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CHARLES GRANT MERRELL, Appellant (Defendant), v. THE STATE OF WYOMING, Appellee (Plaintiff).
[¶1] A jury convicted Charles G. Merrell of two counts of sexual abuse of a minor in the third degree in violation of Wyoming Statute § 6-2-316(a)(iv) (2023). On appeal, Mr. Merrell asserts Wyoming Statute § 6-2-316(a)(iv) is unconstitutionally vague, the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction, his right to a unanimous jury verdict was violated, the district court erroneously admitted evidence about alleged “grooming” behavior, the prosecutor committed misconduct during closing statements, and the cumulative effect of these errors deprived him of due process and a fair trial. We affirm.
ISSUES
[¶2] Mr. Merrell raises six issues, which we rephrase as follows:
I. Is Wyoming Statute § 6-2-316(a)(iv) unconstitutionally vague because the undefined phrase “immodest, immoral, or indecent liberties” fails to provide fair notice of prohibited conduct and permits arbitrary and unequal application of the law?
II. Did the State present sufficient evidence to sustain Mr. Merrell's convictions?
III. Was Mr. Merrell's right to a unanimous verdict violated when each count alleged multiple distinct acts, but the jury was not instructed that it must unanimously agree on which act formed the basis for the charge?
IV. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it admitted evidence and argument regarding alleged “grooming” behavior?
V. Did the prosecutor engage in misconduct during closing arguments that denied Mr. Merrell a fair trial?
VI. Did the cumulative effect of these errors deprive Mr. Merrell of due process and a fair trial?
FACTS
[¶3] On January 10, 2025, a detective from the Lincoln County Sheriff's Office received a report from Star Valley High School that a student, JR, made disclosures of possible sexual abuse by her stepfather, Charles Merrell. Because she did not feel safe at home, JR went to live with her stepbrother in Cedar City, Utah, after disclosing Mr. Merrell's behavior to her siblings over the Christmas holiday. The detective arranged for JR to participate in a forensic interview. During this interview, JR disclosed that Mr. Merrell had discussions with her about masturbation and paid her $50 to encourage her to “explore” her body. He would also frequently touch her buttocks and bare stomach. JR stated Mr. Merrell would give her full body hugs that were so close she could feel his “privates” touching her body. Mr. Merrell kissed JR's neck during some of these hugs. JR told the interviewer Mr. Merrell would force her to dance with him in the kitchen, and he would pull her so close that there would be no space between them. JR stated she could feel Mr. Merrell's “privates” against hers, which she said was “hard” and “stuck out.” JR also disclosed Mr. Merrell would give her “massages” where he would touch her bare buttocks with his hands, even when she objected to this contact. JR described an incident where Mr. Merrell forced her to model a bikini and then tried to pull the waistband lower down onto her hips. When JR flinched and moved away, Mr. Merrell became angry. JR told the detective she was afraid to be alone in the home with Mr. Merrell, and on one occasion Mr. Merrell asked JR if she was afraid he was going to rape her.
[¶4] The detective interviewed Mr. Merrell, who admitted all the contact described by JR, except for having an erection while dancing with or hugging JR. Mr. Merrell read the detective a letter he had written to JR attempting to explain his motives for the forced touching. This letter confirmed much of the conduct described by JR, but asserted his motives were innocent, and he was merely attempting to help her become comfortable with touch so she would have a successful marriage.
[¶5] The State charged Mr. Merrell with two counts of sexual abuse of a minor in the third degree in violation of Wyoming Statute § 6-2-316(a)(iv). Count I alleged Mr. Merrell “[t]ook immodest, immoral or indecent liberties with JR ․ (to wit: touching and massaging [her] buttocks/bare buttocks) ․” Count II alleged Mr. Merrell “[t]ook immodest, immoral or indecent liberties with JR ․ (to wit: rubbing and touching [her] bare stomach, sometimes while kissing [her] neck from behind) ․” Mr. Merrell filed a motion for a bill of particulars, asserting the charges did not “adequately inform [him] of the specific nature, time, place, manner, or means of the alleged offense(s) sufficient to prepare a defense.” After a hearing on Mr. Merrell's motion, the State filed an amended information. The State amended Count I to assert that between October 2021 and September 2023, Mr. Merrell “[t]ook immodest, immoral or indecent liberties with JR ․ (to wit: touching buttocks, pinching buttocks and massaging buttocks) ․” The State amended Count II to assert that between October 2021 and September 2023, Mr. Merrell:
[t]ook immodest, immoral or indecent liberties with JR ․ (to wit: full body hugs, forced dancing, coming up behind JR and putting his hands on her stomach and rubbing/stroking it, sometimes while simultaneously kissing her neck, and forced hugs/dancing when the defendant was erect and put his erect penis on JR's leg) ․
[¶6] A three-day jury trial commenced on October 27, 2025. JR testified she was approximately 8 years old when Mr. Merrell married her mother. When she was between the ages of 10 and 12, Mr. Merrell started insisting on more frequent hugs and asked her to sit on his lap and cuddle with him. When she turned 15, Mr. Merrell began touching her even more. Initially, he would brush up against her buttocks, which he tried to pass off as an accident, but then he progressed to patting, spanking, “full-hand pinching,” and grabbing her buttocks. On the multiple occasions when she told Mr. Merrell that his actions made her uncomfortable, he got defensive and attempted to justify his conduct.
[¶7] JR also testified about massages Mr. Merrell insisted on giving her. She stated Mr. Merrell would ask her if she wanted a massage, and she would decline. Despite her refusal, Mr. Merrell would insist on giving her a massage. She would lie next to him on the couch and “he would run his whole hand underneath [her] spandex and touch [her] bare butt[ocks] and massage it fully.” If she was laying on her back, “he would massage [her] quads and then move up and stick his hand underneath [her] spandex again and massage ․ around [her] hip flexors and close to [her] private parts.” She testified she was 15 when these massages began. Mr. Merrell often complimented JR's buttocks, and he would tell her it was “sexy,” she needed to show it off, and he could not resist touching it.
[¶8] JR described multiple incidents where Mr. Merrell forced her to dance with him. She testified:
In the kitchen, anytime when there would be music playing, he would immediately pull me close, body-to-body contact with him, making sure my legs were spread apart enough that one of his legs could go in between mine so there was no distance between us. He would grab one hand and then with his other he would grip it around my waist and he wouldn't give me any space even when I would try to push back, and he would just sit there and dance with me even though he knew I was uncomfortable with it and that I wanted my distance.
When they were dancing, JR “could feel his penis and his private parts up against [her].”
[¶9] JR further testified Mr. Merrell would force her to hug him and kiss him on the cheek every time she saw him. There were also several occasions where Mr. Merrell came up behind JR, ran his hands up her shirt, rubbed her bare stomach, and kissed her neck. Mr. Merrell told JR she was very attractive, and he felt he had every right to be attracted to her. He often told her she was sexy, beautiful, and “smokin’ hot.”
[¶10] Although the incident occurred when JR was 17 and was not part of the charged conduct, JR also testified about the episode that occurred when she was trying on a swimsuit. Mr. Merrell had purchased a bikini for her, and he insisted that she try it on, even though she was uncomfortable wearing it. When she came out, he called her over and “grabbed the top waistband of the swimsuit bottoms and pulled it lower.” JR was startled and jumped back, and Mr. Merrell responded by grabbing her by the shoulders, shoving her up against the door frame, and yelling in her face. At some point after this occurred, she was alone in the house with Mr. Merrell, and he came into her room, sat next to her on the bed and asked her if she was afraid that he was going to rape her. When JR “answered honestly and told him yes,” Mr. Merrell became defensive and said he would never do that because it would ruin his relationship with his wife and his family.
