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Peter C. FAERBER, Plaintiff-Appellant v. UNITED STATES, Defendant-Appellee
Lieutenant Colonel (LtCol) Peter C. Faerber was commissioned as an officer in the U.S. Marine Corps Reserve in 1992, and he retired with a reserve retirement in 2021. In the case before us, he claims entitlement to the more desirable benefits of an active-duty-status retirement. We reject that claim, as did the Court of Federal Claims (Claims Court).
The particular dispute arose after LtCol Faerber was ordered in 2015 to active duty for a 183-day period that would end in late March 2016. The Marine Corps (which is under the organizational umbrella of the Department of the Navy) extended his active duty several times through successive orders to allow a fitness evaluation pursuant to a medical hold to proceed. On March 21, 2017, however, the then-operative active-duty orders expired (an expiration that automatically released him from active duty), when the Marine Corps denied a further extension because LtCol Faerber declined to waive the so-called “sanctuary” protection of 10 U.S.C. § 12686, which is implemented (as relevant here) through Secretary of the Navy Instruction (SECNAVINST) 1920.6C (Dec. 15, 2005). That protection places certain constraints on the involuntary release of reservists from active duty once they have served long enough in active duty to be within two years of becoming eligible for active-duty retirement. For LtCol Faerber, because of his extensive active duty, that protection would have kicked in four days after his March 21, 2017 release from active duty.
In 2020, LtCol Faerber challenged the March 21, 2017 release in the Claims Court. The Claims Court held that the Marine Corps had unlawfully required LtCol Faerber to waive his sanctuary protection as a condition of further extending his active duty, and the Claims Court remanded the matter to the Board for Correction of Naval Records (Board) to determine the proper remedy for that violation. Faerber v. United States (Faerber I), 156 Fed. Cl. 715, 736, 738 (2021). The merits of that ruling are not now on appeal here. On remand, the Board decided that LtCol Faerber's records should be corrected to state that he remained on active duty until mid-April 2017 (when he was found fit to serve) so that he would have entered the sanctuary period. But the Board also found that the Secretary of the Navy (Secretary) would have immediately taken the affirmative step of releasing LtCol Faerber from active duty under the authority he possesses under § 12686. Even in the absence of the waiver held unlawful in Faerber I, therefore, LtCol Faerber would not have reached the 20 years of active-duty service needed for active-duty retirement.
The Claims Court upheld the Board's ruling as consistent with § 12686 and its implementing regulation, SECNAVINST 1920.6C (Dec. 15, 2005). Faerber v. United States (Faerber II), 169 Fed. Cl. 391, 399–402 (2024). LtCol Faerber appeals. We affirm the Claims Court's decision.
I
A
LtCol Faerber was commissioned as an officer in the U.S. Marine Corps Reserve on December 20, 1992, and he served as a pilot on active duty from July 1993 to December 2002. At that time, LtCol Faerber left active duty and transferred to the Individual Ready Reserve, where, in 2007, he became a judge advocate. From 2007 to 2014, he accepted a series of mobilization orders for active duty. In December 2013, the Commandant of the Marine Corps notified LtCol Faerber that he was eligible for a reserve retirement.
In September 2015, LtCol Faerber was ordered to active duty to serve as the attorney responsible for the Disability Evaluation System (DES) at Camp Pendleton, California, with the orders specifying a period of 183 days—from October 1, 2015, until March 31, 2016. On March 30, 2016, however, LtCol Faerber was placed on medical hold for a service-related back condition. In September of that year, he was referred to DES for evaluation, and his medical hold was extended until March 21, 2017.
Due to that medical hold, LtCol Faerber's active duty orders were extended several times, with the final such set of orders set to expire on March 21, 2017.1 The Marine Corps repeatedly informed LtCol Faerber that he would have to sign a sanctuary waiver—a possibility contemplated by 10 U.S.C. § 12686(b)—before it would extend his active duty again, as he would enter the sanctuary period for active-duty retirement on March 25, 2017. LtCol Faerber declined to sign such a waiver. Accordingly, LtCol Faerber's last active-duty orders expired on March 21, 2017, automatically releasing him from active duty.
