State of Utah, Appellant, v. Lani M. Wilcox, Appellee. (2025)

INTRODUCTION

¶1 Charged with aggravated child abuse after an altercation with a student athlete, Coach Lani Wilcox moved for a pretrial justification hearing to assert her claims of self-defense and defense of others.  ¹ Following an evidentiary hearing, the district court determined that Wilcox made a prima facie claim of defense of others, shifting the burden to the State to disprove that claim by clear and convincing evidence. The district court then found that the State failed to meet its burden and dismissed the charges against Wilcox. The State appeals.

¶2 On appeal, this court must consider for the first time the correct standard for reviewing a district court's decision to dismiss charges after a pretrial justification hearing. More specifically, we must decide how to review the district court's conclusion that Wilcox's belief that the student athlete posed an imminent threat to others was objectively reasonable. Applying the factors laid out in State v. Levin for analyzing mixed questions of fact and law,² we hold that objective imminence is a law-like mixed question subject to correctness review in the pretrial context. And applying that standard to the facts, we hold that the State disproved this element of Wilcox's defense-of-others claim by clear and convincing evidence. We reverse the district court's order dismissing the charges and remand for further proceedings.

BACKGROUND 3

¶3 In August 2022, Lani Wilcox was head coach of the Park City High School girls’ tennis team. During an afternoon practice, sixteen-year-old student-athlete Gwen  ⁴ asked Wilcox about her team placement in an upcoming match. When Wilcox informed her she would be playing on the junior varsity team, Gwen became upset and left the courts. Gwen went into the bathroom to call her mother and calm down.

¶4 About an hour later, Gwen returned to the tennis courts, where Wilcox was standing alone near the center net, watching practice. Surveillance footage shows parts of four tennis courts: three in front of Wilcox, and one behind her. Each court was separated by netting. The court behind Wilcox was also separated from the others by a bench and various equipment bags. When Gwen returned to the courts, four players were on the nearest court in front of Wilcox, playing doubles. The court adjacent to that also had several players playing doubles, and a few more players watching from the back sideline. And a few players were on the court behind Wilcox. The assistant coach was initially standing a few yards from Wilcox, but he left after Gwen approached.

¶5 Gwen picked up her tennis racket, tucked it under her arm, and approached Wilcox. She told Wilcox she felt calm and ready to practice. Wilcox asked Gwen to go home because she had missed most of practice and told her she would not compete the next day. The exchange grew heated. Wilcox pointed repeatedly at Gwen and at the court clock, frustrated that Gwen had wasted almost all of the practice collecting herself in the bathroom. As the conversation escalated, Gwen slapped Wilcox across the face, said “Fuck you, Lani,” and started to turn away from Wilcox. The slap left a red mark on Wilcox's cheek.

¶6 Immediately after the slap, Wilcox moved behind Gwen and wrapped both arms around her. Wilcox testified that she grabbed Gwen to restrain her because she was “afraid of [Gwen] either going after [her] again or anybody on that court because [Gwen] was very, very angry.” Once Wilcox's arms were around Gwen, Wilcox lost her balance and the two fell to the ground. Wilcox hit her head on the tennis court, causing a concussion. Wilcox restrained Gwen for about eleven seconds. Gwen then pushed Wilcox's arms away, freeing herself, and stood up.

¶7 The details of the restraint are disputed. Gwen testified that Wilcox's arms were around her neck and that she could not breathe. When asked where she was restrained, she pointed to her lower neck and collarbones. She was later observed with red marks on her neck. Wilcox maintained that she intended to restrain Gwen around the shoulders and that any contact with Gwen's neck was inadvertent or occurred as the two fell.

¶8 After Gwen stood up, the assistant coach, who had rushed over during the altercation, told her to go home. In response, Gwen kicked him in the groin. Wilcox then seized Gwen again, restraining her a second time for a few seconds.

¶9 The assistant coach told Wilcox they should call the police. Gwen then said she intended to call 9-1-1 and retrieved her phone from her tennis bag. Wilcox took the phone from Gwen's hand and walked away with it. Gwen followed, retrieved the phone from Wilcox, and left the tennis courts.

¶10 The State charged Wilcox with one count of aggravated child abuse, a third-degree felony, and one count of interrupting the use of a communication device, a class B misdemeanor.

¶11 Wilcox moved for a pretrial justification hearing under Utah Code section 76-2-309, asserting that her use of force was justified in defense of herself and others. At the hearing, Wilcox presented evidence first. Wilcox and the assistant coach both testified and faced cross-examination by the State. Wilcox also introduced photos of the injuries to her face from Gwen's slap and medical records documenting a head injury from the fall. The State introduced surveillance footage of the incident. It also introduced two photos showing red marks on Gwen's neck. It then called Gwen and her mother to testify.

¶12 Following the hearing and subsequent argument, the district court made several findings. It found that when Gwen arrived on the court, an argument ensued with Wilcox. Wilcox pointed to the clock and gestured for Gwen to leave. Wilcox walked away a few times but then turned back toward Gwen. The final time, she stepped toward Gwen, getting close to her and pointing her finger at Gwen's face. Gwen then said, “Fuck you, Lani,” and slapped Wilcox in the face.

¶13 The court further found that Wilcox seized Gwen “very quickly[,] ․ almost immediately, almost instantaneously” after the slap. “A struggle ensue[d]” in which it was hard to tell exactly what happened before Gwen and Wilcox were on the ground. The court credited Gwen's testimony that she felt Wilcox's arms around her neck, but the court emphasized that Gwen pointed to the base of her neck, near her collarbones, when she testified. It also noted Gwen's testimony that “once they arrived on the ground, [Gwen] was able to lift Coach Wilcox's arms up and over [Gwen's] head and get up and separate herself from Coach Wilcox.”

¶14 The district court also credited Wilcox's testimony that she believed it was necessary to restrain Gwen after the slap to “prevent [Gwen] from coming back at [her], going after another player, or going after somebody else on the court.” But the court said it was not reasonable for Wilcox to believe she herself would be attacked again, because Gwen was turning away before Wilcox grabbed her. The court then found “credible Coach Wilcox's sworn testimony that she felt it was necessary to prevent [Gwen] from hitting somebody else.”

¶15 The district court concluded that Wilcox was not justified in using force to defend herself, but that she had presented a prima facie claim of defense of others and that the State had failed to disprove justification by clear and convincing evidence. The court dismissed the charges. The State appeals.

ANALYSIS

¶16 Utah law recognizes self-defense and defense of others as affirmative defenses that can justify the use of force.⁵ While these defenses were historically decided by a jury at trial, the legislature recently established a new process allowing for the adjudication of justification claims earlier.  ⁶ Under Utah Code section 76-2-309 (Pretrial Justification Statute), a defendant claiming justification may move for a pretrial hearing at which a judge, rather than a jury, will decide “as a matter of fact and law” whether the defendant's use of force was justified.⁷

¶17 A pretrial justification hearing proceeds in two stages. First, the defendant must “make[ ] a prima facie claim of justification.”⁸ If the defendant succeeds, the hearing proceeds to the second stage, and the burden shifts to the State to prove “by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant's use or threatened use of force was not justified.”⁹ If the State meets its burden, the defendant may reassert the same defense at trial.¹⁰ But if the State fails to meet its burden at the pretrial justification hearing, “the court shall dismiss the charge with prejudice.”¹¹

¶18 Here, both parties agree that Wilcox successfully made a prima facie defense-of-others claim at the first stage of the hearing. At the second stage, the district court concluded that the State failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that Wilcox's conduct was not justified. So the court dismissed the charges against her. The State appeals, arguing it disproved Wilcox's defense-of-others claim. The State argues its evidence showed that Wilcox's belief that Gwen posed an imminent threat to others was not objectively reasonable and, alternatively, that her conduct was disproportionate to the threat.

¶19 The State's appeal provides our first opportunity to review the second stage of pretrial justification hearings. First, we determine the standard of review applicable to a district court's conclusions at a pretrial justification hearing. Applying the factors laid out in State v. Levin for analyzing mixed questions of law and fact,¹² we conclude that the narrow question of the reasonableness of Wilcox's belief that she faced an imminent threat is a law-like mixed question, subject to correctness review. We then apply that standard to the facts here and determine the district court erred in dismissing the aggravated child abuse charge.¹³

I. Appellate Courts Review the Objective Reasonableness of a Defendant’s Belief About Imminence for Correctness

¶20 We begin by assessing the standard of review applicable to a district court's conclusions at the second stage of a pretrial justification hearing. Under the Pretrial Justification Statute, a district court must “determine as a matter of fact and law whether the defendant was justified in the use or threatened use of force.”¹⁴ To make that determination, the court must decide whether the State met its “burden to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant's use or threatened use of force was not justified.”¹⁵

¶21 The parties dispute the applicable standard of review for this conclusion. They agree that we review the district court's factual findings for clear error.  ¹⁶ And they also agree that we review the district court's legal conclusions for correctness.¹⁷ But they dispute the correct standard of review for the ultimate question—whether the State met its burden of proof at the pretrial justification hearing. The State argues for correctness review, while Wilcox asks us to reverse the district court's conclusion only if it is clearly erroneous.

¶22 The appropriate standard of review depends on “the nature of the issue.”¹⁸ On appeal, a different standard of review applies to findings of fact, conclusions of law, and mixed questions of law and fact.¹⁹

¶23 “Mixed questions arise when a district court must apply a particular rule of law to a particular set of facts.”  ²⁰ This court applies “a binary method for determining the appropriate standard of review for mixed questions.”²¹ We review law-like questions for correctness.  ²² And we review fact-like questions deferentially, reversing the determinations of the district court only if they are clearly erroneous.²³

¶24 Under this binary method, we determine whether a mixed question is more law-like or fact-like based on the three factors articulated in State v. Levin.²⁴ This analysis weighs:

(1) the degree of variety and complexity in the facts to which the legal rule is to be applied; (2) the degree to which a trial court's application of the legal rule relies on facts observed by the trial judge, such as a witness's appearance and demeanor, relevant to the application of the law that cannot be adequately reflected in the record available to appellate courts; and (3) other policy reasons that weigh for or against granting discretion to trial courts.25

¶25 Both parties frame their standard-of-review arguments around the district court's ultimate conclusion that the State failed to meet its burden. We agree that the court's conclusion is a mixed question—the application of the Pretrial Justification Statute to the facts presented in the hearing.²⁶ But that conclusion is made up of several smaller mixed questions—the application of the facts of the case to each element of each asserted defense. Because the State could disprove justification by disproving any single element, we limit our analysis to the objective imminence requirement of Wilcox's defense-of-others claim.²⁷

¶26 Individuals may lawfully use force only if they reasonably believe they face an imminent threat. Under Utah Code section 76-2-402(2)(a), “[a]n individual is justified in threatening or using force against another individual when and to the extent that the individual reasonably believes that force or a threat of force is necessary to defend the individual or another individual against the imminent use of unlawful force.”²⁸ The imminence element “distinguishes lawful defensive force from two forms of unlawful force: that which comes too soon and that which comes too late.”²⁹ An individual may use force only to respond to “imminent danger,” meaning “an immediate, real threat to one's safety” or “the danger resulting from an immediate threatened injury.”³⁰ The threat must be “about to occur at any moment” or “impending” to justify the use of force.³¹

¶27 Like many other elements of self-defense, imminence has both a subjective and an objective component: the defendant must genuinely believe they face an imminent threat, and that belief must be reasonable.  ³² The parties do not contest that Wilcox genuinely believed that Gwen posed an imminent threat to others. But the State challenges the district court's conclusion that Wilcox's belief was objectively reasonable. We apply the three Levin factors to the objective imminence element to determine how to review the district court's conclusion on that mixed question.³³

¶28 Under Levin, we first consider “the degree of variety and complexity in the facts to which the legal rule is to be applied.”³⁴ Objective imminence is a question of reasonableness under the circumstances.³⁵ And the Utah Code lists several factors that a fact-finder “may consider” in assessing imminence or reasonableness:

(a) the nature of the danger;

(b) the immediacy of the danger;

(c) the probability that the unlawful force would result in death or serious bodily injury;

(d) the other individual's prior violent acts or violent propensities;

(e) any patterns of abuse or violence in the parties’ relationship; and

(f) any other relevant factors.36

¶29 The facts relevant to self-defense or defense of others are highly varied and often complex.³⁷ Still, objective imminence will often boil down to four facts: (1) the type of force threatened by the alleged aggressor;³⁸ (2) the physical proximity of the defendant, the alleged aggressor, and any threatened third parties;  ³⁹ (3) the passage of time between the aggressor's use or threatened use of force and the defendant's use of force;⁴⁰ and (4) any knowledge the defendant possessed about the likelihood of the alleged aggressor to use unlawful force.⁴¹ In other words, once the district court has found the underlying facts, determining whether a threat was imminent is a relatively straightforward inquiry. Thus, we weigh the first Levin factor neutrally in our analysis.

¶30 Second, we evaluate “the degree to which the application of the legal rule relies on ‘facts’ observed by the trial judge—such as a witness's appearance and demeanor—that cannot be adequately reflected in the record available to appellate courts.”⁴² Courts will frequently be able to assess the objective imminence requirement without relying on credibility assessments. While a finding that a defendant held a certain subjective belief necessarily implicates that defendant's credibility, the reasonableness of that belief turns on the objective facts of the case, not the defendant's state of mind.⁴³

¶31 A district court may need to assess credibility to determine the facts at hand—where the defendant stood, for instance, and what the defendant knew about the alleged aggressor. But once the court has made those purely factual findings, applying the objective standard of reasonableness involves weighing abstract societal values, not credibility or demeanor.  ⁴⁴ There is nothing distinct about district courts’ institutional competency that suggests we should grant them deference in deciding objective imminence.⁴⁵ So the second factor supports viewing this question as more law-like than fact-like.

¶32 The third Levin factor “requires that we take into consideration policy factors related to the degree of deference that should be applied” to a given conclusion by the district court.⁴⁶ And several policy considerations support rigorous appellate review in this context.

¶33 First, de novo appellate review allows for the creation of a uniform body of caselaw.⁴⁷ And uniformity would better permit the public to understand the scope of their constitutional right to use defensive force, allowing the public to more freely exercise that right.⁴⁸

¶34 Second, correctness review protects the public interest in the appropriate resolution of use-of-force cases. The question of reasonableness in the self-defense context has historically been reserved for the jury.⁴⁹ The jury's role in evaluating reasonableness allowed the public to reinforce and perhaps vindicate community values and norms.⁵⁰ But in a pretrial justification hearing, that role of community arbiter falls to judges.  ⁵¹ And by design, pretrial justification hearings empower judges to dismiss charges and cut short the ordinary trial process in appropriate cases.⁵²

¶35 Appellate courts play a necessary role in ensuring that judges do not prematurely end prosecutions by reading the objective imminence requirement too broadly. The Pretrial Justification Statute expressly provides for that type of appellate review any time a judge dismisses criminal charges following a pretrial justification hearing.⁵³ In addition to allowing the State to appeal a dismissal, the Pretrial Justification Statute imposes a lower burden of proof on the State and allows an unsuccessful defendant to raise a justification claim again at trial.⁵⁴ These features ensure that closer cases are still resolved by a jury. In sum, thorough appellate review balances the importance of the self-defense right with the public interest in seeing justice done in use-of-force cases.

¶36 Considering all three Levin factors together, each factor supports classifying the objective imminence element as a law-like mixed question, subject to correctness review.⁵⁵ We now apply that standard to this case.

II. The District Court Erred in Concluding That Wilcox’s Belief that Gwen Posed an Imminent Threat Was Objectively Reasonable

¶37 In this case, the district court erred in concluding that Wilcox's belief that Gwen was an imminent threat to others on the tennis courts was objectively reasonable. “The objective component is satisfied if the proverbial reasonable person in the defendant's position would have also believed that the threat of unlawful force was imminent.”⁵⁶

¶38 Before Wilcox used force against Gwen, the two were in a heated argument about whether Gwen could practice or should go home. As emotions escalated, Gwen cursed at Wilcox and slapped her across the face. Gwen then began to turn away from Wilcox. Wilcox almost immediately grabbed Gwen and restrained her. The two then fell to the ground. Wilcox restrained Gwen for about eleven seconds before Gwen freed herself and stood up.

¶39 When Wilcox grabbed Gwen, surveillance footage shows several other players nearby, but the nearest player was at least several yards away from Gwen. Two players stood on either side of the tennis court nearest Wilcox, and several more players were on or near the next court over. Some players were also on a third court behind Wilcox, separated from the first two courts by a net, benches, and equipment. The assistant coach emerged from that third court about ten seconds after Wilcox began restraining Gwen.

¶40 Before Wilcox used force against Gwen, Gwen had already used unlawful force by slapping Wilcox. But the district court determined that Gwen posed no further threat to Wilcox after she turned away, and it rejected Wilcox's self-defense claim. No one challenges that conclusion in this appeal; the State only appeals the dismissal of Wilcox's charges based on her defense-of-others claim.

¶41 For purposes of this appeal, the State does not dispute the district court's finding that Wilcox genuinely believed Gwen posed an imminent threat to others. The issue before us is whether a reasonable person in Wilcox's situation would have believed that Gwen was imminently going to use unlawful force against the other players or the assistant coach.  ⁵⁷ Given Gwen's physical distance from anyone but Wilcox, holding only her tennis racket, the State established by clear and convincing evidence that a reasonable person would not believe that Gwen was about to use force “at any moment” against the other players or the assistant coach.⁵⁸ At best, the evidence showed that Wilcox used force too early, given that Gwen would need to travel a meaningful distance before she could attack anyone else with the tennis racket or her own hands.

¶42 Wilcox resists this conclusion, arguing that the speed of the altercation rendered her actions reasonable. We recognize that courts must assess reasonableness from the viewpoint of a reasonable person in the actor's situation and must not impose the wisdom of hindsight.⁵⁹ Still, the law demands that force be used only when it is reasonable.⁶⁰ Though we agree with the district court that, based on the surveillance footage, Wilcox restrained Gwen “almost instantaneously” after Gwen slapped her, the speed of her response does not eliminate the statutory requirement of reasonableness. And at this stage in the proceedings, the State has met its burden of proving that Wilcox's belief that Gwen posed an imminent threat was not reasonable.

¶43 Wilcox also argues that we should use Gwen's later attack on the assistant coach as evidence to support our analysis of objective imminence. That Gwen ultimately used force against others, Wilcox argues, vindicates Wilcox's subjective belief that Gwen posed an imminent threat. But we evaluate defendants’ beliefs—both the objective and the subjective components—as of the moment they used force.⁶¹ Gwen's later use of force is irrelevant to what a reasonable person in Wilcox's shoes would have believed at the time she used force. Accordingly, we hold that the district court erred in concluding that Wilcox's belief that she faced an imminent threat was reasonable.

¶44 Because the State met its burden to disprove the objective imminence element of Wilcox's defense-of-others claim by clear and convincing evidence, the district court erred in dismissing the aggravated child abuse charge against Wilcox. We reverse.

CONCLUSION

¶45 We reverse the district court's order dismissing the charges against Wilcox. On appeal, the parties do not dispute that Wilcox subjectively believed that she was responding to an imminent threat. Whether that belief was objectively reasonable is a law-like mixed question that we review for correctness on appeal. And we conclude that the State met its burden to prove by clear and convincing evidence that Wilcox's belief was unreasonable, disproving Wilcox's justification defense. The district court therefore erred in dismissing the charges against her, and we reverse and remand for further proceedings.

FOOTNOTES

1.   See Utah Code § 76-2-309(3).

2.   2006 UT 50, ¶ 25, 144 P.3d 1096.

4.   A pseudonym.

5.   See Utah Code § 76-2-402(2).

6.   See Self Defense Amendments, H.B. 227, 2021 Leg., Gen. Sess. (Utah 2021).

7.   Utah Code § 76-2-309(3)(a).

8.   Id. § 76-2-309(3)(b).

9.   Id.

10.   Id. § 76-2-309(3)(c)(iii).

11.   Id. § 76-2-309(3)(c)(i).

12.   2006 UT 50, ¶ 25, 144 P.3d 1096.

13.   Most of the parties’ arguments relate to the court's dismissal of the aggravated child abuse charge. But the district court also dismissed the interruption of a communication device charge following the pretrial justification hearing. The State appeals that dismissal, and Wilcox concedes that it was improper, because the Pretrial Justification Statute does not apply to class B or C misdemeanors, see Utah Code § 76-2-309(2)(b), and the communications device offense is a class B misdemeanor, id. § 76-6-108(3). We accordingly reverse the dismissal of the communications device charge and remand for further proceedings.

14.   Utah Code § 76-2-309(3)(a).

15.   Id. § 76-2-309(3)(b).

16.   See Randolph v. State, 2022 UT 34, ¶ 18, 515 P.3d 444.

17.   See id. ¶ 19.

18.   Id. ¶ 17 (cleaned up).

19.   Id.

20.   Id. ¶ 20.

21.   Id. ¶ 22 (cleaned up).

22.   Id. ¶ 23.

23.   Id. ¶¶ 24, 49.

24.   See id. ¶ 25; State v. Levin, 2006 UT 50, ¶ 25, 144 P.3d 1096.

25.   Levin, 2006 UT 50, ¶ 25 (cleaned up).

26.   See Randolph, 2022 UT 34, ¶ 20.

27.   We often refer to juries as “fact-finders,” suggesting that their conclusions about guilt, innocence, or the presence or absence of a particular element are purely factual questions. See, e.g., State v. Palmer, 2009 UT 55, ¶ 14, 220 P.3d 1198; State v. Hamilton, 2003 UT 22, ¶ 38, 70 P.3d 111; see also E.A. Strout W. Realty Agency, Inc. v. W.C. Foy & Sons, Inc., 665 P.2d 1320, 1322 (Utah 1983). But after resolving any factual disputes as to what occurred, juries must apply the law from their instructions to those facts—making the jury's verdict a mixed question. See Palmer, 2009 UT 55, ¶ 14 (“It is the role of the jury to find facts and apply them to the judge's instructions on the law.”). That same principle underpins our application of the Levin factors here to determine whether the objective imminence element of self-defense is more fact-like or law-like.

28.   The State characterizes Wilcox's use of force to restrain Gwen as a stranglehold, and so the State argues that we should apply the stricter lethal force standard found in Utah Code section 76-2-402(2)(b). Because we ultimately conclude that Wilcox's defense-of-others claim fails based on imminence under the more lenient non-lethal force standard, we need not consider the State's argument about the degree of force Wilcox used.