[¶11] JR stated Mr. Merrell started having conversations with her about masturbation. He encouraged her to “explore” her body and look at pictures of naked women or the other girls in the locker room and compare her body to theirs. He also forced her to sit in his lap while he read her an article, which he falsely claimed had been written by the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints (LDS), saying masturbation was encouraged by the church. Mr. Merrell asked JR if she had been masturbating, and “to get him off [her] back,” she said that she had. He told her he was “proud” of what she had done and gave her $50.
[¶12] JR explained why she did not disclose Mr. Merrell's conduct to her mother; she testified she was “afraid of what might happen and [of] putting her in harm as well.” However, when her siblings returned home for the holidays, she brought up her concerns about what was going on in the home and explained that she was not comfortable living there any longer. Her siblings helped her pack up her belongings, and she went to live with her stepbrother.
[¶13] After hearing the evidence presented at the trial, the jury found Mr. Merrell guilty of both counts of sexual abuse of a minor in the third degree. Mr. Merrell filed a motion for judgment of acquittal asserting the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction. The district court denied this motion. Mr. Merrell filed a motion for a new trial. The district court denied this motion. The district court sentenced Mr. Merrell to concurrent sentences of three to six years in prison. This appeal timely followed.
DISCUSSION
I. Wyoming Statute § 6-2-316(a)(iv) is not unconstitutionally vague.
[¶14] Mr. Merrell argues Wyoming Statute § 6-2-316(a)(iv) is unconstitutionally vague. Although he primarily asserts the statute is vague as applied to the conduct alleged in this case, he also claims the statute is vague on its face. Mr. Merrell claims the statute fails to provide fair notice of what conduct is illegal, and it delegates policy matters to police, judges, or juries for resolution on an ad hoc and subjective basis.
[¶15] Mr. Merrell filed a motion to dismiss the charges under Rule 12(b)(2) of the Wyoming Rules of Criminal Procedure (W.R.Cr.P.) arguing Wyoming Statute § 6-2-316(a)(iv) was unconstitutionally vague. The district court denied Mr. Merrell's motion. “A court's determination of whether a statute is constitutional on its face or as applied to a defendant is a matter of law” this Court reviews de novo. Dugan v. State, 2019 WY 112, ¶ 10, 451 P.3d 731, 736 (Wyo. 2019) (citation omitted).
A. Wyoming Statute § 6-2-316(a)(iv) is constitutional on its face.
[¶16] “When challenging a statute for unconstitutional facial vagueness[,] the party must demonstrate that the statute reaches a substantial amount of constitutionally protected conduct[ ] or that the statute specifies no standard of conduct at all.” Giles v. State, 2004 WY 101, ¶ 15, 96 P.3d 1027, 1031 (Wyo. 2004) (citations omitted). “When a statute is challenged for vagueness on its face, the [C]ourt examines the statute not only in light of the complainant's conduct, but also as it might be applied in other situations.” Id. (quoting Griego v. State, 761 P.2d 973, 975 (Wyo. 1988)).
[¶17] This Court has repeatedly rejected facial vagueness challenges to Wyoming Statute § 6-2-316(a)(iv). We have consistently held the indecent liberties statute does not reach a substantial amount of protected conduct. See, e.g., Giles, ¶¶ 15–16, 96 P.3d at 1031–32; Ochoa v. State, 848 P.2d 1359, 1363–64 (Wyo. 1993). Indeed, we have found the statute does not implicate constitutionally protected privacy, religious, or free-speech rights. Giles, ¶ 16, 96 P.3d at 1032 (citations omitted); Ochoa, 848 P.2d at 1363–64.
[¶18] Similarly, we have repeatedly rejected the argument that Wyoming Statute § 6-2-316(a)(iv) specifies no standard of prohibited conduct. See Giles, ¶ 19, 96 P.3d at 1033; Ochoa, 848 P.2d at 1363; Griego, 761 P.2d at 976. A “statute is void for vagueness if it fails to give a person of ordinary sensibility fair notice that the contemplated conduct is forbidden.” Giles, ¶ 11, 96 P.3d at 1030 (quoting Hobbs v. State, 757 P.2d 1008, 1011 (Wyo. 1988)). However, this principle “does not invalidate every statute which a reviewing court believes could have been drafted with greater precision.” Id. at ¶ 12, 96 P.3d at 1030 (quoting Sorenson v. State, 604 P.2d 1031, 1033 (Wyo. 1979)). Instead, “[a]ll the Due Process Clause requires is that the law give [s]ufficient warning that men may conduct themselves so as to avoid that which is forbidden.” Sorenson, 604 P.2d at 1033 (citation omitted).
[¶19] In Sorenson v. State, we rejected the argument that the undefined terms “immoral,” “immodest,” and “indecent,” made it impossible for the defendant to understand that his acts were criminal until after the jury passed judgment on his case. 604 P.2d at 1034–35. We held:
If the three words “immoral, immodest and indecent,” standing alone, were our only consideration, we might agree with appellant. Their meanings to each of several persons of ordinary intelligence may differ to a point wherein it could not be said that the conduct required or forbidden is set forth with reasonable certainty. On the other hand, strict application of the definitions of the words could lead to the conclusion that a person of ordinary intelligence would know that conduct such as fondling the breast of a twelve-year-old child is proscribed by them and is clearly prohibited by the “standard of morality” of this society.
In any event, we need not consider the three words on their own connotation as suggested by appellant. They are accompanied in the statute by the words “liberties” and “child” which narrow down and designate with reasonable certainty the acts and conduct required or forbidden. “Liberties” are such as common sense of society would regard as indecent and improper. “Indecent liberties” is self-defining. “Indecent liberties” and “indecent assault” are convertible terms. Accordingly, the statute is not unconstitutionally vague.
Id. (citation modified). We further stated it was unnecessary for the statute to specify what would be considered as “immodest, immoral, and indecent liberties” with particularity, and we recognized “[t]he indelicacy of the subject forbids it.” Id. at 1035. We held “[t]he common sense of the community, as well as the sense of decency, propriety, and morality which people generally entertain, is sufficient to apply the statute to each particular case[ ] and point out unmistakably what particular conduct is rendered criminal by it.” Id. (citations omitted). Due process does not require the statute to “spell out in exact words what constitutes the conduct made punishable.” Id. (citation omitted).
[¶20] “Under the doctrine of stare decisis, we depart from precedent only upon due reflection and only if we are convinced that it is necessary to vindicate plain, obvious principles of law and remedy continued injustice.” Hicks v. State, 2025 WY 113, ¶ 91, 578 P.3d 366, 391 (Wyo. 2025) (quoting Bernard v. State, 2025 WY 66, ¶ 14, 570 P.3d 416, 420 (Wyo. 2025)). Mr. Merrell has failed to convince this Court we should depart from our precedent and hold Wyoming Statute § 6-2-316(a)(iv) is unconstitutionally vague on its face.
B. Wyoming Statute § 6-2-316(a)(iv) is constitutional as applied in this case.
[¶21] We next consider Mr. Merrell's “as applied” challenge. When a statute is challenged “as applied,” we examine the statute solely in light of the defendant's specific conduct. Ruby v. State, 2006 WY 133, ¶ 5, 144 P.3d 425, 427 (Wyo. 2006) (citation modified). To determine whether a statute is unconstitutionally vague as applied, “we must decide whether the statute provides sufficient notice to a person of ordinary intelligence” that the defendant's conduct was illegal and “whether the facts of the case demonstrate arbitrary or discriminatory enforcement.” Id.
