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The STATE of Washington, Respondent, v. Moses WIGGINS, III, Appellant.
OPINION PUBLISHED IN PART
¶1 Moses Wiggins III appeals his conviction for felony murder in the first degree predicated on attempted or completed robbery. In the published portion of this opinion, we hold that the superior court properly declined to instruct the jury on self-defense for this count, because Wiggins's criminal liability was based on his attempting to unlawfully take personal property by force, which is a purpose for which the law does not authorize the use of force. See RCW 9A.16.020; RCW 9A.16.050. We further hold that felony murder in the first degree under RCW 9A.32.030(1)(c) predicated on attempted or completed robbery is not an alternative means crime. As a result, and because in the unpublished portion of this opinion we reject Wiggins's remaining assignments of error, we affirm.
I
A
¶2 Up until March 2021, Wiggins and Waheed Rashid were friendly with each other. According to Wiggins and Kathleen Kroegel, Rashid's girlfriend, Wiggins and Rashid's relationship changed when Wiggins found an automotive part he asked Rashid to sell. Kroegel and Wiggins testified Rashid sold the auto part, but Wiggins did not receive all the proceeds from the sale, and Wiggins testified Rashid did not give Wiggins what he felt was his share. Following the sale, Wiggins would ask Rashid about the money when he came across Rashid near where they lived.
¶3 The dispute between Wiggins and Rashid escalated and began to involve Kroegel and Ariana West, who was dating Wiggins at the time. Wiggins described an incident between Rashid and him, where Rashid threatened Wiggins's unborn child that West was carrying. Wiggins and Kroegel testified one incident involved West taking Kroegel's phone and spraying Kroegel with bear mace while Wiggins stood nearby. They testified that another incident between West and Kroegel involved West hitting Kroegel with a hammer while Wiggins stood nearby. During this incident, West asked for Wiggins's gun, which Wiggins denied having.
¶4 Wiggins testified that a few weeks after Wiggins's son was born in June 2021, Rashid sprayed bear mace at Wiggins and swung a crowbar at him. Wiggins testified that, about a month and a half later, Rashid pointed a gun at Wiggins and said he was going to kill Wiggins. Wiggins testified he did not own a gun at that time, and after that incident he purchased a gun off the street.
¶5 Wiggins and Rashid would communicate with each other through West's Facebook account. Rashid sent voice memos in which Rashid used graphic language. Wiggins felt Rashid's threats in these memos were not idle threats. He also learned from an individual he had known for a long time that at some time before the shooting Rashid wanted to set Wiggins up over the issue between them.
B
¶6 Wiggins testified that he was walking through the apartment complex near where he stayed the night before when he came upon Rashid, who was about 15 feet away from a black car. Wiggins asked Rashid, “[W]hen are you going to come out of your pockets and pay me my money?” Wiggins said he had his gun in his pocket but did not draw it. Rashid responded that he had no money on him and that “you're going to have to kill me.” Wiggins testified that Rashid got into his car and started drawing a pistol while still facing Wiggins straight on. Wiggins testified he began drawing his gun at the same time and fired once on Rashid. Wiggins testified he saw the driver in Rashid's car but did not shoot him because he did not feel the driver was a threat.
¶7 Ernesto Rojas-Renteria testified he knew who Wiggins was and was familiar with the apartment complex. On the day of the shooting, Rojas pulled in near the black car to wait for someone. Rojas testified that he heard “somebody trying to tell somebody to, like, come out of your pockets, and somebody responding ․, you're going to have to kill me if you want something” or “you [are] going to have to kill me because I don't have nothing.” Rojas recognized the second speaker's voice as Rashid's but never saw Wiggins. Rojas heard a gunshot “[r]ight after” these words. After hearing the gunshot, Rojas saw Wiggins coming up towards his vehicle, and Rojas left.
¶8 Soon after the shooting, the driver drove off with Rashid in the car. While driving, the driver called Taef Khazal and told him Rashid had been shot. Khazal testified the driver of the black car was Cesar Oliveros. Khazal testified that during the initial call, Oliveros parked the car, called him back via Facetime, and showed him Rashid's bullet wound. Khazal told Oliveros to hang up and call 911.
¶9 A responding officer found Rashid in the passenger side of the black car with a bullet wound and began rendering aid. Rashid was pronounced dead after 20 to 30 minutes of aid had been provided, and an associate medical examiner confirmed Rashid's death was caused by a gunshot wound. Responding officers found knives in Oliveros's car but did not find a gun either in the car or at the apartment complex. At least one officer walked from site to site but did not search the bushes and shrubbery between the area of the shooting and the parking lot for a firearm.