That same month, LtCol Faerber's case was referred to a Physical Evaluation Board (PEB) for a fitness determination. On March 23, 2017, the PEB found that LtCol Faerber was fit to continue active duty. On April 3, 2017, LtCol Faerber's medical hold was deactivated, effective March 21, 2017. The PEB President, however, did not notify the Commandant of the Marine Corps of the PEB's findings until April 17, 2017, after LtCol Faerber accepted those findings and completed PEB counseling.
B
On April 27, 2020, after exhausting his administrative remedies, LtCol Faerber filed suit against the United States in the Claims Court under 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (the Tucker Act) and 37 U.S.C. § 204 (the Military Pay Act). He asserted that his March 17, 2017 release from active duty was unlawful and had deprived him of active-duty retirement.
On November 1, 2021, the Claims Court denied the government's motion to dismiss and granted judgment on the administrative record in favor of LtCol Faerber. Faerber I, 156 Fed. Cl. at 720. In particular, the Claims Court concluded that the Marine Corps could not lawfully require LtCol Faerber to waive sanctuary protection as a condition of extending his active-duty orders, reasoning that § 12686(b) provides for waivers only as to active-duty orders set to last less than 180 days, but LtCol Faerber's original 2015 DES active-duty orders were to last 183 days. Id. at 731–36. The Claims Court then explained that, because LtCol Faerber would have been entitled to remain on active duty until the completion of his DES evaluation, he would have remained on active duty past March 25, 2017, when he would have obtained sanctuary status. See id. at 723–25, 737–38. The Claims Court remanded the matter for the Board to determine what changes were warranted in LtCol Faerber's military records—specifically, to determine how long he would have remained on active duty. J.A. 371–72.
On July 13, 2022, the Board issued its findings. J.A. 10662–75. It first recommended correcting LtCol Faerber's records to state that he remained on active duty until April 17, 2017, when the PEB's decision became final. See J.A. 10672–73. The Board recognized that this additional active-duty service would have brought LtCol Faerber within his sanctuary period under 10 U.S.C. § 12686(a). See id. It then explained, however, that § 12686(a) itself expressly allows the Secretary to approve the involuntary release from active duty for reservists who have become eligible for the sanctuary protection. Id. The Board determined that “the Secretary would have (and should have) exercised his authority to release [LtCol Faerber] from active duty if he had mistakenly been permitted to enter sanctuary status without a waiver.” J.A. 10673. It stated that this intention was “clear” from the Marine Corps’ actions in this case—including its repeated attempts to extract a sanctuary waiver from LtCol Faerber—as well as from policies of the Department of the Navy and Marine Corps designed “to prevent a member of the [Reserves] from entering sanctuary status due to unexpected medical hold status.” See id.
Under the regulation implementing § 12686 that would have governed LtCol Faerber's release, the Acting Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Manpower and Reserve Affairs) was authorized “to act on behalf of [the Secretary]” in this matter. SECNAVINST 1920.6C ¶ 13(a) (Dec. 15, 2005); see also 10 U.S.C. § 8013(f) (permitting the Secretary to delegate “functions, powers, and duties” to the Assistant Secretary). The Acting Assistant Secretary approved the Board's July 13, 2022 findings the following month and directed the recommended relief. J.A. 10676. The Acting Assistant Secretary noted: “As the official responsible for this decision, I affirm that I would have involuntarily removed [LtCol Faerber] from active duty if he had inadvertently achieved sanctuary status absent an approved waiver.” Id. After a Claims Court remand for correction of a clerical error, see J.A. 390–92, the Board issued a new decision on November 7, 2022, reaffirming the conclusions of its July decision, and the Acting Assistant Secretary again approved the new decision. J.A. 10630–38.
On January 27, 2023, LtCol Faerber returned to the Claims Court, alleging several errors in the Board's remand decision. J.A. 393–408. The parties filed cross-motions for judgment on the administrative record. Faerber II, 169 Fed. Cl. at 394. On January 24, 2024, the Claims Court affirmed the Board, except for requiring that LtCol Faerber's records reflect a release date a few days after April 17, 2017—a minor change in LtCol Faerber's favor not challenged by the government here. Id.
