PEOPLE v. SEAVEY

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Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Third Department, New York.

The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Janet SEAVEY, Also Known as Janet Smith, Also Known as Janet Ero, Appellant.

Decided: July 22, 2004

Before:  MERCURE, J.P., CREW III, MUGGLIN, ROSE and LAHTINEN, JJ. Sandra M. Colatosti, Albany, for appellant. Richard E. Cantwell, District Attorney, Plattsburgh, for respondent.

Appeal from a judgment of the County Court of Clinton County (McGill, J.), rendered July 3, 2003, which resentenced defendant following her conviction of the crimes of criminal possession of a forged instrument in the second degree (four counts), grand larceny in the third degree, forgery in the second degree, grand larceny in the fourth degree, petit larceny (three counts), criminal impersonation in the second degree (three counts) and scheme to defraud in the second degree.

 The facts underlying this case are set forth in our prior decision (305 A.D.2d 937, 762 N.Y.S.2d 435 [2003], lvs. denied 100 N.Y.2d 620, 624, 767 N.Y.S.2d 403, 408, 799 N.E.2d 626, 631 [2003] ).   There, we reversed defendant's conviction on one of the numerous crimes of which she was convicted and remitted to County Court for resentencing.   Defendant contends that the sentence imposed by County Court after remittal was motivated by vindictiveness.   Review of the record from resentencing, at which defendant received an aggregate term of 11 1/212 to 22 years, reveals “no reasonable likelihood of vindictiveness” (People v. Young, 94 N.Y.2d 171, 179, 701 N.Y.S.2d 309, 723 N.E.2d 58 [1999] ).   County Court's sentencing was expressly influenced by defendant's extensive criminal history and her failure to curb criminal conduct despite participation in prior programs.   These reasons are entirely proper considerations for the sentencing court and those reasons remained consistent both at sentencing after the trial and at resentencing following remittal.

 Defendant also urges that, in light of her mental illness, the sentence was harsh and excessive.   The record reflects that County Court considered defendant's mental health infirmity as well as the other reasons she offered to support a shorter sentence.   We find no abuse of discretion in the sentence imposed nor are there extraordinary circumstances warranting modification in the interest of justice (see People v. Parker, 305 A.D.2d 871, 872, 758 N.Y.S.2d 846 [2003], lv. denied 100 N.Y.2d 597, 766 N.Y.S.2d 173, 798 N.E.2d 357 [2003];  People v. Lavoie, 289 A.D.2d 602, 602-603, 733 N.Y.S.2d 799 [2001], lv. denied 98 N.Y.2d 638, 744 N.Y.S.2d 767, 771 N.E.2d 840 [2002] ).

ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed.

LAHTINEN, J.

MERCURE, J.P., CREW III, MUGGLIN and ROSE, JJ., concur.

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