¶10 Wiggins was arrested on January 30, 2022, and gave a statement in which he denied shooting Rashid.
C
¶11 The State charged Wiggins with felony murder in the first degree predicated on robbery or attempted robbery in either the first or second degree (count 1), felony murder in the second degree predicated on assault or attempted assault in the second degree (count 2), and unlawful possession of a firearm in the second degree (count 3). As it would later argue at trial, the State's theory was that Wiggins intended to rob Rashid by displaying his gun, and then Wiggins shot Rashid in the course of the robbery.
¶12 In his trial brief, Wiggins argued self-defense, arguing that because Rashid had threatened and assaulted Wiggins in the past, Wiggins reasonably believed on the day of the shooting Rashid was reaching for a gun. Wiggins further argued that because the State charged him with felony murder predicated on attempted robbery, which he described as an alternative means crime, the State had to prove specific intent to use unlawful force, which he asserted self-defense would negate. The State argued the intent of robbery is to deprive another of their property, which self-defense would not negate. The State also argued there was a factual dispute about whether Wiggins intended to commit robbery rather than acting in self-defense. The court ruled Wiggins would not be able to argue self-defense to count 1, felony murder predicated on either completed or attempted robbery, but could argue it on count 2, felony murder predicated on assault.
¶13 The jury found Wiggins guilty on counts 1 and 2. The court found Wiggins guilty in a bifurcated trial on count 3. The court sentenced Wiggins to 240 months on count 1 and 57 months on count 3, to run concurrently. The court did not sentence Wiggins on count 2, and based on the parties’ stipulation, vacated Wiggins's conviction on count 2 on double jeopardy grounds. Wiggins appeals.
II
¶14 Wiggins argues the trial court erred in prohibiting him from asserting self-defense to count 1. We disagree.
¶15 Review of whether a defendant has been denied their constitutional right to present a defense is de novo. State v. Spokane County Dist. Ct., 198 Wash.2d 1, 12, 491 P.3d 119 (2021). “ ‘A defendant's right to an opportunity to be heard in his defense, including the rights to examine witnesses against him and to offer testimony, is basic in our system of jurisprudence.’ ” Id. at 12, 491 P.3d 119 (quoting State v. Jones, 168 Wash.2d 713, 720, 230 P.3d 576 (2010)).
¶16 On count 1, Wiggins was charged with felony murder in the first degree “while committing and attempting to commit the crime of [r]obbery in the [f]irst [d]egree and [r]obbery in the [s]econd degree.” Washington law defines murder in the first degree in relevant part as follows:
A person is guilty of murder in the first degree when:
(a) With a premeditated intent to cause the death of another person, he or she causes the death of such person or of a third person; or
(b) Under circumstances manifesting an extreme indifference to human life, he or she engages in conduct which creates a grave risk of death to any person, and thereby causes the death of a person; or
(c) He or she commits or attempts to commit the crime of either (1) robbery in the first or second degree, (2) rape in the first or second degree, (3) burglary in the first degree, (4) arson in the first or second degree, or (5) kidnapping in the first or second degree, and in the course of or in furtherance of such crime or in immediate flight therefrom, he or she, or another participant, causes the death of a person other than one of the participants.
RCW 9A.32.030(1) (emphasis added). Under RCW 9A.32.030(1)(c), if a death occurs in the attempt, commission of, or fleeing from one of the enumerated crimes, it is unnecessary for the State to prove that the person who kills another did so with malice, design, or premeditation. State v. Dennison, 115 Wash.2d 609, 615, 801 P.2d 193 (1990). The state of mind of a defendant at the time of the killing is not an element of the crime of felony murder. State v. Craig, 82 Wash.2d 777, 781, 514 P.2d 151 (1973). Generally,
[i]n order to obtain a conviction of first degree felony murder, the State need not prove that the defendant intended to kill the victim. It need show only that the defendant intended to commit the underlying felony and that in the course of, in furtherance of, or in immediate flight therefrom, the defendant caused the death of a person other than one of the participants.
In re Pers. Restraint of Richey, 162 Wash.2d 865, 869, 175 P.3d 585 (2008).
