IN RE: CELINA D., A PERSON ALLEGED TO BE A JUVENILE DELINQUENT, RESPONDENT–APPELLANT. COUNTY OF MONROE, PETITIONER–RESPONDENT. (APPEAL NO. 1.)
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
It is hereby ORDERED that the order so appealed from is unanimously affirmed without costs.
Memorandum: In this juvenile delinquency proceeding pursuant to Family Court Act article 3, respondent appeals in appeal No. 1 from an order of disposition that placed her in the custody of the Office of Children and Family Services for a period of one year. In appeal No. 2, respondent appeals from an order adjudicating her a juvenile delinquent based on the finding that she committed an act that, if committed by an adult, would constitute the crime of criminal mischief in the fourth degree (Penal Law § 145.00 ). Preliminarily, inasmuch as the appeal from the order of disposition brings up for our review the underlying fact-finding order adjudicating her a juvenile delinquent (see Matter of Benjamin S.A., 302 A.D.2d 979, 979, lv denied 100 N.Y.2d 505), the appeal from the fact-finding order in appeal No. 2 must be dismissed (see Matter of Robert M., 71 AD3d 896, 896–897).
With respect to appeal No. 1, respondent contends that her admission to the underlying act was defective because Family Court failed to comply with Family Court Act § 321.3(1). We note at the outset that, although respondent's period of placement has expired, her challenge to the admission is not moot “ ‘because there may be collateral consequences resulting from the adjudication of delinquency’ “ (Matter of Sysamouth D., 98 AD3d 1314, 1314; see Matter of Gabriela A., 23 NY3d 155, 161 n 2). We further note that respondent was not required to preserve her contention for our review inasmuch as “the requirements of Family Court Act § 321.3 are mandatory and nonwaivable” (Matter of Dakota L.K., 70 AD3d 1334, 1335 [internal quotation marks omitted] ). We nonetheless conclude that respondent's contention lacks merit. The record establishes that, in its allocution with respondent and her mother, the court properly advised them of respondent's right to a fact-finding hearing, and the court ascertained that respondent committed the act to which she was entering the admission, that she was voluntarily waiving her right to a fact-finding hearing, that her mother did not object to the admission and waiver, and that they were aware of the possible specific dispositional orders (see § 321.3; Matter of William VV., 42 AD3d 710, 712; cf. Dakota L.K., 70 AD3d at 1334–1335).
Frances E. Cafarell
Clerk of the Court