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Meseret SHIFERAW, Respondent, v. NATIONWIDE AFFIINITY INSURANCE COMPANY OF AMERICA, an Ohio Insurance Company, Appellant.
PUBLISHED OPINION
¶1 Meseret Shiferaw brought claims against her insurer, Nationwide Affinity Insurance Company of America (Nationwide), for (1) violation of the Insurance Fair Conduct Act (IFCA), RCW 48.30.010-.015, (2) a breach of the duty of good faith, (3) violation of the Consumer Protection Act (CPA), chapter 19.86 RCW, and (4) negligence. The jury awarded substantial compensatory damages on the IFCA, bad faith, and negligence claims, and $47 million in punitive damages under Ohio law. The trial court enhanced the IFCA award and applied a two-times multiplier to its award of attorney fees and costs.
¶2 Nationwide appeals. Shiferaw cross-appeals the denial of injunctive relief under the CPA.
¶3 We affirm the awards and judgments for bad faith, negligence, and the CPA violation. We reverse the IFCA award and judgment, and remand with instructions to dismiss that claim with prejudice. We reverse the punitive damages award and judgment. We affirm the denial of a new trial. We reverse the attorney fee and cost awards and related judgments, and remand for a complete redetermination of fees and costs, including whether any multiplier remains appropriate in light of the reduced judgment. The CR 59(j) ruling presents no reversible error. We decline Nationwide's request to reassign this case to a different trial court judge on remand. On cross-appeal, we reverse the denial of injunctive relief and remand for reconsideration under the correct legal standard.
BACKGROUND
¶4 On August 16, 2017, while driving in Alberta, Canada, Meseret Shiferaw entered an intersection after failing to stop at a stop sign. Her vehicle was struck by a semi-truck driven by Paul Coyle. Shiferaw and her husband, Solomon Agere, were seriously injured. Their three children died as a result of the collision. Coyle was also injured.
¶5 Shiferaw held a Washington-issued personal auto policy with $50,000 per person/$100,000 per occurrence bodily injury liability limits. The policy's out-of-state coverage clause increased those limits to the province of Alberta's $200,000 minimum requirement for third-party liability coverage.1 Nationwide timely paid collision, UIM (underinsured motorist), and PIP (personal injury protection) benefits to Shiferaw. Nationwide recognized early on that Shiferaw was solely at fault for the collision, that she was underinsured, and that the multiple claims in this major loss would exceed the available policy limits.
¶6 Agere retained counsel and sought compensation for himself and for the estates of his three children. Beginning on October 6, 2017, Agere's counsel started making formal demands to Nationwide for payment of full liability limits. Coyle's claim remained open under Alberta's two-year limitation period; he never made a formal settlement demand to Shiferaw or Nationwide.2 Nationwide's adjusters took the position that a global resolution of all claims would best protect Shiferaw from exposure to claims in excess of available liability insurance coverage. They declined to settle the intrafamily claims or toll the Washington statute of limitations period while Coyle's claim remained unknown and unresolved, reasoning that payment of insurance proceeds to a single claimant would terminate Nationwide's defense and indemnity obligations and leave Shiferaw exposed without an insurer-provided defense.
¶7 In early June 2019, Agere's counsel again made a settlement demand for full policy limits. Because of uncertainty as to whether the Canadian two-year statute of limitations might apply to a lawsuit brought by Agere in Washington, counsel stated they could no longer wait for resolution of any claim asserted by Coyle. Nationwide rejected Agere's settlement demand and advised Shiferaw, in a letter dated June 27, 2019, that a lawsuit may soon be filed against her.
¶8 On August 12, 2019, Agere's counsel sent a final presuit settlement demand letter to Nationwide requesting policy limits that included the following:
The crux of all this is that Nationwide will be putting its insureds in the very unfair position of forcing a husband to sue his wife for his own injuries and the deaths of their children when there is neither a liability nor damages dispute.
I hope Nationwide does not force this course of action, but the only options to avoid it are (1) immediate agreement to pay the policy limits in settlement of the claims for the childrens’ estates and for [Agere] (which I have the authority to accept) or (2) Nationwide's written confirmation that it does not object to its insured signing a tolling agreement extending the limitations period for four additional months.
Ex. P-21 at 1-2; Clerk's Papers (CP) at 555-56.
¶9 The next day, Nationwide e-mailed Agere's counsel to memorialize a phone conversation where Nationwide (1) confirmed it would not be able to extend the statute of limitations, (2) noted all claims should be settled at the same time to protect their insured from excess liability, and (3) requested a copy of Agere's filed complaint. Nationwide's concern was that tolling for Agere could then require waiving of the statute of limitations for Coyle. Under Canadian law, if Nationwide paid out the first limit to Coyle and there is a second claimant, Nationwide would have to offer the same limit to the second claimant, thus $200,000 to Coyle and $200,000 to Agere.
¶10 On August 15, 2019, Agere, individually and in his capacity as personal representative of the estates of the three children, initiated an action in Spokane County Superior Court against Shiferaw. The next day, Agere amended the complaint to add Nationwide as a defendant. Unbeknownst to Nationwide, on May 16, 2019, Coyle had filed a lawsuit against Shiferaw in the province of Alberta, Canada.
¶11 Prior to filing the Washington lawsuit, Shiferaw retained George Ahrend as personal counsel. Once Agere had initiated his lawsuit, Nationwide assigned defense counsel to Shiferaw for both the Washington and Canadian actions and internally transferred the file to a legal examiner with experience in complex claims. Shiferaw's assigned defense counsel filed a notice of appearance on August 27, 2019. Ahrend formerly appeared in the lawsuit for Shiferaw on August 30. Shiferaw's assigned defense counsel filed a notice of withdrawal and substitution on September 10 for a different assigned counsel to take over, specifying in the notice that George Ahrend remained as private counsel for Shiferaw. Counsel for Nationwide in its capacity as a defendant appeared in the action on September 11.
¶12 On September 25, 2019, three documents were filed in the following order: (1) the substituted counsel assigned by Nationwide to represent Shiferaw filed a notice of withdrawal of counsel, noting the withdrawal was effective immediately and again noting Ahrend remained as private counsel for Shiferaw;3 (2) David Beninger filed a notice of association of counsel with Ahrend on behalf of Shiferaw; and (3) on the pleading paper of the withdrawing law firm, Shiferaw filed an answer and affirmative defenses to Agere's amended complaint, with cross claims asserted against Nationwide. Although the answer was represented to be filed by and through the attorneys who were withdrawing, as well as Ahrend, only Ahrend signed the pleading and the signature block for the withdrawing attorneys was left blank.4 A third law firm assigned by Nationwide to defend Shiferaw later associated with Ahrend and Beninger after the second firm was granted leave to withdraw.
¶13 Shiferaw asserted the following against Nationwide in her September 25, 2019, cross claims:
1. Defendant Nationwide failed to properly negotiate, settle and protect Meseret Shiferaw's interests in one or more of the ways admitted herein, including but not limited to failing to negotiate in good faith, affirmatively explore and relay all terms of settlement or negotiation(s), settle within limits, toll the statute of limitations to avoid suit, advise, assist and communicate, timely tender, offer or interplead limits, timely and properly investigate, evaluate, communicate, settle, defend, pay, obtain informed consent, and/or respond in good faith and in compliance with the contract, statutory and regulatory requirements resulting in a public lawsuit and personal exposure to Meseret Shiferaw in excess of the liability limits. These actions were not in the best interests of Nationwide's insured Meseret Shiferaw and have caused her injury, harm, expense, prejudice and/or damages.
2. As a result, Plaintiff Meseret Shiferaw is forced to defend herself and asserts crossclaims against Nationwide arising in tort, contract, under the common law, statutes, regulations and in equity. These crossclaims include but are not limited to for breach of contract, bad faith, insurance negligence, violation of the Consumer Protection Act (“CPA,” RCW 19.86 et seq.,), estoppel, for joint and several liability, for fault within the meaning of RCW 4.22 et seq., including negligence, gross negligence, reckless, unfair or deceptive conduct, and for declaratory other relief including that sought by Agere against Nationwide.
CP at 42-43.
¶14 Just over a month after Shiferaw asserted her cross claims against Nationwide, it moved for purposes of discovery and trial to bifurcate the personal injury claims between Agere and Shiferaw from the insurance claims asserted by both Agere and Shiferaw against Nationwide. Nationwide also filed a motion seeking leave to deposit the $200,000 policy proceeds with the court pursuant to CR 67, stating it could not determine “how to allocate policy proceeds amongst the five claimants.” CP at 101. The trial court denied both motions, without prejudice to either party to renew the motions at a later date. Discovery disputes ensued; the trial court compelled production of Nationwide's claims file.
