IN RE: the Detention of: R.P. (2026)

Joel's Law allows a person's immediate family member, guardian, conservator, or fellow Indian tribe member to petition a superior court to detain the person for involuntary mental health treatment if a designated crisis responder has declined to detain the person. See RCW 71.05.201. The statute defines an “immediate family member” as “a spouse, domestic partner, child, stepchild, parent, stepparent, grandparent, or sibling.” RCW 71.05.201(10).

RP appeals an initial Joel's Law order detaining him for up to 120 hours of involuntary mental health treatment based on a petition filed by his sister-in-law. RP also appeals a second order detaining him for up to 14 days of involuntary mental health treatment based on the trial court's finding that RP was gravely disabled.

On appeal, RP argues that the trial court erred in granting the initial Joel's Law order because RP's sister-in-law was not an “immediate family member” authorized to file the underlying Joel's Law petition as that term is defined in the statute. Although the State responds that the collateral bar rule bars RP's challenge, in the published portion of this opinion, we conclude that the collateral bar rule is inapplicable here. We agree with RP that his sister-in-law was not eligible to file the Joel's Law petition. We reverse the Joel's Law 120-hour detention order.

In the unpublished portion of this opinion, we affirm the 14-day detention order.¹

FACTS

I. The Initial Joel’s Law Petition and Order

A. Background

RP is a veteran who was living in a tiny home operated by the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs (VA). On September 30, 2024, an Adult Protective Services social worker reported that RP had barricaded himself in his room for at least 7 days and was acting erratically, not taking medications, not eating, and not taking care of himself. The social worker had received reports that RP had not been seen by staff in 7 to 10 days and had a sign outside his door that read, “ ‘Go away.’ ” Clerk's Papers (CP) at 21. The social worker requested an involuntary mental health treatment assessment for RP.

Later the same day, crisis responders arrived at RP's home in response to the assessment request. The facilities case manager told the crisis responders that RP had not been taking medications or eating, had barricaded himself in his room, had not come out for at least seven days, and was presenting as paranoid. Staff at RP's facility believed that RP was not taking medications because he was exhibiting seclusion, paranoia, and delusions of persecution, all behaviors he had displayed in the past when unmedicated. The case manager was concerned for RP's safety due to a possible lack of food.

The crisis responders knocked on RP's door, and RP told them to “ ‘[p]lease go away.’ ” CP at 18. The crisis responders attempted several more times, but RP did not respond further. Since the crisis responders were unable to communicate with RP, they could not determine whether he met criteria to be involuntarily detained for mental health treatment.

B. Joel's Law Petition and Evidence

A few days later, RP's sister-in-law, EP, filed a “Joel's Law Petition for Initial Detention” in Pierce County Superior Court, requesting detention for RP for involuntary mental health treatment and outlining her concerns about him. Joel's Law allows a person's immediate family member, guardian, conservator, or fellow Indian tribe member to petition a superior court for detention of the person for involuntary mental health treatment if a designated crisis responder has conducted an investigation within the last 10 days and decided not to detain the person. See RCW 71.05.201(1). A qualifying person may also file a Joel's Law petition if 48 hours have elapsed since a designated crisis responder received a request for investigation and the designated crisis responder has not taken action to have the person detained. See RCW 71.05.201(1).

In the section labelled “Petitioner's Relationship to the Respondent,” EP checked the box indicating that she was RP's “sibling,” but above the box she wrote “sister-in-law.” CP at 1 (capitalization omitted). In the petition, EP wrote that she had known RP for 50 years and explained that the family had distanced themselves from RP and only communicated with him via phone and text.

In her petition, EP checked “yes” to indicate that she endorsed the following statements: (1) RP was “in danger of serious physical harm resulting from a failure to provide for [his] essential human needs of health or safety” ; (2) there was a “high probability of serious physical harm within the near future without adequate treatment” ; (3) RP manifested “severe deterioration in routine functioning, evidenced by repeated and escalating loss of cognitive or volitional control over his ․ actions,” and he was “not receiving such care as [was] essential for [his] health or safety” ; (4) “harmful consequences” would occur to RP absent treatment; and (5) RP had “refused or failed to accept evaluation and treatment voluntarily.” CP at 3-4 (boldface omitted).

