STATE EX REL STATE v. YOUNG (2026)

The State seeks a writ of prohibition based on the circuit court's dismissal of an indictment against Respondents ¹ for election-related offenses.² Specifically, the circuit court concluded that the more recently amended one-year statute of limitations generally applicable to misdemeanors under West Virginia Code § 61-11-9 applied to render the indictment untimely rather than West Virginia Code § 3-9-24, which specifically allows five years for prosecution of violations of the Election Code.³ We conclude that the language of West Virginia Code § 3-9-24 indicates it applies to misdemeanor violations of the Election Code and, as the more specific statute, should have been applied to the election offenses rather than the general misdemeanor statute of limitations found in West Virginia Code § 61-11-9. Because our precedent instructs that specific statutes prevail over general ones, the circuit court clearly erred in resorting to tenets of statutory construction only employed in the face of two statutes in irreconcilable conflict. We, therefore, grant the requested writ of prohibition.

I.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Respondents Jan Hite King and Kimberly Maynard ran for seats on the Cabell County Commission in 2022 and certified in their candidate filings on February 3, 2022, that they were residents of Cabell County's Magisterial District 1. Upon investigation, the Secretary of State's Office concluded that Ms. King resided in Magisterial District 2 and Ms. Maynard resided in Magisterial District 3; the Deputy Secretary of State and General Counsel referred the election violations for prosecution.⁴ On April 7, 2025, a Cabell County grand jury indicted Ms. King and Ms. Maynard for one count each of false swearing in violation of West Virginia Code § 3-9-3(b) (Counts 1 and 2); one count each of aiding and abetting the other to commit false swearing in violation of West Virginia Code § 3-9-3(b) (Counts 3 and 4); and one count of conspiracy in violation of West Virginia Code § 61-10-31 (Count 5).⁵ Each count of the indictment alleges misdemeanor offenses.

Respondents filed motions to dismiss the indictments, arguing that under West Virginia Code § 61-11-9, misdemeanors must be prosecuted within one year of the offense and that the April 7, 2025 indictment was returned more than one year after February 3, 2022. The State conceded that Count 5, the Chapter 61 conspiracy charge, was subject to the one-year limitation in West Virginia Code § 61-11-19 and therefore untimely, but that the remaining offenses were timely because they are governed by the five-year limitation outlined for election-specific offenses in West Virginia Code § 3-9-24. The circuit court dismissed the indictment, concluding that West Virginia Code § 3-9-24 was vague as to its application to misdemeanors and that because the two limitations periods could not be reconciled, West Virginia Code § 61-11-9 controlled because it was amended more recently than West Virginia Code § 3-9-24. This petition for a writ of prohibition followed.

II.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The State seeks a writ of prohibition under this Court's original jurisdiction, contending that the lower court exceeded its legitimate authority, issuance of which abides the well-established Hoover factors:

In determining whether to entertain and issue the writ of prohibition for cases not involving an absence of jurisdiction but only where it is claimed that the lower tribunal exceeded its legitimate powers, this Court will examine five factors: (1) whether the party seeking the writ has no other adequate means, such as direct appeal, to obtain the desired relief; (2) whether the petitioner will be damaged or prejudiced in a way that is not correctable on appeal; (3) whether the lower tribunal's order is clearly erroneous as a matter of law; (4) whether the lower tribunal's order is an oft repeated error or manifests persistent disregard for either procedural or substantive law; and (5) whether the lower tribunal's order raises new and important problems or issues of law of first impression. These factors are general guidelines that serve as a useful starting point for determining whether a discretionary writ of prohibition should issue. Although all five factors need not be satisfied, it is clear that the third factor, the existence of clear error as a matter of law, should be given substantial weight.

Syl. Pt. 4, State ex rel. Hoover v. Berger, 199 W. Va. 12, 483 S.E.2d 12 (1996). However, because the State seeks a writ of prohibition in a criminal case, we limit its issuance to particularized circumstances:

The State may seek a writ of prohibition in this Court in a criminal case where the trial court has exceeded or acted outside of its jurisdiction. Where the State claims that the trial court abused its legitimate powers, the State must demonstrate that the court's action was so flagrant that it was deprived of its right to prosecute the case or deprived of a valid conviction. In any event, the prohibition proceeding must offend neither the Double Jeopardy Clause nor the defendant's right to a speedy trial. Furthermore, the application for a writ of prohibition must be promptly presented.

Syl. Pt. 5, State v. Lewis, 188 W. Va. 85, 422 S.E.2d 807 (1992), superseded on other grounds by statute as recognized in State v. Butler, 239 W. Va. 168, 179 n.27, 799 S.E.2d 718, 729 n.27 (2017). With these standards in mind, we turn to the parties’ arguments.

III.

DISCUSSION

Here we answer the narrow question of whether misdemeanor election offenses arising under the West Virginia Election Code are governed by the five-year limitations period stated in that chapter at West Virginia Code § 3-9-24 or the one-year limitations period for misdemeanor offenses outlined in West Virginia Code § 61-11-9. The language of West Virginia Code § 3-9-24 specifically states that it governs the time frame for prosecutions of violations of the Election Code, and, as the more specific statute, should have been applied to the underlying charges that Respondents violated provisions of the Election Code.

West Virginia Code § 3-9-24 provides, “[n]o person shall be prosecuted for any crime or offense under any provision of this chapter, unless upon an indictment found and presentment made within five years after the date of the commission of the crime or offense.” Conversely, West Virginia Code § 61-11-9 provides, in relevant part, that “[a] prosecution for a misdemeanor shall be commenced within one year after the offense was committed[.]” Which of these statutes applies is dispositive because the indictment against Respondents was returned more than one year but less than five years from the date of the offenses.

In reading West Virginia Code § 3-9-24, the circuit court reasoned that it was worded in the negative to limit the timeframe for felony prosecutions to those pursued within five years rather than to extend the timeframe for misdemeanor prosecutions to five years from the one-year limitation found in West Virginia Code § 61-11-19. Concluding that the five-year Election Code statute of limitations was vague as applied to misdemeanors, the circuit court found it must be read in conjunction with § 61-11-9, with which it irreconcilably conflicts. Applying tenets of statutory construction, the court then concluded that because West Virginia Code § 61-11-9 was amended in 2002 and West Virginia Code § 3-9-24 was amended in 1978, the one-year limitation contained in the former should prevail as the most recent reflection of legislative will. See Syl. Pt. 2, Stamper by Stamper v. Kanawha Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 191 W. Va. 297, 445 S.E.2d 238 (1994) (“As a general rule of statutory construction, if several statutory provisions cannot be harmonized, controlling effect must be given to the last enactment of the Legislature.”) (citation omitted); accord Wiley v. Toppings, 210 W. Va. 173, 556 S.E.2d 818 (2001) (“When faced with two conflicting enactments, this Court and courts generally follow the black-letter principle that ‘effect should always be given to the latest ․ expression of the legislative will ․’ ”) (quoting Joseph Speidel Grocery Co. v. Warder, 56 W. Va. 602, 608, 49 S.E. 534, 536 (1904) (footnote omitted).

However, the circuit court jumped to conclusions, resigning itself to repeal of West Virginia Code § 3-9-24 by implication without first attempting to harmonize the two statutes as required by the precedent on which it relied. Both Stamper and Wiley, supra, turn to the last-in-time rule only in the face of conflicting enactments that cannot be harmonized. But the circuit court's perceived conflict was of its own making. West Virginia Code § 61-11-9 is misemployed when introduced to an analysis of election-specific offenses where the language of West Virginia Code § 3-9-24 patently demonstrates its command over violations of the Election Code.⁶

The language of West Virginia Code § 3-9-24 makes no attempt to distinguish felonies from misdemeanors and invites no confusion as to its application to election-specific misdemeanor offenses, providing a five-year statute of limitations for “any crime or offense under any provision of this chapter.” (Emphasis added). Consistent with that language, the Legislature created various election-specific offenses in Chapter 3 that carry penalties in the form of both felonies and misdemeanors. See W. Va. Code §§ 3-1-34; 3-1-36; 3-2-10; 3-2-32 to -36; 3-3-4; 3-4A-7; 3-4A-19; 3-4A-23; 3-4A-33 to -34; 3-5-23; 3-8-5d; 3-8-2; 3-8-7 to -8; 3-8-11 to -12; 3-9-1 to -23; 3-12-15. There is nothing vague about whether it applies to misdemeanors and felonies for violations of Chapter 3, specifically, when the Legislature chose the words “any crime or offense” and “any provision of this chapter.” See Syl. Pt. 2, Thomas v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 164 W. Va. 763, 266 S.E.2d 905 (1980) (“The word ‘any,’ when used in a statute, should be construed to mean any.”).