¶17 In relevant part, a person commits robbery when he or she unlawfully takes personal property from the person of another or in his or her presence against his or her will by the use or threatened use of immediate force, violence, or fear of injury to that person or his or her property or the person or property of anyone. RCW 9A.56.190.1 Intent to unlawfully take personal property is an essential element of robbery. See State v. Kjorsvik, 117 Wash.2d 93, 98, 812 P.2d 86 (1991). “An attempt crime contains two elements: intent to commit a specific crime and taking a substantial step toward the commission of that crime.” State v. DeRyke, 149 Wash.2d 906, 910, 73 P.3d 1000 (2003).
¶18 The court instructed the jury that to convict Wiggins on count 1, there needed to be proof that, among other elements, Wiggins committed or attempted to commit robbery, which the court defined as occurring when a person unlawfully and with intent to commit theft thereof takes personal property by the use of force in terms paralleling the statutory definition of robbery in RCW 9A.56.190. Wiggins argues that denying him self-defense to count 1 prevented him from putting on a consistent theory of defense. He says his defense was that “the force he used was lawful under the circumstances,” and that the trial court erred when it “artificially and inaccurately treated the force used in the context of an alleged attempted first degree robbery as categorically distinct from force used for self-protection.” We disagree.
¶19 For the jury to find Wiggins guilty of felony murder, the jury needed to find that Wiggins committed or attempted to commit robbery, and to find that, the jury needed to find that Wiggins intended to unlawfully take personal property from Rashid. This was reflected in instruction 11, which stated that a person commits the crime of robbery when the person unlawfully and with intent to commit theft thereof takes personal property from the person or in the presence of another, among other elements. The jury would have needed to find Wiggins not guilty of felony murder if it did not conclude Wiggins had the intent to unlawfully take personal property at the time of his interacting with Rashid, for in that case no robbery or attempted robbery would have occurred. On count 1, Wiggins did not face criminal liability for defending himself, but only for using force to unlawfully take personal property.
¶20 The legislature has identified situations in which use of force is lawful and has specified when use of deadly force may be justified. RCW 9A.16.020 (lawful use of force); RCW 9A.16.050 (justifiable homicide). Use of force may be lawful when used by a person about to be injured or preventing or attempting to prevent an offense against them, but the force must not be more than necessary. RCW 9A.16.020(3). Homicide is justifiable when committed in the lawful defense of oneself when there is reasonable ground to apprehend the deceased's plan to imminently commit a felony or cause great personal injury to the defendant. RCW 9A.16.050; see State v. Bogdanov, 27 Wash. App. 2d 603, 619, 532 P.3d 1035 (2023) (justifiable homicide defense in cases of conduct threatening life or great bodily harm). Neither statute authorizes the use of force to unlawfully take personal property, which remains a criminal act.
¶21 In State v. Acosta, the court analyzed who has the burden of proof on the issue of self-defense in a criminal case. 101 Wash.2d 612, 615, 683 P.2d 1069 (1984). The court reasoned that because self-defense is a lawful act, one acting in self-defense cannot “be aware of facts or circumstances ‘described by a statute defining an offense.’ ” Id. at 616, 683 P.2d 1069 (quoting RCW 9A.08.010(1)(b)(i) (defining criminal culpability based on “knowledge”)). Thus, the presence of self-defense negates an element of the crime, and the State is required to disprove the lawful use of force as self-defense in order to prove that the defendant acted unlawfully. Id. However, while self-defense has the effect of negating the mens rea element when self-defense is present, the reason self-defense is available is that the law has authorized the lawful use of force in those cases. RCW 9A.16.020, .030. The authorization for the lawful use of force does not extend to using force to unlawfully take personal property. To the contrary, the code sections proscribing robbery make the use of force for that purpose criminal.
¶22 This shows why Wiggins's argument based on the principle explained in Acosta does not work. Wiggins focuses on State v. Lewis, 156 Wash. App. 230, 238, 233 P.3d 891 (2010). There, rejecting a claim of self-defense in a robbery case, we distinguished authority involving a charge of assault, explaining that self-defense would negate the intent element. Id. at 238-39, 233 P.3d 891. In contrast, because the crime of robbery in that case had no element of intent to inflict bodily injury, but included actual infliction of bodily injury as an element, self-defense “fail[ed] to negate a corresponding intent element of the crime of robbery.” Id. at 239, 233 P.3d 891. Wiggins argues that in his case, in contrast, where the State relied on attempted robbery, it was required to prove an intent element. Wiggins implies that, unlike in Lewis, in his case there was an intent element that self-defense would negate. But even though there was an intent element in this case, it was not one that self-defense would negate. If, as the State was required to prove to convict, Wiggins used force with intent to unlawfully take personal property from Rashid, Wiggins's use of force was not an authorized, lawful use of force and, with the balance of the elements proved as well, he committed or attempted to commit robbery. The trial court correctly declined to instruct the jury on self-defense to the charge of felony murder predicated on attempted or completed robbery.