[¶22] Mr. Merrell contends Wyoming Statute § 6-2-316(a)(iv) is unconstitutionally vague as applied to the conduct alleged in the case because he had no notice the charged conduct could violate the statute. He claims previous decisions have involved sexual intercourse, direct manipulation of a child's genitals, or conduct that is “more overtly sexual and materially more egregious ․” He argues the statute should require some form of sexual contact or contact with a victim's intimate parts. Finally, he argues the legislature's failure to define the conduct prohibited by Wyoming Statute § 6-2-316(a)(iv) with precision or without reference to any defined physical act “leaves the boundary of felony criminal liability to be supplied on a case-by-case basis.”
[¶23] We disagree. The absence of a prior case involving identical conduct does not necessarily establish a lack of notice. We have recognized “if the statute has been previously applied to conduct identical to that of the appellant, he cannot complain that notice was lacking.” Giles, ¶ 13, 96 P.3d at 1031 (citation omitted). However, we have also made clear that identical precedent is not required. See Ruby, 2006 WY 133, ¶ 7, 144 P.3d at 428–30 (quoting Rabuck v. State, 2006 WY 25, ¶¶ 18–26, 129 P.3d 861, 865–67 (Wyo. 2006) (rejecting an insufficient notice argument and stating “the lack of prior cases discussing similar conduct is not determinative”). Rather, “[w]e will not find a statute vague as applied if we can conclude that its language would sufficiently apprise a person that the conduct proven at trial was prohibited by law.” Jones v. State, 2016 WY 110, ¶ 24, 384 P.3d 260, 266 (Wyo. 2016) (citation omitted).
[¶24] We previously rejected the argument the indecent liberties statute applies only to offenses amounting to sexual assault. Rabuck, 2006 WY 25, ¶ 23, 129 P.3d at 866–67. Contrary to Mr. Merrell's argument, we have recognized the indecent liberties statute has “broad application.” Rabuck, ¶ 19, 129 P.3d at 866 (citation omitted). The breadth is consistent with the statute's purpose of “protect[ing] children from exploitation.” Id. at ¶ 22, 129 P.3d at 866 (quoting Misenheimer v. State, 2001 WY 65, ¶ 12, 27 P.3d 273, 280 (Wyo. 2001)). A person exploits a child by “taking unjust advantage of [a child] for one's own benefit or selfish ends.” Exploitation, Black's Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024).
[¶25] The fairness required by the vagueness doctrine does not require a statute that specifies “in exact words” what conduct is punishable. Giles, 2004 WY 101, ¶ 21, 96 P.3d at 1034 (quoting Millhollan v. State,143 S.E.2d 730, 733 (Ga. 1965)). The doctrine does not transform the practical difficulty of drafting a criminal statute broad enough to encompass varied conduct into a constitutional defect. Id. (quoting Sorenson, 604 P.2d at 1035). “[T]he indecent liberties statute should not be subject to challenge ‘by virtue of the fact that it is broad enough to capture even innovative forms of sexual imposition upon minors.’ ” Rabuck, 2006 WY 25, ¶ 19, 129 P.3d at 866. The question, therefore, is not whether the statute expressly identifies the particular conduct at issue in this case, but whether its language gave Mr. Merrell fair notice that such conduct was prohibited.
[¶26] When this Court is asked to consider whether a criminal statute provided an accused with sufficient notice, “we have examined the defendant's consciousness of guilt in assessing whether the defendant had notice of the criminal prohibition.” Rabuck, 2006 WY 25, ¶ 20, 129 P.3d at 866. Here, the evidence demonstrates Mr. Merrell understood that JR viewed his conduct as inappropriate. Mr. Merrell repeatedly became defensive when JR expressed her discomfort with or objection to his conduct, and he attempted to justify the continued forced touching. In addition, after JR left the home, but before he was interviewed by the police, Mr. Merrell composed a letter attempting to explain his behavior to JR. The letter graphically described the conduct JR later disclosed to the police, and it asked her to choose between his proposed alternative motives for touching her:
When Chuck had her try on swimsuits, was he trying to help her overcome her negative body image? Was he trying to help build her confidence and low self[-]esteem? Was he trying to help her face the embarrassment she always displayed when she had on a swimsuit??????
Or [․]
Was he getting his Jollies off watching her put on a swimsuit? Was he getting so visually excited he just couldn't wait to get his hands down her pants and finger bang her brains out?
When he challenged her to start giving hugs and kisses and practice it often, was it so she could face her fears of closeness and touch? Was he trying to help her with her insecurity with intimacy? Was he trying to help her develop the ability to let people in? To let people get near?
Or [․]
Was it just so he could French kiss her on the mouth and stick his tongue down her throat? Was it so he could rub his penis up against her, cause himself to get a woody, and show off his big, hard, boner?
When Chuck challenged her to stop fearing her bum and how negatively she felt about it ․ was he trying to have her not care so much? To stop giving her power away to that insecure thought and feeling? To allow vulnerability to touch in that area she feared so much?
Or [ ․]
Was he brushing it, patting it, smacking it, and giving her a massage, so that he could get excited about the ideas of grabbing that ass, bending her over and sexually pounding her from behind?
Mr. Merrell's statements demonstrate he had fair notice that his conduct was prohibited. His contemporaneous efforts to justify the touching and explain it to JR indicate he understood the nature of his conduct and recognized this type of conduct was unlawful. See Rabuck, 2006 WY 25, ¶ 20, 129 P.3d at 866 (stating the defendant's attempts to conceal his conduct indicated he understood his conduct was unlawful). These statements also show Mr. Merrell knew society would construe his actions as immoral or indecent.
[¶27] In further assessing whether Mr. Merrell had fair notice that his conduct was prohibited, we consider his conduct in its full context and under the totality of the circumstances. See id. at ¶ 31, 129 P.3d at 868 (citation omitted). Here, the record reflects Mr. Merrell knew both JR and her mother objected to his conduct. Despite these objections, Mr. Merrell continued grabbing and pinching JR's buttocks, massaging her bare buttocks and hip flexors underneath her spandex, forcing her to dance so closely to him that she “could feel his penis and his private parts up against [her,]” and hugging her from behind while running his hands over her bare stomach and kissing her neck. The evidence also shows Mr. Merrell justified doing things like peeking into JR's room by saying she was not his biological daughter, and it was natural for him to be curious. Mr. Merrell admitted to his wife that he was sexually attracted to JR. He also told JR he was attracted to her, and “he felt he had every right to be.” He often told JR she was “sexy,” “beautiful,” or “smokin’ hot.” He asked JR to keep their conversations about masturbation secret, and he attempted to convince JR it was acceptable for her to engage in masturbation by saying it was condoned by their church. Mr. Merrell's behavior got progressively worse until JR became afraid that he was going to rape her.
[¶28] The totality of the circumstances demonstrates Mr. Merrell's conduct constituted “taking unjust advantage of [JR] for [his] own benefit or selfish ends.” Exploitation, Black's Law Dictionary. The circumstances described above demonstrate Mr. Merrell's conduct was the type of conduct that a person of ordinary intelligence would understand could fall within the statute's prohibition. Indeed, the common sense of society would recognize Mr. Merrell's conduct as implicating the very type of exploitation the statute seeks to prevent. See Rabuck, 2006 WY 25, ¶ 22, 129 P.3d at 866 (quoting Misenheimer, 2001 WY 65, ¶ 12, 27 P.3d at 280). The statute therefore provided Mr. Merrell sufficient notice that his conduct was prohibited. We conclude Wyoming Statute § 6-2-316(a)(iv) was not unconstitutionally vague as applied to Mr. Merrell.