It is undisputed that Respondents were indicted for Chapter 3 misdemeanor offenses, and the State conceded that the single count not brought under Chapter 3—Count Five, for violation of West Virginia Code § 61-10-31—was appropriately dismissed as untimely because it was subject to the one-year limitation contained in Chapter 61, speaking to crimes generally. Allowing that both statutes would purport to apply to misdemeanors,⁷ it does not follow that they are in irreconcilable conflict,⁸ and courts are obligated to give effect to both, if possible. “ ‘[C]ourts are not at liberty to pick and choose among ․ [legislative] enactments, and when two statutes are capable of co-existence, it is the duty of the courts, absent a clearly expressed ․ [legislative] intention to the contrary, to regard each as effective.’ ” State v. Harris, 195 W. Va. 43, 48 n.6, 464 S.E.2d 363, 368 n.6 (1995).

“When faced with a choice between two statutes, one of which is couched in general terms and the other of which specifically speaks to the matter at hand, preference generally is accorded to the specific statute.” Newark Ins. Co. v. Brown, 218 W. Va. 346, 351, 624 S.E.2d 783, 788 (2005). “Typically, when two statutes govern a particular scenario, one being specific and one being general, the specific provision prevails.” Bowers v. Wurzburg, 205 W. Va. 450, 462, 519 S.E.2d 148, 160 (1999). See also Harris, 195 W. Va. at 47, 464 S.E.2d at 367 (“We agree with the defendant that W. Va. Code, 49-5-16(b), being a specific enactment dealing with the issue at hand, should control over the more general provision of the murder sentencing statute, W. Va. Code, 61-2-2.”). There is no basis to employ the general time limitations in Chapter 61 for a Chapter 3 offense where Chapter 3 contains its own, specific statute of limitations.⁹

Applying West Virginia Code § 3-9-24 to election-offense misdemeanors and § 61-11-9 to misdemeanors in general, is not only consistent with the statutory language and applicable tenets of statutory construction, but is buttressed by this Court's acknowledgement that “our state election code presents a comprehensive ‘code of laws for the establishment, administration and regulation of elections and election procedures in the state of West Virginia.’ ” Wells v. State ex. rel Miller, 237 W. Va. 731, 738, 791 S.E.2d 361, 368 (2016) (quoting W. Va. Code § 3-1-1).

The circuit court thus clearly erred in resorting to ill-fitting tenets of statutory construction based on the date of last amendment ¹⁰ that, in practicality, repealed West Virginia Code § 3-9-24 by implication, at least with respect to misdemeanor violations of the Election Code. “The repeal of a statute by implication is not favored, and where two statutes are in apparent conflict, the Court must, if reasonably possible, construe such statutes so as to give effect to each.” Syl. Pt. 4, State ex rel. Graney v. Sims, 144 W. Va. 72, 105 S.E.2d 886 (1958). Accord, Syl. Pt. 1, State ex rel. City of Wheeling v. Renick, 145 W. Va. 640, 116 S.E.2d 763 (1960) (“Repeal of a statute by implication is not favored in law.”). As discussed above, the statutes are not in conflict; one speaks to general crimes and the other to specific violations of the Election Code. In reading a conflict into those statutes, the circuit court took the Legislature's action in 2002 to amend West Virginia Code § 61-11-9 to mean that, from that point forward, § 61-11-9’s general one-year limitation applied to every misdemeanor in the Code, and that the Legislature simultaneously neglected to repeal West Virginia Code § 3-9-24’s specific five-year limitation for violations of the Election Code.

It is widely accepted that specific statutes prevail over general ones irrespective of the order of enactment unless it is readily apparent that the Legislature intended to repeal the specific statute by passing the general one:

[w]here one statute deals with a subject in general terms, and another deals with a part of the same subject in a more detailed way, the two should be harmonized if possible; but if there is any conflict, the latter will prevail, regardless of whether it was passed prior to the general statute, unless it appears that the legislature intended to make the general act controlling.

2B Norman J. Singer, Sutherland Statutory Construction § 51.05, at 244 (6th ed. 2000) (footnotes omitted). Our jurisprudence mirrors this view. The Court held at Syllabus Point 2 of Trumka v. Clerk of the Circuit Court of Mingo County that

“ ‘A general statute, which does not use express terms or employ words which manifest a plain intention so to do, will not repeal a former statute dealing with a particular subject, and the two statutes will operate together unless the conflict between them is so real and irreconcilable as to indicate a clear legislative purpose to repeal the former statute.’ Point 6, syllabus, Harbert v. The County Court of Harrison County, 129 W. Va. 54, [39 S.E.2d 177 (1946)].” Syllabus Point 1, Brown v. Civil Service Comm'n, 155 W. Va. 657, 186 S.E.2d 840 (1972).

175 W. Va. 371, 332 S.E.2d 826 (1985). Moreover, “To warrant the adjudication of the repeal of a statute by implication there must exist such a positive repugnancy between the statute claimed to be repealed and the subsequent enactment that they cannot, by any reasonable hypothesis, be consistently reconciled.” Syl. Pt. 2, State ex rel. Thompson v. Morton, 140 W. Va. 207, 84 S.E.2d 791 (1954).

Respondents thus ask this Court not only to set aside its precedent that specific statutes prevail over general ones, but to additionally find that the statutes are in true and irreconcilable conflict, that they are so positively repugnant to one another that we must presume a mistake on the part of the Legislature, and that repeal by implication is the only remaining option at the Court's disposal. There is simply no occasion here to prompt such drastic measures.

Accordingly, we find clear error in the circuit court's application of the general, one-year statute of limitations found in West Virginia Code § 61-11-9, to dismiss election offenses that are subject to a five-year statute of limitations under West Virginia Code § 3-9-24. The State has no adequate, alternative means to correct the error and was deprived of its right to prosecute. Concluding that the standards set forth in Lewis are satisfied and the factors in Hoover weigh in favor of extraordinary relief, we grant the petition for a writ of prohibition.

IV.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we grant the writ of prohibition to prevent enforcement of the May 1, 2025 order of the circuit court dismissing the indictment charging Respondents with violations of the Election Code.

Writ granted.

I respectfully dissent from the majority's decision and, for the reasons discussed below, I would refuse to issue the writ of prohibition in this case.

Prohibition is not warranted in this case. The lower court did not commit a “substantial, clear-cut, legal error[ ] plainly in contravention of a clear statutory, constitutional, or common law mandate․” Syl. Pt. 1, in part, Hinkle v. Black, 164 W. Va. 112, 262 S.E.2d 744 (1979) (emphasis added), superseded, in part, by statute on other grounds as stated in State ex rel. Thornhill Grp., Inc. v. King, 233 W. Va. 564, 759 S.E.2d 795 (2014). That the majority had to rely on the rules of statutory construction to construe the statutes of limitation at issue in this case belies its conclusion that the court committed clear error as a matter of law as required by syllabus point 4 of Hoover v. Berger, 199 W. Va. 12, 483 S.E.2d 12 (1996). While I agree that some of the Hoover factors may weigh in favor of the State, here – as it always does – this case turns on factor (3): “whether the lower tribunal's order is clearly erroneous as a matter of law.” Id. at 15, 483 S.E.2d at 15. As Hoover explains, “the third factor, the existence of clear error as a matter of law, should be given substantial weight.” Id.

In order to determine whether the Circuit Court of Cabell County's order below is “clearly erroneous as a matter of law,” we must, just as the lower court was compelled to do, examine two different statutes which address the same subject and which, at least in part, conflict with one another as each would be applied to the facts of this case. The statute preferred by the defendants, and upon which the lower court relied, is West Virginia Code § 61-11-9, which provides that “[a] prosecution for a misdemeanor shall be commenced within one year after the offense was committed[.]” The State, however, argues that the controlling statute is West Virginia Code § 3-9-24, which provides that “[n]o person shall be prosecuted for any crime or offense under any provision of this chapter, unless upon an indictment found and presentment made within five years after the date of the commission of the crime or offense.”

As noted by the majority, each defendant was indicted by the Cabell County Grand Jury for two election-law misdemeanors. The indictment ¹ alleges that in filing to run for office, each defendant knowingly misrepresented the magisterial district in which she resided and that each defendant aided and abetted the other in doing the same, all in violation of West Virginia Code § 3-9-3(b), which prohibits “any person making any declaration required under [the Election Code from] knowingly mak[ing] a false statement or representation therein, or [from] counsel[ing], advis[ing], aid[ing] or abet[ting] another to make such a declaration containing any false statement or representation[.]” To resolve the defendants’ motion to dismiss, the court was required to determine which of two conflicting statutes – West Virginia Code § 61-11-9 or West Virginia Code § 3-9-24 – governs the charged misdemeanor election law violations. If the one-year limitation in § 61-11-9 applies, dismissal of the indictment was manifest and proper, as the alleged February 3, 2022, offenses were not indicted until April 7, 2025; if, however, the five-year period in § 3-9-24 controls, the charges were timely and dismissal was unwarranted.