¶15 In late November 2019, Agere moved for partial judgment on the pleadings establishing Shiferaw's negligence and causation. Nationwide did not file a response to the motion. Agere and Shiferaw agreed that damages exceeded $200,000. The trial court granted the motion. Agere then moved for entry of partial judgment; Shiferaw moved to compel payment of liability proceeds. Over Nationwide's objection, the court ordered Nationwide to pay the proceeds to Agere within seven days. Nationwide unsuccessfully sought discretionary review of that decision in this court, arguing that exhausting limits without a release from Agere left Shiferaw exposed with potentially no insurer-provided defense.
¶16 On March 27, 2020, Agere and Shiferaw agreed to submit the remaining claims between them to binding arbitration. Notice of the agreement was filed with the court and served on Nationwide's counsel just over two months before the arbitration was scheduled to take place. Agere and Shiferaw further stipulated that Washington law applied to recoverable damages, pre- and postjudgment interest, costs, and attorney fees. Although Nationwide as a party claimed it was kept in the dark as to these developments, it was informed of the arbitration, invited to participate, received briefing submitted to the arbitrator by Agere and Shiferaw, and Nationwide's counsel telephonically attended the arbitration (choosing only to listen to and monitor the proceedings).
¶17 Arbitration occurred on June 3, 2020. The arbitrator awarded $17,123,927.71 ($16,605,370.41 to Agere and the children's estates on the wrongful death and survival action claims, $517,761.75 to Agere on his personal injury claims, and $795.55 to Agere for costs and statutory attorney fees), and then reduced the award by $200,000.00, the amount earlier paid by Nationwide. Agere moved to confirm the arbitration award, arguing that with Shiferaw's bad faith allegation the trial court could rule no policy limit applied and judgment could be executed against Nationwide. Nationwide paid the full award on August 13, 2020; Agere released all claims that he had asserted against Shiferaw and Nationwide. The court entered an order granting Agere's CR 41(a)(1)(B) motion for voluntary dismissal of his claims with prejudice on September 18, 2020.
¶18 On March 19, 2020, less than three months before the arbitration hearing and with leave of court, Agere filed an amended complaint. The claims against Shiferaw were the same, but Agere added the following additional claims against Nationwide: (1) a failure to act in good faith and violations of IFCA and the CPA with regard to the PIP and UIM claims, and (2) unjust enrichment.5 On June 8, 2020, one day after the $17,123,927.71 arbitration award to Agere, Shiferaw sent Nationwide an IFCA notice and demand for benefits. Nationwide responded to the notice on July 1. On July 6, Shiferaw answered the second amended complaint and added the following to her cross claims against Nationwide:
3. Cross Claim Plaintiff Shiferaw provided an opportunity to and served notice upon defendant Nationwide that it had the additional and full statutory deadline of 20 days to redress the coverage and claims mishandling violations and unreasonable denials of coverage or payment of benefits that has harmed, injured and/or damaged Shiferaw[.] Nationwide chose not to resolve the injury and damage from its unreasonable conduct and the basis for the claims under the Insurance Fair Conduct Act (IFCA), RCW 48.30. et. seq. As a result, Cross Claim Plaintiff now asserts relief under the IFCA against defendant Nationwide for payment of the arbitration award with interest, and all other actual, compensatory, exemplary, economic, non-economic, general, special, and other damage and harm and relief as IFCA permits.
CP at 397. Separate answers by Nationwide to the second amended complaint and Shiferaw's cross claims were filed on July 24.
¶19 Intensive motion practice ensued. On July 24, 2020, Nationwide moved for a determination that Washington law applied to Shiferaw's negligence and common law bad faith claims to preclude punitive damages under Ohio law. In briefing, Nationwide conceded that an actual conflict of law existed between Washington and Ohio on the issue of punitive damages, but argued Washington law should apply because it had the most significant contacts under Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 145 (A.L.I. 1971). Shiferaw argued Ohio law governed under dépeçage 6 principles because Nationwide is an Ohio corporation and its claims decisions occurred in Ohio. That same day, Shiferaw moved for partial summary judgment asking that Nationwide be held liable for bad faith, negligence, breach of contract, and the CPA/IFCA violations.
¶20 On August 12, 2020, Shiferaw moved for an order compelling satisfaction of all judgments and awards against her through confirmation of the arbitration award and satisfaction of judgments. She sought protection from awards and judgments and wanted to mitigate her damages. Shiferaw contended that she had “been unable to obtain Nationwide's cooperation or assistance,” and Nationwide was keeping her and counsel “in the dark while [at the same time] asserting a defense that Shiferaw has not done enough to mitigate her damages.” CP at 1157.
¶21 On August 28, 2020, Nationwide filed a second motion for partial summary judgment seeking an order (1) that any bad faith damages could not include sums already paid on the arbitration award, interest, and judgment on the pleadings, and (2) dismissal of the IFCA claim. Shiferaw moved for partial summary judgment on Nationwide's affirmative defenses.
¶22 The trial court issued a November 20, 2020, letter ruling on the various motions, which is summarized below:
• Conflict of law question: Ohio law (allowing punitive damages) would apply here if Shiferaw prevails on her bad faith claim because the place of the injury-causing conduct was Ohio where Nationwide made its claims-handling decisions. This furthers Ohio's interest in deterring and punishing certain conduct and is not inconsistent with Washington's policy against punitive damages or its disinterest in protecting foreign companies engaging in such conduct.
• Enforcement of settlement agreement: The July 2020 agreement between Nationwide and Agere was not binding on Shiferaw. Although Agere released all his claims against Shiferaw, and Nationwide transferred funds of $17,215,517.18 to Agere's counsel's trust account in consideration for that release, Shiferaw herself had not accepted its terms before the money was disbursed. Absent her assent, the agreement between Nationwide and Agere for payment and release was not enforceable as to her.
• Nationwide's affirmative defenses: No reservation of rights was required because Nationwide had acknowledged its duty to defend and the defenses were asserted solely against the bad faith claim (not coverage). Fraud/collusion need not be pleaded with CR 9(b) specificity when raised as an affirmative defense (not for affirmative relief) and remained for a jury determination. Failure to mitigate is not a defense when the insurer has acted in bad faith. Failure to cooperate requires proof of actual prejudice and presented material fact issues for the jury.
• Shiferaw's partial summary judgment motion on Nationwide's liability for bad faith, negligence, breach of contract, and the CPA/IFCA violations: A single violation of the unfair claims settlement practices regulations, chapter 284-30 WAC, can constitute a per se unfair/deceptive act under the CPA and support bad faith and breach. Because reasonable minds could differ on the facts presented in support of and in opposition to these claims, questions of fact remain for a jury determination of these issues.
• Shiferaw's IFCA claim against Nationwide: This claim was properly brought, as IFCA does not require an outright denial of benefits and can rest on conduct resulting in denial of benefits promised by the policy.
¶23 Corresponding orders on these rulings were entered December 14, 2020.
¶24 Nationwide moved to disqualify Beninger as trial counsel on the grounds that he would be a necessary witness on its collusion affirmative defense; the motion was denied (and a later renewed motion was also denied). The trial court also determined that Shiferaw was entitled to Olympic Steamship 7 attorney fees as the prevailing party on her motion to compel Nationwide to pay liability policy proceeds to Agere. Nationwide moved to (1) bifurcate the liability/compensatory portion of trial from a determination on punitive damages and (2) compel election by Shiferaw between the remedies of punitive damages under Ohio law or treble damages under IFCA and the CPA. The court granted bifurcation because Ohio treats punitive damages as a substantive matter carrying a right to bifurcation, but denied the motion for election of remedies, holding the bad faith, IFCA, and CPA claims were not repugnant and are mutually exclusive. The trial court determined Shiferaw could seek punitive damages as well as IFCA and CPA damages so long as they were not based on the same conduct, and that Shiferaw must make that election prior to judgment to avoid double recovery.
¶25 With Agere's claims against Shiferaw and Nationwide resolved and released, and those causes of action voluntarily dismissed by Agere, the trial court on January 17, 2023, entered an order realigning the remaining parties and changing the case caption with Shiferaw as plaintiff and Nationwide as defendant.
Trial
¶26 The compensatory phase of trial began on January 23, 2023. Evidence included testimony that Nationwide: never made a presuit offer to Agere to settle his claims against Shiferaw, effectively forcing Agere to sue his wife over the children's deaths; delayed payment of medical/PIP/funeral/grief benefits; failed for two years to tender or assist in dividing the liability policy limits; should have appointed counsel for Shiferaw far earlier than the onset of litigation; and the adjusters lacked sufficient training/experience and failed to escalate the claim internally or settle when liability was clear. An attorney Nationwide assigned to defend Shiferaw during the Agere litigation, and who actually represented her until that portion of this litigation concluded, testified that Nationwide withheld the claims file from him, which he described as a very unusual practice in the context of his insurance defense litigation practice. During trial, Nationwide's counsel lodged hundreds of objections and repeatedly accused Shiferaw's personal attorney, David Beninger, of misconduct.
