KERN v. Lieutenant John P. McMenemy, Respondent.  (Appeal No. 1.)

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Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Fourth Department, New York.

Wendy L. KERN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CITY OF ROCHESTER, Fire Department of City of Rochester, Police Department of City of Rochester, Rochester Firefighters Association, Inc., Local 1071, IAFF, Daniel Cavuoto, Individually and as President of Local 1071, IAFF, Charles D. Ippolito, Individually and as Former Chief of Fire Department of City of Rochester, Lloyd Eldridge, Defendants-Respondents, et al., Defendant. Lieutenant John P. McMenemy, Respondent.  (Appeal No. 1.)

Decided: December 30, 1999

PRESENT:  GREEN, J.P., LAWTON, PIGOTT, JR., SCUDDER and CALLAHAN, JJ. Emmelyn Logan-Baldwin, Rochester, for plaintiff-appellant. Paul D. MacAuley, for defendants-respondents City of Rochester, Fire Department of City of Rochester, Police Department of City of Rochester and Charles D. Ippolito, individually and as former Chief of Fire Department of City of Rochester. Lucina O. Lapoff, Rochester, for defendant-respondent Rochester Firefighters Association, Inc., Local 1071, IAFF. John R. Parrinello, Rochester, for defendant-respondent Daniel Cavuoto, individually and as President of Local 1071, IAFF. Scott M. Green, Rochester, for defendant-respondent LLoyd Eldridge. Bradley c. Rosen, Rochester, for respondent.

 Supreme Court properly denied in part plaintiff's motion for a protective order.   The court, “because of its obvious familiarity with the matter, has broad discretion to supervise the discovery process and was in the best position to determine what is ‘material and necessary’ ” (Jackson v. Dow Chem. Co., 214 A.D.2d 827, 828, 624 N.Y.S.2d 675).   In view of the allegations in the complaint, the court reasonably determined that the conduct and activities of plaintiff both outside and within the workplace during her employment were relevant to the defamation cause of action and the alleged injury to plaintiff's profession, reputation and standing in the community.   The disclosure permitted by the court was properly limited to evidence “material and necessary in the * * * defense of” that cause of action (CPLR 3101[a] ).   The court also properly exercised its discretion in denying those parts of plaintiff's cross motions seeking disqualification of the law firm representing nonparty witness Lieutenant John P. McMenemy (see, Rich v. Hackel, 205 A.D.2d 316, 317, 613 N.Y.S.2d 5) and sanctions pursuant to 22 NYCRR part 130 (see, Scaccia v. MacCurdy, 239 A.D.2d 942, 661 N.Y.S.2d 812).

Order unanimously affirmed without costs.

MEMORANDUM: