STATE OF WASHINGTON v. WILLIAM ROWAN (2026)

William Rowan appeals his convictions for two counts of rape of a child in the first degree. The evidence of guilt came from the testimony of the child victim, buttressed by the examining doctor's opinion that the child was sexually assaulted multiple times. This opinion was based solely on believing what the child said.

Rowan seeks dismissal of the charges and reversal of his convictions. We deny his requests for dismissal of the charges but we reverse his convictions due to the improper opinion testimony of the State's examining doctor.

FACTS

In December 2020, the State charged William Rowan with rape of a child in the first degree. The named victim was a young relative, A.A.,¹ born in 2010. In October 2021, the State filed an amended information, adding a second count of rape of a child in the first degree. The two counts are identical except for the dates of the offense; count I charged conduct happening “on or about October 1, 2020 through 12/7/2020” and count II charged conduct happening “on or about October 24, 2020.” Clerk's Papers (CP) at 85-86.

The matter eventually came on for trial in June 2022. The State called Detective Jason Ritoch, who had spent more than 20 years with the Klickitat County Sheriff's Office. In November 2020, he was referred to investigate A.A.’s allegations of rape. He testified that A.A. was 11 years old during the incidents under investigation. After his interview with A.A., Detective Ritoch believed he had probable cause to arrest Rowan. On cross-examination, Detective Ritoch admitted he never looked for physical corroboration of A.A.’s reports, such as DNA evidence, due to the period of time between the reported acts and his investigation.

A.A. testified she lived with her grandparents and Rowan lived in a trailer on her grandparents’ property. She said she did not like living with her grandparents because she was hit a lot and forced to have sex with Rowan. She testified that Rowan had both oral and vaginal sex with her. She said that the sex had been going on ever since she could remember. She also testified that in October 2020 there was a day when Rowan raped her twice in one day—once in the morning and once in the evening. She could not remember whether the rape was oral or vaginal. She also testified that during an interview related to this case, she asked whether she would get a toy and asked herself whether she was lying. She clarified that she asked herself whether she was lying because her grandparents had suggested to her that she was imagining the things she reported about Rowan.

Michelle Tremblay-Chance, a family therapist and forensic interviewer, conducted a forensic interview with A.A. in November 2020. She testified that forensic interviews with children are recorded on video so the child does not have to keep repeating the story. She testified that A.A. “cried off and on, just a little tears, during the interview, but had a lot of self-doubt and a lot of self-questioning.” Rep. of Proc. (RP) at 416. She testified this was not an unusual emotional state for a child who had been abused over a period of time.

Robin Henson, MD, a doctor of obstetrics and gynecology who specializes in sexual assault, examined A.A. Dr. Henson testified that A.A.’s genitalia showed some redness but was otherwise normal. From the examination, Dr. Henson testified she could neither rule in nor rule out sexual abuse. Despite this, she testified she believed A.A. had been sexually assaulted multiple times:

Q And as a result of your examination, were you able to develop an opinion as to whether or not she'd been a victim of any type of sexual abuse?

A Not solely based on the examination, no.

Q Do you have an opinion?

A Yes.

Q And what is that opinion?

A My opinion is that she was sexually assaulted over time, multiple times.

Q And that's based upon what?

A It's based upon the history that she gave while I was examining her and asking her questions. And during the forensic interview, the information that she came forward with.

Q But as terms of physical, you can't rule it out or rule it in— just looking at the physical examination.

A That's correct.

RP at 429. Defense counsel did not object to this testimony.

The court instructed the jury that it was “the sole judges of the credibility of each witness [and] the sole judges of the value or weight to be given to the testimony of each witness.” CP at 209. It also instructed the jury, “In order to convict a person of rape of a child in the first degree, as defined in these instructions, it shall not be necessary that the testimony of the alleged victim be corroborated.” CP at 218. The latter instruction was based on RCW 9A.44.020(1). The jury returned verdicts of guilty on both counts.

Rowan appeals to this court.

ANALYSIS

A. RCW 9A.44.020(1) is not unconstitutional

Rowan argues that RCW 9A.44.020(1) is facially unconstitutional for various reasons. We reject his arguments.