¶27 The jury found Nationwide: (1) violated IFCA, (2) breached the duty of good faith, (3) violated the CPA, and (4) was negligent. It awarded Shiferaw $27,136,000 in total compensatory damages broken down as follows: (1) $136,000 in economic damages for the IFCA violation, bad faith, CPA violation, and negligence, and (2) $27,000,000 in noneconomic damages ($20,000,000 for the IFCA violation, $5,000,000 for bad faith, and $2,000,000 for negligence).
¶28 In phase two of the bifurcated trial, the jury found that Shiferaw was entitled to an award of punitive damages for common law bad faith under Ohio law. It awarded $47,000,000 in punitive damages, and also found that Nationwide was liable for the reasonable attorney fees of counsel retained by Shiferaw to prosecute the claim.
¶29 On March 2, 2023, the trial court entered a judgment on the $27,136,000 in compensatory damages awarded by the jury. The court noted this was not a final judgment that would commence the 30-day deadline in which to appeal.
¶30 On March 15, 2023, the trial court entered a supplemental judgment for $47,000,000 in punitive damages, $20,136,000 in enhancement (double rather than treble) damages for the IFCA violation, and $8,323,910 in attorney fees and costs. The total judgment against Nationwide now stood at $102,595,910.
Posttrial motions
¶31 Nationwide filed six posttrial motions: (1) renewed motion under CR 50 for judgment as a matter of law, (2) new trial based on prejudice and misconduct from opposing counsel, (3) new trial based on misconduct and errors regarding attorney witnesses, (4) new trial or remittitur of compensatory jury verdict, (5) renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law regarding judgment for compensatory damages, and (6) renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law on punitive damages. Shiferaw moved to strike all the motions as (1) successive posttrial motions in violation of CR 59(j), (2) violating the page limitations for nondispositive motions under LCR 40, and (3) a misrepresentation of applicable law in violation of CR 11 and RPC 3.3. Shiferaw filed a combined response on the merits of the motions and sought to supplement her judgment for attorney fees and costs for having to respond to the motions.
¶32 On May 10, 2023, the trial court issued a 17-page ruling and order denying all of Nationwide's motions (treating each as a motion for new trial or reconsideration). In an order and second supplemental judgment entered on May 17, the court awarded Shiferaw's counsel an additional $448,465.00 in attorney fees and a total of $185,396.04 in expenses ($181,734.64 through trial and $3,661.40 posttrial). The second supplemental judgment raised the total fee and cost award to $8,957,771.04 and the overall judgment to $103,229,771.04.
¶33 Shiferaw requested in her cross claim “injunctive relief against Nationwide to enjoin it from violating the insurance statutes, regulations and contract and in committing the unfair and deceptive claims handling violations and misconduct as alleged, and/or to be further alleged.” CP at 44. The parties submitted posttrial briefing on this issue and on May 12, 2023, the trial court heard argument from counsel and took the matter under advisement. On June 23, the court issued an opinion and order denying injunctive relief.
Appeals
¶34 Nationwide timely appeals from the judgments entered against it and the court's ruling/order on Nationwide's posttrial motions. Shiferaw timely cross-appeals from the trial court's posttrial opinion/order denying injunctive relief.
ANALYSIS
Nationwide's Direct Appeal
1. IFCA claim
¶35 Nationwide contends the trial court erred in denying its motion for judgment as a matter of law on the IFCA claim. We agree.
¶36 The purpose of IFCA is to protect insurance policy holders and it was enacted “to provide [those] insureds with another legal resource against their [own] insurer for wrongful denials” of a claim for coverage. Perez-Crisantos v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 187 Wash.2d 669, 679, 389 P.3d 476 (2017). While similar to and sometimes overlapping with bad faith and CPA claims, IFCA claims must be based on either the “unreasonable denial of a claim for coverage or payment of benefits under an insurance policy.” Beasley v. GEICO Gen. Ins. Co., 23 Wash. App. 2d 641, 662, 667-68, 517 P.3d 500 (2022), review denied, 200 Wash.2d 1028, 523 P.3d 1188 (2023).
¶37 IFCA creates a private right of action for a “first party claimant” who is “unreasonably denied a claim for coverage or payment of benefits by an insurer.” RCW 48.30.015(1). “ ‘First party claimant’ means an individual, corporation, association, partnership, or other legal entity asserting a right to payment as a covered person under an insurance policy or insurance contract arising out of the occurrence of the contingency or loss covered by such policy or contract.” RCW 48.30.015(4); WAC 284-30-320(7). “IFCA clearly vests a cause of action with first party claimants,” but “nothing in the language of IFCA gives third party claimants the right to sue.” Trinity Universal Ins. Co. of Kansas v. Ohio Cas. Ins. Co., 176 Wash. App. 185, 201, 312 P.3d 976 (2013). “ ‘Third-party claimant’ means any individual, corporation, association, partnership or other legal entity asserting a claim against any individual, corporation, association, partnership or other legal entity insured under an insurance policy or insurance contract of the insurer.” WAC 284-30-320(17).
¶38 First-party coverage refers to insurance benefits that are paid directly to an insured by an insurer for a covered loss. Mut. of Enumclaw Ins. Co. v. Dan Paulson Constr., Inc., 161 Wash.2d 903, 914 n.8, 169 P.3d 1 (2007). Third-party coverage refers to insurance benefits where the insurer is obligated to defend and indemnify the insured against liability claims made by another party. Id. The same automobile insurance policy can provide both types of coverage: first-party coverage available to the insured for direct benefits such as UIM and PIP coverage, and third-party coverage for claims arising out of the liability of the insured to others.
¶39 On June 8, 2020, one day after the arbitrator made the $17,123,927.71 award to Agere on his third-party liability claims, Shiferaw sent her IFCA notice to Nationwide. Shiferaw alleged that the IFCA notice was being made “due to Nationwide's claims mishandling and its failure to properly and timely investigate, evaluate, explain, communicate, respond, negotiate, settle, protect, defend and/or pay benefits arising from the collision in August 2017.” CP at 1319. Shiferaw demanded that Nationwide “pay all the benefits owed and to resolve and secure protection for and from all claims.” CP at 1320. At this point, there were no outstanding claims by Shiferaw for collision coverage or UIM/PIP benefits. Thus, she was not asserting a right to payments for first-party coverage benefits in this notice. However, she was still a first-party claimant under IFCA because she was asserting her right to benefits under the third-party liability policy: the right to defense and indemnification for claims asserted by others.
¶40 When an insured proves that their insurer violated IFCA, they may recover “actual damages sustained, together with the costs of the action, including reasonable attorneys’ fees and litigation costs.” RCW 48.30.015(1). This court has previously held that “noneconomic damages are ‘actual damages’ under RCW 48.30.015.” Beasley, 23 Wash. App. 2d at 653-54, 517 P.3d 500. In addition, upon a finding that an insurer has unreasonably denied a claim for coverage or payment of benefits, the trial court may award up to three times the actual damages. RCW 48.30.015(2). In determining whether treble damages are appropriate, the court can consider whether the insurer violated any of the certain regulations/rules specified in RCW 48.30.015(5) while processing the claim, but a regulatory violation by itself does not create an independent cause of action under IFCA. Perez-Crisantos, 187 Wash.2d at 684, 389 P.3d 476.
¶41 When an insured has already recovered bad faith damages that encompass the same harm as the IFCA damages, the insured is not entitled to double recovery. Beasley, 23 Wash. App. 2d at 670, 517 P.3d 500. This court in Beasley held that because the bad faith damages the jury awarded necessarily included IFCA damages, the insured could not recover any amount above the bad faith award in IFCA noneconomic damages. Id.
¶42 When an insured believes their insurance company has violated IFCA, a prerequisite to any litigation of the claim is notice to the insurer and the insurance commissioner, and an opportunity for the insurer to cure. RCW 48.30.015(8). Under this mandatory safe-harbor provision: an insurer is not liable if, within 20 days after receiving written notice of the basis for the action, it “resolves the basis for the action.” RCW 48.30.015(8).8 Should the insurer fail to cure within the 20-day period, the insured may initiate an IFCA cause of action without any further notice. Id.
