IN RE: the Personal Restraint Petition of Amandhla WASHINGTON (2004)

RULING DENYING REVIEW

Amandhla Washington is currently serving a prison term for possession of a controlled substance.   Arguing that the Department of Corrections is denying him his right to earn up to 50 percent of his sentence in early release credits pursuant to RCW 9.94A.728(1)(b), Mr. Washington filed a personal restraint petition in Division Two of the Court of Appeals.   In a published order, a panel of judges of the Court of Appeals denied the petition, holding that a prior gross misdemeanor violation of a domestic violence protection order disqualified Mr. Washington from the 50-percent credit.  In re Washington, 125 Wash.App. 506, 106 P.3d 763 (2004).   Mr. Washington now seeks this court's discretionary review.  RAP 16.13(c);  RAP 13.5.

Certain offenders may earn up to 50 percent of their sentences in early release credits.  RCW 9.94A.728(1)(b).  An offender is disqualified, however, if he or she has a prior conviction for a sex offense, a violent offense, a “crime against persons as defined in RCW 9.94A.411,” a “felony that is domestic violence as defined in RCW 10.99.020,” residential burglary, or certain drug offenses.  RCW 9.94A.728(1)(b)(ii)(C).  The term “crime against persons” includes violation of a domestic violence court order.  RCW 9.94A.411(2)(a).   Mr. Washington has a prior conviction for gross misdemeanor violation of a domestic violence protection order.   Thus, the Department of Corrections considers him ineligible for the 50-percent credit.

But Mr. Washington points out that the term “domestic violence” also includes violation of a protection order.   See RCW 10.99.020(3)(r).  And since the statute on its face disqualifies those with prior “felony” domestic violence convictions, Mr. Washington reasons his gross misdemeanor violation of a protection order does not disqualify him.   He urges that the express reference to “felony” domestic violence convictions implies exclusion of misdemeanor violations.   Further, he contends that to read the term “crimes against persons” to include misdemeanor protection order violations would render meaningless the specific provision regarding “felony” domestic violence convictions.

The Court of Appeals properly rejected this argument.   The fact that there may be overlap between categories of disqualifying convictions does not render any one of the categories meaningless or imply the exclusion of crimes appearing in one category but not another.   Indeed, RCW 9.94A.728(1)(b)(ii)(C) is replete with overlap.   For instance, the statute expressly lists as disqualifying crimes “sex offenses” and “violent offenses,” yet the terms “crimes against persons” and “domestic violence” include many sex and violent offenses.   See RCW 9.94A.030(28) (sex offenses);  RCW 9.94A.030(45) (violent offenses);  RCW 9.94A.411(2)(a) (crimes against persons);  RCW 10.99.020(3) (domestic violence offenses).   And the terms “crimes against persons” and “domestic violence” have many crimes in common as well.   It does not follow that the express inclusion of “felony domestic violence” crimes on the list of disqualifying offenses necessarily excludes all misdemeanor “crimes against persons” that also constitute domestic violence crimes.

In short, Mr. Washington does not show the Court of Appeals obviously or probably erred in its statutory interpretation.   The motion for discretionary review is therefore denied.

/s/ Geoffrey Crooks

Commissioner