IN RE: the Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of J.B. (Minor Child) D.B. (Mother), Appellant-Respondent, v. Indiana Department of Child Services, Appellee-Petitioner Kids’ Voice of Indiana, Appellee-Guardian ad Litem.
 D.B. (“Mother”) is the biological mother of J.B. (“Child”).1 The Department of Child Services (“DCS”) became involved with Child after Mother gave birth to Child while placed in a mental-health facility. On July 28, 2020, DCS filed a petition alleging that Child was a child in need of services (“CHINS”). After Child was found to be a CHINS, the juvenile court ordered Mother to participate in certain services. Mother's participation in services was inconsistent, and Mother never achieved the level of stability necessary to put her in the position to successfully care for Child. DCS eventually petitioned to terminate Mother's parental rights to Child after Mother failed to successfully complete the court-ordered services or maintain stability. Following an evidentiary hearing, the juvenile court granted DCS's termination petition. On appeal, Mother contends that DCS violated her due process rights by failing to provide her with adequate services. Mother alternatively contends that DCS failed to present sufficient evidence to support the termination of her parental rights. We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
 Mother has a history of serious mental-health issues requiring placements in residential treatment facilities, including a placement in a residential facility when she was twelve years old. During that placement, Mother met S.T. (“Foster Mother”), a therapist who had worked at the facility where Mother had been placed. At some point, Foster Mother attempted to become Mother's foster parent, but Mother was not able to “step down” from residential treatment and eventually went to another residential treatment facility. Tr. Vol. II p. 13. After Mother turned eighteen, she continued to keep in contact with Foster Mother, who tried “to help her maneuver [through] life.” Tr. Vol. II p. 13.
 On July 22, 2020, “a Court found [Mother] to be suffering from a psychiatric disorder with unspecified psychosis and intellectual disability, leaving her gravely disabled. The Court ordered that [Mother] be involuntarily” admitted to the psychiatric unit at St. Vincent's hospital in Indianapolis “for up to ninety days.” Ex. Vol. p. 24. During this admission, Mother informed Foster Mother that she had been diagnosed with unspecified schizophrenia and had been ordered to take medication. Mother gave birth to Child on July 23, 2020, while admitted at St. Vincent's.
 On July 28, 2020, DCS filed its CHINS petition, in which it alleged that Child was a CHINS due to Mother's “mental health condition that makes her unable to provide appropriate care for” Child; hospitalization, which left Child without a caregiver; and admission “to using marijuana during her pregnancy.” Ex. Vol. pp. 24, 25. The CHINS court ordered the removal of Child from Mother's care and ordered placement and supervision of Child to be placed with DCS. Mother subsequently requested that Child be placed with Foster Mother in Louisville, Kentucky.
 On December 9, 2020, the juvenile court adjudicated Child to be a CHINS after Mother admitted that she needed “assistance to ensure that child has safe and stable housing.” Ex. Vol. p. 49. After finding Child to be a CHINS, the juvenile court ordered Mother to engage in home-based therapy and case management, complete a mental-health evaluation, complete random drug screens, and follow all recommendations of service providers. Child was eventually placed with Foster Mother per Mother's request.
 Mother initially showed some progress by obtaining housing and employment but failed to retain both long-term. Mother also failed to engage in mental-health treatment as ordered by the court. Mother initially participated in supervised visitation with Child, but her visitation was suspended after an incident in July of 2021.
 Kara Smith transported Mother to Louisville, Kentucky for visitation and supervised Mother's visits with Child. On July 13, 2021, Smith drove Mother to Louisville but, on arrival, Mother “didn't really want to do anything at all.” Tr. Vol. II p. 86. Smith convinced Mother that they should take Child to the park, but upon arriving, Mother “didn't want to get out of the car.” Tr. Vol. II p. 87. Instead, they decided to go get breakfast. At breakfast, Mother refused to feed Child, who appeared to be hungry. At that point, Smith suggested that “it would be best to take [Child] home so she could be taken care of.” Tr. Vol. II p. 88. Mother “walked off.” Tr. Vol. II p. 88. Smith, who was concerned for Mother's safety, tried to engage Mother, and asked “if she wanted to continue the visit.” Tr. Vol. II p. 89. When Smith informed Mother that she was going to take Child home, Mother “started opening [Smith's] car doors and closing them so that [she] couldn't leave.” Tr. Vol. II p. 90. Mother took Child from the car and started to walk away. Smith followed Mother and called 911. When the responding officers arrived, Mother initially refused to hand over Child but eventually did so. Child was returned to Foster Mother's care without injury.