Application
¶43 In its motion for summary judgment and again on appeal, Nationwide contends that Shiferaw did not have a cause of action under IFCA because she failed to show that Nationwide unreasonably denied a claim for indemnification or unreasonably denied her a defense. With respect to Shiferaw's indemnification claim, Nationwide points out that it had paid Agere the policy limits several months prior to Shiferaw's IFCA notice. Shiferaw responds that Nationwide's delay in paying the policy limits violated IFCA, the amount paid did not include noneconomic damages, and Nationwide paid only under compulsion and conditioned payment on a reservation of rights. We conclude that Shiferaw's IFCA claim fails as a matter of law for several reasons.
¶44 First, because Nationwide paid its entire liability policy limits before the statutory notice-and-cure period began, it resolved the basis for any IFCA action. Nationwide tendered the $200,000 policy limit to Agere on February 7, 2020, which was more than four months before Shiferaw sent her June 8 IFCA notice. That payment exhausted the available liability coverage and satisfied Nationwide's contractual obligations of indemnification under the policy. No further benefits remained owing under the insurance contract.
¶45 Shiferaw argues that Nationwide's February 7, 2020, payment of the $200,000.00 liability policy limits to Agere did not resolve the basis of her claim under IFCA because the June 8 claim notice included the actual damages of $17,123,927.71 awarded by the arbitrator on June 7.
¶46 Under RCW 48.30.015(8)(a), a first-party claimant must provide written notice of the “basis for the cause of action to the insurer” 20 days prior to initiating an IFCA cause of action. Because neither “basis” nor “cause of action” is defined anywhere in the statute, we apply the “plain and ordinary meaning” to these words and phrases. Duskin v. Carlson, 136 Wash.2d 550, 559, 965 P.2d 611 (1998).
¶47 In ordinary usage, “basis” means “an underlying fact or condition; a foundation or starting point.” Black’s Law Dictionary 185 (12th ed. 2024). “Cause of action” is a well-established legal term meaning “[a] group of operative facts giving rise to one or more bases for suing; a factual situation that entitles one person to obtain a remedy in court from another person.” Black’s Law Dictionary 275 (12th ed. 2024). “Basis for the cause of action,” therefore, means the factual and legal grounds that give rise to the IFCA claim. Because the only cause of action created by RCW 48.30.015 is for the unreasonable denial of a claim for coverage or payment of benefits, the phrase “basis for the cause of action” in the statute is the insurer's specific conduct—the unreasonable denial—that the claimant contends entitles them to relief.
¶48 The subsequent $17,123,927.71 arbitration award to Agere represented extracontractual liability beyond policy limits. IFCA is directed at the unreasonable denial or withholding of contractual coverage or benefits owed under a policy of insurance. Allowing an IFCA claim to proceed on the basis of asserted extracontractual damages would render the cure provision meaningless and undermine the statute's purpose of mandating an attempt at prelitigation resolution of insurance disputes. See RCW 48.30.015(8)(b).
¶49 Second, the benefits at issue were third-party liability limits paid to Agere. IFCA does not create a cause of action for an insured's complaint about the timing or manner of payment to a third-party claimant. The threshold requirement of the statute is that a claimant must show either an unreasonable denial of coverage or unreasonable denial of benefits owed under the policy. RCW 48.30.015(1); Perez-Crisantos, 187 Wash.2d at 683, 389 P.3d 476. Payment to Agere was not a contractual obligation Nationwide owed directly to Shiferaw in the sense contemplated by IFCA. Washington law has long recognized that third-party claimants generally lack a direct cause of action against an insurer for bad faith; a bad faith analysis turns on whether the insurer violated a contractual obligation owed to the insured. Tank v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 105 Wash.2d 381, 393-95, 715 P.2d 1133 (1986). The consequences of which Shiferaw complains—excess liability exposure, the intrafamily lawsuit, and the large arbitration award—flow from the competing third-party claims that exceeded the contractual limit. They do not convert a dispute over the timing of payment to a third-party claimant into a denial of benefits owed to Shiferaw herself under IFCA.
¶50 This case is distinguishable from first-party UIM claims, in which the insurer owes a direct contractual duty to pay its own insured once the amount is determined. See RCW 48.22.030(1). Prolonged withholding of an undisputed amount of UIM benefits can constitute an unreasonable denial of payment of benefits under IFCA. Beasley, 23 Wash. App. 2d 641, 517 P.3d 500; see also Labeaume v. First Nat'l Ins. Co. of Am., 37 Wash. App. 2d 445, 470, 591 P.3d 377 (2026) (“[W]hile the legislative history of IFCA establishes the legislature did not intend IFCA recovery for mere delay of UIM benefits, both Washington and federal courts have allowed IFCA claims for the effective denial of a UIM claim—for example, through an unreasonably low settlement offer.”), petition for review filed, No. 105670-2 (Wash. Aug. 14, 2026). Here, the payment obligation ran to a third-party claimant. Nationwide's decisions about timing and global resolution involved competing claims, cross-border (U.S. and Canada) exposure, and the need to protect Shiferaw from excess judgments. Those considerations do not convert a third-party payment dispute into an actionable IFCA claim by the first-party insured.
¶51 Third, IFCA's plain language requires an unreasonable denial of a claim for coverage or payment of benefits. RCW 48.30.015(1). The trial court instructed the jury that Nationwide violated IFCA if it “unreasonably delayed or denied a claim for payment of benefits or coverage.” CP at 5505 (jury instruction 8). That instruction expanded the statute beyond its text. See RCW 48.30.015(1). “[A] court must not add words where the legislature has chosen not to include them.” Rest. Dev., Inc. v. Cananwill, Inc., 150 Wash.2d 674, 682, 80 P.3d 598 (2003).
¶52 Our Supreme Court has emphasized that IFCA's trigger is an unreasonable denial of coverage or benefits. Perez-Crisantos, 187 Wash.2d at 676-84, 389 P.3d 476. Regulatory violations alone—without an unreasonable denial—do not create an independent IFCA claim. Id. Legislative history reinforces the focus on denial:
An original sponsor of IFCA proposed an amendment that would have allowed an insured to sue their insurer for unreasonably “deny[ing] or delay[ing]” coverage or payment of benefits. Amend. 5726-S AMS WEIN S2651.1 to Substitute S.B. 5726, 60th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2007) (emphasis added). But the sponsor later submitted a proposed amendment removing the “delay” language, stating, “The act no longer addresses unreasonable delays in payment of insurance benefits.” Amend. 5726-S AMS BERK S2868.1 to Substitute S.B. 5726, 60th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2007); see also Engrossed Substitute S.B. 5726, 60th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2007).
Labeaume, 37 Wash. App. 2d at 468, 591 P.3d 377.
¶53 Certain federal district court decisions have recognized an effective or constructive denial of a claim based on unreasonable delay or underpayment. See, e.g., Cohodas v. Cont'l Ins. Co., 717 F. Supp. 3d 1008, 1016 (W.D. Wash. 2024) (“[T]here are genuine issues of material fact as to whether [the insurer] unreasonably denied coverage or benefits by virtue of its handling of [the insured's] claim, including its delay in payment.”); Gochev v. First Am. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 695 F. Supp. 3d 1255, 1267 (W.D. Wash. 2023) (“[A] jury [could] conclude [the insurer] acted unreasonably in handing [the insured's] claim ․ despite [the insurer] ultimately paying the [p]olicy's limits.”); Bauman v. Am. Commerce Ins., 2016 WL 4703317, at *3 (W.D. Wash. 2016) (“[A]t some point, a failure/refusal to respond to a request for settlement offer becomes tantamount to an unreasonable denial of benefits.”); Taladay v. Metro. Grp. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 2016 WL 3681469, at *20 (W.D. Wash. 2016) (“[A]lthough [the insurer] never explicitly denied [the insured]s’ requests for coverage, [the insurer]’s unreasonable delay in payment and/or underpayment of various aspects of [the insured]s’ claim violated IFCA.”); Cedar Grove Composting, Inc. v. Ironshore Specialty Ins. Co., 2015 WL 3473465, at *6 (W.D. Wash. 2015) (“A refusal to pay a demand for coverage reasonably promptly is an unreasonable denial of benefits, even if only temporary.”); Kifer v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 2015 WL 12030068, at *4-5 (W.D. Wash. 2015) (Issues of fact prevented dismissing an IFCA claim although insurer “eventually paid the full amount.”); contra Young v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am., 2022 WL 4017893, at *8 (W.D. Wash. 2022) (“[A]n IFCA claim for denial of payment ‘cannot survive’ when the insurer ultimately pays the claimant's full demand.”). Those decisions are not binding on Washington state courts. See Kumar v. Gate Gourmet Inc., 180 Wash.2d 481, 491, 325 P.3d 193 (2014). More importantly, they are distinguishable. Most involve first-party benefits that had become liquidated and clearly due to the insured. The dispute between Shiferaw and Nationwide concerned the timing and global resolution of multiple competing third-party claims that exceeded policy limits. A reasoned (even if ultimately unsuccessful) strategy to protect the insured from excess exposure across jurisdictions is not the equivalent of a refusal to pay a benefit that is due under the policy.
