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MUBARAK v. STATE

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Court of Appeals of Georgia.

MUBARAK v. The STATE.

No. A10A0194.

Decided: July 15, 2010

William Charles Lea, for Appellant. Paul L. Howard Jr. and Peggy Ann Katz, for Appellee.

Rauf Mubarak appeals from the denial of his motion for new trial following his convictions for aggravated assault, aggravated battery, possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, and by bifurcated trial, possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. Following our review, we affirm.

Viewed in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict, the evidence shows that Mubarak operated an escort service out of an apartment that was rented in the name of the victim's girlfriend, who worked for Mubarak as an escort. The victim testified that he went to the apartment to change the locks on the door because he had heard that prostitution was occurring at the apartment and he did not want his girlfriend involved. As he was changing the locks, Mubarak approached him and pulled out a revolver. The victim retreated into the apartment to escape. Mubarak fired two shots through the door, and the victim was struck in the cheek and ear. The victim jumped out of an apartment window, ran from the complex, and called police. Mubarak was found outside near the apartment when police arrived.

1. Mubarak first contends that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon pursuant to OCGA § 16-11-133. He argues that the State failed to prove that he was the person, “Derrick Beck,” identified in the prior conviction.

The record reflects that the State provided notice of its intent to use a prior robbery conviction which identified Mubarak in his former name of “Derrick Beck” before the trial. Mubarak did not object to the use of the conviction until after the trial ended and the jury found him guilty. “[W]hen the defendant fails to object to evidence of a prior conviction during the presentencing phase of the trial, the error is deemed waived.” Turner v. State, 259 Ga.App. 902(1) (578 S.E.2d 570) (2003).

2. Mubarak next contends that the trial court erred in charging the jury on the meaning of “maliciously” in the context of the elements of aggravated battery. He argues that the trial court's definition from Black's Law Dictionary differs substantially from the definition prescribed by case law.

In reviewing a challenge to the trial court's jury charge, we view the charge as a whole to determine whether that court fully and fairly instructed the jury on the law of the case. If the jury is charged in such a manner as to work no prejudice to the defendant, then this Court will not consider a challenge to the wording of isolated segments.

(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Watkins v. State, 265 Ga.App. 54 (592 S.E.2d 868) (2004).

During the jury deliberation, the jury sent out a note asking the trial court to define “maliciously.” The trial court instructed the jury using the definition from Black's Law Dictionary, which defines “malicious,” as “substantially certain to cause injury without just cause or excuse.” Mubarak objected and requested that the jury either not be given a definition or that the court give the definition used in the homicide statute, that “defined malicious as an abandoned and malignant heart or with ill will or ill intent.”

Generally, “the word ‘maliciously’ has such obvious significance and common understanding that there is no need to define it in the jury charge.” Grant v. State, 257 Ga.App. 678, 680(1)(a) (572 S.E.2d 38) (2002).

Pretermitting whether the use of the definition of “maliciously” from Black's Law Dictionary was error, “an erroneous charge does not warrant a reversal unless it was harmful and, in determining harm, the entirety of the jury instructions must be considered.” (Citations omitted.) Foote v. State, 265 Ga. 58, 59-60(2) (455 S.E.2d 579) (1995). In looking at the entirety of the jury instructions, it is clear that no harm was committed, as the record reflects that the trial court charged the jury quite extensively on the element of intent as it related to the crimes charged and properly advised the jury of the State's requisite burden of proof.. Thus, the additional charge on the definition of maliciously, did not, in the context of the charge as a whole, prejudice Mubarak, and thus does not constitute reversible error.

3. Mubarak also contends that the trial court erred in overruling several hearsay objections he made during testimony from the responding police officer regarding statements made by the victim to the officer during the preliminary investigation.

This court will not disturb a trial court's determination that evidence is admissible as part of the res gestae unless it is clearly erroneous. Lewis v. State, 249 Ga.App. 812, 814(2) (549 S.E.2d 732) (2001), overruled on other grounds in Miller v. State, 285 Ga. 285 (fn.1) (676 S.E.2d 173) (2009). Upon review of the complained-about testimony, we find that the trial court did not err in overruling the objections because they were admissible as part of the res gestae of the crime. The officer testified that the victim was upset and had blood on his face when he arrived and made the statements regarding the incident shortly thereafter. Thus we find the statements were relevant and made without premeditation, and were admissible as part of the res gestae.

4. In Mubarak's fourth enumeration of error, he contends that the trial court erred in foreclosing him from impeaching two of the State's witnesses during his cross-examination of the responding police officer with the witnesses prior recorded statements.

A prior inconsistent statement becomes admissible when the witness denies having made such statement. After the witness denies having made the prior contradictory statement, the witness may be impeached; however, before the contradictory statement may be admitted against the witness, the time, place, person and circumstances attending the former statement shall be called to the witness' mind. [OCGA] § 24-9-83. In the case sub judice, the witness[es] never denied making a contradictory statement; thus, the door to impeachment was never opened. Even assuming the witness[es] denied making a contradictory statement, the defense never laid a proper foundation for the use of any such statement for impeachment purposes. Therefore, the trial court's ruling was appropriate.

(Citations omitted.) Jackson v. State, 173 Ga.App. 851, 855(5) (328 S.E.2d 741) (1985).

5. Mubarak next asserts that the trial court should have sua sponte charged the jury that he “must knowingly possess a firearm” to be guilty of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. However, Mubarak concedes that he requested that the trial court used the statutory language in charging the jury on this count. “[E]ven the review of substantial error under OCGA § 5-5-24(c) is not available when the giving of an instruction, or the failure to give an instruction, is induced during trial by counsel for the complaining party.” Courrier v. State, 270 Ga.App. 622, 625(2) (607 S.E.2d 221) (2004).

6. Mubarak also contends that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to certain hearsay statements, failing to request a jury instruction on defense of habitation, failing to challenge the constitutionality of OCGA § 16-11-133 (felon in possession of a firearm) or submit to the jury an instruction as to the element of “knowingly” in that offense, and also for failing to properly impeach two of the State's witnesses.

In order to establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the appellant must show both that counsel's performance was deficient and that a reasonable probability exists that but for counsel's deficient performance, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 695-696 (104 SC 2052, 80 LE2d 674) (1984).

Davis v. State, 221 Ga.App. 131, 133(3) (470 S.E.2d 520) (1996). Moreover,

[t]o demonstrate deficient representation, a convicted criminal defendant must show that counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Such a defendant must overcome the strong presumption that counsel's performance fell within a wide range of reasonable professional conduct and that counsel's decisions were made in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment. The reasonableness of counsel's conduct is examined from counsel's perspective at the time of trial and under the circumstances of the case.

(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Knox v. State, 290 Ga.App. 49, 51-52(1) (658 S.E.2d 819) (2008).

a. Although Mubarak contends that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the responding officer's testimony about what the victim said at the time of the incident, given that the testimony at issue was admissible, trial counsel did not err in failing to object to the same. Anthony v. State, 282 Ga.App. 457, 459(2) (638 S.E.2d 877) (2006).

b. Mubarak contends that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request a charge on defense of habitation. At the motion for new trial hearing, trial counsel testified that he could not “think of a strategic reason that [he] failed to request an instruction on defense of habitation.”

OCGA § 16-3-23 provides that a person is justified in using force which is intended or likely to cause death or great bodily harm to prevent an unlawful entry or attack upon a habitation if:

(1) [t]he entry is made or attempted in a violent and tumultuous manner and he or she reasonably believes that the entry is attempted or made for the purpose of assaulting or offering personal violence to any person dwelling or being therein and that such force is necessary to prevent the assault or offer of personal violence ․ or ․ (3)[t]he person using such force reasonably believes that the entry is made or attempted for the purpose of committing a felony therein and that such force is necessary to prevent the commission of the felony.

Here, there was no evidence that the victim attempted to enter the apartment to harm anyone inside the building, and in fact, the evidence demonstrated that the victim went inside the apartment to escape from Mubarak when the victim saw that he had a gun. The evidence did not reflect that the victim's intent was other than to change the locks of the apartment.

Where there is no evidence that the victim was attempting to enter or attack the habitation at the time he was injured by the defendant, a defense of habitation charge is not authorized. Wike v. State, 262 Ga.App. 444 (585 S.E.2d 742) (2003); Darden v. State, 233 Ga.App. 353, 354(1) (504 S.E.2d 256) (1998). Thus, as this justification defense was not supported by the evidence, trial counsel was not ineffective in failing to request that the jury be so charged.

c. Regarding Mubarak's additional grounds for his claim of ineffective assistance, “[w]e have carefully reviewed the trial transcript and the motion for new trial transcript, ․ [and][w]e find that evidence supports trial counsel's decisions.” Rowe v. State, 263 Ga.App. 367, 370(5) (587 S.E.2d 781) (2003). Thus, the trial court did not clearly err in finding that Mubarak did not meet his burden of showing ineffective assistance. See Felder v. State, 260 Ga.App. 27, 33(10) (579 S.E.2d 28) (2003).

Judgment affirmed.

BARNES, Presiding Judge.

Senior Appellate Judge G. ALAN BLACKBURN concurs and BERNES, J., concurs in divisions 1-4 and 6 and in judgment only in division 5.

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