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Supreme Court, Appellate Term, New York.

TZE HAO YEN et al., Appellants, v. German RAMOS, Respondent.

Decided: November 17, 1999

Present:  HON. STANLEY PARNESS, P.J., HON. WILLIAM P. McCOOE and HON. WILLIAM J. DAVIS, Justices. Thomas B. Purzan, Brooklyn, for appellants. Fischman & Heaney L.L.P., New York City (Mitchell P. Heaney of counsel), for respondent.

Order dated July 25, 1997 (Carol H. Arber, J.) reversed, with $10 costs, motion denied and petition reinstated.

 The notice of non-renewal underlying this “owner use” holdover proceeding informed the tenant that one of the named landlords (Lin) “desires occupy [sic] for her own use and residence”, and further explained that

“Ms. Lin formerly resided at 1702 Church Avenue, Brooklyn, New York in a studio apartment and managed a Laundromat on the ground floor.   Her studio apartment went with the business which she managed at that time.   The Laundromat business was placed on the market for sale in April 1996 and Ms. Lin, as a result, lost her job as manager and was forced to vacate wherein (sic) she moved to Newark, New Jersey.   At the present time, she is in a one room apartment and desires to return to New York City.”

 In such form, the nonrenewal notice complied with the specificity requirements imposed by Rent Stabilization Code (9 NYCRR) § 2524.2(b) and governing precedent (see, Berkeley Assocs. Co. v. Camlakides, 173 A.D.2d 193, 569 N.Y.S.2d 629, affd. 78 N.Y.2d 1098, 578 N.Y.S.2d 872, 586 N.E.2d 55;  see also, Hughes v. Lenox Hill Hosp., 226 A.D.2d 4, 18, 651 N.Y.S.2d 418, lv. denied 90 N.Y.2d 829, 660 N.Y.S.2d 552, 683 N.E.2d 17).  “The absence of the words ‘primary residence’-a legal term of art-is not fatal to the efficacy of a preliminary notice in an owner occupancy proceeding, particularly where the characterization of the intended use of the premises ․ is not inconsistent with its use as a primary residence.”  (Teichman v. Ciapi, 160 Misc.2d 182, 183, 612 N.Y.S.2d 293).