¶54 Because (1) Nationwide paid all contractual benefits before the notice-and-cure period began, (2) the benefits at issue were third-party liability payments, and (3) IFCA requires an unreasonable denial of coverage or benefits rather than mere delay, Shiferaw had no viable IFCA claim as a matter of law. We reverse the IFCA awards and judgments, and remand with instructions to dismiss the IFCA claim with prejudice.
2. Choice of law—punitive damages under Ohio law
¶55 Nationwide challenges the $47 million punitive damages award. It argues that Washington law governs and does not authorize common law punitive damages, and alternatively that the evidence was insufficient to support a finding of actual malice under Ohio law. Shiferaw contends that Ohio law applies and that the award is supported by the evidence. The trial court applied Ohio law. We reverse the punitive damages award and judgment on two independent grounds.
2.1 Insufficient evidence of actual malice under Ohio law
¶56 Even assuming Ohio law applies, the evidence was insufficient as a matter of law to support a finding of actual malice by clear and convincing evidence.9 Therefore, the question of punitive damages should not have been submitted to the jury for deliberation.
¶57 Since as early as 1859, Ohio courts have allowed punitive damages to be awarded in tort actions involving fraud, malice, or insult. Preston v. Murty, 32 Ohio St. 3d 334, 334, 512 N.E.2d 1174 (1987). In a case that does not involve allegations of fraud or insult, an award of punitive damages necessarily rests on the presence of malice. Id. at 334-35, 512 N.E.2d 1174. Ohio requires proof of actual malice by clear and convincing evidence. Perez v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 35 Ohio St. 3d 215, 218, 520 N.E.2d 198 (1988) (citing Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 342, 94 S. Ct. 2997, 41 L. Ed. 2d 789 (1974)); see also R.C. 10 § 2315.21(D)(4). Ohio's model civil jury instructions (OJI-CV) provide as follows:
3. ACTUAL MALICE. “Actual malice” necessary for an award of punitive damages is
(Use appropriate alternative[s])
(A) a state of mind characterized by hatred, ill will, or a spirit of revenge;
(or)
(B) a conscious disregard for the rights and safety of another person that has a great probability of causing substantial harm.
1 OJI-CV 315.37. “[I]t is apparent from the case law that actual malice can be placed in two general categories: first, behavior characterized by hatred, ill will, or a spirit of revenge and, second, extremely reckless behavior revealing a conscious disregard for a great and obvious harm.” Preston, 32 Ohio St. 3d at 335, 512 N.E.2d 1174. The second element has been described as “conscious, deliberate or intentional” and that it “requires the party to possess knowledge of the harm that might be caused by [their] behavior.” Id. It is “more than mere negligence” and is “reflected in the use of such terms as ‘outrageous,’ ‘flagrant,’ and ‘criminal.’ ” Id. at 335-36, 512 N.E.2d 1174. The Ohio Supreme Court held:
[T]hat actual malice, necessary for an award of punitive damages, is (1) that state of mind under which a person's conduct is characterized by hatred, ill will or a spirit of revenge, or (2) a conscious disregard for the rights and safety of other persons that has a great probability of causing substantial harm. In the latter case, before submitting the issue of punitive damages to the jury, a trial court must review the evidence to determine if reasonable minds can differ as to whether the party was aware [their] act had a great probability of causing substantial harm. Furthermore, the court must determine that sufficient evidence is presented revealing that the party consciously disregarded the injured party's rights or safety. If submitted to the jury, the trial court should give an instruction in accordance with the law we announce today.
Preston, 32 Ohio St. 3d at 336, 512 N.E.2d 1174. Thus, if the claim being presented does not include aspects of hatred, ill will, or a spirit of revenge, then before submitting a punitive damages case to the jury, the trial court must review the evidence to determine if reasonable minds can differ as to both (1) a party being knowingly aware that their conduct had a great probability of causing substantial harm and (2) that the party consciously disregarded the rights or safety of the party who was injured. Id.
¶58 In Washington, judgment as a matter of law is appropriate when, viewing the evidence and all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, no substantial evidence supports the claim. H.B.H. v. State, 192 Wash.2d 154, 162, 429 P.3d 484 (2018).
¶59 Viewed in the light most favorable to Shiferaw, the record contains evidence of significant problems in Nationwide's handling of these claims: multi-year delays, failure to make an early offer of settlement, inadequate communication, adjustor inexperience, a withheld claims file from Shiferaw's assigned defense counsel, failure to timely appoint panel counsel to defend Shiferaw, and the decision to not agree to toll the Washington statute of limitations or settle the intrafamily claims while the Canadian claim remained open. Those facts support the jury's findings of bad faith and negligence.
¶60 This same evidence does not, however, permit a reasonable jury to find Nationwide's conduct was characterized by hatred, ill will, or a spirit of revenge. Nor does it permit a finding that Nationwide was knowingly aware that its conduct had a great probability of causing substantial harm and that it consciously disregarded Shiferaw's rights or safety.
¶61 The record does not support the requisite actual malice threshold such that this claim should be submitted to the jury on the issue of punitive damages. Instead, the record shows that Nationwide acted on advice of counsel and pursued a strategy of global resolution aimed at protecting Shiferaw from multiple third-party claims that exceeded the available policy limits. Evidence of later business practices is irrelevant to Nationwide's state of mind at the time of the alleged misconduct. Even giving Shiferaw the benefit of every reasonable inference, the evidence presented in the compensatory phase of trial does not meet the clear and convincing threshold required under Ohio law. The trial court therefore should have granted Nationwide's motion for judgment as a matter of law on punitive damages.
¶62 This ground alone requires vacatur of the punitive damages award.
2.2 Washington has the most significant relationship
¶63 Independently, Washington law governs the availability of punitive damages. “In tort, if there is an actual conflict of law, the court applies the two-part most significant relationship test to determine which state's substantive law to apply to the claim.” Woodward v. Taylor, 184 Wash.2d 911, 918, 366 P.3d 432 (2016). “An actual conflict of law exists where the result of an issue is different under the laws of the interested states.” Id. (citing Seizer v. Sessions, 132 Wash.2d 642, 648, 940 P.2d 261 (1997)). “For the first part of the most significant relationship test, the court evaluates the contacts each interested jurisdiction has with the parties and the occurrence under the factors of Restatement [(Second) of Conflict of Laws] section 145 plus any more specific section of the Restatement that is relevant to the cause of action.” Id. “For the second part of the most significant relationship test, the court must then evaluate the interests and policies of the potentially concerned jurisdiction by applying the factors set forth in Restatement section 6.” Id.; see also Johnson v. Spider Staging Corp., 87 Wash.2d 577, 580-81, 555 P.2d 997 (1976); Erickson v. Pharmacia, LLC, 5 Wash.3d 585, 601, 578 P.3d 306 (2025).
¶64 Washington does not authorize common law punitive damages. Barr v. Interbay Citizens Bank of Tampa, Fla., 96 Wash.2d 692, 699-700, 635 P.2d 441, 649 P.2d 827 (1981); Dailey v. N. Coast Life Ins. Co., 129 Wash.2d 572, 574, 919 P.2d 589 (1996). Ohio permits punitive damages upon clear and convincing proof of actual malice. Zoppo v. Homestead Ins. Co., 71 Ohio St. 3d 552, 557-58, 644 N.E.2d 397 (1994); R.C. § 2315.21(D)(4). The purpose of punitive damages under Ohio law is not to compensate a plaintiff but to punish and deter a defendant's conduct and potential future misconduct, and discourage others from engaging in similar future actions. McFarren v. Canton, 2016-Ohio-484, 59 N.E.3d 652, at ¶ 90.
¶65 When an actual conflict of law exists, the court applies the most significant relationship test. Restatement section 145(1) provides that “[t]he rights and liabilities of the parties with respect to an issue in tort are determined by the local law of the state which, with respect to that issue, has the most significant relationship to the occurrence and the parties under the principles stated in § 6.” The contacts to be taken into account include:
(a) the place where the injury occurred,
(b) the place where the conduct causing the injury occurred,
(c) the domicile, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place of business of the parties, and
(d) the place where the relationship, if any, between the parties is centered.
These contacts are to be evaluated according to their relative importance with respect to the particular issue.
Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 145(2).
¶66 Shiferaw is a Washington resident. The insurance policy was issued and delivered in Washington. The occurrence giving rise to these claims took place in Alberta, Canada. Critically, the insurer-insured relationship that gave rise to the duty of good faith was formed, centered, and regulated in Washington under Washington's comprehensive statutory scheme, including IFCA, and the claims settlement practices regulations.