II. The evidence was sufficient to sustain Mr. Merrell's convictions.
[¶29] Mr. Merrell argues the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction for two reasons. First, he contends the State failed to prove all the essential elements of the crime as charged in Count II. Second, Mr. Merrell contends the “conduct proven at trial does not rise to the level of conduct previously upheld by this Court.” We will address each of these arguments in turn.
A. The State presented sufficient evidence to prove all the essential elements of Count II.
[¶30] Mr. Merrell asserts the State had to prove he engaged in all the conduct that followed the “to wit” language in the elements instruction that was given to the jury. This instruction informed the jury they had to find Mr. Merrell:
5. Knowingly took immodest, immoral or indecent liberties with [JR] (to wit: full body hugs, forced dancing, coming up behind [JR] and putting his hands on her stomach and rubbing/stroking it, sometimes while simultaneously kissing her neck, and forced hugs/dancing when the defendant was erect and put his penis on [JR's] leg)․
Mr. Merrell asserts the “defendant was erect” allegation was part of the element of the crime, and the State did not present sufficient evidence to prove JR felt an erection.
[¶31] Our standard of review for challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence is well known.
[W]e do not reweigh the evidence or reexamine the credibility of witnesses; we determine whether a jury could have reasonably concluded each of the elements of the crime was proven beyond a reasonable doubt․ Regardless of whether the evidence is direct or circumstantial, we simply determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found that the essential elements of a charged crime were proven beyond a reasonable doubt on the evidence presented.
Walker v. State, 2026 WY 94, ¶ 45, 596 P.3d. 249, 263 (Wyo. 2026) (citation modified).
[¶32] Mr. Merrell asserts there is no evidence in the record from which the jury could reasonably infer JR felt an erection, and its finding on this element must be based on speculation and conjecture. It is true that this Court “must guard against a conviction obtained by adding inference to inference.” Hightower v. State, 2020 WY 152, ¶ 19, 477 P.3d 103, 106 (Wyo. 2020) (quoting Seeley v. State, 959 P.2d 170, 175–76 (Wyo. 1998)). When a conviction is based in part on inference, that inference “must be based on more than speculation and conjecture.” Id. As we have explained:
the line between a reasonable inference that may permissibly be drawn by a jury from basic facts in evidence and an impermissible speculation is not drawn by judicial idiosyncracies. [sic] The line is drawn by the laws of logic. If there is an experience of logical probability that an ultimate fact will follow a stated narrative or historical fact, then the jury is given the opportunity to draw a conclusion because there is a reasonable probability that the conclusion flows from the proven facts.
Id. (quoting Sunward Corp. v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 811 F.2d 511, 521 (10th Cir. 1987)). Thus, we must determine whether the facts proved by the State provided the jury a logical basis to conclude JR felt an erection or whether reaching that conclusion required the jury to speculate. See id. at ¶ 21, 477 P.3d at 107 (identifying the “critical question” as whether the jury could draw permissible inferences to “bridge the gap” between the State's evidence and the jury's ultimate conclusion).
[¶33] Here, the State's evidence provided the jury with a logical basis to conclude JR felt an erection. JR testified that she could feel Mr. Merrell's “penis and private parts” against her leg when they were dancing in the kitchen. The detective who interviewed JR “took” JR's statements about Mr. Merrell's penis sticking out “to be describing an erection.” In the letter Mr. Merrell wrote to JR, he asked her to decide whether he was trying to help her face her fears of intimacy and touch or if he was forcing her to hug and kiss him so “he could rub his penis up against her, cause himself to get a woody, and show off his big, hard, boner[.]” While JR may have never used the word erection in her testimony, the jury could reasonably infer from the basic facts in evidence that Mr. Merrell did in fact have an erection during the forced dancing.
[¶34] The State presented sufficient evidence to prove Mr. Merrell committed all the conduct listed in Count II.
B. The conduct proven at trial satisfied the statute and established Mr. Merrell committed third-degree sexual abuse of a minor.
[¶35] Mr. Merrell's sufficiency argument largely rests on a comparison between his conduct and the conduct at issue in prior indecent liberties cases. He asserts previous cases brought under the indecent liberties statute have applied to over sexualized conduct involving breasts, sexual intrusion, or intercourse. He asserts there is not sufficient evidence to sustain his conviction because there is no evidence of sexual contact or sexual intrusion, and “the conduct proven here differs materially from the conduct previously sustained.”
[¶36] As discussed above, the indecent liberties statute applies to offenses other than those amounting to sexual assault. Rabuck, 2006 WY 25, ¶ 23, 129 P.3d at 867. In fact, “physical touching is not a required element of the crime of indecent liberties.” Id. at ¶ 24, 129 P.3d at 867. This Court has previously upheld convictions under the indecent liberties statute for a variety of conduct, including surreptitiously recording minors in a state of undress. Id. at ¶¶ 19–32, 129 P.3d at 866–69; Ruby, 2006 WY 133 ¶¶ 6–8, 144 P.3d at 427–30. In this case, the jury was not tasked with deciding whether Mr. Merrell's behavior was as egregious as that of other defendants who have been convicted under the statute. Instead, the jury was asked to determine whether Mr. Merrell's behavior fell within the statute. The jury found that it did. We find the jury's determination was reasonable and supported by the evidence.
[¶37] Mr. Merrell's conduct was largely undisputed. During his interview with the detective and in his written letter, he admitted to touching JR. The evidence established Mr. Merrell grabbed and pinched JR's buttocks, massaged her bare buttocks and hip flexors underneath her spandex, forced her to dance so closely to him that she “could feel his penis and his private parts up against [her,]” and hugged her from behind while running his hands over her bare stomach and kissing her neck. The main dispute in the case was Mr. Merrell's motive for touching JR. The jury could have reasonably rejected Mr. Merrell's claims that his motives were innocent and concluded his inappropriate touching of his stepdaughter with sexual motives fell within the statute.
[¶38] The State presented sufficient evidence to sustain Mr. Merrell's convictions on both counts.
III. Mr. Merrell's right to a unanimous verdict was not violated.
[¶39] Mr. Merrell argues his right to a unanimous verdict was violated because both counts contained “multiple discrete factual allegations within a single element through the ‘to wit’ language[,]” but “[t]he jury was never instructed that it must unanimously agree on which specific act satisfied that element.”
[¶40] Because Mr. Merrell did not object to the jury instructions below, we review this claim for plain error. Lee v. State, 2024 WY 97, ¶ 12, 555 P.3d 496, 499 (Wyo. 2024) (citations omitted); see also Duncan v. State, 2026 WY 86, ¶ 27, 593 P.3d 1237, 1245 (Wyo. 2026) (reviewing jury instructions for plain error when no objection was made at trial). “To establish plain error, an appellant must show: ‘(1) the record clearly reflects the alleged error; (2) a violation of a clear and unequivocal rule of law in a clear and obvious manner; and (3) the appellant was denied a substantial right which caused the appellant material prejudice.’ ” Lee, ¶ 12, 555 P.3d at 499 (quoting Kobielusz v. State, 2024 WY 10, ¶ 24, 541 P.3d 1101, 1108 (Wyo. 2024)). “Material prejudice exists when the appellant demonstrates a reasonable probability that the jury verdict would have been more favorable in the absence of the error.” Id. (quoting Soares v. State, 2024 WY 39, ¶ 37, 545 P.3d 871, 880 (Wyo. 2024)).
[¶41] The first prong of plain error is satisfied here because the jury instructions appear in the record. To establish the second prong, Mr. Merrell “must demonstrate that a clear and unequivocal rule of law was violated in a clear and obvious, not merely arguable, way.” Walker v. State, 2022 WY 158, ¶ 22, 521 P.3d 967, 977 (Wyo. 2022) (quoting Six v. State, 2008 WY 42, ¶ 12, 180 P.3d 912, 917 (2008)). We apply the following principles when reviewing jury instructions:
The purpose of jury instructions is to provide the jury with a foundational legal understanding to enable a reasoned application of the facts to the law. In order to support a reliable verdict, it is crucial that the trial court correctly state the law and adequately cover the relevant issues. Ultimately, the test of adequate jury instructions is whether they leave no doubt as to the circumstances under which the crime can be found to have been committed.
Id. (quoting Blevins v. State, 2017 WY 43, ¶ 26, 393 P.3d 1249, 1255 (Wyo. 2017)).
[¶42] Most unanimity challenges involve cases where a defendant was charged with two or more identical counts of the same crime without any differentiation between the counts in the jury instructions. In those circumstances, there is a risk the jury could convict a defendant without unanimously agreeing on which charge formed the basis for the conviction. See, e.g., Walker, 2022 WY 158, ¶18, 521 P.3d at 976 (reversing two of the appellant's convictions when he was charged with five identical counts of sexual abuse and the instructions and verdict form did not differentiate among the counts). A second type of unanimity challenge involves cases where a defendant was charged with committing a crime in alternative ways. See, e.g., Bloomquist v. State, 914 P.2d 812, 818 (Wyo. 1996) (discussing the requirement for a unanimous verdict when the defendant was charged with alternative ways of committing aggravated vehicular homicide). Neither of these unanimity challenges is at issue in the case.
[¶43] Instead, Mr. Merrell argues “[t]hese were separate factual allegations” in a single count. He asserts the fact the jury submitted a question during deliberations asking if it had to find “all of the described offenses happened or some of the offenses,” and what the words “to wit” meant shows the jury was uncertain “as to the factual basis required for a conviction.” To the extent Mr. Merrell's argument rests on the premise that each factual allegation constituted a separate offense, his claim is one of duplicity, not instructional error.
[¶44] “Our precedent clearly prohibits charging multiple separate offenses in a single count.” Triplett v. State, 2017 WY 148, ¶ 14, 406 P.3d 1257, 1260 (Wyo. 2017). Wyoming has long prohibited “duplicitous” charging on the grounds that “no man should be tried or convicted for several offenses when he is charged with but one.” Id. (quoting McInturff v. State, 808 P.2d 190, 193 (Wyo. 1991)). However, this Court has also recognized that some statutes “prohibit a course of conduct rather than specific acts.” Id. at ¶ 15, 406 P.3d at 1260. If Mr. Merrell believed the State improperly charged multiple offenses in a single count, he was required to raise that objection before trial. Id. at ¶¶ 14–16, 406 P.3d at 1260–61. He did not. Although Mr. Merrell repeatedly argued the statute was unconstitutionally vague and his conduct did not violate the statute, he never objected on the grounds of duplicitous charging. Accordingly, to the extent Mr. Merrell now contends the State improperly charged multiple offenses in a single count, he waived any such objection. Id. at ¶ 14, 406 P.3d at 1260 (citing Schuler v. State, 2008 WY 47, ¶ 15, 181 P.3d 929, 933 (Wyo. 2008) (“[O]ur precedent [ ] clearly holds that if duplicitous charging is not raised before trial, the duplicity defect is waived.”).
[¶45] Further, Mr. Merrell failed to show the district court violated any clear and unequivocal rule of law because the jury instructions adequately informed the jurors the State had to prove “each” element of the crime, and the jury had to acquit Mr. Merrell if it found “any” element had not been proven. In addition, the instructions specifically identified the conduct alleged in support of each count. For Count I, he was alleged to have taken indecent liberties with JR “to wit: touching buttocks, pinching buttocks, and massaging buttocks[.]” For Count II, he was alleged to have taken indecent liberties with JR “to wit: full body hugs, forced dancing, coming up behind [JR] and putting his hands on her stomach and rubbing/stroking it, sometimes while simultaneously kissing her neck, and forced hugs/dancing when the defendant was erect and put his erect penis on [JR's] leg[.]” When taken as a whole, the instructions “leave no doubt as to the circumstances under which the crime can be found to have been committed.” Walker, 2022 WY 158, ¶ 22, 521 P.3d at 977 (citation omitted). Therefore, the jury instructions were adequate, and Mr. Merrell failed to establish the second prong of plain error.
[¶46] Finally, even assuming the jury should have been instructed that it had to unanimously agree on a particular act constituting each offense, Mr. Merrell cannot establish the third prong of plain error because he cannot demonstrate material prejudice. In cases where we have found the jury should have been instructed that it must unanimously agree on which single act constituted the crime, we have held a conviction can be upheld if the evidence in the record proves every act charged. See, e.g., Bush v. State, 908 P.2d 963, 967 (Wyo. 1995). The same is true here. As discussed above, the State presented sufficient evidence to prove Mr. Merrell committed every charged act. Therefore, he cannot show a reasonable probability the verdict would have been more favorable to him absent the alleged error in the instructions.
IV. The district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting evidence and argument regarding “grooming.”
[¶47] Before the trial, the State filed a notice that it intended to call Dr. Matthew Gray to testify as an expert about “grooming” behaviors and delayed disclosures by children who have been victims of sexual abuse. Mr. Merrell filed a motion in limine seeking to exclude this testimony. Mr. Merrell argued allowing testimony about grooming was irrelevant, misleading, unduly prejudicial, and an improper expert opinion on the ultimate issue. The district court denied Mr. Merrell's motion, finding the proposed testimony was “relevant and admissible.”
[¶48] At the trial, Dr. Gray told the jury he was not familiar with the facts of this case, and he explained he was there to testify about “peer-reviewed empirical research ․ that characterizes child sexual abuse, grooming tactics, [and] behaviors that culminate in sexual abuse․” He testified regarding the definition of “grooming”:
It is a pattern of strategies and tactics that a perpetrator will use to cultivate a trusting relationship with a potential victim. And it's designed to increase sexual contact access to a victim and continue that activity, and it's also designed ․ to prevent disclosure or reporting so those activities can continue.
He testified grooming often begins with “attempts by the perpetrator to cultivate perceptions of [ ] a special relationship․” Next, there is typically “a testing of the waters” where the perpetrator begins to “gradually do things that are sort of lower level to see if the child can be trusted to not report” the conduct. The perpetrator then attempts to characterize these behaviors as “normal or part of the special relationship” or discuss the negative consequences that could happen if people found out what was happening. A perpetrator might also use anger or threats to prevent disclosure. Dr. Gray testified many of the behaviors a perpetrator may use could appear quite similar to those seen in a normal adult/child relationship, and while “many of those behaviors by themselves might be innocuous and not problematic ․ it's necessary to look at [the] pattern of behaviors.” Dr. Gray also testified that most child sexual abuse victims do not disclose the abuse to anyone until adulthood.