First, the Claims Court rejected LtCol Faerber's argument based on the “constructive service doctrine.” LtCol Faerber argued that the doctrine required the Board, after Faerber I ruled that his actual release was unlawful, to keep LtCol Faerber on his active-duty assignment through the entirety of the sanctuary period (thereby entitling him to active-duty retirement). Faerber II, 169 Fed. Cl. at 397–98. The Claims Court explained that there was no categorical rule requiring a court to find that a service member would have remained on active duty for the duration of his sanctuary period and that the constructive service doctrine, properly applied, “would merely place [LtCol Faerber] in the same position he would have been in but for the [Marine Corps’] unlawful action––not a better one.” Id.
Second, the Claims Court rejected LtCol Faerber's argument that the Board's decision contravened multiple applicable regulations, including SECNAVINST 1920.6C, Encl. (3), ¶ 7(b)(3) (Dec. 15, 2005). See Faerber II, 169 Fed. Cl. at 398–403. The Claims Court acknowledged that the Board failed to consider that particular instruction, but it determined that such failure was “harmless.” Id. at 399. Rather, the Claims Court agreed with the government that SECNAVINST 1920.6C, Encl. (3), ¶ 7(b)(3) (Dec. 15, 2005) permitted the Secretary, by affirmative action, to release LtCol Faerber from active duty notwithstanding his sanctuary status, as the Board determined that the Secretary would have done. See id. at 400–02. The Claims Court rejected LtCol Faerber's argument that the instruction limits such in-sanctuary releases to cases of physical disability or “for cause” separation. Id.
The Claims Court agreed with LtCol Faerber only in one respect: It ruled that the Board erred in selecting April 17, 2017, for LtCol Faerber's involuntary release date, as he was entitled to several additional working days for out-processing. Id. at 405–06. Once LtCol Faerber's records were corrected accordingly, the Claims Court issued its final judgment on November 21, 2024. J.A. 30.
LtCol Faerber timely appealed to our court. We have jurisdiction to review the Claims Court's decision pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(3).
II
A
We review a Claims Court decision “granting or denying a motion for judgment on the administrative record without deference.” Bee v. United States, 181 F.4th 1348, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2026) (internal quotation marks omitted). We apply the same standard of review as the Claims Court and “will not disturb the decision of the Board unless it is arbitrary, capricious, contrary to law, or unsupported by substantial evidence.” Id. (internal brackets omitted).
A Marine Corps Reserve officer who has completed at least twenty years of qualifying service is entitled to a reserve retirement, which typically includes retirement pay beginning at the age of 60. See 10 U.S.C. § 12731(a), (f). But a Marine Corps Reserve officer who has served on active duty for at least twenty years (with at least ten as an officer) is eligible for active-duty retirement, which includes immediate retirement pay. See 10 U.S.C. § 8323(a), (e).
In 1956, Congress established what has long been called a “sanctuary” period for reservists who are (1) on non-training active-duty orders and (2) within two years of becoming eligible for active-duty retirement. See Wilson v. United States, 917 F.2d 529, 531–33 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (en banc). The key provision, now codified as 10 U.S.C. § 12686(a), reads:
(a) Limitation. Under regulations to be prescribed by the Secretary concerned, which shall be as uniform as practicable, a member of a reserve component who is on active duty (other than for training) and is within two years of becoming eligible for retired pay or retainer pay under a purely military retirement system (other than the retirement system under chapter 1223 of this title [10 U.S.C. §§ 12731–41]), may not be involuntarily released from that duty before he becomes eligible for that pay, unless the release is approved by the Secretary.
10 U.S.C. § 12686(a) (emphasis added). (The reference to chapter 1223 plays no role in this case.) As the language makes clear, the provision permits release within the sanctuary period by an affirmative act of approval by the Secretary, without substantively restricting that approval authority, and LtCol Faerber makes no argument to us that the Secretary was barred by the statutory provision itself from approving his release after he acquired sanctuary status on March 25, 2017.
The statute calls for implementation by “regulations,” and it is one such regulation that is in dispute here. SECNAVINST 1920.6C, Encl. (3), ¶ 7(b) (Dec. 15, 2005), sets forth a list of “statutory limitations ․ regarding the release of Reserve officers from active duty.” Within that list, subparagraph 7(b)(3) states:
Under [10 U.S.C. § 12686], Reserve officers who are on active duty (other than for training) and have completed 18 or more years of active service shall not be involuntarily released from that duty except in the case of physical disability or separation for cause before they become eligible for retired pay, other than under the retirement system in Chapter 1223 of [title 10 of the United States Code], unless their release is approved by [the Secretary].