¶67 Nationwide is an Ohio company, and its claims-handling decisions here were made by personnel located in Ohio. Those contacts are relevant and must be given weight. The place of the wrongful corporate conduct is often the dominant factor when the issue is punitive damages because the purpose of punitive damages is to punish the defendant's conduct in the present case and deter future similar actions. Erickson, 5 Wash.3d at 629-30, 578 P.3d 306; see also Kammerer v. W. Gear Corp., 96 Wash.2d 416, 421-24, 635 P.2d 708 (1981); Singh v. Edwards Lifesciences Corp., 151 Wash. App. 137, 143-48, 210 P.3d 337 (2009).
¶68 The duty here arises from an ongoing insurer-insured contractual relationship created, centered, and regulated by Washington law. Washington has substantial interest in regulating that relationship and in defining the remedies available for breach of its laws. Those interests are greater than Ohio's interest in applying its punitive damages rules to claims-handling decisions directed at a Washington insured under a Washington policy. Weighing the contacts and the relevant state interests, Washington law prevails in the most significant relationship test.
2.3 Remaining arguments
¶69 Because the punitive damages award and judgment is reversed on the independent grounds set forth above, we need not address Nationwide's additional challenges to the jury instructions, the statutory cap calculation, or the refusal to require an election between IFCA enhanced damages and Ohio punitive damages.
3. Motion for a new trial—attorney conduct
¶70 Nationwide contends that pervasive misconduct by Shiferaw's counsel—persistent improper questions, harassment of witnesses, disrespect toward the court, the timing of a midtrial motion to exclude key witnesses, and portions of closing argument—was so prejudicial, individually and cumulatively, that the trial court abused its discretion in denying a new trial. We disagree.
¶71 The decision to grant or deny a motion for a new trial based on attorney conduct rests within the trial court's sound discretion. Gilmore v. Jefferson County Pub. Transp. Benefit Area, 190 Wash.2d 483, 502-04, 415 P.3d 212 (2018). The grant or denial of a new trial under such circumstances is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Aluminum Co. of Am. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 140 Wash.2d 517, 537, 998 P.2d 856 (2000). “[W]e require a much stronger showing of abuse of discretion to set aside an order granting a new trial than one denying a new trial.” Teter v. Deck, 174 Wash.2d 207, 222, 274 P.3d 336 (2012). “The trial court is in the best position ‘to most effectively determine if counsel's misconduct prejudiced a party's right to a fair trial.’ ” Andren v. Dake, 14 Wash. App. 2d 296, 305, 472 P.3d 1013 (2020) (quoting Spencer v. Badgley Mullins Turner, PLLC, 6 Wash. App. 2d 762, 790, 432 P.3d 821 (2018)). We examine the totality of the conduct rather than parsing every objectionable statement as a separate claim. Rookstool v. Eaton, 12 Wash. App. 2d 301, 312, 457 P.3d 1144 (2020).
3.1 Claimed prejudicial misconduct
¶72 A trial court controls the mode and order of examining witnesses and presenting evidence so as to ascertain the truth, avoid waste of time, and protect witnesses from harassment or embarrassment. ER 611(a). “To preserve an error relating to misconduct of counsel, a party should object to the statement, seek a curative instruction, and move for a mistrial or new trial.” City of Bellevue v. Kravik, 69 Wash. App. 735, 743, 850 P.2d 559 (1993).
¶73 Nationwide alleges there was a high volume of argumentative questions and comments, harassment of witnesses, speaking objections in violation of pretrial rulings, and instances of disrespect toward the court by Shiferaw's counsel. The parties agree that Nationwide made 632 objections during trial to questions posed by Shiferaw's counsel, David Beninger, of which the trial court overruled 343 (54 percent) and sustained 289 (46 percent).
¶74 The initial interaction by Beninger with the first witness called by Shiferaw in her case-in-chief, who had been counsel for Agere in the underlying litigation between Agere and Shiferaw, was:
BY MR. BENINGER:
Q Good morning, ․
A Good morning. Can you hear me? Do I need to adjust this?
Q No, it's good․
A ․ Let me know if I'm too quiet. I do speak quietly sometimes.
Q Probably won't with the subject matter here.
I want you to assume that we've heard a lot in the defense opening about what a greedy, opportunistic lawyer you are that took advantage of a tragic situation to set up an insurance company for your own financial wealth.
[NATIONWIDE'S COUNSEL]: I'm going to object, Your Honor. That's not a question.
THE COURT: I'll sustain it if you can ask a question.
3 Verbatim Rep. of Proc. (VRP) (Jan. 25, 2023) at 1015.
¶75 The first day of testimony by Agere's counsel was riddled with objections. On the morning of the second day of testimony, prior to Beninger completing his direct examination of the witness, counsel addressed these objections with the court outside the presence of the jury. Both parties presented extensive argument related to allegations by Nationwide of leading and argumentative questions, statements of law embedded into questions, foundation, and the prejudicial impact, if any, these questions might have on the jury. Nationwide also requested a curative instruction be given to the jury prior to the resumption of testimony. After counsel concluded its argument on these issues, the trial court stated:
It is true that the Court has discretion to allow certain leading questions for certain witnesses. A seasoned lawyer is not one that I'm going to allow leading questions.
At this point, I agree with defense. [Beninger] asked a lot of leading questions. I'm going to tell [Nationwide's counsel] stand up and object every time because I'm going to call [Beninger] on it right away, and I understand that [Nationwide is] worried about what it does to the jury, but the Court is going to point out eventually then to the jury that the reason why [Nationwide's counsel] keep[s] getting up is because the questions are improper, and the Court's going to keep ruling on them.
At this point, you are absolutely not going to lead [Agere's counsel] today. I'm going to ask that you ask basically questions that are not leading.
․
I know it's a pain, but I'm going to have [Nationwide] object every time, and then there will be a curative instruction today, not this morning. I'm going to see how it goes, but if it continues and [Nationwide's counsel has] to keep getting up, I will give them a curative instruction that I've instructed [Nationwide] if [Nationwide's counsel] think[s] it's improper, [Nationwide] stand up every time, and I'm going to rule on it, and I'll tell [the jury] what it is.
[Beninger is] going to behave today, ask proper questions or [Nationwide] will stand up, and I'm going to—
․
I'm going to give the jury a curative instruction. I don't want to prejudice either side.
3 VRP (Jan. 26, 2023) at 1237-39. The court reprimanded Beninger on other occasions as well.
¶76 On appeal, Nationwide asserts the trial court repeatedly found “misconduct.” The record does not support that characterization. While the court expressed frustration with Beninger's examination style, it never labeled the behavior “misconduct.” The court, at times, expressed similar frustration with Nationwide's counsel. In denying Nationwide's motion for a new trial, the court observed that both sides pushed boundaries during trial regarding rules and etiquette, that most of the challenged incidents occurred outside the jury's presence, and that Nationwide itself had violated local rules on page limits and CR 59 in its posttrial motions without first seeking leave of court. The court viewed the lapses as reflective of vigorous advocacy in a long, high-stakes case rather than a campaign of prejudice.
¶77 Although the litigation was hotly contested and counsel on both sides engaged in questionable conduct that at times pushed the bounds of professionalism, the trial court consistently managed the proceedings in a fair and neutral fashion. It addressed the behavior in real time and encouraged the attorneys to improve for the benefit of the jury's ability to follow the evidence. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for a new trial on this basis.
3.2 Objections and the proposed curative instruction
¶78 Persistent use of questions known to be objectionable can itself be problematic; prejudice may result even when objections are sustained because repeated sustained objections may leave the jury with the impression that the objecting party is concealing something important. Teter, 174 Wash.2d at 223, 274 P.3d 336; Andren, 14 Wash. App. 2d at 318, 472 P.3d 1013.
¶79 An isolated factual error in the trial court's ruling—stating that Nationwide had never proposed language for a curative instruction when in fact it had—does not render the overall determination in not granting a new trial untenable. One week into the trial, Nationwide filed a motion for curative instructions to the jury and submitted three proposed instructions for consideration by the court. It also moved to disqualify Beninger as lead counsel and later renewed this request. When Nationwide moved for a new trial based on attorney misconduct, the trial court in part relied on the premise that despite being asked for proposed curative instruction language, Nationwide never provided any. That premise was incorrect.
¶80 The error is not dispositive. At the outset of trial, the court instructed the jury that objections should not influence its decisions and that jurors must disregard any evidence the court ruled was inadmissible. The trial court's ultimate conclusion rested on its assessment of the cumulative effect of the unchallenged conduct on the jury, not solely on the absence of a proposed instruction. While the trial court's ruling did rely on an inaccurate factual premise, the record as a whole still supports the trial court's broader determination that the conduct did not warrant a new trial.
