DEUTSCHE BANK NATIONAL TRUST COMPANY, AS TRUSTEE UNDER THE POOLING AND SERVICING AGREEMENT DATED AS OF SEPTEMBER 1, 2006, GSAMP TRUST 2006-FM2, MORTGAGE PASS-THROUGH CERTIFICATES, SERIES 2006-FM2, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. NELLIE NUNEZ CAMERO, Defendant-Appellant JOSE DELA CRUZ NUNEZ, Defendant-Appellee JOHN DOES 1-10; JANE DOES 1-10; DOE PARTNERSHIPS 1-10; DOE CORPORATIONS 1-10; DOE ENTITIES 1-10 and DOE GOVERNMENTAL UNITS 1-10, Defendants.
ORDER DISMISSING APPEAL
Upon review of the record, it appears that:
(1) On July 11, 2017, Defendant-Appellant Nellie Nunez Camero (Camero), pro se, filed the notice of appeal;
(2) On August 28, 2017, the circuit court clerk filed the record on appeal, and the appellate clerk filed a notice of entering case on calendar, indicating the statement of jurisdiction and opening brief were due on or before September 7, 2017, and October 9, 2017, respectively. Camero is not a registered Judiciary Electronic Filing System User. It is unclear whether the appellate clerk conventionally served Camero with the August 28, 2017 notice when it was entered;
(3) Camero did not file the statement of jurisdiction or opening brief, or request an extension of time;
(4) On November 16, 2017, the appellate clerk notified Camero that the time for filing the statement of jurisdiction and opening brief had expired, the matter would be called to the court's attention that same day for appropriate action, which could include dismissal of the appeal, pursuant to Hawai‘i Rules of Appellate Procedure (HRAP) Rules 12.1(e) and 30, and Camero may request relief from default by motion. The appellate clerk conventionally served Camero with the November 16, 2017 notice;
(5) On January 11, 2018, the appellate clerk conventionally served Camero with the August 28, 2017 notice of entering case on calendar, and a first amended default notice, indicating the matter would be called to the court's attention on January 22, 2018, for appropriate action, which could include dismissal of the appeal, pursuant to HRAP Rules 12.1(e) and 30, and that any request for relief from default should be made by motion; and
(6) Camero took no further action in this appeal.
Therefore, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the appeal is dismissed.