In her handwritten statement supporting the petition, EP described an incident where RP was previously in a medical facility because he was found on the road at night cutting himself. EP worried he might harm himself like this again because he was talking and acting similarly. EP noted that RP was calm and took his medications at the medical facility, and that he started helping with mowing and mopping in the VA tiny home community where he lived. EP wrote that, while on medication, RP is a “caring, helpful, industrious individual although known to be easily angered.” CP at 8.

However, EP observed that over the later months, RP had deteriorated, experiencing extreme anxiety and delusional thinking. Although RP was calmer during the times he took his prescribed medication, EP noted that RP would take extra doses of his medication, saying the prescribed dose was too weak. Then, when RP ran out of medication, he would get worse and occasionally self-medicate with other drugs. RP had told EP many times that he would not make it through the night, and “to tell Mom that he loves her and to tell his son that he is so sorry.” CP at 6. EP wrote that it had been almost a year since RP had started “thinking and acting so out of touch with reality.” Id. She further explained that “in that time there ha[d] only been about [six] conversations where he was talking and thinking normally,” and that she suspected he was taking his prescribed medications on those occasions. Id.

EP wrote that RP had not left his tiny home for about nine days and that when concerned neighbors went to his door, he told them to go away. EP explained that RP was irrational when he spoke with her on the phone recently, saying things like, “They're going to crucify me. If I step out[ ] of the door[,] they are going to beat me to a pulp! Everyone I've ever known, the whole world—if they knew what was going on—would kill me. I've got to get away from the VA.” CP at 4. RP asked EP and her husband, RP's brother, to come get him, but EP could not have him in their home due to his erratic moods and behavior.

EP described an incident that day where RP called her and stated that he could not get out of bed, he hadn't shaved, and he had asked someone to bring him milk. RP yelled over the phone that “this was God's judgement, that he was being eaten up inside because of what he had done, and “[t]hat all the military people would hate him and try to kill him.” CP at 5-6. EP concluded her statement by observing that over the past year, RP had “spiralled down so badly that [she] fear[ed] for him,” and that if she had known about the Joel's Law petition earlier, she would have filed it a year ago. CP at 7.

A manager of the “Mobile Outreach Crisis Team” also submitted a declaration to the trial court describing why the designated crisis responders who arrived on scene could not determine whether RP met criteria to be involuntarily detained. And the crisis responders’ agency submitted additional documentation to the trial court about the attempt to make contact with RP on September 30, 2024.

C. Joel's Law Order for Initial Detention

In response to the petition, a commissioner issued a Joel's Law order on October 7, 2024, requiring RP to be detained in an evaluation and treatment facility for no more than 120 hours. In the Joel's Law order, the commissioner checked the box indicating that “[a] review of the Petition shows that there is sufficient evidence to conclude that [EP] is an immediate family member, the guardian, the conservator of the Respondent, or a federally recognized Indian tribe of which the Respondent is a member.” CP at 13. There is no further explanation in our record as to how the commissioner came to this conclusion.

The commissioner found probable cause to detain RP because RP was gravely disabled as a result of a mental disorder, and RP had refused or failed to accept appropriate evaluation and treatment voluntarily. The commissioner did not check the associated boxes stating how the grave disability requirement was met. The commissioner therefore did not find that RP, as a result of the mental disorder, was “in danger of serious physical harm resulting from a failure to provide for [his] essential human needs of health or safety.” CP at 14. Nor did the court find at this stage that RP “manifest[ed] severe deterioration in routine functioning evidenced by repeated and escalating loss of cognitive or volitional control over [his] actions and [was] not receiving such care as [was] essential for [his] health and safety.” Id.

Below the statement in the order that read, “A review of the Petition and all of the supporting documentation shows sufficient evidence to support the allegation/s as follows,” the commissioner wrote, “Evidence Resp. not taking medications. Delusional behavior. [E]rratic behavior.” CP at 13.²

On October 14, 2024, a crisis responder detained RP under the authority of the Joel's Law order. RP was ultimately placed on a 120-hour detention at Wellfound Behavioral Health Hospital. RP appeals the order authorizing his initial detention under Joel's Law.

ANALYSIS

As an initial matter, both parties agree that even though RP's detention has ended, this appeal is not moot. When making a civil commitment determination, a trial court “shall give great weight” to the individual's prior civil commitments within the last three years. RCW 71.05.245(3). Therefore, “each commitment order has a collateral consequence in subsequent petitions and hearings, allowing us to render relief if we hold that the detention under a civil commitment order was not warranted.” In re Det. of M.K., 168 Wn. App. 621, 626, 279 P.3d 897 (2012). As a result, we agree that this appeal is not moot because RP's detention orders have collateral consequences for future involuntary treatment proceedings.