We review challenges to the constitutionality of statutes de novo. City of Fircrest v. Jensen, 158 Wn.2d 384, 389, 143 P.3d 776 (2006). We presume that statutes are constitutional, and the party challenging the legislation bears the burden of showing it is unconstitutional. Woods v. Seattle's Union Gospel Mission, 197 Wn.2d 231, 239, 461 P.3d 1060 (2021).

RCW 9A.44.020(1) reads: “In order to convict a person of any crime defined in this chapter [on sex offenses] it shall not be necessary that the testimony of the alleged victim be corroborated.” All of Rowan's constitutional challenges spring from his assertion that, under the statute, “a trier of fact may not conclude that the absence of corroborating evidence requires acquittal of the charges.”² Second Suppl. Br. of Appellant at 4 (alteration in original). We disagree with his reading of the statute.

By its plain terms, the statute permits a jury to convict a defendant of a sex offense based on the testimony of only the victim. It does not preclude a jury from acquitting a defendant due to a lack of corroboration. Nor does it alter the requirement for the State to prove every element of the charged offense beyond a reasonable doubt. See State v. Clayton, 32 Wn.2d 571, 574, 202 P.2d 922 (1949) (“[W]hat the court thereby told the jury was not that the uncorroborated testimony of the prosecutrix in the instant case was sufficient to convict the appellant of the crime with which he was charged, but, rather, that in cases of this particular character, a defendant may be convicted upon such testimony alone, provided the jury should believe from the evidence, and should be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant was guilty of the crime charged.” (alteration in original)). With the proper reading of the statute in mind, we turn to Rowan's constitutional challenges.

Separation of Powers

When analyzing separation of powers challenges, we look to whether the activity of one branch threatens the independence or integrity or invades the prerogatives of another. Carrick v. Locke, 125 Wn.2d 129, 135, 882 P.2d 173 (1994). Here, there is no such threat to the independence or integrity of the judiciary. The statute does not constrain the decision-making of courts in any particular case any more than any other statute. In fact, it provides more discretion in resolving sex crimes, as previously the testimony of the alleged victim in a rape case did require corroboration. State v. Chenoweth, 188 Wn. App. 521, 537, 354 P.3d 13 (2015). RCW 9A.44.020(1) thus does not violate the separation of powers.

Privileges and Immunities

“No law shall be passed granting to any citizen, class of citizens, or corporation other than municipal, privileges or immunities which upon the same terms shall not equally belong to all citizens, or corporations.” Wash. Const. art. I, § 12. This clause is concerned with avoiding favoritism and preventing discrimination. Am. Legion Post No. 149 v. Dep't of Health, 164 Wn.2d 570, 606, 192 P.3d 306 (2008). “A privilege is not necessarily created every time a statute allows a particular group to do or obtain something.” Id. at 606-07. Instead, it pertains to those fundamental rights that belong to the citizens of the state by reason of such citizenship. Id. at 607.

RCW 9A.44.020(1) confers no special benefit to victims of sexual assault. If anything, it cures a prior deficiency they faced. A rape victim's testimony once required corroboration. Juries, however, are otherwise generally permitted to believe uncorroborated testimony. Rather than conferring a special benefit to alleged victims of sex crimes, RCW 9A.44.020(1) merely places them on a similar level with victims of other crimes and thus does not violate the privileges and immunities clause.

Equal Protection

The equal protection clauses of the state and federal constitutions require that similarly situated persons should be treated alike and aim at securing equality of treatment by prohibiting hostile discrimination. Am. Legion Post No. 149, 164 Wn.2d at 608. As noted above, RCW 9A.44.020(1) merely makes explicit that victims of sexual assault are not held to a higher evidentiary burden than any other witness, and thus there is no equal protection issue.

Bill of Attainder

“A bill of attainder is legislation that applies to named individuals or ascertained members of groups in such a way as to inflict punishment on them without judicial trial. A legislative act is not a bill of attainder merely because it compels an individual or defined group to bear burdens that the individual or group dislikes.” In re Pers. Restraint of Ramsey, 102 Wn. App. 567, 576, 9 P.3d 231 (2000) (citation omitted). RCW 9A.44.020(1) does not inflict punishment without judicial trial. It, in fact, operates only at trial, by removing an evidentiary hurdle once faced only by victims of sex crimes. It is not a bill of attainder.

B. Sufficient evidence supports Rowan’s convictions

Rowan next argues that the State presented insufficient evidence to sustain his convictions. We disagree.

“In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence in a criminal prosecution, this court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution. If, after viewing the evidence in this light, the appellate court concludes that any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt, it must uphold the verdict.” State v. Alexander, 64 Wn. App. 147, 157, 822 P.2d 1250 (1992) (alteration in original). “In sexual abuse cases where the State alleges multiple acts within the same charging period, the State need not elect particular acts associated with each count so long as the evidence clearly delineates specific and distinct incidents of sexual abuse during the charging periods.” State v. Edwards, 171 Wn. App. 379, 401, 294 P.3d 708 (2012). To sustain a conviction via generic testimony, the alleged victim must (1) describe the act or acts with sufficient specificity to allow the jury to determine what offense, if any, has been committed, (2) describe the number of acts committed with sufficient certainty to support each of the counts alleged by the prosecution, and (3) be able to describe the general time period in which the acts occurred. State v. Hayes, 81 Wn. App. 425, 438, 914 P.2d 788 (1996); Edwards, 171 Wn. App. at 402.

The State alleged multiple acts within the same charging period and did not elect specific acts associated with each count. We thus look to whether A.A.’s testimony satisfies the Hayes generic testimony test.

A.A. testified that Rowan forced her to have oral and vaginal sex with him. This is clearly a sufficiently specific description of the acts alleged to satisfy the first prong.

A.A. further testified that Rowan's sexual assaults happened at least once a week for years and that in October 2020, there was a day when Rowan raped her twice in one day. She also testified that Rowan raped her at least once around Halloween 2020. This testimony indicates that within October 2020, Rowan raped A.A. at least twice, which describes the number of acts with sufficient certainty to satisfy the second prong of the Hayes test. Her testimony about the rapes in October also satisfies the third prong, as they indicate the general time period in which the acts occurred.

The Hayes test being satisfied, the evidence is sufficient to convict Rowan of two counts of first degree rape of a child.

C. The Trial court did not impermissibly comment on Rowan’s guilt

“Judges shall not charge juries with respect to matters of fact, nor comment thereon, but shall declare the law.” Wash. Const. art. IV, § 16. Rowan contends that the trial court violated this provision when it instructed the jury that “[i]n order to convict a person of rape of a child in the first degree, as defined in these instructions, it shall not be necessary that the testimony of the alleged victim be corroborated.” CP at 218.

“The constitutional provision that a trial judge shall not charge with respect to matters of fact, nor comment thereon, means no more than that the judge is forbidden to convey or indicate to the jury, by word or act, his personal opinion as to the truth or falsity of any evidence introduced upon the trial.” Clayton, 32 Wn.2d at 573. The Clayton court considered a similar jury instruction:

“You are instructed that it is the law of this State that a person charged with attempting to carnally know a female child under the age of eighteen years may be convicted upon the uncorroborated testimony of the prosecutrix alone. That is, the question is distinctly one for the jury, and if you believe from the evidence and are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the defendant, you will return a verdict of guilty, notwithstanding that there be no direct corroboration of her testimony as to the commission of the act.”

Id. at 572 (internal quotation marks omitted). The court concluded that “the trial court expressed no opinion as to the truth or falsity of the testimony of the prosecutrix, or as to the weight which the court attached to her testimony, but submitted all questions involving the credibility and weight of the evidence to the jury for its decision thereon.” Id. at 573-74. This conclusion was bolstered by the lower court further instructing the jury “that they were the sole judges of the weight to be given to the testimony of the witnesses.” Id. at 577. Accordingly, the noncorroboration instruction in that case was not an unconstitutional comment on the evidence, nor is it here.

D. Improper testimony on credibility and guilt

Rowan argues that Dr. Henson's opinion that A.A. was sexually abused constituted an impermissible opinion on credibility and guilt. We agree.

“The right to have factual questions decided by the jury is crucial to the right to trial by jury.” State v. Montgomery, 163 Wn.2d 577, 590, 183 P.3d 267 (2008). Impermissible opinion testimony on guilt “violates the defendant's constitutional right to a jury trial, which includes the independent determination of the facts by the jury.” State v. Quaale, 182 Wn.2d 191, 199, 340 P.3d 213 (2014). “No witness, law or expert, may testify to [their] opinion as to the guilt of a defendant, whether by direct statement or inference.” State v. Black, 109 Wn.2d 336, 348, 745 P.2d 12 (1987).

We have held that a State's expert's opinion that a child had been sexually abused is an improper opinion warranting reversal. See State v. Carlson, 80 Wn. App. 116, 124-25, 906 P.2d 999 (1995); State v. Fitzgerald, 39 Wn. App. 652, 656-57, 694 P.2d 1117 (1985). The result is the same when a State's expert couches their opinions on subjective diagnoses that the child victim was sexually abused. Black, 109 Wn.2d at 349 (victim had “rape trauma syndrome”); State v. Florczak, 76 Wn. App. 55, 74, 882 P.2d 199 (1994) (victim had “posttraumatic stress disorder” from being abused).

Relatedly, “[a]n expert may not offer an opinion on an ultimate issue of fact when it is based solely on the expert's perception of the witness’ truthfulness.” Alexander, 64 Wn. App. at 154. Here, Dr. Henson testified there was no physical evidence ruling in or out that A.A. was sexually abused. In response to the State's question as to whether she had an opinion if A.A. had been sexually abused, Dr. Henson responded that A.A. had been sexually assaulted multiple times. When explaining why she held this opinion, Dr. Henson answered it was based on what A.A. told her during the interview and A.A.’s forensic interview. Under the authorities discussed, the doctor's opinion was improper.

The State's response is two-fold—this unpreserved claim of error is not reviewable under RAP 2.5(a)(3)’s manifest constitutional error standard; and error, if any, was harmless. We disagree.

First, as noted previously, a defendant's right to have a jury decide issues of fact is a core constitutional right. And it is obvious that Dr. Henson's opinion was both improper and prejudicial. Hence, this unpreserved claim of error is reviewable under RAP 2.5(a)(3)’s “manifest error affecting a constitutional right” standard.

Second, in conducting a constitutional harmless error review in a criminal case, we must ask whether the State has proved the error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt— considering both the strength of the properly admitted evidence of guilt as well as the prejudicial impact of the erroneously admitted evidence. State v. Magaña Arévalo, 5 Wn.3d 781, 810, 582 P.3d 330 (2026). Here, there was no physical evidence to support A.A.’s testimony that Rowan sexually abused her. There were no independent eyewitnesses either. The State's case depended on the jury believing A.A. And A.A., herself, had wondered aloud if she might have imagined the years-long abuse by Rowan.

“Opinion testimony on a core issue of guilt or witness veracity is a form of vouching,” and “it is especially dangerous when such testimony comes from a witness with a heightened aura of authority, such as a police officer or an expert.” State v. Lang, 12 Wn. App. 2d 481, 488, 458 P.3d 791 (2020).

The State had a problem. The evidence supporting its charges came from one witness, a child witness who herself had possible doubts. So, the State solved its problem with an expert, a doctor whose expertise included interviewing child victims of sexual abuse: the doctor believed the child, so the jury should, too. This solution runs contrary to the constitutional right of an accused to have the jury resolve questions of fact.

The State has failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the strength of the properly admitted evidence was sufficient to counteract the weight the jury likely placed on the doctor's improper opinion. Reversal of Rowan's convictions is required.

Reverse and remand.

A majority of the panel having determined that only the foregoing portion of this opinion will be printed in the Washington Appellate Reports and that the remainder, having no precedential value, shall be filed for public record pursuant to RCW 2.06.040, it is so ordered.

Statement of additional grounds for review (SAG)

Rowan raises a number of additional grounds for us to consider. As they are somewhat repetitive, we group similar grounds together for ease of analysis. If a ground does not appear in this list, it is because it failed to state a ground for relief.

Ineffective Appellate Counsel

In ground 1, Rowan asserts his appellate counsel was ineffective for not informing him before filing the partial appeal of the trial record. Ground 7 meanwhile asserts that “my appeals attorney did not raise other topics, and points in her [initial] brief, that magnify the prosecutor's misconduct, and neglection of his duties as a minister of justice.” Am. SAG at 4. He raises a similar claim in ground 23. An attorney is not obligated to raise every issue, even if nonfrivolous, requested by the client. Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751, 103 S. Ct. 3308, 77 L. Ed. 2d 987 (1983). We find no error.

