IN RE: OMIA M.

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Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Fourth Department.

IN RE: OMIA M., DE'KARI M., ARIEL M.,

CAF 15–00684

Decided: November 18, 2016

PRESENT:  WHALEN, P.J., CENTRA, CARNI, CURRAN, AND TROUTMAN, JJ. EVELYNE A. O'SULLIVAN, EAST AMHERST, FOR RESPONDENT–APPELLANT. ELISABETH M. COLUCCI, BUFFALO, FOR PETITIONER–RESPONDENT.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

DEAN S. PULEO, ATTORNEY FOR THE CHILDREN, BUFFALO.

It is hereby ORDERED that the order so appealed from is unanimously affirmed without costs.

Memorandum:  Respondent mother appeals from an order denying her motion pursuant to CPLR 5015(a) to vacate an order approving her conditional judicial surrender of parental rights with respect to her five children (see Social Services Law § 383–c [3][a], [b] ).  The mother's motion was based solely upon Family Court's inherent power to open its prior orders or judgments in the interest of justice (see generally Oneida Natl. Bank & Trust Co. of Cent. N.Y. v Unczur, 37 A.D.2d 480, 483).  Thus, the mother's contention that she did not knowingly enter into the surrender of her parental rights is raised for the first time on appeal and therefore is not preserved for our review (see generally Matter of Arkadian S. [Crystal S.], 130 AD3d 1457, 1458, lv dismissed 26 NY3d 995).  In any event, that contention is without merit.  It is well settled that, in the absence of “fraud, duress or coercion in the execution or inducement of a surrender[, n]o action or proceeding may be maintained by the surrendering parent ․ to revoke or annul such surrender” (§ 383–c [6][d] ).  Here, the mother failed to allege fraud, duress or coercion as a basis for vacatur (see Matter of Sabrina H., 245 A.D.2d 1134, 1135).  Moreover, the record establishes that the court's voir dire of the mother substantially complied with the requirements of Social Services Law

§ 383–c (3)(b) (see Matter of Naquan L.G. [Carolyn C.], 140 AD3d 757, 760).

Frances E. Cafarell

Clerk of the Court