 After the incident, Mother's case management team recommended that Mother complete a full psychological evaluation, complete any resulting recommendations, and see her therapist before visits would resume. Mother, however, did not complete the recommended services. As the case proceeded, Mother demonstrated frustration with, and threatening behaviors aimed at, service providers.
 At some point, Mother engaged in therapy with Dr. Brian Edmonds, a licensed clinical social worker. Dr. Edmonds met with Mother weekly or bi-weekly, depending on Mother's request. Dr. Edmonds's treatment was driven by Mother and was based on her self-reporting. Dr. Edmonds was unaware of Mother's schizophrenia diagnosis and Mother's treatment goals were only to obtain housing and employment. Dr. Edmonds last met with Mother in May of 2022.
 Meanwhile, on October 18, 2021, DCS had filed a petition to terminate Mother's parental rights to Child. The juvenile court held a fact-finding hearing on June 7, June 28, and August 3, 2022. During the fact-finding hearing, Foster Mother testified that, having observed Mother both on and off of her medication, Mother was able to be a “bit more rational” when taking her medication but makes “spot on decisions” when not on her medication “[l]ike she doesn't think about it, she just kind of goes at it.” Tr. Vol. II p. 16. Smith testified that Mother lacked a meaningful bond with Child as “there wasn't really like an emotional connection.” Tr. Vol. II p. 85. The juvenile court also heard evidence regarding Mother's failure to engage in the court-ordered mental-health services. On August 30, 2022, the juvenile court entered an order terminating Mother's parental rights to Child.
Discussion and Decision
 “The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects the traditional right of parents to establish a home and raise their children.” Bester v. Lake Cnty. Off. of Fam. & Child., 839 N.E.2d 143, 147 (Ind. 2005). Although parental rights are of a constitutional dimension, the law allows for the termination of those rights when parents are unable or unwilling to meet their parental responsibilities. In re T.F., 743 N.E.2d 766, 773 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001), trans. denied. Parental rights, therefore, are not absolute and must be subordinated to the best interests of the child. Id. Termination of parental rights is proper where the child's emotional and physical development is threatened. Id. The juvenile court need not wait until the child is irreversibly harmed such that his physical, mental, and social development is permanently impaired before terminating the parent-child relationship. Id.
 In reviewing termination proceedings on appeal, this court will not reweigh the evidence or assess the credibility of the witnesses. In re Involuntary Termination of Parental Rights of S.P.H., 806 N.E.2d 874, 879 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004). We only consider the evidence that supports the juvenile court's decision and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom. Id. Where, as here, the juvenile court includes findings of fact and conclusions thereon in its order terminating parental rights, our standard of review is two-tiered. Id. First, we must determine whether the evidence supports the findings and, second, whether the findings support the legal conclusions. Id.
 In deference to the juvenile court's unique position to assess the evidence, we set aside the juvenile court's findings and judgment terminating a parent-child relationship only if they are clearly erroneous. Id. “A finding of fact is clearly erroneous when there are no facts or inferences drawn therefrom to support it.” Id. A judgment is clearly erroneous only if the legal conclusions made by the juvenile court are not supported by its findings of fact, or the conclusions do not support the judgment. Id.
I. Mother's Due Process Claim
 In challenging the juvenile court's order, Mother contends that she was denied due process because DCS failed to provide her with appropriate services. Specifically, Mother asserts that
The trained DCS professionals wholly failed to take into account the ramifications of [Mother's] disability issues and that those issues would likely impair her ability to follow through on services. DCS, and its contracted services providers, failed to comply with the manuals regarding services. Here, the DCS service providers and GALs almost unanimously indicated that [Mother] suffered from mental health issues and acknowledged inability to connect with providers for some referrals based upon obstacles due to Covid; yet, they steadfastly refused to coordinate with the providers [Mother] had sought out on her own or address the root cause of the barriers to [Mother's] completion of services in precisely the manner they dictated in order to visit or gain placement of [Child].