[¶49] On appeal, Mr. Merrell asserts Dr. Gray's testimony was not limited to “abstract educational principles,” but instead “provided a behavioral framework through which the jury could interpret the alleged conduct in this case.” He asserts the testimony created a risk the jury would not evaluate the conduct “by asking whether a particular act satisfied the statutory element of ‘immodest, immoral or indecent liberties,’ but by asking whether the overall pattern fit a recognized abuse progression model.” The State asserts Dr. Gray's testimony “was relevant to help the jury resolve the only real factual dispute at trial: whether Mr. Merrell's conduct was innocuous or indecent.”
[¶50] This Court reviews a district court's decision to admit or reject expert testimony for an abuse of discretion. Nania v. State, 2025 WY 16, ¶ 14, 562 P.3d 1306, 1310 (Wyo. 2025) (citation omitted). “In determining whether there has been an abuse of discretion, the ultimate issue is whether or not the court could reasonably conclude as it did. As long as there exists a legitimate basis for the trial court's ruling, we will not reverse that decision on appeal.” Id. (citation modified). “If we find the district court abused its discretion in admitting or excluding evidence ․ we next consider whether the error was prejudicial.” Id. at ¶ 15, 562 P.3d at 1310. “To establish prejudicial error, the appellant ‘must show a reasonable probability that, without the error, the verdict might have been different.’ ” Id. (quoting Toth v. State, 2015 WY 86A, ¶ 35, 353 P.3d 696, 707 (Wyo. 2015)).
[¶51] We have recognized a district court does not err when it admits “expert testimony [that] is linked to objective evidence, assists the jury in understanding the evidence, and avoids directly commenting on another witness's credibility ․” Nielsen v. State, 2018 WY 132, ¶ 39, 430 P.3d 740, 753 (Wyo. 2018). Similarly, we have acknowledged the issue of whether a child has been sexually assaulted or abused “is generally beyond common experience,” and allowing an expert to testify about how the evidence can be interpreted assists the trier of fact. Montoya v. State, 822 P.2d 363, 366–67 (Wyo. 1991). This Court has previously upheld the admission of expert testimony about grooming in a sexual abuse case. In Ingersoll v. State, a police officer testified about how child sexual offenders often groom their victims, provided examples of grooming, and stated there were “signs” or “indications” the defendant had been “grooming [the victim.]” 2022 WY 74, ¶ 32, 511 P.3d 480, 490 (Wyo. 2022). We found the officer's testimony was not improper because it “ ‘merely informed the jury about the meaning and significance’ of certain evidence in the case and left the ultimate conclusion of [the defendant's] guilt for the jury.” Id. (citing Nielsen, 2018 WY 132, ¶ 28, 430 P.3d at 749; Cureton v. State, 2007 WY 168, ¶ 11, 169 P.3d 549, 551 (Wyo. 2007)).
[¶52] Dr. Gray's testimony in this case was similar to that we found to be properly admitted in Ingersoll. Dr. Gray testified about “peer-reviewed empirical research ․ that characterizes child sexual abuse, grooming tactics, [and] behaviors that culminate in sexual abuse․” He provided an objective definition of grooming and described an escalating pattern of behaviors that research has shown is common in many sexual abuse cases. Dr. Gray clearly told the jury he was not familiar with the facts of this case, and he was not talking about this particular victim or Mr. Merrell. With the exception of the erection, Mr. Merrell admitted to all the alleged contact with JR. The main issue for the jury to determine was whether this conduct was innocent or amounted to taking “immodest, immoral, or indecent liberties” with JR. Dr. Gray supplied general background on grooming patterns drawn from research. He did not apply that information to any evidence in this case or offer any opinion about Mr. Merrell's conduct. The jury remained free to decide whether and how that general information related to the facts before it and retained the exclusive responsibility of determining whether the charged conduct constituted “immodest, immoral, or indecent liberties.” The district court could reasonably conclude this evidence was relevant and would assist the jury in understanding the evidence. See Nielsen, 2018 WY 132, ¶ 39, 430 P.3d at 753. Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion when it admitted this testimony.
V. The prosecutor did not commit misconduct or otherwise deprive Mr. Merrell of a fair trial during closing argument.
[¶53] Mr. Merrell asserts the prosecutor engaged in prosecutorial misconduct in closing arguments in four ways: 1) vouching for JR's credibility; 2) appealing to passion and moral judgment instead of the statutory elements; 3) injecting religion and improper narrative themes; and 4) diluting the burden of proof. He alleges this conduct was prejudicial because the evidence in this case was not overwhelming and turned on credibility. The State contends the prosecutor's closing argument was legally proper.
[¶54] “When determining whether a prosecutor committed misconduct during closing arguments, ‘we review the entire argument, and do not isolate discrete parts of the argument that may be taken out of context.’ ” Testerman v. State, 2025 WY 58, ¶ 50, 568 P.3d 1206, 1219 (Wyo. 2025) (quoting King v. State, 2023 WY 36, ¶ 44, 527 P.3d 1229, 1245 (Wyo. 2023)). “Closing arguments ‘[ ] must be based upon the evidence submitted to the jury.’ ” Id. (quoting Dysthe v. State, 2003 WY 20, ¶ 24, 63 P.3d 875, 884 (Wyo. 2003)). While attorneys are afforded wide latitude and “may comment on and suggest reasonable inferences from all the evidence admitted during trial[,] ․ there are limits on a prosecutor's closing arguments.” Id. (citing Berry v. State, 2023 WY 75, ¶ 49, 533 P.3d 474, 488 (Wyo. 2023)). A prosecutor may not “ ‘inject his opinion as to the weight of the evidence in arguing to the jury’ because ‘a prosecutor may be seen as an authority whose opinion carries greater weight than the jury's opinion.’ ” Id. (quoting King, ¶ 44, 527 P.3d at 1245.
[¶55] Mr. Merrell filed a motion for new trial based in part on a claim of prosecutorial misconduct. While the district court found some of the prosecutor's statements amounted to “error,” it ultimately denied Mr. Merrell's motion for a new trial.
[¶56] “We review the denial of a motion for new trial, including a motion based upon alleged prosecutorial misconduct, for an abuse of discretion.” Willoughby v. State, 2011 WY 92, ¶ 8, 253 P.3d 157, 161 (Wyo. 2011) (citations omitted). “An abuse of discretion occurs when the district court could not reasonably have concluded as it did.” Id. (citation omitted). Further, Mr. Merrell only objected to one of these allegedly improper statements at trial. “The general rule in Wyoming is that a failure to interpose a timely objection to improper argument is treated as a waiver, unless the prosecutor's misconduct is so flagrant as to constitute plain error, requiring reversal.” Carrier v. State, 2017 WY 88, ¶ 59, 400 P.3d 358, 370 (Wyo. 2017) (quoting Trujillo v. State, 2002 WY 51, ¶ 4, 44 P.3d 22, 23–24 (Wyo. 2002)). If a defendant does object to an alleged error below, “we review his challenge for harmless error ‘after first determining if error occurred.” Keller v. State, 2024 WY 72, ¶ 43, 551 P.3d 465, 478 (Wyo. 2024) (citation modified) (quoting Berry, 2023 WY 75, ¶ 36, 533 P.3d at 485).
