JOHN DEFORGE, PLAINTIFF–APPELLANT, v. LYNDI KARWOSKI, DEFENDANT–RESPONDENT.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
It is hereby ORDERED that the order so appealed from is unanimously reversed on the law without costs, defendant's cross motion is denied, the complaint is reinstated and plaintiff's motion is granted.
Memorandum: In this action commenced by plaintiff to recover damages arising from money that he paid in his capacity as a cosigner in satisfaction of the student loan taken out by defendant, his daughter, plaintiff contends that Supreme Court erred in granting defendant's cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and instead should have granted his motion for summary judgment on the complaint, awarding him damages in the sum of $4,132.08 plus interest from the date on which he paid the loan along with the costs and disbursements incurred in bringing this action. We agree. In cosigning the loan agreement, plaintiff acted as a surety and thus, in accordance with the general rule, is equitably entitled to full indemnity against the consequences of the default of defendant, the principal obligor (see Lori–Kay Golf, Inc. v. Lassner, 61 N.Y.2d 722, 723; Leghorn v. Ross, 53 A.D.2d 560, affd 42 N.Y.2d 1043, rearg. denied 43 N.Y.2d 835). Contrary to the court's determination, a separate written contract between the parties to this action was not required to enable plaintiff to recover from defendant. Plaintiff surety's right to indemnification from his daughter, the principal herein, exists independently of any right of the creditor that issued the student loan pursuant to its written agreement with defendant, i.e., the principal under the agreement (see Blanchard v. Blanchard, 201 N.Y. 134, 138).
We further agree with plaintiff that he did not waive his right to seek indemnification from defendant pursuant to the terms of the loan agreement (see generally Morlee Sales Corp. v Manufacturers Trust Co., 9 N.Y.2d 16, 19; Guasteferro v Family Health Network of Cent. N.Y., 203 A.D.2d 905). Finally, we reject defendant's contention that this action is barred by the doctrine of laches (see generally Marcus v. Village of Mamaroneck, 283 N.Y. 325, 332; Matter of Kuhn v. Town of Johnstown, 248 A.D.2d 828, 830; Cohen v. Krantz, 227 A.D.2d 581, 582).
Patricia L. Morgan
Clerk of the Court