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Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department, New York.

Eugene LIGHT, et al., Plaintiffs, v. ROBERT MARTIN CORPORATION, et al., Defendants.

ROBERT MARTIN CORPORATION, et al., Third-Party Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. NEW YORK BLOOD CENTER, Third-Party Defendant-Respondent.

Decided: January 30, 1997

Before MURPHY, P.J., and MILONAS, NARDELLI and ANDRIAS, JJ. Francis G. Passaro, for Third-Party Plaintiffs-Appellants. David S. Chien, for Third-Party Defendant-Respondent.

Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Stuart Cohen, J.), entered April 1, 1996, which, inter alia, granted third party defendant New York Blood Center's motion for summary judgment dismissing the third-party complaint, unanimously affirmed, with costs.

The motion court properly concluded that even if defendants/third-party plaintiffs' tenant, third-party defendant New York Blood Center, had procured an insurance policy naming them as an additional insured, as required by the lease, plaintiff's accident would not have been covered thereunder (cf., Kinney v. G.W. Lisk Co., 76 N.Y.2d 215, 557 N.Y.S.2d 283, 556 N.E.2d 1090).   It is not disputed that the accident occurred on the driveway leading from the loading dock of the building owned by defendants/third-party plaintiffs.   This ground-level area cannot reasonably be construed as being “ in, upon or adjacent” to the Blood Center's “demised premises”, which specifically are described in the lease as the “upper level” of the building (see, Wilfred Labs. v. Fifty-Second St. Hotel Assocs., 133 A.D.2d 320, 324, 519 N.Y.S.2d 220, lv. dismissed 71 N.Y.2d 994, 529 N.Y.S.2d 277, 524 N.E.2d 878).   While it is true that the Blood Center was obligated to keep the “ loading dock areas” free of “refuse and debris”, that site was expressly labeled as one of the “common” building areas whose overall maintenance was the owner's responsibility.   Moreover, the accident did not arise out of “conduct and operation of Tenant's use or occupancy of the demised premises”.