An examination of the histories of the two statutes is necessary to arrive at the correct answer to the question now laid before this Court. Our law codified at West Virginia Code § 61-11-9, requiring that “[a] prosecution for a misdemeanor shall be commenced within one year after the offense was committed[,]” is older than the State of West Virginia itself. It came to us from the mother commonwealth, and as long as there has been a State of West Virginia, our code of laws has provided a one-year statute of limitation on the prosecution of misdemeanors.² See 1847-48 Va. Acts 114 (“Prosecutions for ․ all other misdemeanors [shall be commenced] within one year next after commission of the offense or wrongful act, and not afterwards.”). It is equally important for purposes of analysis of the history of the two statutes before us that our law does not contain any generally applicable statute of limitation for the prosecution of a felony. See State v. Carrico, 189 W.Va. 40, 43, 427 S.E.2d 474, 477 (1993) (noting that “West Virginia has no statute of limitations affecting felony prosecutions.”).³

In an extraordinary session in 1908, the West Virginia Legislature passed “An Act limiting the time within which certain offenses may be punished.” 1908 W. Va. Acts 84-85. That enactment provided as follows:

Sec. 1. No prosecution shall be had for any violation of the laws concerning elections by the people, or the laws concerning offences relating to elections, or of the laws relating to the nomination of candidates for public office, unless indictment be found, or presentment made, or prosecution be begun for the offence within one year after the same was committed.

Sec. 2. All acts and parts of acts inconsistent with this act, are hereby repealed.

Id. By its clear language, this statute applied to both felonies and misdemeanors (“any violation of the laws concerning elections by the people․”). As noted above, when this statute was enacted, there was already in place a statute requiring that prosecution for any misdemeanor must be commenced within one year of the commission of the offense. The records of the Legislature do not reveal anything about its intent in 1908, but what seems obvious is that the Legislature sought to set a limitation of one year for the commencement of a prosecution of an election-law felony. As noted above, until the enactment of this statute in 1908, there was no statute of limitation applicable to the prosecution of an election-law felony, and there had already long been a statute setting one year as the time limit for commencing a prosecution of any misdemeanor.

It should also be noted that section 2 of the 1908 enactment would have had no effect upon the already-existing one-year statute of limitation on misdemeanors. The repealer language of section 2 of the 1908 act applied only to “acts and parts of acts inconsistent with” the new act. The statute already in place, requiring that prosecution of a misdemeanor be commenced within one year after commission of the offense, was not inconsistent with the new act requiring that prosecution of any election law violation be commenced within one year. If anything, it was redundant with regard to misdemeanor violations of the Election Code. In any event, we can safely say that the 1908 act did not conflict with or repeal the existing limitation for misdemeanor prosecutions.

The 1908 statute remained in place in that form from the time of its enactment until 1963. In 1963, the West Virginia Legislature enacted a comprehensive election law. 1963 W. Va. Acts 221-379. This Act repealed all of Chapter 3 of the West Virginia Code as it then existed and replaced it with a new Chapter 3, the form of which divided the chapter into ten separate articles, each with a varying number of sections. As enacted, the new statute of limitation provided that “[n]o person shall be prosecuted for any crime or offense under any provision of this chapter, unless upon an indictment found and presentment made within one year after the date of the commission of the crime or offense.” W. Va. Code § 3-9-24 (1963) (emphasis added).

Again, according to its plain terms, the limitation imposed by this section applied to both election-law felonies and misdemeanors (“any crime or offense under any provision of this chapter․”). The one-year limitation for the commencement of all prosecutions remained from the 1908 law, but the 1963 statute did make a change in the manner in which the prosecution of an election law misdemeanor could be commenced. The statute required for the first time that no one could be prosecuted for an election law offense except upon “indictment found and presentment made,” in other words upon a true bill returned by a grand jury. Article III, section 4 of the West Virginia Constitution has always required that, for a felony, a formal charge must be made by a grand jury, but our constitution does not require that a person be indicted by a grand jury when the offense charged is “cognizable by a justice,” i.e., a misdemeanor. So, while West Virginia Code § 3-9-24 (1963) did not change the temporal requirements established by the 1908 statute (one year to commence a prosecution), it did extend the constitution's grand jury protections to those persons accused of election law misdemeanors.

The 1963 enactment of West Virginia Code § 3-9-24 remained in effect until 1978, when it was amended to provide that “[n]o person shall be prosecuted for any crime or offense under any provision of this chapter, unless upon an indictment found and presentment made within five years after the date of the commission of the crime or offense. Id. (emphasis added). As seen, the 1978 amendment to this statute changed “one year” to “five years.” This version of the statute is one of the two statutes with which the lower court had to contend.

The Legislative record provides little help in seeking to ascertain exactly what the Legislature intended when it amended this section in 1978. I agree that, on its face, this statute appears to apply to both felonies and misdemeanors delineated in the Election Code. Little question may exist that the Legislature sought to extend from one year to five years the time within which the State could commence prosecution of an election law felony. This is manifest from the fact that, but for this statute, there would be no time limitation upon the commencement of a prosecution for an election-law felony. But what of misdemeanors under Chapter 3? After 1978, for the first time, this statute, as it related to misdemeanors, conflicted with West Virginia Code § 61-11-9.

When West Virginia Code § 3-9-24 was amended and re-enacted in 1978, it did not include any language like the repealing section found within the 1908 law: “All act and parts of acts inconsistent with this act, are hereby repealed.” Such language, were it part of West Virginia Code § 3-9-24, would surely help to clarify what the Legislature was seeking to do in 1978.

It is worth noting here that a general principle applied by this Court historically to its analysis of legislative enactments is that we presume that the Legislature is aware of and understands the laws that it has passed. See Syllabus, State ex rel. Berkeley County Court v. Keedy, 124 W. Va. 408, 20 S.E.2d 468 (1942) (“In the enactment of a statute, the legislature must be presumed to have acted with full knowledge of all prior statutes dealing with the same subject matter.”); State v. Hinkle, 129 W. Va. 393, 397, 41 S.E.2d 107, 109 (1946) (“The Legislature is presumed to know of the existence and the effect of its prior enactments when it passes subsequent legislation.”); Syl. Pt. 1, Duff v. Kanawha County Commission, 250 W. Va. 510, 905 S.E.2d 528 (2024) (“It is a settled principle of statutory construction that courts presume the Legislature drafts and passes statutes with full knowledge of existing law.”). This is the point at which the majority, in my opinion, misapprehends application of established principles. While the majority correctly cites applicable principles of law, it misapplies them. As noted by the majority, it is well established that “[r]epeal of a statute by implication is not favored in law.” Syl. Pt. 1, State ex rel. City of Wheeling v. Renick, 145 W. Va. 640, 116 S.E.2d 763 (1960). The majority presumes that in 1978 the Legislature intended to repeal or supersede West Virginia Code § 61-11-9, as that statute would relate thenceforth to election law misdemeanors. The only evidence to which the majority points for this proposition is the text of West Virginia Code § 3-9-24, but the text of the statute does not support this conclusion.

One does not have to dig too deeply within the West Virginia Code to find examples of statutes in which the Legislature has demonstrated that it knows how to elevate one statute's application over another's in a particular circumstance, and how to subordinate one statute to another in a particular circumstance. See W. Va. Code § 11-9-15 (1984) (limiting prosecution under the Tax Code to “three years after the offense was committed, notwithstanding any provision of this code to the contrary.”) (emphasis added); W. Va. Code § 22-1-16 (2000) (requiring the Department of Environmental Protection, “notwithstanding any provision of this code to the contrary,” to commence criminal action “within three years from the date the right to bring the ․ proceeding has accrued.”) (emphasis added); W. Va. Code § 61-5A-9(e) (1970) (requiring prosecutions for misdemeanors under the Bribery and Corrupt Practices Act to be brought within six years “[n]otwithstanding the provisions of [W. Va. Code § 61-11-9] or any other provision of law to the contrary[.]”) (emphasis added). No such language – making clear the Legislature's intention to extend the statute of limitations for election-law misdemeanors – may be found anywhere within West Virginia Code § 3-9-24. This Court must not write into a statute provisions which the Legislature could have, but did not, include. See Banker v. Banker, 196 W. Va. 535, 546-47, 474 S.E.2d 465, 476-77 (1996) (“It is not for this Court to read into [a statute] that which it does not say. Just as courts are not to eliminate through judicial interpretation words that were purposely included, we are obligated not to add to statutes something the Legislature purposely omitted.”); State v. Richards, 206 W. Va. 573, 577, 526 S.E.2d 539, 543 (1999) (“It is not the province of the courts to make or supervise legislation, and a statute may not, under the guise of interpretation, be modified, revised, amended, distorted, remodeled, or rewritten[.]”) (citation omitted); Motto v. CSX Transp., Inc., 220 W. Va. 412, 420, 647 S.E.2d 848, 856 (2007) (“Where the Legislature itself has not acted, it is improper for this Court, under the guise of statutory interpretation, to amend legislative enactments in order to judicially impose upon the Legislature a result it did not intend.”).