III
¶23 Wiggins argues his right to a unanimous jury verdict was violated because felony murder predicated on attempted or completed robbery presents alternative means crimes, and the State did not present sufficient evidence of each. We conclude that felony murder predicated on attempted or completed robbery is not an alternative means crime.
¶24 We review whether a statutory offense constitutes an alternative means crime de novo. State v. Buck, 6 Wash.2d 524, 528, 588 P.3d 1071 (2026). The Washington Constitution affords criminal defendants the right to a unanimous jury verdict. State v. Woodlyn, 188 Wash.2d 157, 162-63, 392 P.3d 1062 (2017) (citing Const. art. I, § 21). “ ‘Alternative means crimes’ are offenses in which the proscribed criminal conduct may be proved in multiple ways.” Buck, 6 Wash.3d at 528, 588 P.3d 1071 (quoting State v. Smith, 159 Wash.2d 778, 784, 154 P.3d 873 (2007)). “In these cases, ‘an expression of jury unanimity is not required provided each alternative means presented to the jury is supported by sufficient evidence.’ ” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting State v. Barboza-Cortes, 194 Wash.2d 639, 643, 451 P.3d 707 (2019)). “If insufficient evidence supports one or more of the alternative means presented to the jury, the conviction will not be affirmed.” Id.
¶25 This inquiry asks whether the statutory language describes distinct or similar acts. Id. at 529, 588 P.3d 1071. We will analyze a challenge to unanimity only if the statute creates alternative means. Id. at 528-29, 588 P.3d 1071. The legislature has not defined what an alternative means crime is or which crimes constitute alternative means offenses, and we review each case on its own merits. Id. at 529, 588 P.3d 1071.
¶26 Where the statute or provision describes distinct acts, each act more likely is a separate means and a separate crime. Id. However, if the statute or provision provides different definitions or descriptions of one criminal act, then the act is a single means and a single crime. Id. Simply structuring a statute into subsections or using the disjunctive word “or” does not create an alternative means crime. State v. Sandholm, 184 Wash.2d 726, 734, 364 P.3d 87 (2015). When a statute describes only minor nuances inhering in the same act, the various alternatives are facets of the same criminal conduct. Buck, 6 Wash.3d at 529, 588 P.3d 1071.
¶27 To determine whether charged acts are distinct or similar, courts consider factors which include “ ‘[1] the title of the [statutory] act; [2] whether there is a readily perceivable connection between the various acts set forth; [3] whether the acts are consistent with and not repugnant to each other; [4] and whether the acts may inhere in the same transaction.’ ” Id. at 529-30, 588 P.3d 1071 (alterations in original) (quoting State v. Shoop, 1 Wash.3d 532, 538-39, 528 P.3d 363 (2023)). The alternative means doctrine may not apply where the alternatives involved may be characterized as a “ ‘means within [a] means.’ ” State v. Smith, 159 Wash.2d at 783, 154 P.3d 873 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting In re Pers. Restraint of Jeffries, 110 Wash.2d 326, 339, 752 P.2d 1338 (1988) (concluding the use of the word “or” did not sufficiently identify alternative means of alternative aggravating circumstances)).
¶28 Here, felony murder predicated on either attempted or completed robbery describes similar, not distinct, acts.
¶29 First, the first degree murder statute defines the crime as capable of being committed in three ways, the last of which, RCW 9A.32.030(1)(c), is felony murder. While, as noted below, this court has treated felony murder predicated on different predicate felonies as presenting alternative means, the title of the statutory act at least points away from Wiggins's argument. The statutory text also indicates an enumerated felony and its attempt are similar acts. The first degree murder statute defines the felony murder prong as being met when the defendant “commits or attempts to commit” any of the listed felonies. RCW 9A.32.030(1)(c). This implies that attempting or completing one of the felonies are similar acts, which comports with the principle of felony murder to attach strict liability for deaths resulting in the course of certain felonies. See State v. Leech, 114 Wash.2d 700, 708, 790 P.2d 160 (1990) (“The purpose of the felony murder rule is to deter felons from killing negligently or accidentally by holding them strictly responsible for killings they commit.”).
¶30 Second, although attempt is an inchoate offense governed by statute separate from first degree felony murder and robbery, the perceivable connection between attempted and completed robbery does not support a conclusion they are alternative means. Courts analyze perceivable connection by determining whether “with each of the enumerated means ‘the result to be accomplished is the same, each having the common object as defined by the statute.’ ” State v. Arndt, 87 Wash.2d 374, 381, 553 P.2d 1328 (1976) (quoting State v. Hennessy, 114 Wash. 351, 357, 195 P. 211 (1921)). “A person acts with intent or intentionally when he or she acts with the objective or purpose to accomplish a result which constitutes a crime.” RCW 9A.08.010(1)(a). The essential element of robbery is the intent to unlawfully take personal property. See Kjorsvik, 117 Wash.2d at 98, 812 P.2d 86. Because intent to commit a specific crime is an element of attempt, DeRyke, 149 Wash.2d at 910, 73 P.3d 1000, an element of attempted robbery is the intent to commit robbery. For purposes of RCW 9A.32.030(1), the underlying felonies of attempted and completed robbery each has the common object of intending to unlawfully take personal property from another by force.
¶31 Third, the elements of first degree felony murder support that attempted robbery and robbery are consistent with and not repugnant to each other. The elements of first degree felony murder predicated on robbery are “(1) a homicide; (2) committed ‘in the course of or in furtherance of ․ or in immediate flight’ from a robbery.” State v. Bottrell, 103 Wash. App. 706, 718, 14 P.3d 164 (2000) (quoting RCW 9A.32.030(1)(c)). Although the predicate felony is an element of the felony murder degree charge, the defendant is not actually charged with the predicate felony. State v. Kosewicz, 174 Wash.2d 683, 691-92, 278 P.3d 184 (2012). Thus, the essential elements of the predicate felony are not essential elements of felony murder, and only the mental state is imported. Id. at 692, 278 P.3d 184. To the extent the elements differ, the differences do not suggest distinct criminal acts. See State v. Burnett, 37 Wash.2d 619, 621, 225 P.2d 416 (1950) (upholding conviction for first degree felony murder where there was insufficient evidence of completed robbery but sufficient evidence of attempted robbery).
¶32 Fourth, attempted and completed robbery may inhere in the same transaction for felony murder. A homicide is deemed committed during the perpetration of a felony if there was close proximity in terms of time and distance between the homicide and the felony. Leech, 114 Wash.2d at 706, 790 P.2d 160. RCW 10.61.003 provides that “[u]pon an indictment or information for an offense consisting of different degrees, the jury may find the defendant not guilty of the degree charged in the indictment or information, and guilty of any degree inferior thereto, or of an attempt to commit the offense.”
¶33 Based on the four Arndt factors, we hold that felony murder in the first degree under RCW 9A.32.030(1)(c) predicated on attempted or completed robbery is not an alternative means crime. This court has previously applied an alternative means analysis requiring sufficient evidence of each alternative means when felony murder is predicated on different underlying felonies. State v. Maupin, 63 Wash. App. 887, 892-94, 892, 822 P.2d 355 (1992) (applying the alternative means analysis to separately enumerated felonies for felony murder predicated on second degree kidnapping and first degree rape or attempted rape). In concluding that count 1 in this case did not present an alternative means crime, we do not consider the question presented in Maupin, and therefore we also do not question its analysis of felony murder predicated on different felonies. But since count 1 in this case did not present an alternative means crime, it was not necessary that the State present sufficient evidence of completed robbery in addition to attempted robbery. As a result, and because we find no error in the balance of Wiggins's assertions on appeal, we affirm.
¶34 We have determined that the remainder of this opinion has no precedential value. Therefore, it will be filed for public record in accordance with the rules governing unpublished opinions. See RCW 2.06.040.
IV
¶35 Wiggins argues there was insufficient evidence to support a conviction for count 1. We disagree.
¶36 The Due Process Clause protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged. State v. Zghair, 4 Wash.3d 610, 619, 567 P.3d 1 (2025). Thus, the sufficiency of the evidence is a question of constitutional law that this court reviews de novo. Id. We ask whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State. Id. at 619-20, 567 P.3d 1. “ ‘[T]he factfinder's role as weigher of the evidence is preserved through a legal conclusion that upon judicial review all of the evidence is to be considered in the light most favorable to the prosecution.’ ” Id. at 620, 567 P.3d 1 (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560 (1979)). Circumstantial and direct evidence are equally reliable, and inferences based on circumstantial evidence must be reasonable, not based on speculation. Id. Credibility determinations are not subject to review. Id.
¶37 A person may be guilty of felony murder where they commit or attempt to commit specified crimes, including robbery in the first or second degree. RCW 9A.32.030(1)(c)(1). Because robbery and attempted robbery are not alternative means crimes, the State did not need to present sufficient evidence of both robbery and attempted robbery for the jury to return a unanimous verdict on count 1. See Smith, 159 Wash.2d at 783, 154 P.3d 873 (concluding that where the alternative means analysis results in “ ‘means within [a] means’ ” alternatives, the constitutional right to a unanimous jury verdict is not implicated (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting In re Pers. Restraint of Jeffries, 110 Wash.2d 326, 339, 752 P.2d 1338 (1988))).
¶38 Here, there was sufficient evidence presented at trial for the jury to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt Wiggins shot and killed Rashid during an attempted robbery. Wiggins and Rashid had been disputing the sale of an auto part. Wiggins testified he approached Rashid in the apartment complex yard with a firearm in his pocket and asked Rashid about the money Rashid allegedly owed Wiggins. Rashid said he had no money and Wiggins would have to kill him. Rojas testified that “[r]ight after” hearing those words, he heard a gunshot. Wiggins testified he shot Rashid once. The medical examiner testified Rashid's cause of death was from a gunshot wound to the chest. The court instructed the jury it could convict if it found Wiggins guilty of either robbery or attempted robbery. There was sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude that Wiggins intended to unlawfully take personal property from Rashid and that he killed Rashid during the attempted robbery.
V
¶39 Wiggins argues the prosecutor abused their charging discretion by charging him with felony murder based on robbery and such a charging decision precluded him from meaningfully presenting a defense. We disagree.
¶40 As a member of the executive branch, the prosecutor is vested with the decision to determine and file appropriate charges. State v. Rice, 159 Wash. App. 545, 560, 246 P.3d 234 (2011), aff'd on other grounds, 174 Wash.2d 884, 279 P.3d 849 (2012). A prosecutor has wide discretion to charge or not to charge a suspect. State v. Pettitt, 93 Wash.2d 288, 294, 609 P.2d 1364 (1980). “Crimes against persons will be filed if sufficient admissible evidence exists, which, when considered with the most plausible, reasonably foreseeable defense that could be raised under the evidence, would justify convictions by a reasonable and objective fact finder.” RCW 9.94A.411(2)(a) (outlining standards for prosecutors to bring charges).
¶41 For the proposition that the prosecutor's charging scheme of felony murder is disparate treatment and thus an abuse of discretion, Wiggins cites State v. Blake, 197 Wash.2d 170, 481 P.3d 521 (2021). In Blake, the Supreme Court acknowledged criminalizing passive and innocent nonconduct can place unfettered discretion in the hands of police officers, making people who might look suspicious to the police become future criminals, and risks violating other constitutional protections. Id. at 182 & n.10, 481 P.3d 521. However, first degree robbery is not passive and innocent nonconduct because it requires the defendant intend to unlawfully take personal property from another by force. Cf. id. at 180, 481 P.3d 521 (concluding Washington's strict liability drug possession statute criminalized passive and innocent nonconduct because the statute did not require a knowledge element and was insufficient to the objective of regulating drugs).
¶42 Wiggins does not cite any authority for the proposition that a prosecutor's decision to charge felony murder based on robbery where the defendant has a firearm at the time of the shooting, asks for money, and then shoots the decedent is an abuse of prosecutorial discretion. We conclude the prosecutor did not abuse their discretion.
VI
¶43 Wiggins argues the trial court erred in admitting his prior convictions for theft and possession of stolen property under ER 609 because it prejudiced his right to a fair trial. We conclude the trial court did not err.
¶44 Given the greater understanding of the disparate racial impact of the criminal justice system, Wiggins argued the court should preclude the State from impeaching him with his potentially admissible convictions for possession of stolen property; and, on an additional basis that the State failed to provide sufficient notice, the court should exclude his prior convictions that were more than 10 years old. The court concluded that, provided the State laid the proper foundation, Wiggins's convictions for crimes of dishonesty would be admissible if Wiggins testified. At trial, Wiggins's attorney introduced evidence of Wiggins's prior convictions for theft and possession of stolen property on direct examination.