29.   State v. Clara, 2024 UT 10, ¶ 36, 546 P.3d 963 (cleaned up).

30.   Id. (cleaned up).

31.   Id. (cleaned up).

32.   Id. ¶ 37.

33.   See 2006 UT 50, ¶ 25.

34.   Id.

35.   Clara, 2024 UT 10, ¶ 44.

36.   Utah Code § 76-2-402(5).

37.   See, e.g., Clara, 2024 UT 10, ¶¶ 6–8 (defendant fired gun after being repeatedly rammed with a snowplow); State v. Sorbonne, 2022 UT 5, ¶¶ 5–6, 506 P.3d 545 (following a “heated argument” about the father's impending divorce, father confronted the defendant, who threatened his father with a loaded gun); State v. Berriel, 2013 UT 19, ¶¶ 2–5, 299 P.3d 1133 (defendant received a phone call from a friend who said her boyfriend was hurting her; defendant drove to the friend's house and stabbed the boyfriend despite no apparent immediate threat).

38.   See, e.g., Utah Code § 76-2-402(5)(a), (c); Clara, 2024 UT 10, ¶¶ 45, 49.

39.   See, e.g., Utah Code § 76-2-402(5)(b); Clara, 2024 UT 10, ¶ 49.

40.   See, e.g., Utah Code § 76-2-402(5)(b); Berriel, 2013 UT 19, ¶¶ 14, 16–20.

41.   See, e.g., Utah Code § 76-2-402(5)(d), (e); Sorbonne, 2022 UT 5, ¶ 40.

42.   Levin, 2006 UT 50, ¶ 40.

43.   Cf. id. ¶¶ 38–40 (noting that “the objective nature of” the Fifth Amendment custodial interrogation test makes credibility determinations less important in that context).

44.   See Clara, 2024 UT 10, ¶ 37.

45.   See State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 1266 (Utah 1993) (explaining that, in deciding the appropriate standard of review, we should take account “of the relative capabilities of each level of the court system to take evidence and make findings of fact in the face of conflicting evidence, on the one hand, and to set binding jurisdiction-wide policy, on the other”); see also Randolph, 2022 UT 34, ¶ 39 n.11 (discussing the importance of institutional competencies in the Levin analysis).

46.   Levin, 2006 UT 50, ¶ 26.

47.   Cf. Randolph, 2022 UT 34, ¶ 42 (explaining that correctness review provides better guidance to the public and governmental actors about the bounds of legal actions).

48.   See id.; see also Utah Const. art. I, §§ 1, 6.

49.   See generally 41 C.J.S. Homicide §§ 491–92 (2025); cf. Self Defense Amendments, H.B. 227, 2021 Leg., Gen. Sess. (Utah 2021) (amending the statutory scheme to assign the judge the role of assessing pretrial justification claims).

50.   See generally Laura I. Appleman, The Lost Meaning of the Jury Trial Right, 84 Ind. L.J. 397, 438–39 (2009); Jessica L. West, Protest Is Different, 50 U. Rich. L. Rev. 737, 750, 753–56 (2016).

51.   See generally Utah Code § 76-2-309(3)(a).

52.   See id. § 76-2-309(3).

53.   See id. § 76-2-309(3)(c)(ii).

54.   See id. § 76-2-309(3)(b), (c)(iii).

55.   See Randolph, 2022 UT 34, ¶ 23.

56.   State v. Clara, 2024 UT 10, ¶ 37, 546 P.3d 963.

57.   See id.

58.   See id. ¶ 36 (cleaned up).

59.   See id. ¶ 48.

60.   See Utah Code § 76-2-402(2)(a).

61.   See Clara, 2024 UT 10, ¶ 37 (“The objective [imminence] component is satisfied if the proverbial reasonable person in the defendant's position would have also believed that the threat of unlawful force was imminent.” (emphasis added)); see also State v. Gourdin, 2015 UT App 309, ¶ 5, 365 P.3d 737 (noting that evidence of a victim's later violence was not relevant to the reasonableness or “imminence of the defendant's use of force at the time of the altercation”).

Chief Justice Durrant, opinion of the Court: