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Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Fourth Department, New York.

IN RE: DERRICK C., Jessica C., and Tori C. Jefferson County Department of Social Services, Petitioner-Respondent; Deanna G., Respondent-Appellant.

Decided: June 13, 2008

PRESENT:  HURLBUTT, J.P., MARTOCHE, SMITH, GREEN, AND PINE, JJ. Muldoon & Getz, Rochester (Gary Muldoon of Counsel), for Respondent-Appellant. Kathryn G. Wolfe, Watertown, for Petitioner-Respondent. Eugene J. Langone, Jr., Law Guardian, Watertown, for Derrick C., Jessica C., and Tori C.

 In this proceeding pursuant to article 10 of the Family Court Act, respondent mother appeals from an order of fact-finding and disposition adjudging that she neglected her son and derivatively neglected her two daughters.   The order also directed that the children be placed in the custody of their maternal grandparents for a period of up to one year, during which time the mother was placed under the supervision of petitioner.   We reject the contention of the mother that she received ineffective assistance of counsel at the fact-finding hearing.  “It is not the role of this Court to second-guess the attorney's tactics or trial strategy” (Matter of Katherine D. v. Lawrence D., 32 A.D.3d 1350, 1351-1352, 822 N.Y.S.2d 349, lv. denied 7 N.Y.3d 717, 827 N.Y.S.2d 688, 860 N.E.2d 990) and, based on our review of the record, we conclude that the mother received meaningful representation (see id. at 1352, 822 N.Y.S.2d 349).

 Contrary to the mother's further contention, Family Court's findings of neglect and derivative neglect are supported by a preponderance of the evidence (see Family Ct. Act § 1046[b][i] ).   The testimony presented at the fact-finding hearing established that the mother continued to reside with the children's father and refused to believe that her son was sexually abused by his father, despite the fact that the father pleaded guilty to sexual abuse in the first degree based on an incident in which he touched her son's penis (see Matter of A.R., 309 A.D.2d 1153, 1154-1155, 764 N.Y.S.2d 746;  Matter of Anita J.F., 267 A.D.2d 1044, 1045, 701 N.Y.S.2d 557, lv. denied 94 N.Y.2d 762, 708 N.Y.S.2d 51, 729 N.E.2d 708;  Matter of Jennifer G. [Appeal No. 2], 261 A.D.2d 823, 687 N.Y.S.2d 844;  Matter of Elizabeth G., 255 A.D.2d 1010, 1012, 680 N.Y.S.2d 32, lv. denied 93 N.Y.2d 814, 697 N.Y.S.2d 561, 719 N.E.2d 922, lv. dismissed 93 N.Y.2d 848, 688 N.Y.S.2d 494, 710 N.E.2d 1093).   The findings of derivative neglect with respect to the mother's two daughters were proper because the mother thereby “demonstrated a fundamental defect in [her] understanding of the duties and obligations of parenthood and created an atmosphere detrimental to the physical, mental and emotional well-being of [her two daughters]” (A.R., 309 A.D.2d at 1155, 764 N.Y.S.2d 746 [internal quotation marks omitted];  see also Matter of Alexis C., 27 A.D.3d 646, 647-648, 811 N.Y.S.2d 449).

 Contrary to the contention of the mother, the requirement that she “acknowledge her role in the sexual abuse” of her son was a permissible condition of the mother's supervision (see Family Ct. Act § 1057;  22 NYCRR 205.83[b][2], [7] ).   The terms and conditions of an order of supervision “need not necessarily relate to [a parent's] adjudicated acts or omissions” (Matter of Baby Girl W., 245 A.D.2d 830, 832, 666 N.Y.S.2d 346).   We note in any event that the mother may satisfy that condition of her supervision by acknowledging that the sexual abuse occurred (see Matter of Jesus JJ., 232 A.D.2d 752, 754, 649 N.Y.S.2d 61, lv. denied 89 N.Y.2d 809, 655 N.Y.S.2d 889, 678 N.E.2d 502).

It is hereby ORDERED that the order so appealed from is unanimously affirmed without costs.