Whether such misconduct has been reviewed on the basis of harmless error, W.R.Cr.P. 52(a) and W.R.A.P. 9.04, or on the basis of plain error, W.R.Cr.P. 52(b) and W.R.A.P. 9.05, this Court has focused on whether such error ․ affected the accused's “substantial rights.” The accused's right to a fair trial is a substantial right. Wyo. Const. art. 1, §§ 6, 9, and 10; and see, e.g., Jones v. State, 580 P.2d 1150, 1154 (Wyo. 1978). Before we hold that an error has affected an accused's substantial right, thus requiring reversal of a conviction, we must conclude that, based on the entire record, a reasonable possibility exists that, in the absence of the error, the verdict might have been more favorable to the accused. Jones v. State, 735 P.2d 699, 703 (Wyo. 1987).
Davis v. State, 2005 WY 93, ¶ 23, 117 P.3d 454, 463 (Wyo. 2005) (quoting Earll v. State, 2001 WY 66, ¶ 9, 29 P.3d 787, 789–90 (Wyo. 2001)). “The appellant bears the burden of establishing prosecutorial misconduct.” Id. at ¶ 24 (citation omitted).
A. Vouching
[¶57] “Vouching occurs when a prosecutor offers his opinion of a witness's credibility, as distinguished from when he infers credibility from the same evidence the jury has before it.” Testerman, 2025 WY 58, ¶ 53, 568 P.3d at 1220 (quoting Byerly v. State, 2019 WY 130, ¶ 21, 455 P.3d 232, 242 (Wyo. 2019)). “We judge the challenged comments not in isolation but in the context of the prosecutor's entire argument, considering the context of the comments and comparing them with the evidence produced at trial.” Id. (quoting Berry, 2023 WY 75, ¶ 44, 533 P.3d at 487).
[¶58] As he did at trial, on appeal Mr. Merrell objects to the following comment the prosecutor made during closing argument:
That young girl got up there and told you about the horrible time in her life and things that had happened to her. That was hard, uncomfortable, and she was solid and she was strong and she was honest.
He asserts this statement was “an endorsement” of JR's credibility and not an argument about the evidence. The State contends this comment was not vouching, and it is instead akin to those we found to be proper in Testerman.
[¶59] In Testerman, the prosecutor stated the detective who investigated the case “did a good job [testifying]. He was honest, and spilled the beans.” 2025 WY 58, ¶ 54, 568 P.3d at 1220. We found this statement was not vouching because “the prosecutor was not asserting his personal belief[ ] or injecting his own opinion about whether [the witness's] testimony was reliable.” Id. at ¶ 57, 568 P.3d at 1220. Instead, this statement was part of the prosecutor's argument that the detective was an experienced trial witness who presented well to juries. Id. The statement referred “to inadequacies in the investigation that [the detective] admitted during his testimony.” Id. The prosecutor did not confirm his personal experience with the witness but explained how the detective had been forthright when discussing his investigation. Id.
[¶60] Similarly, in Burton v. State, we found the prosecutor did not commit misconduct by stating the witnesses “were blatantly honest” by admitting to things they were doing. 2002 WY 71, ¶¶ 33–35, 46 P.3d 309, 317–18 (Wyo. 2002). We found the prosecutor was not personally vouching for the credibility of the witnesses but was instead pointing out that the witnesses were being forthright when discussing their drug use, which was a difficult matter to discuss “in a public forum.” Id. at ¶ 35, 46 P.3d at 318. The prosecutor “drew a reasonable inference from the evidence that the witnesses would have no motive to lie by confessing their drug use because use of drugs is illegal and is not accepted by general society.” Id.
[¶61] When taken in context, the prosecutor's comment in this case is like those we found to be proper in Testerman and Burton. The prosecutor was not asserting her personal belief about whether JR's testimony was reliable. See Testerman, 2025 WY 58, ¶ 57, 568 P.3d at 1220. Rather, the prosecutor acknowledged this topic was “uncomfortable” and “hard,” and related to a “terrible time” in JR's life. The prosecutor was pointing out that JR was being “strong” and “honest” while testifying about things that were embarrassing and difficult to discuss in a public forum. See Burton, 2002 WY 71, ¶ 35, 46 P.3d at 318.
[¶62] Even if we were to conclude the prosecutor's comment was improper, as the district court did, Mr. Merrell would still have to establish this comment “impacted his substantial rights” to justify a reversal of his conviction. Guy v. State, 2008 WY 56, ¶ 22, 184 P.3d 687, 694 (Wyo. 2008) (citation omitted). “A defendant's substantial rights have been affected when, absent the misconduct, there is a reasonable possibility that the verdict might have been more favorable to the defendant.” Id. (citation omitted). Although not explicitly stated in the district court's ruling, it appears it concluded Mr. Merrell's substantial rights were not prejudiced because the prosecutor repeatedly stated it was the jury's role to determine credibility. We agree.
[¶63] The prosecutor's statement that JR was “honest” and “solid” “when viewed in isolation as opposed to the prosecutor's entire argument, could at most have given the jury [the] ‘impression’ ” that she was vouching for the witness's credibility. White v. State, 2003 WY 163, ¶ 32, 80 P.3d 642, 655 (Wyo. 2003). However, in this case the prosecutor twice referred the jury to the district court's instruction that it was the jury's role to determine “the credibility of the witnesses.” See id. The prosecutor's comment was not “accompanied by any personal attestation of fact.” See id. Instead, she discussed the trial testimony and the reasons the jury should infer JR was credible.
[¶64] We have recognized the primary issue in many child sexual abuse cases “is the defendant's credibility versus that of the child[ ] ․” Warner v. State, 2001 WY 67, ¶ 23, 28 P.3d 21, 29 (Wyo. 2001). However, in this case, with the exception of the erection, the facts were largely undisputed. Both in his letter and his interview with the detective, Mr. Merrell admitted to massaging JR's bare buttocks, patting and smacking JR's buttocks, forcing her to hug and kiss him, and dancing with her in the kitchen. These statements coincided with JR's testimony. The main issue in this case was Mr. Merrell's motive for engaging in this conduct. It is doubtful the jury's verdict on this issue was impacted by the prosecutor's statement that JR was “solid” and “honest.” Therefore, we find that any error was harmless, and the district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Mr. Merrell's motion for a new trial based on this statement.
B. Appeals to the Jury's Passions
[¶65] Mr. Merrell asserts the prosecutor appealed to the jury's passions by “inject[ing] sexualized imagery and emotional framing” into the case. Specifically, he objects to the prosecutor's statement that Mr. Merrell described JR as “a hot sexy bombshell of a teenage girl” and asked the jury to “[t]ell him unequivocally that all those years that conduct was not decent.”
[¶66] Mr. Merrell did not object to these comments below, so we apply a plain error standard of review. See Carrier, 2017 WY 88, ¶ 59, 400 P.3d at 370. “To establish plain error, [Mr. Merrell] must establish first, the record clearly presents the incident alleged to be error; second, a clear and unequivocal rule of law was violated in a clear and obvious, not merely arguable, way; and third, he was denied a substantial right resulting in material prejudice against him.” Duncan, 2026 WY 86, ¶ 27, 593 P.3d at 1245 (quoting Townsend v. State, 2025 WY 108, ¶ 15, 576 P.3d 1254, 1259 (Wyo. 2025)).