¶45 Evidence that a witness has been convicted of a crime shall be admitted if it involved dishonesty or false statement, regardless of punishment. ER 609(a)(2). “[C]rimes of theft involve dishonesty and are per se admissible for impeachment purposes under ER 609(a)(2).” State v. Ray, 116 Wash.2d 531, 545, 806 P.2d 1220 (1991), abrogated on other grounds by State v. Crossguns, 199 Wash.2d 282, 505 P.3d 529 (2022).2
¶46 We review rulings made under ER 609 for abuse of discretion. State v. Rivers, 129 Wash.2d 697, 704-05, 921 P.2d 495 (1996). In declining to adopt a constitutional harmless error standard for review of ER 609 rulings, the Supreme Court stated that “while a defendant's decision to testify may be affected by the possibility of impeachment by prior conviction, ․ a defendant has no constitutional right to testify free of such impeachment.” State v. Brown, 113 Wash.2d 520, 554, 782 P.2d 1013 (1989).
¶47 The cases Wiggins cites do not discuss the prejudicial impact of crimes of dishonesty under ER 609(a)(2). See State v. Calegar, 133 Wash.2d 718, 722, 947 P.2d 235 (1997) (discussing admissibility of drug convictions under ER 609(a)(1)); State v. Hardy, 133 Wash.2d 701, 710-13, 946 P.2d 1175 (1997) (concluding that admitting evidence of a prior drug conviction under ER 609(a)(1) as an “unnamed felony” was error because the lack of relationship of the conviction to the defendant's veracity did not outweigh the prejudice of encouraging the jury to convict based upon propensity for criminal activity); State v. Vazquez, 198 Wash.2d 239, 253, 494 P.3d 424 (2021) (discussing the open door doctrine as an alternative method for admitting ER 609(a)(1) evidence about the defendant's criminal history).
¶48 Here, the court admitted three convictions for possession of stolen property in the third degree and two convictions for theft in the third degree. All five convictions were within 10 years of his trial in 2024. Because these convictions were for crimes of dishonesty and the dates of conviction were within 10 years, the trial court did not err in admitting these convictions.
VII
¶49 Wiggins argues the court impermissibly diluted the State's burden to disprove his self-defense on count 2 and that there was insufficient evidence to disprove self-defense. He also argues his counsel was ineffective for proposing an instruction setting forth an incorrect standard for self-defense on this count.
¶50 The parties successfully moved to vacate Wiggins's second degree felony murder charge based on assault in 2025, and Wiggins's felony judgment and sentence indicate he was not sentenced for second degree felony murder. Because we affirm his conviction on count 1, we do not reach these arguments.
¶51 Affirmed.
FOOTNOTES
1. A person is guilty of robbery in the first degree if in the commission of a robbery or of immediate flight therefrom, they are armed with a deadly weapon, display what appears to be a firearm or other deadly weapon, or inflict bodily injury. RCW 9A.56.200(1)(a). Robbery in the second degree does not require a finding a deadly weapon was used or bodily injury occurred. Compare RCW 9A.56.200 with RCW 9A.56.210.
2. Wiggins argues that, in light of the Supreme Court's open letter on racial equality in the judiciary from 2020, we should overrule Ray and permit trial courts discretion to admit evidence of prior convictions for crimes of dishonesty. Letter from the Wash. State Sup. Ct., to Members of the Judiciary and the Leg. Cmty. (June 4, 2020), https://www.courts.wa.gov/content/publicUpload/Supreme% 20 Court% 20News/Judiciary% 20Legal% 20Community% 20SIGNED% 20060420.pdf [https://perma.cc/QNT4-H5P7]. Wiggins argues the automatic admission of crimes of dishonesty exacerbates racial inequities for Black defendants and interferes with their right to present a meaningful defense. Nonetheless, Wiggins offered no authority suggesting the holding in Ray as applied to the ER 609(a)(2) analysis has been overruled or abrogated. This court lacks the prerogative to overrule Supreme Court precedent.
Birk, J.
WE CONCUR: Chung, J. Hazelrigg, C.J.
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Docket No: No. 86870-5-I
Decided: November 09, 2026
Court: Court of Appeals of Washington, Division 1.
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