Jurisdiction

In ground 2, Rowan asserts that “the State of Washington has divested itself of any jurisdiction by failing to respect their duties under the U.S. Constitution and Washington Constitution, to include state laws and court rules.” Am. SAG at 3. He raises similar claims in grounds 10, 11, 21, 22, and 50. Even if the court made legal errors, Rowan provides no authority to suggest that these errors would completely divest the State and all of its courts of jurisdiction to hear his case.

Sufficiency of the Evidence

Grounds 4 and 5 challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to convict Rowan of first and second degree rape of a child respectively. Ground 24 seems to make the same claim. Ground 43 is similar. As addressed above, the State presented sufficient evidence to sustain Rowan's convictions.

Jury Instruction

Ground 41 and possibly ground 42 contend that the noncorroboration instruction is unconstitutional. As noted earlier, we disagree.

Motion to modify

We initially set this case to be heard on our September 2025 docket. But Rowan's fourth appellate counsel moved to withdraw in August 2025 after Rowan informed counsel that his mother was his attorney, and his mother insisted that counsel either contact the Federal Bureau of Investigation about the unconstitutionality of RCW 9A.44.020(1) or withdraw. Mot. for Withdrawal and Substitution of Attorney on Appeal (Aug. 11, 2025) at 1-2. We granted counsel's motion to withdraw and stayed the appeal pending appointment by the Office of Public Defense of a fifth attorney. Ruling on Mot. to Withdraw (Aug. 13, 2025).

On February 11, 2026, Rowan filed a motion to lift the stay. He also filed an affidavit of prejudice asking this court to vacate and dismiss his underlying charges because the State violated his right to a speedy trial as well as an “Affidavit of Defendant/Appellant Regarding Directives” asking this court to require his new counsel to comply with certain directives. (Feb. 24, 2026). Our commissioner lifted the stay but denied Rowan's other requests. Comm'r’s Ruling (Apr. 3, 2026) at 4.

Rowan filed a motion to modify the commissioner's ruling. We address his motion now.

We are familiar with the history of this appeal. Nearly all of the delay in this appeal was caused by Rowan or his mother. The writing judge had previously reviewed the file and prepared an appendix that set forth the various ways in which Rowan and his mother caused this appeal to be delayed over the years. See “Appendix” of “Order Denying Appellant's Motion to Direct Trial Court to Vacate Convictions” (Oct. 10, 2025).³ As shown in that Appendix, Rowan and his mother repeatedly directed appellate counsel to investigate facts outside the trial court record and to raise arguments that counsel was unwilling to pursue. This insistence led to a breakdown of relations with multiple appointed appellate counsel and a resulting delay.

We also decline to compel Rowan's counsel to follow his directives. It is the role of appellate counsel, not the client, to decide which legal arguments to raise. McCoy v. Louisiana, 584 U.S. 414, 422, 138 S. Ct. 1500, 200 L. Ed. 2d 821 (2018); In re Pers. Restraint of Meredith, 191 Wn.2d 300, 313, 422 P.3d 458 (2018). A criminal defendant's remedy when they believe counsel has failed to adequately address an issue on appeal is to file a statement of additional grounds for review. RAP 10.10.

FOOTNOTES

1.   To protect the privacy interests of the minor child, we use fictitious initials throughout this opinion. Gen. Order 2012-1 of Division III, In re the Use of Initials or Pseudonyms for Child Victims or Child Witnesses, (Wash. Ct. App. June 18, 2012), https://www.courts.wa.gov/appellate_trial_courts/?fa=atc.genorders_orddisp&ordnumber =2012_001&div=III.

2.   Rowan's phrasing of his argument is difficult to parse. We construe his argument as, “A trier of fact may believe it cannot acquit when there is no corroborating evidence.”

3.   The panel provides this citation in the event Rowan seeks review by our State Supreme Court of this court's ruling on this issue. The cited Appendix will be helpful in that event.

Lawrence-Berrey, J.

WE CONCUR: Staab, C.J. Cooney, J.