SECNAVINST 1920.6C, Encl. (3), ¶ 7(b)(3) (Dec. 15, 2005). (We hereafter omit the date when citing this provision.)
B
On appeal, LtCol Faerber presents two challenges to the Board's decision. First, he argues that his involuntary release was barred under SECNAVINST 1920.6C, Encl. (3), ¶ 7(b)(3). Faerber Opening Br. at 28–47. Second, he argues that the Board should not have “retroactively” removed him from sanctuary status in light of the constructive service doctrine. Id. at 47–57. We reject both arguments.
1
LtCol Faerber argues that the Board “erred as a matter of law” in concluding that the Secretary could lawfully have released him from active duty notwithstanding his sanctuary status, because, he asserts, SECNAVINST 1920.6C, Encl. (3), ¶ 7(b)(3) bars such release by limiting any Secretary approval to the “physical disability” and “for cause” circumstances stated in the “except” clause of the provision (quoted just above). Faerber Opening Br. at 30. We reject LtCol Faerber's interpretation of the instruction, without giving deference to the government's interpretation.
The instruction, as relevant here, states that the covered reservists “shall not be involuntarily released from [active] duty except in the case of physical disability or separation for cause before they become eligible for retired pay,” “unless their release is approved by [the Secretary].” SECNAVINST 1920.6C, Encl. (3), ¶ 7(b)(3). The “except” clause is attached, without a comma, to the barring phrase; and the entirety of the barring-and-except clause is then separated by a comma from the “unless” clause authorizing Secretary approval. That structure naturally makes the barring clause first subject to the “except” clause exception (for physical-disability and for-cause bases) and, as thus already narrowed by the exception, further subject to the “unless” clause. The provision does not place the “except” clause in the sentence so as to suggest that it limits the scope of the “unless” clause's authorization of Secretary approval. The straightforward reading is that the provision does not apply to the physical-disability and for-cause circumstances—in which other provisions provide for such releases while cabining the Secretary's authority. The Secretary may release service members in those circumstances pursuant to recommendations by boards. See SECNAVINST 1920.6C, Encl. (4) (Board of Inquiry for separation for cause); SECNAVINST 1850.4E ¶ 1003(b) (Apr. 30, 2022) (Physical Evaluation Board for separations for physical disability). That exception aside, the involuntary-release bar is always inapplicable when the Secretary grants a specific approval for such release under this instruction. See Faerber II, 169 Fed. Cl. at 400–402.
LtCol Faerber's position, which would limit the Secretary's approval authority to the physical-disability and for-cause circumstances, runs counter to the ordinary meaning of the language given the structure of the sentence. See Faerber Opening Br. at 28–47. His position might be suggesting that the sentence be rewritten to deny the “unless” clause meaningful effect, which is counter to a basic interpretive principle. See, e.g., Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 174 (2001); Sharp v. United States, 580 F.3d 1234, 1237–38 (Fed. Cir. 2009); see also Boeing v. Secretary of the Air Force, 983 F.3d 1321, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2020). At a minimum, LtCol Faerber's position treats the sentence as if it had been written to say that covered reservists shall not be involuntarily released during the sanctuary period “except in the case of physical disability or separation for cause before they become eligible for retired pay where their release is approved by the Secretary.” Such language would capture LtCol Faerber's notion that release during the sanctuary period is barred unless the release is for physical disability or for cause and the release is approved by the Secretary. But the Secretary did not choose such language for the instruction, using instead the “except ․, unless” structure, with its quite different meaning.
The natural interpretation of the language of the SECNAVINST 1920.6C sentence also aligns the instruction with the statute it is implementing. The statute creates a general rule against the involuntary release of reservists from active duty during their sanctuary period, but its final phrase establishes a critical and broad exception: “unless the release is approved by the Secretary.” 10 U.S.C. § 12686(a). LtCol Faerber accepts that the statutory language itself does allow Secretary-approved release without limitation to physical-disability or for-cause circumstances. See Faerber Opening Br. at 31–33. We have been shown no basis for the striking result LtCol Faerber proposes, i.e., that the Secretary sharply curtailed the broad authority granted by the statute, which the Board noted could be important for, among other things, satisfying manpower needs and budget constraints. J.A. 10673. Indeed, SECNAVINST 1920.6C undermines the curtailed-authority reading of the instruction proposed by LtCol Faerber. Paragraph 16 of the same enclosure states: “Nothing in this instruction shall be interpreted as preventing [the Secretary] from separating, releasing from active duty, or requiring officers to show cause for retention where otherwise authorized by law or regulation.” SECNAVINST 1920.6C, Encl. (3), ¶ 16 (emphasis added). Because the Secretary is undisputedly authorized to release reservists from active duty during their sanctuary period by § 12686(a) even outside the physical-disability and for-cause circumstances, that authority is preserved by the just-quoted ¶ 16 of SECNAVINST 1920.6C, Encl. (3). LtCol Faerber's reading of ¶ 7(b)(3) of the same instruction would contradict that preservation of statutory authority.2
In sum, we reject LtCol Faerber's reading of the instruction, and we therefore see no error in the Board's decision based on the asserted lack of authority of the Secretary to have released LtCol Faerber from active duty during his sanctuary period.
2
LtCol Faerber further argues that the constructive service doctrine barred the Board from finding that the Secretary would have released him from active duty during the sanctuary period, i.e., before he would have acquired eligibility for active-duty retirement. Faerber Opening Br. at 47–57. LtCol Faerber describes the Board's finding as impermissibly “retroactively” releasing him, in the sense that he was not released from active duty at the end of the sanctuary period but instead at a point within that period. Id. We discern no reversible error on this ground.
The constructive service doctrine is a remedial doctrine designed to “return successful plaintiffs to the position that they would have occupied ‘but for’ their illegal release from duty.” Barnick v. United States, 591 F.3d 1372, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (quoting Christian v. United States, 337 F.3d 1338, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2003)); see Sharpe v. United States, 935 F.3d 1352, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2019). To that end, “military personnel who have been illegally or improperly separated from service are deemed to have continued in active service until their legal separation.” Christian, 337 F.3d at 1347. In Barnick, we noted that “the discretionary power granted to the Correction Boards by 10 U.S.C. § 1552 includes the power to backdate discharges where such backdating places the claimant where he likely would have been absent the improper discharge.” 591 F.3d at 1380 (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted; relying on Denton v. United States, 204 Ct. Cl. 188, 200 (1974)).
Pursuant to that discretionary power, the Board found that LtCol Faerber would have likely been released from active duty as soon as his medical hold was terminated and he was found fit for duty in April 2017. See J.A. 10673. The fact that this release would have occurred during LtCol Faerber's sanctuary period—i.e., when he would have received an active-duty retirement after almost two more years of active-duty service—does not render the Board's finding incompatible with the constructive service doctrine. The doctrine merely provides that “military pay claimants are ‘entitled to be placed in the same position they would have been in’ but for the wrongful action they suffered, ‘but not in a better position.’ ” Sharpe, 935 F.3d at 1359 (quoting Christian¸ 337 F.3d at 1344) (emphasis added). The doctrine in that way aligns with the widely applicable and well-established remedial principle that “[t]he injured party is to be placed, as near as may be, in the situation he would have occupied if the wrong had not been committed.” Wicker v. Hoppock, 73 U.S. 94, 99 (1867); see Taylor v. McDonough, 71 F.4th 909, 942 (Fed. Cir. 2023) (plurality) (en banc) (quoting and citing authorities). The Board adhered to the constructive-service doctrine here. Accordingly, we reject LtCol Faerber's challenge on this issue.
III
We have considered LtCol Faerber's remaining arguments and find them unpersuasive. For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the Claims Court's decision.
AFFIRMED
FOOTNOTES
1. Department of Defense Instruction (DoDI) 1241.01, ¶ 3 provides that certain active-duty reservists with unresolved medical conditions incurred in the line of duty shall be retained on active duty until they are “found fit for duty, separated, or retired as a result of a DES finding.” See DoDI 1241.01, ¶ 3 (Apr. 19, 2016).
2. There is also a plausible explanation for the Secretary's inclusion of the “except” language that does not require the curtailment result (as already suggested above): In the cases of physical disability and separation for cause, other specific formal procedures exist to effectuate release with approval by the Secretary (or the Secretary's delegatee). See Faerber II, 169 Fed. Cl. at 401–02; U.S. Br. at 24, 34–35.
Taranto, Circuit Judge.
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Docket No: 2025-1372
Decided: November 13, 2026
Court: United States Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit.
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