I. Collateral Bar Rule

The State argues that the collateral bar rule precludes RP's challenge to the Joel's Law order detaining him for 120 hours. “The collateral bar rule prohibits a party from challenging the validity of a court order in a proceeding for violation of that order.” City of Seattle v. May, 171 Wn.2d 847, 852, 256 P.3d 1161 (2011). The State contends that because the commissioner had jurisdiction and authority to issue the order, RP cannot attack any error in issuing it under the collateral bar rule. RP responds that the collateral bar rule only applies to proceedings for violations of a prior order, and since RP did not violate either order, review is not barred. We agree with RP.

The collateral bar rule “recognize[s] that flaws [that] do not go to the heart of the judicial power are insufficient to justify the flaunting of an otherwise lawful order.” Mead Sch. Dist. No. 354 v. Mead Educ. Ass'n, 85 Wn.2d 278, 284, 534 P.2d 561 (1975). All of the cases the State relies on apply the collateral bar rule in proceedings where a party violated a court order, consistent with this underlying policy. See May, 171 Wn.2d at 850 (prosecution for violation of a domestic violence protection order); State v. Noah, 103 Wn. App. 29, 33, 9 P.3d 858 (2000) (contempt order for violation of an underlying antiharassment order); Mead Sch. Dist., 85 Wn.2d at 279 (contempt order for violation of a temporary injunction); State v. Miller, 156 Wn.2d 23, 24, 123 P.3d 827 (2005) (prosecution for violation of a domestic violence no-contact order). Without a proceeding about a violation of the challenged court order, the collateral bar rule does not apply, and there is no reason to preclude review.

The collateral bar rule is limited to situations where a party violates a court order and then seeks to challenge the validity of the underlying order. See May, 171 Wn.2d at 852. Here, RP did not violate either of the court orders mandating his involuntary detention, and he properly appealed the orders. So the collateral bar rule does not apply, and RP's challenge to the validity of the initial detention order is reviewable.³

II. Whether the Trial Court Erred in Issuing the Joel’s Law Order

RP's sister-in-law, EP, filed the Joel's Law petition for RP's detention. RP argues that the superior court erred in granting the Joel's Law petition where the petitioner was not an immediate family member as defined by RCW 71.05.201(10). The State does not make an argument on this point, claiming only that RP's challenge to the Joel's Law order is precluded by the collateral bar rule. See Br. of Resp't at 24-29. We agree with RP that RP's sister-in-law, EP, was not an “immediate family member” authorized to file a Joel's Law petition seeking RP's involuntary detention.

A. Joel's Law

Joel's Law allows a person's immediate family member, guardian, conservator, or fellow Indian tribe member to petition a superior court for detention of the person for involuntary treatment if 48 hours have elapsed since a designated crisis responder received a request for investigation and the designated crisis responder has not taken action to have the person detained. See RCW 71.05.201(1). Here, designated crisis responders received a request to investigate RP and did not detain him. So, under RCW 71.05.201(1), an immediate family member could file a petition to detain RP after 48 hours.

The statute defines an “immediate family member” as “a spouse, domestic partner, child, stepchild, parent, stepparent, grandparent, or sibling.” RCW 71.05.201(10). After reviewing all of the information provided in a Joel's Law petition, the court may enter an order for initial detention if it finds that “(a) there is probable cause to support a petition for detention; and (b) the person has refused or failed to accept appropriate evaluation and treatment voluntarily.” RCW 71.05.201(7).

Statutory interpretation is a question of law reviewed de novo. Dep't of Ecology v. Campbell & Gwinn, LLC, 146 Wn.2d 1, 9, 43 P.3d 4 (2002). A court's fundamental objective is to ascertain and carry out the legislature's intent. Id. “[I]f the statute's meaning is plain on its face, then the court must give effect to that plain meaning as an expression of legislative intent.” Id. at 9-10. Because plain meaning does not require construction, courts do not need to consider outside sources if a statute is unambiguous. Jametsky v. Olsen, 179 Wn.2d 756, 762, 317 P.3d 1003 (2014). Courts generally must consider the legislature's intent and avoid absurd results. In re Det. of C.W., 147 Wn.2d 259, 272, 53 P.3d 979 (2002). But because civil commitment statutes involve a deprivation of liberty, they should be strictly construed. Id.

Only when a statute's language is ambiguous and could be reasonably interpreted in multiple ways do we turn to other tools for statutory construction. State v. Valdiglesias LaValle, 2 Wn.3d 310, 318, 535 P.3d 856 (2023). Expressio unius est exclusio alterius, a common maxim of statutory construction, holds that “[w]here a statute specifically designates the things or classes of things upon which it operates, an inference arises in law that all things or classes of things omitted from it were intentionally omitted by the legislature.” Wash. Nat. Gas Co. v. Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1, 77 Wn.2d 94, 98, 459 P.2d 633 (1969).

The parties point to no case law equating a sibling-in-law with a “sibling” under RCW 71.05.201(10), and we have found none.

B. Analysis

RCW 71.05.201(10) is unambiguous. The legislature included siblings, but not “siblings-in-law” within the definition of an “immediate family member” authorized to file a Joel's Law petition. Under the plain language of the statute, an immediate family member does not include a “sibling-in-law.” RCW 71.05.201(10). And even if the language were not plain, because a curtailment of liberty is involved, we must strictly construe the statute, and it would violate this principle to read “sibling” broadly to include “siblings-in-law.” See C.W., 147 Wn.2d at 272.

Further, even if the definition of “immediate family member” were ambiguous, applying expressio unius est exclusio alterius, where the legislature specifically designated a class, an inference arises that omissions were intentional. See Wash. Nat. Gas Co., 77 Wn.2d at 98. Here, the legislature included other relatives who are not related by blood, including stepparents and stepchildren, but chose not to include any in-laws. Applying this principle of construction, we infer that siblings-in-law were intentionally omitted as a class of family members allowed to file a Joel's Law petition.

There is no evidence that EP was RP's guardian, or that she represented a tribe of which RP was a member. So there is no statutory category of relationship that would allow her to file the petition.

CONCLUSION

Because EP was not authorized to file a Joel's Law petition for RP, the court below erred in granting EP's petition and issuing the Joel's Law order. Accordingly we reverse the initial 120-hour detention order filed under Joel's Law.

A majority of the panel having determined that only the foregoing portion of this opinion will be printed in the Washington Appellate Reports and that the remainder shall be filed for public record in accordance with RCW 2.06.040, it is so ordered.

UNPUBLISHED PORTION

RP argues that the trial court erred in granting the 14-day detention order because there was not substantial evidence to support the conclusion that RP was gravely disabled. Treating the unchallenged factual findings as verities on appeal, we conclude that the trial court's findings were sufficient to support the conclusion that RP was gravely disabled. RP was diagnosed with schizophrenia, paranoid type; he had severely deteriorated in routine functioning; and an expert testified RP would likely isolate, not take his medication and not eat, as he had before, if he was immediately released. We therefore affirm the 14-day order.⁴

ADDITIONAL FACTS

I. 14-Day Commitment Order

A. 14-Day Commitment Petition

At the end of his initial detention, RP's examining mental health counselor and nurse practitioner at Wellfound filed a petition in Pierce County Superior Court to further detain RP for up to 14 days of involuntary treatment. The petition alleged that as a result of a behavioral health disorder, RP was gravely disabled, and that there were no less restrictive alternatives to involuntary detention. The petition stated that RP had been diagnosed with “[s]chizophrenia, paranoid type.” CP at 44. The petitioners’ declaration relied in part on RP's history regarding his present illness, including EP's statements in her Joel's Law petition about RP.⁵

The declaration also relied in part on an evaluation of RP on the day the petition was filed. That evaluation noted that RP had below average grooming and hygiene; he wore wrinkled scrubs that appeared not to have been changed since awakening; and he was depressed, anxious, hopeless, and helpless. In his evaluation, RP acknowledged that he heard voices that “don't ever go away” and would “all of a sudden attack” him and tell him “that suicide [was] good,” and that he was “a piece of [sh**] or a pile or crap.” CP at 43 (boldface omitted). RP stated that he felt like he was stuck in a rut where no one seemed to be able to help him, and that there were days when he just wanted to lie in bed.

The evaluators found that RP had questionable judgment due to his reluctance to engage in treatment, lack of insight into the imminent risk associated with an earlier suicide attempt, and failure to recognize the need for treatment. RP also showed “impaired cognitive control” because he was isolative and guarded, he felt he could battle the voices on his own, and he did not understand the negative consequences of taking more medication than prescribed. Id. RP's history of two previous overdoses a few months before and prior recent hospitalizations also supported the petition.

B. Hearing

On October 21, 2024, a different commissioner presided over RP's 14-day detention hearing. Prior to the hearing, RP had filed a motion to dismiss the petition, arguing that the Joel's Law petition was invalid. The commissioner denied the motion to dismiss, and RP does not appeal that decision. Nor does RP challenge the commissioner's findings of fact contained in the order detaining RP for up to 14 days of involuntary treatment. See Appellant's Opening Br. at 2-3.

Paul Mellick, a licensed mental health counselor at Wellfound Behavioral Health Hospital who co-petitioned for RP's detention, testified at the hearing. Mellick was familiar with RP from a recent prior hospitalization at Wellfound, and he had treated RP in the court-mandated 120-hour detention. On direct examination, Mellick described his observations from his most recent evaluation of RP. Mellick noted that RP was pleasant, cooperative, and willing to engage in the assessment, but that RP begged and pleaded with him not to go forward with detention. Although RP engaged with the treatment team when they approached him in his room, RP did not come out of his room otherwise and remained isolated unless encouraged. Over the weekend before the hearing, RP indicated to Mellick that he was no longer experiencing auditory or visual hallucinations. But Mellick testified that when RP did hear the voices, they were derogatory, telling RP that he was good for nothing and that he needed to end his life. RP also vaguely indicated that he experienced hallucinations: “ ‘They're out to get me. They're out to attack me.’ ” 1 Verbatim Rep. of Proc. (VRP) at 21.

Mellick described RP's judgment as poor because RP was reluctant to engage in activities outside his room, “almost as though he [was] terrified or afraid to even exit the threshold of his door.” Id. Mellick opined that RP's insight was good in that RP knew he needed to get better and took medications and ate food, although only with encouragement.

Mellick provided information on RP's previous inpatient detentions, stating that RP had one detention in 2020 and a few in 2023. RP had four emergency room visits in 2024, all associated with mental illness, for issues ranging from trouble with demons to severe anxiety to suicidal thoughts. RP's previous August 2024 emergency room visit resulted in hospitalization at Wellfound after RP had allegedly overdosed on half a bottle of Advil. At discharge from this detention, RP adamantly assured Mellick that he would engage a therapist, but that appears to not have happened.

Mellick rejected the idea of less restrictive treatment for RP because RP made similar promises during his last stay at Wellfound in August 2024, when Mellick decided not to go forward with a 14-day hearing. For RP's current treatment, Mellick requested that RP remain at Wellfound for up to 14 additional days for purposes of outpatient management, allowing the hospital staff to set RP up with resources and medication adherence help. Mellick observed that RP was willing to engage with outpatient services through the VA if they were set up for him. Mellick believed that if RP were immediately discharged without this help, RP would repeat this cycle and return to the hospital.

RP also testified at the hearing. RP first stated that if he were to leave the hospital, he would go back to his tiny home. RP then said, “The reason why nobody has seen me in the past is because I have been making plans to go to Arizona.” 1 VRP at 33. RP continued, “[M]y plans were to go to ․ Wyoming, not to hurt anybody.” Id. RP stated that he would continue taking his medication, and that he would get medication from the VA in Wyoming. If he remained in his tiny home in Washington; however, he would get his medication in the mail from the VA.

RP explained that he does interact with people, and that he is courteous and keeps his troubles to himself. He said that he had gone to two different meetings at the hospital the previous day. RP then stated, “The only reason these words came out like they did is because I thought I was confiding in my sister, who would not let me talk to my brother, who I've been wanting to see for over three years.” 1 VRP at 34. RP testified that the reason he stayed in his room at the hospital is because “there [was] too much going on [there] for [him],” and his room was “the only place [he] [could] find any peace.” 1 VRP at 35.

If RP were to leave the hospital, RP said that he would be willing to participate in outpatient services like therapy, but he would prefer if providers came to his house. RP offered that lately he had gotten tired of people coming to his door asking for things, so he left a sign indicating he did not wish to be disturbed. RP explained that he had resources in the community or people who could support him. And RP expressed that he was willing to work with his provider to adjust his medication.

C. Trial Court's Findings, Conclusions, and Order

1. Unchallenged findings

The trial court entered findings of fact consistent with Mellick's testimony as described above. RP does not challenge any specific trial court finding on appeal, so the unchallenged findings are treated as verities. In re Det. of W.C.C., 193 Wn. App. 783, 793 n.5, 372 P.3d 179 (2016) (citing State v. Gibson, 152 Wn. App. 945, 951, 219 P.3d 964 (2009)). In the trial court's order, the “Evidence” section stated that “the court incorporates by reference the oral findings of fact and conclusions of law.” CP at 81.

The trial court made written findings regarding RP's history, appearance, disposition, and presentation. The trial court found that RP had four prior emergency room visits and several prior detentions, including in 2023 and 2024. At the time of his most current detention at Wellfound, RP was presenting as paranoid, he thought people were going to attack him, and he had not left his VA-provided tiny home for some time. RP's appearance was appropriate for the setting, but he had not changed clothes in a number of days, and his hair was in disarray, although he looked better for court. At the time of his assessment, RP's disposition was pleasant, cooperative, and engaged, but he was begging and pleading with staff to not go forward with detention.

RP would engage in groups and take his medication when prompted but otherwise would not leave his room at Wellfound. RP was fully oriented to place and time and his memory appeared intact. His speech was fast and rapid, but he responded appropriately to questions.

The trial court also made findings about RP's perceptions, judgment, insight, and control. RP's thought process was irritable, depressed, and hopeless. RP had internal turmoil and did not know what to do to get better. Voices in RP's head would attack him and come and go, and RP had no coping skills to know what to do when the voices came. The voices in RP's head were derogatory and degrading. The voices would tell RP that he was not worthy or valuable and that he needed to end his life. As of a few days before the hearing, RP stated he no longer experienced any auditory or visual delusions, but RP admitted to struggling with his equilibrium.

The trial court found that RP's judgment was poor because RP was reluctant to engage in activities outside his room; reluctant to do mental health counseling in the community; and reluctant to take medications in the community or in the facility without significant prompting, although he repeatedly promised to take his medication. RP's insight was good in that he knew he needed to get better, but he only took medications and ate food with encouragement and prompting. It was unclear whether he was taking medications before he was detained. RP's cognitive and volitional control was impaired in that RP stayed in his room and remained guarded, withdrawn, and isolative. RP was not assaultive.

The trial court also made findings regarding RP's community support and medication. RP was struggling to stay medicated. RP had a medication management provider, but not a mental health counselor, through the VA. RP stated that he was not getting enough medications from the VA and, according to family, he would take more medication than prescribed. RP stated repeatedly that he was willing to take medications when he left the facility. At the facility, RP was lying in bed depressed, so he requested medication from the doctor to boost his energy to get out of bed. RP had promised in the past that he would get a mental health provider for counseling, but he had not done so because he did not have the follow-through to complete the task.

The trial court found that a less restrictive alternative to detention was not appropriate because RP was engaging in repeat behavior. Although RP wanted to get help and get better, he lacked the ability to follow up. RP had stated the same things in his last hospitalization but did not follow through with getting additional mental health support when released. After the discharge two months before, RP decompensated and returned to the emergency room on an alleged Advil overdose. The trial court found that if RP was discharged at this time, he would likely not get the mental health support in the community that he needed, and he would likely return to a facility.

The trial court also made findings regarding RP's testimony. The court found that when RP testified, he was rambling and unable to stay on track. RP stated that he wanted to move to free land in Arizona and then he wanted to move to Wyoming. RP also confirmed he was isolative, stating that he could not live in noise, and that he preferred to stay in his room and not interact with others. RP's appearance, disposition, and orientation seemed to be improving while in care. However, his presentation and speech still appeared symptomatic as evidenced by his rapid speech, rambling, and non-responsive answers.

2. 14-day detention order and RP's appeal

Based on the unchallenged findings, the trial court entered its order on October 21, 2024, ordering RP to be detained for no more than 14 days of involuntary treatment at Wellfound. The trial court concluded that RP was gravely disabled and not a good-faith voluntary patient. To support this conclusion, the trial court ultimately found that RP suffered from schizophrenia, paranoid type. The trial court also found by a preponderance of the evidence that, as a result of a behavioral health disorder, RP manifested severe deterioration in routine functioning evidenced by repeated and escalating loss of cognitive or volitional control over his actions and that he was not receiving such care as was essential for his health or safety.

After four days of commitment under the 14-day order, Wellfound staff discharged RP. RP timely appeals the order detaining him for up to 14 days of involuntary commitment. RP assigns error to the trial court's conclusion that RP was gravely disabled but he does not challenge any of the trial court's findings of fact.

ADDITIONAL ANALYSIS

I. Substantial Evidence Supports the Conclusion of Grave Disability

In support of its order detaining RP for an additional 14 days after the initial Joel's Law order expired, the trial court concluded that RP was “gravely disabled” under prong (b): “a condition in which a person, as a result of a behavioral health disorder ․ (b) manifests severe deterioration in routine functioning evidenced by repeated and escalating loss of cognitive or volitional control over [their] actions and is not receiving such care as is essential for [their] health or safety.” RCW 71.05.020(25). RP argues that “there is insufficient evidence in the record to support the conclusion that [RP] suffers from a deterioration of cognitive and volitional control aside from his propensity to isolate himself in his room and have a depressive air when confined to a mental health facility.” Appellant's Opening Br. at 31. We disagree. Treating the trial court's unchallenged findings as verities, we hold that the findings support the trial court's conclusion that RP was gravely disabled.

A. Grave Disability

“[M]ental illness alone is not a constitutionally adequate basis for involuntary commitment.” In re LaBelle, 107 Wn.2d 196, 201, 728 P.2d 138 (1986). But individuals may be involuntarily committed if they are likely to seriously harm themselves or others or are “gravely disabled.” RCW 71.05.150(1). RCW 71.05.240(4)(a) provides:

At the conclusion of the probable cause hearing, if the court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that a person detained for behavioral health treatment, as the result of a behavioral health disorder ․ is gravely disabled, and, after considering [and rejecting] less restrictive alternatives to involuntary detention and treatment, ․ the court shall order that such person be detained for involuntary treatment not to exceed [14] days.”

Preponderance of the evidence means that the evidence establishes that the proposition at issue is more probably true than not true. In re Pers. Restraint of Pugh, 7 Wn. App. 2d 412, 423, 433 P.3d 872 (2019).

When demonstrating evidence of severe deterioration in routine functioning necessary to prove grave disability, it is insufficient to show that treatment “would be preferred or beneficial or even in [the detainee's] best interests.” LaBelle, 107 Wn.2d at 208. “To justify commitment, such care must be shown to be essential to an individual's health or safety and the evidence should indicate the harmful consequences likely to follow if involuntary treatment is not ordered.” Id.

The definition of “grave disability” in RCW 71.05.020(25) under prong (b), is intended to broaden the scope of involuntary commitment standards to reach “those discharged patients who, after a period of time in the community, drop out of therapy or stop taking their prescribed medication and exhibit ‘rapid deterioration in their ability to function independently.’ ” LaBelle, 107 Wn.2d at 206 (quoting Mary L. Durham & John Q. La Fond, The Empirical Consequences and Policy Implications of Broadening the Statutory Criteria for Civil Commitment, 3 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 395, 410 (1985)). “Implicit in the definition of gravely disabled under [RCW 71.05.020(25)(b)] is a requirement that the individual is unable, because of severe deterioration of mental functioning, to make a rational decision with respect to [their] need for treatment.” LaBelle, 107 Wn.2d at 208. This standard allows the State to intervene “before a mentally ill person's condition reaches crisis proportions,” preventing the so-called “revolving door” syndrome, where patients leave the hospital only to relapse and be rehospitalized. Id. at 206.

In In re Det. of A.F., we held that the evidence was sufficient to support the trial court's conclusion that AF was gravely disabled. 20 Wn. App. 2d 115, 128, 498 P.3d 1006 (2021). In that case, a doctor's testimony showed that AF was losing cognitive and volitional control because of delusional thought content and an increasing intensity and frequency of mental health symptoms. Id. The evidence also demonstrated that AF was unable to make rational choices regarding his care due to impaired judgment and superficial insight resulting from his bipolar symptoms and delusional thoughts. Id.

Where the trial court has weighed the evidence, our review is generally “limited to determining whether substantial evidence supports the findings and, if so, whether the findings in turn support the trial court's conclusions of law and judgment.” LaBelle, 107 Wn.2d at 209. But where findings are unchallenged, those findings become verities on appeal. W.C.C., 193 Wn. App. at 793 n.5. Here, RP did not specifically challenge any of the trial court's findings. Therefore, we consider only whether the findings support the trial court's conclusions.

B. Analysis

The unchallenged findings are sufficient to support the trial court's conclusion that RP was gravely disabled. RP was diagnosed with schizophrenia, paranoid type, and the findings show that a behavioral health disorder caused him to severely deteriorate, impacting routine functioning. The findings also show that RP was not receiving care essential to his health and safety in the community before his detention.

As discussed above, the findings demonstrate that in recent months, RP's functioning significantly decreased, with an increasing number of emergency room visits and issues with taking medication as prescribed. RP would take more medication than prescribed and then run out of medication, so he had periods of being unmedicated. RP had four prior emergency room visits and several prior detentions. RP was detained two months prior to the detention at issue, and he promised to get a mental health provider for counseling at that time, but he did not do so because he lacked the ability to follow-through to complete the task. After the prior discharge from Wellfound, RP decompensated and returned to the emergency room after an alleged Advil overdose. The trial court found that if RP were discharged, he would likely not get the mental health support he needed, and he would likely return to inpatient treatment. These findings support the conclusion that RP was unable to make a rational decision regarding his treatment, and that harmful consequences such as rehospitalization would occur without treatment.

In the days leading up to RP's initial detention, the trial court's findings and the supporting evidence show that RP was especially withdrawn and paranoid, barricading himself in his room, refusing help, and experiencing hallucinations. Voices in RP's head would attack him and RP lacked the coping skills to know what to do when the voices came. RP's refusal to leave his home would have impacted his ability to meet his own basic needs for things like nutrition and health care, something his case managers emphasized. At Wellfound, RP did not come out of his room and only took medications and ate food when staff encouraged and prompted him. Although he improved some while in treatment, RP was still symptomatic during his testimony as evidenced by rambling speech and responses. RP still struggled with staying medicated and controlling his cognitive and volitional responses, and he remained quite guarded and isolative.

All of these facts show that the trial court did not err when it concluded a mental disorder caused RP to experience repeated and escalating loss of cognitive or volitional control over his actions, indicating that he was not receiving the care he needed in the community.

Although RP contends that his case contrasts with A.F., the evidence here also supports the conclusion that RP was gravely disabled. Like in A.F., where the doctor testified that AF was losing cognitive and volitional control due to delusional thought content, here, the trial court's findings based on Mellick's testimony similarly indicate that RP's cognitive and volitional control decreased because RP was guarded, isolative, and withdrawn, and he remained in his room if left to his own devices. 20 Wn. App. 2d at 120; CP at 83. As in A.F., RP's mental illness symptoms increased in the time leading up to the hearing because RP was struggling to stay medicated, and he had four previous emergency room visits, with his last visit resulting in hospitalization at Wellfound in August 2024. 20 Wn. App. 2d at 120; CP at 82.

Moreover, the trial court made detailed findings outlining why it concluded that RP was gravely disabled due to RP's impaired judgment, previous detentions, perceptions, medication issues, and inability to get the care he needed on his own. The trial court relied on a variety of sources, including Mellick's expert testimony, RP's own testimony, and the underlying petitions to conclude that RP was gravely disabled.

Thus, the trial court's findings were sufficient to support the conclusion that RP was gravely disabled and that a 14-day commitment was warranted.

CONCLUSION

We reverse the trial court in part and affirm in part. We vacate the initial Joel's Law order as discussed in the published portion of this opinion but otherwise affirm the 14-day detention order.

FOOTNOTES

1.   R.P. does not contend that the invalidity of the initial Joel's Law detention order would undermine the validity of the later, 14-day order.

2.   At the end of the substantive portion of the order, a prechecked box indicated that the petition was denied, presumably a scrivener's error. CP at 16.

3.   An exception to the collateral bar rule exists for orders that are void. May, 171 Wn.2d at 852. An order is void only if there is “ ‘an absence of jurisdiction to issue the type of order, to address the subject matter, or to bind the defendant.’ ” Id. (quoting Mead Sch. Dist., 85 Wn.2d at 284). This narrow exception makes sense given the underlying purpose of the rule to disincentivize the flaunting of court orders. Mead Sch. Dist., 85 Wn.2d at 284. But because the rule does not apply in the first place, we need not address the exception.

4.   RP does not contend that invalidity of the initial Joel's Law detention order would undermine the validity of the later, 14-day order, nor does he appeal the trial court's denial of a motion to dismiss on this basis. As a result, we do not address this issue.

5.   RP does not argue on appeal that this reliance was improper. See Appellant's Opening Br. at 21-36.

GLASGOW, J.

We concur: VELJACIC, C.J. LEE, J.