Appellant's Br. pp. 37–38. Essentially, Mother claims that DCS should have been more flexible in requiring her to complete services.
 Mother asserts that “[i]nstead of helping [her] navigate the various systems, DCS threw up roadblocks to her success.” Appellant's Br. p. 28. However, the record is clear that DCS offered Mother a plethora of services but that Mother did not successfully complete the services offered. In addition, while family case manager (“FCM”) Claudia Smith did not reach out to providers other than those to which DCS sent referrals to see if they were treating Mother, she testified that she would have made referrals for services through Mother's allegedly preferred providers had Mother asked her to do so. (Tr. Vol. II p. 133, 136)
 In support, Mother points to this court's opinion in In re T.W., 135 N.E.3d 607, 615 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019), trans. denied, in which this court concluded that “for a parent's due process rights to be protected in the context of termination proceedings, DCS must have made reasonable efforts to preserve and/or reunify the family unit in the CHINS case (unless the no reasonable efforts exception applies).” In reaching that conclusion the court acknowledged that “DCS is not required to provide parents with services prior to seeking termination of the parent-child relationship,” id. at 612, and that “[w]hat constitutes ‘reasonable efforts’ will vary by case.” Id. at 615. The evidence before the juvenile court establishes that, in this case, provided Mother with numerous services aimed at helping Mother get to the position where reunification was possible. Mother failed to complete the services offered and failed to request that she be permitted to complete services with service providers other than those chosen by DCS. Despite Mother's assertion that DCS should have been more flexible in regards to the completion of services, we cannot say that DCS failed to make reasonable efforts to reunify Mother with Child.
II. Sufficiency of the Evidence
 Mother also contends that the evidence is insufficient to support the termination of her parental rights to Child. In order to support the termination of Mother's parental rights to Child, DCS was required to prove the following:
(A) that one (1) of the following is true:
(i) The child has been removed from the parent for at least six (6) months under a dispositional decree.․ (iii) The child has been removed from the parent ․ for at least fifteen (15) months of the most recent twenty-two (22) months ․ as a result of the child being alleged to be a child in need of services․.
(B) that one (1) of the following is true:
(i) There is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the child's removal or the reasons for placement outside the home of the parents will not be remedied.
(ii) There is a reasonable probability that the continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-being of the child.
(iii) The child has, on two (2) separate occasions, been adjudicated a child in need of services;
(C) that termination is in the best interests of the child; and (D) that there is a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of the child.
Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(b)(2). Mother argues that the evidence is insufficient to prove subsections (B) and (C).
A. Subsection (B)
 Mother argues that DCS failed to prove both that there is a reasonable probability that the conditions resulting in Child's removal from and continued placement outside her care will be remedied and that there is a reasonable probability that continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to Child's well-being. It is well-settled that because Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(b)(2)(B) is written in the disjunctive, the juvenile court need only find that one of the conditions listed therein has been met. See In re C.C., 788 N.E.2d 847, 854 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003), trans. denied. Therefore, where the juvenile court determines that one of the factors has been proven and there is sufficient evidence in the record supporting the juvenile court's determination, it is not necessary for DCS to prove, or for the juvenile court to find, the other factors listed in Indiana Code section 31-34-2-4(b)(2)(B). See In re S.P.H., 806 N.E.2d at 882.
 When determining whether a reasonable probability exists that the conditions justifying a child's removal and continued placement outside the home will not be remedied, the trial court must judge a parent's fitness to care for his or her children at the time of the termination hearing, taking into consideration evidence of changed conditions. In so doing, the trial court may consider the parent's response to the services offered through [DCS]. A pattern of unwillingness to deal with parenting problems and to cooperate with those providing social services, in conjunction with unchanged conditions, support a finding that there exists no reasonable probability that the conditions will change. Additionally, [DCS] was not required to rule out all possibilities of change; rather, it needed to establish only that there is a reasonable probability that the parent's behavior will not change.
In re B.J., 879 N.E.2d 7, 18–19 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (internal citations and quotations omitted), trans. denied.
 In concluding that there was not a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in Child's removal from Mother's care would be remedied, the juvenile court found as follows:
16. On August 12, 2021, the CHINS Court suspended Mother's parenting time with the Child on the written motion of DCS following an incident during parenting time in which Mother endangered her own safety, the safety of the parenting time supervisor, and the safety of the Child. In addition, the CHINS court authorized parenting time to resume conditioned upon positive recommendations of the Team.
20. The conditions that have led to the Child's removal, placement, and retention outside the home are Mother's untreated or undertreated mental health issues, lack of stable housing, and lack of stable employment or income. The conditions independently and collectively prevent the Child from being safely returned to Mother's care.
21. Mother has untreated or undertreated mental health issues which preclude her from safely parenting the Child. Mother has previously admitted that she is diagnosed with schizophrenia, but testified at the fact finding that she is diagnosed with anxiety only. Mother minimizes and does not acknowledge the extent of her mental health issues[,] nor has she sought to treat them successfully. Mother has not adequately treated her mental health although she has been provided with services through DCS to do so for more than two years.
22. Mother demonstrated paranoia indicative of untreated or undertreated mental health conditions during her direct testimony.․
23. Mother's testimony during the fact finding lacked credibility as she made inconsistent statements regarding her mental health diagnosis, medications, hospitalizations, and ongoing treatment. Mother admits that she is not currently taking any medication for her mental health conditions and has previously stated that she prefers smoking marijuana.
24. Mother denies that she needs additional services and has indicated that she does not understand why the Child has not been returned to her care.
26. During the years [Foster Mother] has known Mother, [Foster Mother] has observed Mother both and on and off her prescribed medications for schizophrenia. [Foster Mother] observed Mother is better able to make rational, thoughtful decisions while on her medication. When Mother is off her medication, [Foster Mother] observed Mother to make more impulsive decisions.
27. Mother did not participate in the mental health services, including a psychological evaluation, which were offered by DCS and ordered by the CHINS Court. Mother has been hospitalized as a result of her mental health at least twice since the child was born, however Mother denied the same during her direct testimony. [Mother's service providers have] repeatedly encouraged Mother to participate in mental health services․. DCS has offered mental health services to Mother for more than two years throughout the CHINS case and she currently has an open referral for a psychological evaluation in which she has failed to participate. She also currently has an open referral for home[-]based therapy in which she has failed to participate.
28. Mother has displayed hostile, threatening, erratic, paranoid, and dangerous behaviors with service providers and with the Child which are indicative of her untreated or undertreated mental health issues. Her behavior has led to service providers contacting law enforcement due to safety concerns. Mother's behavior, coupled with a lack of progress toward goals, has resulted in multiple service providers unsuccessfully closing Mother's services. Her erratic and dangerous behavior with the Child while exercising parenting time led to the suspension of Mother's parenting time.
29. Mother was participating in therapy through a community based provider, Brian Edmonds. Dr. Edmonds is a PhD and Licensed Clinical Social Worker (“LCSW”). Dr. Edmonds was meeting with Mother weekly or bi-weekly, depending on her request, but was unaware of Mother's diagnosis of schizophrenia because his treatment of Mother is based solely on her self-report. His engagement with Mother is client-driven and her stated treatment goals are only to obtain housing and employment. Mother's therapy does not include medication management. Mother mentioned the Child during her first session with Dr. Edmonds, but has not discussed the Child in any therapy session since that time.
30. Mother is no longer meeting with Dr. Edmonds regularly and Dr. Edmonds has not seen Mother since May, 2022.
31. Mother has made no meaningful or sustainable progress in obtaining stable housing necessary for the Child although she has been provided with services to assist with the same for more than two years. DCS has provided multiple home based case managers to assist Mother with housing. Although Mother successfully completed home-based case management with Mr. Ruben Cooper in early 2021, she has failed to maintain stable housing. Despite DCS continuing to offer additional home[ ]based case management services, since early 2021, Mother has been living with friends; living in a homeless shelter; and living in her car.
32. Mother has made no meaningful or sustainable progress in obtaining stable employment or income to support the Child although she has been provided with services to assist with the same for two years. DCS has provided multiple home based case managers to assist Mother with employment. Although Mother successfully completed home-based case management with Mr. Ruben Cooper in early 2021, she has failed to maintain stable employment or income to support the child. Despite DCS continuing to offer additional home based case management services, since early 2021, Mother has not maintained stable employment. Mother recently lost a job due to lack of transportation after her car broke down.
33. Although Mother is working with Lavon[e] Donigan[ ]Bradley, a home-based case manager through a community based organization, Outreach, Mother still has not obtained housing or stable employment. As recently as June of 2022, Mother was living out of her car.
34. Mother fails to recognize that she is unable to safely parent the Child at this time. Mother testified that, despite her lack of stable housing or employment, she believes she is stable at this time. While Mother has participated with Dr. Edmonds and Ms. Donigan[-]Bradley in the past few months, Mother has a habitual pattern of more than two years of discontinuing services with providers prior to making sustainable progress, failing to benefit and effectively utilize skills provider to her by service providers, and failing to make sustainable changes in her ability to safely parent the Child.
35. In mid to late 2021, Mother's whereabouts were unknown to [DCS] for several months. Mother admits that she does not regularly communicate with [DCS] nor participate in [case team meetings].
Appellant's App. Vol. II pp. 20–22.
 Mother challenges the findings set forth in numbered paragraphs 16, 20, 21, 22, 26, 27, 28, and 30. As for finding number (“Finding No.”) 16, Mother does not dispute that the incident occurred, but merely argues that Child “did not have an adverse reaction” to the incident and “there was no evidence of how anyone was endangered.” Appellant's Br. p. 42. We cannot agree that there was no evidence of endangerment as Mother actively attempted to stop Smith's vehicle, took Child from the vehicle, walked away through a parking lot, and initially refused to hand Child over to the police. The fact that no one was injured during the incident does not mean that the risk of danger was not present. Mother's behavior was reckless and concerning, regardless of whether Child remained composed throughout the ordeal.
 As for Findings Nos. 20 and 21, Mother claims that there was evidence that she had received some treatment. The juvenile court's determination that Mother had untreated mental-health issues, however, was supported by ample evidence. As for Finding No. 22, Mother claims that “[t]here is no indication that the Court has any expertise in diagnosing a party with ‘paranoia.’ ” Appellant's Br. p. 43. The juvenile court, however, was in the position to observe Mother and to make judgments based on its observations.
 Mother claims that Finding No. 26 is erroneous because despite Foster Mother's direct testimony regarding her observations of Mother when off her medication as compared to on her medication, “[t]here was no indications that [Mother] was better off with medication.” In challenging Findings Nos. 31–35, Mother argues that the juvenile court ignored evidence indicating that she had begun to make some progress prior to the fact-finding hearing. Mother's challenges to each of these findings amounts to nothing more than an invitation for this court to reweigh the evidence, which we will not do. See In re S.P.H., 806 N.E.2d at 879.
 In challenging Finding No. 27, Mother claims that the juvenile court “conflates testimony” regarding to Mother's failure to participate in the mental-health services offered by DCS. Appellant's Br. p. 43. While Mother may have sought some mental-health treatment on her own, the evidence clearly demonstrates that Mother did not participate in the services offered by DCS. As for Finding No. 28, Mother claims that the juvenile court used “synonyms for the words used by DCS service providers” that “lean toward sensationalistic descriptions.” Appellant's Br. p. 43. While some of the words used by the juvenile court may be synonyms of words used during the fact-finding hearing, the juvenile court's finding accurately describes the evidence presented. These findings are supported by the record.
 As for Finding No. 30, Mother claims that Donigan-Bradley's testimony contradicted the juvenile court's finding that Mother was no longer meeting with Dr. Edmonds. Dr. Edmonds's testimony, however, indicated that as of the date of the bench trial, he had not met with Mother for a number of months and was not aware of her then-current status. Mother's challenge to this finding amounts to nothing more than an invitation to reweigh the evidence, which we will not do. See In re S.P.H., 806 N.E.2d at 879.
 In addition to challenging the above-mentioned findings, Mother asserts that the juvenile court “improperly failed to consider Mother's substantial improvements and circumstances that began at least four months prior to the termination hearings and were ongoing at the time” that the juvenile court's order was issued. Appellant's Br. p. 25. In support, Mother points to the testimony of Donigan-Bradley, her case manager at Outreach, which provided Mother with case-management services. Donigan-Bradley testified to certain improvements that Mother had allegedly made in the time preceding the termination hearing. The juvenile court, however, was not obligated to believe this evidence. See Thompson v. State, 804 N.E.2d 1146, 1149 (Ind. 2004) (“[F]actfinders are not required to believe a witness's testimony even when it is uncontradicted.”).
 Upon review, we conclude that the evidence supports the challenged findings. We also conclude that the juvenile court's findings support its conclusion that there was not a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in Child's removal from Mother's care would be remedied. Mother's claim to the contrary amounts to nothing more than an invitation for this court to reweigh the evidence, which we will not do. See In re S.P.H., 806 N.E.2d at 879.
B. Subsection C
 We are mindful that in considering whether termination of parental rights is in the best interests of the child, the juvenile court is required to look beyond the factors identified by DCS and look to the totality of the evidence. McBride v. Monroe Cnty. Office of Fam. & Child., 798 N.E.2d 185, 203 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003). In doing so, the juvenile court must subordinate the interests of the parents to those of the children involved. Id. “A parent's historical inability to provide a suitable environment along with the parent's current inability to do the same supports a finding that termination of parental rights is in the best interests of the children.” Lang v. Starke Cnty. Office of Fam. & Child., 861 N.E.2d 366, 373 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), trans. denied.
The [juvenile] court need not wait until the child is irreversibly harmed such that [his or her] physical, mental, and social development is permanently impaired before terminating the parent-child relationship. Additionally, a child's need for permanency is an important consideration in determining the best interests of a child, and the testimony of the service providers may support a finding that termination is in the child's best interests.
In re A.K., 924 N.E.2d 212, 224 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010).
 The juvenile court concluded that termination of Mother's parental rights was in Child's best interests. In challenging this conclusion, Mother asserts that “there was no evidence of best interests” from any of the DCS service providers, Child's court-appointed special advocate (“CASA”), or the guardian ad litem (“GAL”). Appellant's Br. p. 41. Despite Mother's assertion, FCM Smith testified at the fact-finding hearing that she could not recommend Child's return to Mother's care because Mother had not addressed her mental health and had not maintained stable housing and employment. FCM Smith described her level of concern for Mother's ability to safely provide for Child as “severe.” Tr. Vol. II p. 126. FCM Smith did not recommend giving Mother additional time to complete services because “[i]t would just delay the permanency. We would get nowhere.” Tr. Vol. II p. 127. Therapist Adrienne Brown testified that Mother had not successfully completed services and that she “would be very concerned” for Child's safety if placed in Mother's care. Tr. Vol. II p. 62. Jan Townsend, Child's original GAL, testified that she believed that “there would be a physical danger to [Child] if she was placed in [Mother's] care in her current state” and that she did not believe Mother would be able to successfully complete services, even if offered more time. Tr. Vol. II p. 70. Specifically, GAL Townsend expressed safety concerns “in regards to [Mother's] ability to be able to provide a safe and stable environment for her daughter and also being that the concern of addressing the mental health had not been addressed then that would be a safety concern as well.” Tr. Vol. II p. 70. Courtney Ryan, Child's successor GAL, testified that she believed that “it is in [Child's] best interest to be adopted by her current placement as that placement [is] able to meet her physical, mental, [and] emotional needs.” Tr. Vol. II pp. 76–77. Given Mother's failure to engage in, let alone successfully complete, services, GAL Ryan recommended that Mother's parental rights to Child be terminated and reiterated her belief that adoption was in Child's best interests.
 Given FCM Smith's, Brown's, GAL Townsend's, and GAL Ryan's testimony and recommendations, coupled with the evidence demonstrating that Mother has not successfully completed any services and Child's need for permanency, we conclude that the juvenile court's determination that termination of Mother's parental rights is in Child's best interests is supported by sufficient evidence. See Lang, 861 N.E.2d at 373 (providing that the testimony of the case worker, GAL, or a CASA regarding the children's best interests supports a finding that termination is in the children's best interests). Mother's claim to the contrary again amounts to nothing more than an invitation for this court to reweigh the evidence, which, again, we will not do. See In re S.P.H., 806 N.E.2d at 879.
 The judgment of the juvenile court is affirmed.
1. Child has no identified father and no individual claiming to be Child's father participates in this appeal.
May, J., and Mathias, J., concur.