A.S.G., Petitioner, v. LEONARD ODDO (2026)

MEMORANDUM ORDER GRANTING SECOND MOTION TO ENFORCE THIS COURT'S ORDER

I. Procedural Background

Petitioner A.S.G.¹ filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus on June 4, 2026, alleging that he was detained by Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) in violation of the Immigration and Nationality Act and in violation of Petitioner's constitutional rights on February 7, 2026. (ECF No. 1). Determining that Petitioner was subject to discretionary detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) and was thus entitled to an “individualized bond hearing before a neutral Immigration Judge” (“IJ”), the Court granted the Petition in part. (ECF No. 19).

A bond hearing was held on July 1, 2026, (the “first bond hearing”) in which Petitioner was denied bond on the grounds that he was a flight risk. (ECF No. 20). Petitioner filed a Motion to Enforce, arguing that Respondents failed to obey the Court's prior order because the IJ did not make an individualized determination of Petitioner's bond or detention status. (ECF No. 23). The Court concluded that the IJ in the first bond hearing made a determination based solely on a conclusory statement that Petitioner's two prior arrests, one for an open for an open container violation in 2006 and the other relating to a 2025 altercation for which charges were dismissed, paired with Petitioner's ongoing removal proceedings, which were not finalized and pending appeal, counseled against the grant of bond. (ECF No. 28, at 2–3). Because the IJ did not make individualized findings beyond such conclusory statements, the Court granted the Motion and ordered Respondents to provide Petitioner a new, constitutionally compliant bond hearing, de novo, before a different IJ. Id. at 4.

Respondents filed notice that a new bond hearing took place on August 20, 2026, (the “second bond hearing”) and that bond was again denied on the grounds that Petitioner was a flight risk. (ECF No. 30-1). On August 27, 2026, Petitioner filed a Notice stating that Respondents had failed to comply with the Court's order to file a transcript of the first bond hearing, stated that Petitioner had concerns about the constitutional adequacy of the hearing, and requested the Court order Respondents to file the transcript and grant Petitioner leave to make a submission regarding the adequacy of the hearing. (ECF No. 31). The Court granted the request, and the submission was filed on September 16, 2026, to which Respondents Responded on September 27, 2026. (ECF Nos. 33, 37, 39).

Petitioner's submission regarding the second bond hearing contends that the second bond hearing was also constitutionally inadequate and that the second IJ also failed to make an individualized determination as to bond or detention. (ECF No. 37, at 3). Although not submitted as a motion, the submission argues that Petitioner's constitutional rights were and continue to be violated and requests the Court order Petitioner's release. (ECF No. 37, at 3). Respondents’ Response argues that the bond hearing was constitutionally adequate and that the Court lacks jurisdiction to review the discretionary aspects of the IJ's judgment. (ECF No. 39, at 2). The Court therefore construes the submission as a Second Motion to Enforce, on which the issue of the constitutional adequacy of the second bond hearing has been fully briefed.

II. Discussion

As courts in this District have repeatedly recognized, “it is beyond reasonable dispute that a habeas court retains jurisdiction to enforce compliance with an order conditionally granting the writ.” Collado Nunez v. Oddo, No. 25-CV-143J, 2026 WL 1170973, at *5 (W.D. Pa. Apr. 30, 2026); accord A.D. v. Oddo, No. 25-00460J, 2026 WL 1251470, at *2 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 12, 2026); Morgan v. Oddo, No. 3:24-cv-221, 2025 WL 2653707, at *3 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 16, 2025). That is because a “court has the inherent power to enforce its own orders,” E.O.H.C. v. Sec'y U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., 950 F.3d 177, 194 (3d Cir. 2020). In this case, the Court expressly retained jurisdiction over this action and the parties pending further proceedings. (ECF No. 19, at 4). The only issue is the scope of the Court's jurisdiction to review a bond hearing conducted by an IJ. Both parties agree, however, that while federal district courts “lack jurisdiction to review any discretionary determinations underlying the [IJ's] bond decision,” they may “review whether the bond hearing was fundamentally unfair” such that it violates the detainee's due process rights. Ghanem v. Warden Essex Cnty. Corr. Facility, No. 21-1908, 2022 WL 574624, at *2 (3d Cir. Feb. 25, 2022).

“In a fundamentally fair bond hearing, due process has three essential elements. An alien: (1) is entitled to factfinding based on a record produced before the decisionmaker and disclosed to him or her; (2) must be allowed to make arguments on his or her own behalf; and (3) has the right to an individualized determination of his [or her] interests.” Ghanem, 2022 WL 574624, at *2 (quoting Kamara v. Att'y Gen. of U.S., 420 F.3d 202, 211 (3d Cir. 2005)). Petitioner contends that, like the decision in the first bond hearing, the IJ's decision in the second bond hearing was not based on an individualized determination of his interests.

To determine whether a bond hearing is individualized, the Court evaluates: (1) “whether the decision of the immigration judge paid full fidelity to the law of the case”; (2) “whether there has been no plain legal error by the immigration judge in identifying and applying the controlling legal precepts”; and (3) whether the exercise of discretion in denying bond was so arbitrary that it would offend fundamental tenets of due process. See Serrano-Vargas v. Lowe, 2019 WL 3003382 (M.D. Pa. July 10, 2019); see also Mujica-Marquez v. Hoover, No. 4:26-CV-00623, 2026 WL 1483740, at *5 (M.D. Pa. May 27, 2026) (“[T]he absence of legitimate support for the IJ's decision means the exercise of discretion in denying bond was so arbitrary that it ․ offend[ed] fundamental tenets of due process.”) (internal quotation omitted).

Here, the IJ determined that Petitioner is a flight risk based on two findings: (1) that Petitioner is unlikely to succeed in obtaining lawful status in the United States; and (2) that, if released, Petitioner's “significant” community ties would deepen, thus increasing his incentive to avoid compliance with a final order of removal. (ECF Nos. 30-1, 36-1 at 13–14). The Court discusses both in turn in the context of the principles set out above.

Following the second bond hearing, the IJ determined that Petitioner was unlikely to obtain lawful status though Petitioner's asylum application or applications for withholding of removal under the Immigration and Nationality Act and Convention Against Torture, which are both currently on appeal. (ECF No. 36-1, at 13). As the Court noted in its first Memorandum Order Granting Petitioner's Motion to Enforce:

[T]hat the Petitioner was “ordered removed,” despite a pending appeal and no final removal order ․ was not considered in an individualized manner. Such a finding would apply to many persons at a bond hearing before an immigration judge, but without further consideration of the individual facts of the Petitioner's case and how they relate to whether the Petitioner poses a risk of flight, merely finding that the Petitioner has been ordered removed is insufficiently individualized to support such a finding that this individual poses a risk of flight.

(ECF No. 28, at 3). Respondents provide no persuasive reason the court should not apply the same reasoning and reach the same conclusion as it did in the prior Order. Concluding that Petitioner is unlikely to be successful in his appeal does not necessarily connect to the determination that Petitioner is not likely to appear to future immigration proceedings. The same logic would apply nearly every bond applicant under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) with a pending appeal; the existence of an appeal implies that an IJ would have already made a determination that the detainee was not eligible for lawful status in the United States. Section 1226(a) nevertheless obligates Respondents to provide a bond hearing even to such detainees. If the fact that a detainee is appealing his immigration status was determinative of flight risk, a bond hearing would be a mere “rubber-stamp,” invalidating the very purpose for which it is held. See Zheng v. Rokosky, 826 F. Supp. 3d 545, 555 (D.N.J. 2026) (quoting Abdulai v. Ashcroft, 239 F.3d 542, 550 (3d Cir. 2001)). Denial of bond based on the fact of a non-final removal order “would be in conflict with Congress's decision to mandate detention for noncitizens with orders of removal only once those orders become final.” Timbigamba v. FCI Berlin, Warden, 836 F. Supp. 3d 430, 446 (D.N.H. 2026) (emphasis added).

The IJ did not connect her conclusion on the likelihood of Petitioner's ultimate success on the merits of his immigration applications to Petitioner's risk of flight in any way individualized to Petitioner. While an IJ has significant discretion in determining the weight to afford facts relevant to a bond decision, “the IJ must exercise that discretion in an individualized fashion based on the noncitizen's specific circumstances, not merely the procedural posture of their removal proceedings.” Id.; see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19(d) (“Consideration by the Immigration Judge of an application ․ regarding custody or bond ․ shall be separate from and apart from, and shall form no part of, any deportation or removal hearing or proceeding.”). A non-final removal order and the purported unlikelihood of relief are quintessential “mechanistic factors” common to nearly every noncitizen detained under § 1226(a), and thus cannot form the basis of an individualized determination. Almeida v. Lowe, No. 4:26-CV-01750, 2026 WL 2943125, at *3 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 30, 2026) (“Mechanistic reliance on factors that are common to all § 1226([a]) detainees will not suffice”) (quoting Santos v. Lowe, No. 1:18-CV-1553, 2020 WL 4530728, at *3 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 6, 2020)) (brackets in original).

Perhaps in an attempt to draw a connection between Petitioner's non-final removal order and the risk of his non-appearance at future immigration proceedings, the second reason the IJ states as the basis for her determination that Petitioner is a flight risk is his “significant” community ties. (ECF No. 30-1). Petitioner has lived in the United States for over twenty years and has ties to his community through marriage, siblings, employment, and his church. (ECF No. 36-1, at 13–14).

The IJ recognized this, and reasoned that:

[i]f released [Petitioner] would be able to resume residing in the same community, maintain his employment, and continue his daily life while his proceedings remain pending. The continuation of those circumstances may result in even stronger personal and community ties over time. As those ties deepen, the incentive to avoid compliance with a final order of removal correspondingly increases.

(ECF No. 30-1). This is an odd result, to say the least. “Significant” community and family ties would normally mitigate a risk of flight and are generally seen as such in bond proceedings. See Lemus Crispin v. Bondi, 832 F. Supp. 3d 534, 545 (E.D. Va. 2026) (holding that an IJ violated due process at a § 1226(a) bond hearing by counting the petitioner's stable employment history, ordinarily favorable evidence of community ties, against him); Ashley v. Ridge, 288 F. Supp. 2d 662, 669 (D.N.J. 2003) (concluding community ties were appropriately favorably weighed by IJ granting bond); see also Matter of Guerra, 24 I&N Dec. 37, 40 (BIA 2006).

Permitting such reasoning to carry the day would put every person seeking bond in an untenable position; if they have no community ties, an IJ could (perhaps quite reasonably) conclude they are a flight risk because they have nothing incentivizing them to comply with court dates or remain at a known location, i.e., to stay in the community to which they are tied. But under the reasoning that the IJ applied here, if a petitioner has significant community ties, then an IJ could also apparently conclude they are flight risk because they have too much of an incentive to avoid compliance because of their desire to remain at a known location. In other words, under the IJ's rationale, when it comes to “community ties” (have them or not), it really is “head's you lose, tails you lose.”

In addition to this obvious Catch-22 style of reasoning, every person who is released on bond has the opportunity to develop “stronger personal and community ties” over time. If this reasoning were permissible, there would be quite literally no argument about community ties that a detainee could make that would weigh in favor of bond. See Suchite-Mendez v. Mullin, No. 2:26-CV-01691-DGE, 2026 WL 1801004, at *6 (W.D. Wash. June 23, 2026) (“[I]f every noncitizen could be denied bond for those general reasons, there would be no reason to have a bond hearing in the first place.”). Denying bond on grounds that would apply to virtually every detainee renders the hearing constitutionally deficient because those grounds are not individualized. Where a bond decision rests on a question that would permit the denial of bond no matter the answer, the decision “by all appearances act[s] as a ‘mere rubber-stamp’ for Respondents’ predetermined decision to deny bond” and permits the Court to “easily find[ ] that Petitioner's bond hearing was fundamentally unfair and violated his due process rights.” See Zheng, 826 F. Supp. 3d at 555 (quoting Abdulai, 239 F.3d at 550).

The result of the second bond hearing rested exclusively on two factors: A.S.G.’s non-final, on-appeal order of removal and his significant community ties. The Court concludes that, because the IJ did not make individualized determinations about how either of these factors create a risk of flight (and the second reason is facially illogical and universal as set out above), the Petitioner did not receive an individualized hearing, rendering the exercise of discretion by the IJ in denying bond arbitrary. The second bond hearing therefore fell short of the constitutional requirements of due process.

III. Conclusion

Having concluded that A.S.G.’s first and second bond hearings each failed to comply with the Court's Orders and were constitutionally deficient, the Court must determine what remedy is appropriate. Respondents have “now violated [Petitioner's] due process rights t[hrice]: first when [Respondents] initially detained him unlawfully under § 1225(b), and then [twice] again when [Respondents] deprived him of a constitutionally adequate bond hearing.” Mujica-Marquez, No. 4:26-CV-00623, 2026 WL 1483740, at *5; see also Buele Morocho v. Warden Philadelphia FDC, No. 26-1150, 2026 WL 2546223, at *7 (3d Cir. Aug. 28, 2026). Moreover, A.S.G. has been detained by ICE for over eight months, all of which indicates that “release is the only just remedy.” 2026 WL 1483740, at *5. The Court therefore concludes that the appropriate remedy in this matter is to direct that Respondents release A.S.G. from custody on the following terms. The Court thus GRANTS the Petitioner's Second Motion to Enforce the Court's Order (ECF No. 37).

AND NOW, this 13th day of October 2026, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:

• The Second Motion to Enforce (ECF No. 37) is GRANTED;

• Respondents shall release Petitioner from detention into this judicial district within three (3) days of the date of this Order subject to reasonable noncustodial conditions of supervision consistent with 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a);

• Respondents shall file and serve on Petitioner's counsel notice of the date, time, and location of Petitioner's release at least twenty-four (24) hours before the release is set to occur;

• Respondents are ENJOINED from re-detaining Petitioner under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a);

• Respondents shall release Petitioner with any and all personal property, including the items he had with him at Moshannon Valley Processing Center or at any other detention locations at which he was held;

• Respondents shall file a declaration or affidavit pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746 within seventy-two (72) hours of Petitioner's release, confirming the date, time, and manner of release.

The Clerk will close the case on the docket without prejudice, and the Court retains jurisdiction over the action and the parties pending further proceedings, as may be appropriate, including interpretation or enforcement of its Orders.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The Court granted Petitioner leave to file under pseudonym, permitting him to proceed through the use of initials. (ECF No. 9).

Mark R. Hornak UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE