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Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department, New York.

Michael D'ANTONIO, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. 1251 AMERICAS ASSOCIATES, et al., Defendants-Respondents.

Americas Associates, L.P., etc., et al., Third-Party Plaintiffs-Respondents, v. Shimizu America Corporation, et al., Third-Party Defendants-Respondents. [And A Fourth-Party Action].

Decided: June 19, 2001

SULLIVAN, P.J., NARDELLI, ELLERIN, BUCKLEY and MARLOW, JJ. Alexander J. Wulwick, for Plaintiffs-Appellants. Christine Gasser, Victor A. Vincenzi, for 1251 Americas Associates. Victor A. Vincenzi, Robert A. Dashow, for Shimizu America Corp.

Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Paul Omansky, J.), entered May 8, 2000, which, inter alia, granted the motion of third-party defendant Miller Druck Co. Inc. and the cross motion of defendants Shimizu American Corporation, 1251 Americas Associates, MFD 1251 Americas Corporation, and Mitsui Fudosan (USA) Inc. for summary judgment, dismissing plaintiffs' Labor Law claims, unanimously affirmed, without costs.

 Plaintiff was injured when he fell while installing anchors or hooks into a wall.   The area where the anchors or hooks were to be placed was only six feet from the floor, one-half to one inch above plaintiff's head.   It is uncontested that plaintiff did not need the elevation provided by the ramp/platform to perform his task.   Under these circumstances, the motion court properly dismissed plaintiff's Labor Law § 240(1) claim, since plaintiff's task did not involve “a significant risk inherent in the particular task because of the relative elevation at which the task must be performed” (Rocovich v. Consolidated Edison Co., 78 N.Y.2d 509, 514, 577 N.Y.S.2d 219, 583 N.E.2d 932).   In short, plaintiff's task did not present an elevation risk within the contemplation of Labor Law § 240(1), but rather “the type of ordinary and usual peril a worker is commonly exposed to at a construction site” (Sousa v. Am. Ref-Fuel Co. of Hempstead, 258 A.D.2d 514, 515, 685 N.Y.S.2d 279;  see also, DeStefano v. Amtad New York, Inc., 269 A.D.2d 229, 703 N.Y.S.2d 34;  DeMayo v. 1000 N. of New York Co., 246 A.D.2d 506, 667 N.Y.S.2d 400).

 The motion court also properly dismissed plaintiff's cause of action predicated on Labor Law § 241(6), since plaintiff failed to articulate the violation of any specific Industrial Code rule or regulation (see, Rizzuto v. L.A. Wenger Contr. Co., 91 N.Y.2d 343, 349-350, 670 N.Y.S.2d 816, 693 N.E.2d 1068;  Keegan v. Swissotel New York, Inc., 262 A.D.2d 111, 113, 692 N.Y.S.2d 39, lv. dismissed 94 N.Y.2d 858, 704 N.Y.S.2d 533, 725 N.E.2d 1095).