3.3 Attorney witnesses declining to testify
¶81 Nationwide argues that it was prejudiced by Shiferaw's counsel waiting until the day before one of Shiferaw's prior defense attorneys was scheduled to testify to move to exclude them, by repeatedly characterizing the attorneys as “conflicted lawyers” who were deliberately assigned by Nationwide to put its interests before that of Shiferaw, and by creating pressure that caused the lawyers to decline to appear at trial.
¶82 The argument is unsupported by citation to legal authority and may be disregarded on that ground alone. RAP 10.3(a)(6); Brownfield v. City of Yakima, 178 Wash. App. 850, 875-76, 316 P.3d 520 (2014). Even if considered, it does not establish an abuse of discretion.
¶83 In pretrial disclosures of lay and expert witnesses for trial, Nationwide identified as lay witnesses the attorneys assigned by Nationwide to defend Shiferaw in the underlying claims by Agere. Shiferaw moved to exclude these attorneys the day before one was scheduled to testify, arguing that an insurer may not use information against its own insured that had been acquired by assigned defense counsel under the umbrella of attorney-client privilege, and that Shiferaw had never agreed to waive that privilege. During argument, the court itself raised the possibility of professional responsibility issues and suggested an in-camera inquiry of the attorney witnesses so the attorneys could thereafter decide whether they were willing to testify. Counsel did not act on the court's offer. Nationwide later reported that the attorneys declined to testify. The attorneys themselves chose not to testify; they were not excluded by threat or order of the court.
¶84 The timing of the motion and the repeated labeling of these attorneys as “conflicted lawyers” framed a less-than-ideal narrative. Nothing in the record, however, demonstrates that an earlier motion would have produced a different outcome or that the situation so distorted the trial that the jury could not fairly evaluate the evidence. The trial court acted within its discretion in declining to grant a new trial on this ground.
3.4 Closing argument
¶85 Nationwide contends that Beninger violated three pretrial in limine rulings during closing argument by referencing punitive concepts, Nationwide's corporate status and financial condition, and the absence of training or lessons learned—all during the compensatory phase of trial—and by urging the jury to send a message.
¶86 Several of the challenged statements came close to or crossed the lines drawn by the orders in limine. “Even when portions of closing argument are improper or inaccurate, failure to make contemporaneous objections usually waives any error unless the argument was so flagrant and prejudicial as not to be subject to a curative instruction.” Wash. State Physicians Ins. Exch. & Ass'n v. Fisons Corp., 122 Wash.2d 299, 333-34, 858 P.2d 1054 (1993). That principle applies with particular force when the jury has been instructed that lawyers’ remarks and arguments are not evidence. Id. at 334, 858 P.2d 1054.
¶87 Nationwide did not object to any of the challenged statements and did not request a curative instruction. The trial court gave the standard instruction that arguments are not evidence. We deem the claim to be waived. Even if the statements violated pretrial rulings, the trial court could reasonably conclude they were not so flagrant and incurable as to require a new trial.
3.5 Conclusion on the cumulative claim
¶88 Nationwide identified a substantial volume of questionable and at times improper conduct, a high number of sustained objections, a factual error in the trial court's written posttrial ruling, and closing remarks that approached or crossed the boundaries of pretrial in limine rulings. Those points raise legitimate concerns about cumulative effect.
¶89 “Because the trial court is in the best position to determine the prejudice of circumstances at trial, we review the decision to grant or deny a mistrial for abuse of discretion.” Helmbreck v. McPhee, 15 Wash. App. 2d 41, 67, 476 P.3d 589 (2020). A mistrial should be granted only when nothing the court says or does can remedy the harm and the party has been so prejudiced that only a new trial can correct the error. Id. at 67-68, 476 P.3d 589.
¶90 Given the trial court's first-hand observation, its repeated corrective interventions, its finding that much of the questionable attorney conduct occurred outside the jury's presence, and its conclusion that the cumulative effect did not prevent the jury from deciding the case on the evidence and the law, we cannot say the decision was manifestly unreasonable or based on untenable grounds. The trial court properly denied the motion for a new trial.
4. Attorney fee multiplier
¶91 Nationwide challenges the two-times multiplier applied to the lodestar fee award. Because we have substantially reduced the judgment by reversing the IFCA award and judgment, and reversing the punitive damages award and judgment, we reverse the entire attorney fee and cost award and judgment, and remand for a complete redetermination.
¶92 An insured who must sue to obtain the benefit of their insurance contract is entitled to an award of attorney fees. Olympic S.S., 117 Wash.2d at 52-53, 811 P.2d 673. Shiferaw remains successful on the surviving bad faith, negligence, and CPA claims and is therefore entitled to fees under Olympic Steamship and the CPA.
¶93 Adjustments to the lodestar are reserved for rare occasions. Miller v. Kenny, 180 Wash. App. 772, 825-26, 325 P.3d 278 (2014). A contingency multiplier may be warranted when the lodestar does not adequately account for the high-risk nature of the case. Chuong Van Pham v. Seattle City Light, 159 Wash.2d 527, 541-42, 151 P.3d 976 (2007). Quality-of-representation adjustments are extremely limited because quality is ordinarily reflected in the hourly rate, but an upward adjustment may be warranted for unusually good representation. Bowers v. Transamerica Title Ins. Co., 100 Wash.2d 581, 599, 675 P.2d 193 (1983) (plurality opinion).
¶94 On remand, the trial court must conduct a fresh determination of the reasonable lodestar (hours reasonably expended multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate) attributable to the successful claims that remain, and must then decide, in the exercise of its discretion, whether any multiplier remains appropriate and, if so, at what level. The court is not bound by its prior decision to apply a two-times multiplier. It may consider changed circumstances, including the reduced recovery, the relative success on the surviving claims, and the factors set forth in Scott Fetzer Company v. Weeks, 122 Wash.2d 141, 859 P.2d 1210 (1993), and related authority. We express no view on whether a multiplier is still warranted.
5. CR 59(j)
¶95 Nationwide filed successive posttrial motions both before and after entry of judgment without first obtaining leave of the court. Nationwide asserts that it brought its posttrial motions only after the entry of judgment and, thus, the superior court erred when it ruled Nationwide violated CR 59(j).
¶96 CR 59(j) provides: “If a motion for reconsideration, or for a new trial, or for judgment as a matter of law, is made and heard before the entry of the judgment, no further motion may be made, without leave of the court first obtained for good cause shown.”
¶97 The record shows Nationwide filed four posttrial motions two days before the trial court entered a judgment on the punitive damages award, then filed two additional posttrial motions after judgment, all without leave of court. The trial court correctly observed these motions violated CR 59(j). The observation is immaterial, however, because the court went on to decide the motions on the merits. We therefore do not disturb those rulings.
6. Reassignment of trial judge
¶98 Nationwide argues that reassignment to a different trial judge is appropriate on remand because the trial court applied incorrect legal standards and made other questionable discretionary decisions.
¶99 Reassignment is warranted only if a judge's impartiality can reasonably be questioned or to avoid the appearance of unfairness. “Due process, the appearance of fairness, and ․ the Code of Judicial Conduct require disqualification of a judge who is biased against a party or whose impartiality may be reasonably questioned.” Wolfkill Feed & Fertilizer Corp. v. Martin, 103 Wash. App. 836, 841, 14 P.3d 877 (2000). A trial court is presumed to perform its functions without bias or prejudice. Id. The appearance of fairness doctrine is violated only when a reasonably prudent and disinterested observer would conclude that the parties did not obtain a fair, impartial, and neutral hearing. State v. Solis-Diaz, 187 Wash.2d 535, 540, 387 P.3d 703 (2017) (per curiam). “The party asserting a violation of the appearance of fairness must show a judge's actual or potential bias.” Id. “The test for determining whether the judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned is an objective test that assumes that ‘a reasonable person knows and understands all the relevant facts.’ ” Sherman v. State, 128 Wash.2d 164, 206, 905 P.2d 355 (1995) (quoting In re Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc., 861 F.2d 1307, 1313 (2d Cir. 1988)).
¶100 None of the examples submitted by Nationwide demonstrate partiality or unfairness on the part of the trial judge. On remand, if available, the same judicial officer may preside over further proceedings.
Shiferaw's Cross Appeal
Injunctive relief
¶101 After the jury found that Nationwide violated the CPA, Shiferaw moved for permanent injunctive relief under RCW 19.86.090. She asked the trial court to enjoin Nationwide from continuing the unfair or deceptive claims handling practices the jury found violated the CPA. Prior to trial, Nationwide successfully moved to reserve the issue of injunctive relief exclusively for decision by the court after the jury trial. The trial court granted the motion. After the verdict, the trial court denied Shiferaw's request. In doing so, it applied the traditional equitable factor from Tyler Pipe Industries, Inc. v. Department of Revenue, 96 Wash.2d 785, 638 P.2d 1213 (1982), and RCW 7.40.020, and further found there was no danger of recurrent future violations.
¶102 A trial court's decision to grant or deny an injunction is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Rabon v. City of Seattle, 135 Wash.2d 278, 284, 957 P.2d 621 (1998). “A trial court necessarily abuses its discretion if the decision is based upon untenable grounds, or the decision is manifestly unreasonable or arbitrary.” Kucera v. Dep't of Transp., 140 Wash.2d 200, 209, 995 P.2d 63 (2000).
¶103 RCW 19.86.090 expressly authorizes a private plaintiff who is injured in business or property by a violation of the CPA to “bring a civil action in superior court to enjoin further violations.” The statute is to be liberally construed. Strenge v. Clarke, 89 Wash.2d 23, 29, 569 P.2d 60 (1977). Private citizen actions are an integral part of CPA enforcement and serve the purpose of protecting the public as a whole. Scott v. Cingular Wireless, 160 Wash.2d 843, 853, 161 P.3d 1000 (2007). A consumer may obtain injunctive relief under the CPA even if that injunction would not directly affect that particular consumer's private interests. Hockley v. Hargitt, 82 Wash.2d 337, 351, 510 P.2d 1123 (1973); Dix v. ICT Group, Inc., 160 Wash.2d 826, 837, 161 P.3d 1016 (2007).
¶104 The traditional equitable factors articulated in Tyler Pipe and RCW 7.40.020 focus on irreparable harm to the individual party seeking the injunction. Those requirements are not imposed by RCW 19.86.090. By evaluating Shiferaw's request under the Tyler Pipe standard and by requiring her to prove a danger of recurrent future violations under that framework, the trial court applied the wrong legal standard and thereby abused its discretion.
¶105 On remand, the trial court shall reconsider the request under RCW 19.86.090. The proper inquiry centers on whether an injunction would further the public interest in preventing unfair or deceptive acts or practices, taking into account the nature and severity of the conduct found by the jury, the likelihood that similar conduct may recur, the adequacy of other remedies (including the monetary judgment and regulatory oversight by the Washington State Insurance Commissioner), and whether the requested relief is appropriately tailored. The court may consider whether a purely prohibitory injunction against future violations of the insurance regulations and the CPA is warranted, or whether more specific affirmative relief is necessary and workable. The court is not required to grant an injunction; it retains discretion to deny relief if, after applying the correct legal standard, it concludes that an injunction is not appropriate under the circumstances. We express no view on the ultimate outcome.
APPELLATE ATTORNEY FEES
The superior court already determined that Shiferaw is entitled to attorney fees and costs pursuant to Olympic S.S., 117 Wash.2d 37, 811 P.2d 673, IFCA, RCW 48.30.015(3), and the CPA, RCW 19.86.090. CP [at] 2347-45, 8973-78. The jury also determined that Shiferaw is entitled to attorney fees and costs as part of its punitive damages verdict. CP [at] 5533. The same grounds justify attorney fees and costs on appeal, and Shiferaw hereby requests such fees and costs pursuant to RAP 18.1(a)-(b).
Br. of Appellant at 185.
¶106 RAP 18.1 requires more than a bald request for attorney fees and costs on appeal. Nw. Wholesale, Inc. v. Pac. Organic Fruit, LLC, 183 Wash. App. 459, 492, 334 P.3d 63 (2014), aff'd, 184 Wash.2d 176, 357 P.3d 650 (2015); Henne v. City of Yakima, 177 Wash. App. 583, 590, 313 P.3d 1188 (2013), rev'd on other grounds, 182 Wash.2d 447, 341 P.3d 284 (2015). The party seeking attorney fees on appeal must provide citation to the applicable law that grants the right to such fees and argument. Nw. Wholesale, 183 Wash. App. at 492-93, 334 P.3d 63; Henne, 177 Wash. App. at 590, 313 P.3d 1188. The requirement of “argument” is implied by RAP 18.1(b) (“Argument in Brief”). This requirement is especially necessary when the requestor's right to fees based on the authority they cite can be reasonably questioned. As explained below, we mostly deny Shiferaw's request for attorney fees on appeal.
¶107 First, Shiferaw did not prevail on her IFCA claim or her punitive damages claim, so we deny her request to the extent she incurred attorney fees on appeal for those claims. Second, although Olympic Steamship supports an award of attorney fees for an insured forced to litigate against their insurer to obtain the benefits of their insurance policy, 117 Wash.2d at 52-54, 811 P.2d 673, it is unclear whether the awards that are the subject of this appeal were benefits of the insurance policy or extra contractual damages. Some argument on this issue would be required to convince this court that the holding of Olympic Steamship applies here. Third, RCW 48.30.015(3) mandates an award by the trial court of attorney fees for “unreasonable denial of a claim for coverage,” but Shiferaw did not prevail on this claim. Fourth, Shiferaw's request for attorney fees based on the “CPA” is about as bald of a request as one can imagine. She fails to cite the statute; rather, she refers to the entire act. We question to what extent, if any, the parties addressed the CPA on appeal. Some argument on this point would have been helpful. Nevertheless, subject to Shiferaw's compliance with RAP 18.1(d), we grant her request for attorney fees on appeal for defending her CPA award but place the onus on Shiferaw to convince our commissioner that some of her fees on appeal were incurred defending that award.
CONCLUSION
¶108 We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. We affirm the awards and judgments on Shiferaw's claims for bad faith, negligence, and violation of the CPA. The IFCA award and judgment is reversed, and we remand for dismissal of that claim with prejudice. The $47 million punitive damages award and judgment is reversed. The denial of a new trial is affirmed. The attorney fee and cost awards and judgments are reversed, and we remand for a complete redetermination of the lodestar and of whether any multiplier remains appropriate. The CR 59(j) ruling presents no reversible error. Reassignment of the trial court judge on remand is denied.
¶109 On cross-appeal, the denial of injunctive relief is reversed, and the matter is remanded for reconsideration under RCW 19.86.090 in accordance with the guidance set forth above.
FOOTNOTES
1. It was not always clear to the parties whether the policy limits should be calculated in Canadian or United States currency. Nationwide's initial position was that CAN$200,000 was the policy limit and Agere's presuit settlement demands were consistent with Nationwide's position. Ultimately, it was determined that US$200,000 was the aggregate limit.
2. Under the province of Alberta's Limitations Act, RSA (Revised Statutes of Alberta) 2000, chapter L-12, the general rule is a claim for personal injury must be brought within two years of the occurrence resulting in an injury.
3. This notice did not comply with the requirement in CR 71(c)(1) that 10 days’ notice be given to allow for any objections to withdrawal.
4. On October 2, 2019, the substituted law firm and counsel as assigned by Nationwide filed a notice of intent to withdraw that complied with the notice requirements of CR 71, also noting Ahrend and Beninger remained private counsel for Shiferaw. Shiferaw through Ahrend objected to the withdrawal, prompting a motion for withdrawal with corresponding briefing. After a hearing on the motion, leave was granted on November 1, 2019, for the second assigned defense counsel to withdraw.
5. Agere's claim against Nationwide for declaratory judgment remained unchanged.
6. “Dépeçage” is “[a] court's application of different state laws to different issues in a legal dispute; choice of law on an issue-by-issue basis.” Black’s Law Dictionary 551 (12th ed. 2024).
7. Olympic S.S. Co., Inc. v. Centennial Ins. Co., 117 Wash.2d 37, 52-53, 811 P.2d 673 (1991).
8. “Notice may be provided by regular mail, registered mail, or certified mail with return receipt requested. Proof of notice by mail may be made in the same manner as prescribed by court rule or statute for proof of service by mail. The insurer and insurance commissioner are deemed to have received notice three business days after the notice is mailed.” Id.
9. On appeal, Nationwide argues there is no actual conflict of law between Washington and Ohio on the availability of punitive damages. Shiferaw responds that in the trial court Nationwide conceded the existence of an actual conflict and therefore the argument is waived on appeal. Although the existence of an actual conflict is a pure question of law and a mandatory threshold inquiry in any choice of law analysis, Nationwide's prior concession led the trial court to proceed directly to the most significant relationship test. We therefore begin our review from that point and assume, for purposes of our analysis, that an actual conflict of law exists.
10. Ohio Revised Code.
Murphy, J.
WE CONCUR: Staab, C.J. Lawrence-Berrey, J.
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Docket No: No. 39643-6-III
Decided: November 10, 2026
Court: Court of Appeals of Washington, Division 3.
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