The majority correctly acknowledges that, if there is a conflict between statutes, the Legislature's most recent pronouncement of the law on the subject controls. However, the majority drew the wrong conclusion from its application and analysis of this principle. West Virginia Code § 3-9-24 was enacted in its current form in 1978. West Virginia Code § 61-11-9, on the other hand, was last amended and re-enacted in 2002. The majority chooses nonetheless to give effect to the older of the Legislature's enactments at the expense of the Legislature's more recent expression of the law. Of course, had the Legislature intended for West Virginia Code § 3-9-24 to be and remain controlling, even in the face of a subsequent amendment and re-enactment of West Virginia Code § 61-11-9, it need only have included a clear supersession clause, such as “notwithstanding any provision of this code to the contrary,” to indicate its intent for that statute to apply over any conflicting law, as it did in the tax, environmental protection, and bribery and corrupt practices statutes cited above.

Given the foregoing, I cannot join the majority's holding that the circuit court's ruling was “clearly erroneous as a matter of law,” the third, and most weighty, of the Hoover factors. In my opinion, the lower court reached the correct decision. Moreover, even if the lower court's decision was erroneous, it is only because a majority of this Court has now, for the first time ever, declared that the statute of limitation in the Election Code applies to misdemeanor election law offenses rather than the almost two hundred year-old misdemeanor statute of limitation found in West Virginia Code § 61-11-9. That does not constitute a “clear error of law” that would entitle the State to the extraordinary remedy of a writ of prohibition. Hoover requires that the lower court's decision be “clearly erroneous as a matter of law” in order to warrant the issuance of a writ of prohibition. Syl. Pt. 4, Hoover, 199 W. Va. at 12, 483 S.E.2d at 12. Such clear error is not present here.

We must be mindful that the circumstances under which the State of West Virginia may seek a writ of prohibition involving a criminal defendant are quite limited: only “where the trial court has exceeded or acted outside of its jurisdiction.” Syl. Pt. 5, in part, State v. Lewis, 188 W. Va. 85, 422 S.E.2d 807 (1992), superseded on other grounds by statute as recognized in State v. Butler, 239 W. Va. 168, 179 n.27, 799 S.E.2d 718, 729 n.27 (2017). Because a writ of prohibition is an extraordinary remedy available to the State only in narrowly defined circumstances, strict adherence to its substantive prerequisites is essential. Here, I believe that the circuit court committed no clear error of law; accordingly, the petition should be denied.

Therefore, for the reasons stated above, I respectfully dissent.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Respondent Kimberly Maynard did not file a brief or otherwise participate in the proceedings before this Court.

2.   We acknowledge the contribution of amicus curiae, the West Virginia Secretary of State, who filed a brief in this case. We value amicus participation and consider its brief in conjunction with the parties’ arguments.

3.   The Election Code is found in Chapter 3 of the West Virginia Code. West Virginia Code § 3-1-1 provides “[t]his chapter shall constitute and may be cited as the ‘West Virginia Election Code’ and contemplates and comprehends a code of laws for the establishment, administration and regulation of elections and election procedures in the State of West Virginia.”

4.   West Virginia Code § 3-1A-6(c) tasks the Secretary of State with “investigat[ing] the administration of election laws, frauds and irregularities in any registration or election” and “report[ing] violations of election laws to the appropriate prosecuting officials[.]” Because our analysis is limited to legal issues of statutory construction, the details of the underlying investigation and delay in prosecution are unnecessary to our review except insofar as the prosecution was commenced more than one year, but less than five years, from February 3, 2022.

5.   Respondent King's brief argued that the State lacked standing to pursue a writ of prohibition before this Court for lack of prosecutorial authority below. This Court directed the State to address standing in a reply brief. The reply brief and supplemental appendix demonstrated that the West Virginia Prosecuting Attorney Institute had erroneously informed Respondent that Seth Gaskins had not been properly appointed as special prosecutor; as a result, Respondent withdrew the standing challenge at oral argument. Given that standing is apparent from the record and now undisputed, we find it unnecessary to further address the issue.

6.   We distinguish the statutory choice-of-application analysis here with that for harmonization of statutes read in pari materia, that is, because they relate to the same subject-matter. As this Court explained in Manchin v. Dunfee, 174 W. Va. 532, 536, 327 S.E.2d 710, 714 (1984), it is an oversimplification of the rule to conclude that because statutes relate to the same subject, they must always be read in pari materia. The obligation to read statutes together under that tenet of statutory construction is premised on a conclusion that the statute at issue is ambiguous and its clarity ascertained by analyzing another statute with which it was intended to operate. Syl. Pt. 1, State v. Epperly, 135 W. Va. 877, 65 S.E.2d 488 (1951) (“The rule that statutes which relate to the same subject should be read and construed together is a rule of statutory construction and does not apply to a statutory provision which is clear and unambiguous.”). In any case, “a related statute cannot be utilized to create doubt in an otherwise clear statute.” Manchin, 174 W. Va. at 536, 327 S.E.2d at 714.

7.   Respondent King makes a slightly different argument on appeal than that advanced in the circuit court, that is, that West Virginia Code § 61-11-9 is actually the more specific provision because West Virginia Code § 3-9-24 applies to both felonies and misdemeanors and West Virginia Code § 61-11-9 only applies to misdemeanors. In addition to being inconsistent with its argument that § 3-9-24 was intended only to apply to felonies based on its verbiage, that argument also ignores that the Election Code further specifies the type of misdemeanors to which it applies and so is still the more specific of the two. We further find Respondent's reliance on State v. Leonard is misplaced. 209 W. Va. 98, 543 S.E.2d 655 (2000). While Leonard states that West Virginia Code § 61-11-19 is “a specific statute of limitation for misdemeanors,” the Court's use of the word “specific” was not in the context of a statutory construction analysis of general and specific statutes, nor intended to imply that it would necessarily override other statutes not then before the Court. See id. at 101, 543 S.E.2d at 658.

8.   In State v. Schober, this Court recently explained that “[s]tatutes generally conflict when they ‘ “are explicitly contrary to, or inconsistent with, each other.” ’ Off. of Hawaiian Affs. v. Kondo, 153 Hawai'i 170, 528 P.3d 243, 251 (2023) (quoting Boyd v. Haw. State Ethics Comm'n, 138 Hawai'i 218, 378 P.3d 934, 943 (2016)).” 251 W. Va. 34, 41, 909 S.E.2d 69, 76 (2024).

9.   Respondent's argument is also based in large part on the Secretary of State's policies that they contend demonstrate that the Secretary of State views West Virginia Code § 61-11-9 as the controlling provision for misdemeanors, even for violations of the Election Code. The Secretary of State's amicus brief indicates that the policy manual was amended and that, in practice, it pursues prosecution of misdemeanor Election Code violations beyond the one-year limitation of West Virginia Code § 61-11-9. Because we find that the language of West Virginia Code § 3-9-24 provides a straightforward answer to which statute prevails, we need not address either argument relative to policies and practices of the Secretary of State.

10.   Though not pertinent to our analysis insofar as we find error in application of the last-enacted tenet of statutory construction, we note for the sake of clarity that amendments are distinguishable from enactments. The circuit court took the date of amendment as dispositive without looking to what had been amended. The Election Code and West Virginia Code § 61-11-9 co-existed with a one-year statute of limitations until 1978 when the Election Code was amended from a one-year limitations period to the now-existing five-year limitation period. In 2002, West Virginia Code § 61-11-9 was amended to change the statute of limitations for petit larceny from three years to one year.Prior to 2002, West Virginia Code § 61-11-9 provided that misdemeanors were generally subject to a one-year statute of limitations save for those for perjury and petit larceny, both of which permitted three years for prosecution. See W. Va. Code § 61-11-9 (1923). The 2002 amendments reflect that the Legislature struck the exception for petit larceny, which Respondent takes to mean that the Legislature sought a flat one-year statute of limitations for all misdemeanors as a matter of policy, but there is nothing in the bill's history that bears out that legislative purpose. Instead, it reflects that petit larceny was changed to a one-year statute of limitations because the provision related to form language for an indictment for petit larceny, West Virginia Code § 62-9-10, already provided for one year and the Legislature clocked the inconsistent provisions. See H.B. 4044, 75th Leg. Reg. Sess. (W. Va. 2002).

1.   Both defendants were charged together in a single indictment setting forth four counts of election law misdemeanors, two counts against each defendant, as well as a count charging both defendants with conspiracy. The conspiracy charge, like the other four charges, was dismissed by the circuit court as being outside the statute of limitations for the prosecution of misdemeanors established by West Virginia Code § 61-11-9. The State did not seek prohibition of the lower court's dismissal of the conspiracy charge.

2.   As discussed below, the Legislature has created some statutory exceptions to the one-year statute of limitation on the prosecution of misdemeanors.

3.   There are some statutory exceptions to the rule that there is no statute of limitation for the prosecution of a felony in West Virginia. Indeed, one of the statutes under examination in this case contains one such limitation. West Virginia Code § 61-11-9 provides, in a part immaterial to this case, that “[a] prosecution for committing or procuring another person to commit perjury shall be commenced within three years next after the perjury was committed.” Perjury is a felony. See W. Va. Code §§ 61-5-1 and 61-5-3.

BUNN, Chief Justice:

JUSTICE TRUMP dissents and reserves the right to file a separate opinion.