[¶67] The first prong of plain error is met here because the allegedly erroneous comments appear in the record. We have held “[a]rguments which are calculated to appeal to the jury's prejudice or passion are improper because they pose a risk that the accused may be convicted for reasons wholly irrelevant to his guilt or innocence.” Burton, 2002 WY 71, ¶ 15, 46 P.3d at 314 (citations omitted). However, a prosecutor is allowed to “comment on and suggest reasonable inferences from all the evidence admitted during trial.” Testerman, 2025 WY 58, ¶ 50, 568 P.3d at 1219 (quoting Berry, 2023 WY 75, ¶ 49, 533 P.3d at 488). In this case, when the prosecutor's statements are viewed in light of the entire record, it is apparent her comments were permissible comments on the evidence and not improper appeals to the jury's passion.
[¶68] The detective testified Mr. Merrell sent text messages to JR where he told her she was sexy and referred to her as “a blonde bombshell.” JR testified Mr. Merrell often told her she was sexy and “smokin’ hot.” Thus, the prosecutor's statement that Mr. Merrell had referred to JR as a “a hot sexy bombshell” was a fair representation of the evidence that had been presented.
[¶69] Similarly, to convict Mr. Merrell of the charged crimes, the jury had to find his conduct amounted to “immodest, immoral, or indecent liberties” under Wyoming Statute § 6-2-316(a)(iv). Asking the jury to tell Mr. Merrell his conduct was “not decent” and “what he put this young girl through was immoral” was not injecting “emotional framing” into the case. She was not “encourag[ing] the jury to convict [Mr. Merrell] in order to protect the community rather than upon the evidence presented at trial.” Burton, 2002 WY 71, ¶ 15, 46 P.3d at 314. Rather, the prosecutor was asking the jury to consider the evidence admitted at trial and find Mr. Merrell's conduct satisfied the statutory elements. The prosecutor did not violate a plain and equivocal rule of law by discussing the statutory elements.
[¶70] Because Mr. Merrell cannot establish the prosecutor's comments constituted plain error, the district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied his motion for a new trial based on these statements.
C. Injecting Religion and Other Themes
[¶71] Mr. Merrell asserts the prosecutor “shifted the jury's focus from statutory elements to character and narrative” when she told the jury: “You don't get to use religion, justification, grooming tactics or anything else to do what you want with a girl's body[.]” Mr. Merrell did not object to this comment below, so we apply a plain error standard of review. See Carrier, 2017 WY 88, ¶ 59, 400 P.3d at 370.
[¶72] As with his previous argument, Mr. Merrell cannot establish the prosecutor transgressed a clear and unequivocal rule of law. The prosecutor was not making an unrelated, inflammatory religious reference. Instead, the prosecutor was referring to JR's testimony that Mr. Merrell attempted to convince her the LDS church approved of young girls engaging in masturbation, and his attempts to justify his conduct by saying it was necessary to prepare JR to “fulfill the needs of [her] future husband.” This was another permissible comment on the evidence that was admitted during the trial. See Testerman, 2025 WY 58, ¶ 50, 568 P.3d at 1219.
[¶73] Because Mr. Merrell cannot show the prosecutor's statement transgressed a clear and unequivocal rule of law, the district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Mr. Merrell's motion for a new trial based on these statements.
D. Burden of Proof
[¶74] Mr. Merrell asserts the prosecutor minimized the burden of proof when she told the jury “[a]nd nowhere in there will you see that reasonable doubt equals a pause.” Mr. Merrell did not object to this comment below, so we apply a plain error standard of review. See Carrier, 2017 WY 88, ¶ 59, 400 P.3d at 370.
[¶75] It is “[a] fundamental principle in our criminal law” that “the burden of proof rests on the State and never shifts.” Dixon v. State, 2019 WY 37, ¶ 44, 438 P.3d 216, 232 (Wyo. 2019). “A prosecutor may not suggest a defendant carries any burden of proof or otherwise suggest the defendant must present certain evidence.” Id. (citations omitted). In addition, a prosecutor may explain that the State's burden of proof “is not to establish guilt to an absolute certainty.” Solis v. State, 2013 WY 152, ¶ 46, 315 P.3d 622, 632 (Wyo. 2013) (quoting Rivera v. State, 987 P.2d 678, 680 (Wyo. 1999)). However, “it is error for a prosecutor to attempt to define ‘reasonable doubt’ for the jury.” Id. (citing Blakely v. State, 542 P.2d 857, 861 (Wyo. 1975)). When viewed in light of the entire record, the prosecutor's statement in this case was not an attempt to define reasonable doubt. Instead, it was a response to remarks made in Mr. Merrell's closing argument and an attempt to direct the jury to the district court's instructions on reasonable doubt.
[¶76] In his closing argument, Mr. Merrell's counsel stated:
So going back to this determination of what beyond a reasonable doubt is. If you have to pause and it causes you to pause and think when you're thinking about the evidence before you, you've got reasonable doubt, and he needs the benefit of that, ladies and gentlemen, on each and every one of these charges, the benefit of the reasonable doubt when we have a statute that is being stretched beyond what it has normally been used for.
He went on to say:
The State has latitude to give these broad time frames, but you have latitude to demand something more specific especially when we're going to make hugs felonies. We need to have something, and I argue you need to have something more specific that has this proven beyond a reasonable doubt other than “I think.” When there's an “I think,” that's an opinion and that's an opinion that gives you time to pause.”
In response to these statements, the prosecutor made the following remarks in her rebuttal:
So again, today it is up to you. We've gotten the jury instructions, and as we've talked about many times and you can read, it says there is no specific definition for immodest, immoral, or indecent liberties with a child, rather it's the action that the common sense of society would regard as indecent and improper. Today you are the common sense of society. It further says that you take the totality of the circumstances into account in determining that. And nowhere in there will you see that reasonable doubt equals a pause. There's a reason for the jury instructions. That is the instruction.
These statements show the prosecutor did not attempt to substitute her own definition of reasonable doubt or to minimize the State's burden. Instead, the prosecutor was arguing Mr. Merrell's proposed definition of reasonable doubt was not supported by the district court's instructions.
[¶77] The prosecutor's comments did not transgress a clear and unequivocal rule of law. The district court did not abuse its discretion when it found these comments did not amount to misconduct and denied Mr. Merrell's motion for a new trial based on this statement.
VI. In the absence of error, cumulative error cannot exist.
[¶78] Mr. Merrell asserts this case involves “a trial conducted under an undefined statutory element, instructions embedding multiple distinct factual allegations within a single element, juror confusion about what conduct had to be found, admission of extra-statutory ‘grooming’ testimony, and closing argument that appealed to moral condemnation and vouched for credibility of the main witness.” He argues the cumulative effect of these errors deprived him of due process.
[¶79] “The purpose of evaluating for cumulative error is to address whether the cumulative effect of two or more individually harmless errors has the potential to prejudice the defendant to the same extent as a single reversible error.” O'Dell v. State, 2026 WY 26, ¶ 50, 584 P.3d 443, 454 (Wyo. 2026) (quoting King v. State, 2023 WY 36, ¶ 51, 527 P.3d 1229, 1246–47 (Wyo. 2023)). Because we did not find even a single instance of error here, we do not consider Mr. Merrell's cumulative error argument. See id.
CONCLUSION
[¶80] Wyoming Statute § 6-2-316(a)(iv) is not unconstitutionally vague on its face or as applied to Mr. Merrell. The State presented sufficient evidence to sustain Mr. Merrell's convictions. Mr. Merrell's right to a unanimous verdict was not violated. The district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting evidence of “grooming.” The prosecutor did not engage in misconduct during closing argument that prejudiced Mr. Merrell's right to a fair trial. Finding no error, we affirm.
FENN, Justice.
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Docket No: S-26-0015
Decided: November 13, 2026
Court: Supreme Court of Wyoming.
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