233).

 Viewing the evidence, the law, and the circumstances of the case, it cannot be said that the defendant was denied the effective assistance of counsel (see, People v. Baldi, 54 N.Y.2d 137, 444 N.Y.S.2d 893, 429 N.E.2d 400).   The defense counsel delivered a clear and cogent opening statement, conducted meaningful cross-examination of the People's witnesses, lodged objections consistent with the defense theory, moved for a trial order of dismissal at the close of all the evidence, and urged leniency during sentencing (see, People v. Gordon, 248 A.D.2d 634, 670 N.Y.S.2d 537 [2d Dept.1998];  People v. Mondelus, 233 A.D.2d 408, 650 N.Y.S.2d 576).

 Further, the trial court did not improvidently exercise its discretion in ruling that the prosecutor would be allowed to question the defendant as to the underlying facts of a prior conviction if he testified at trial, since the conviction was probative on the issue of credibility and indicated his willingness to place his interests before those of society (see, People v. Sandoval, 34 N.Y.2d 371, 357 N.Y.S.2d 849, 314 N.E.2d 413;  Peo ple v. Coward, 248 A.D.2d 397, 669 N.Y.S.2d 825 [2d Dept.1998] ).

MEMORANDUM BY THE COURT.

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