UNITED STATES v. DIXON (2025)

AMENDED ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS THE INDICTMENT

Before the Court is a Motion to Dismiss filed by Defendant Steven Andrew Dixon (“Defendant”) on August 15, 2025. (Dkt. # 28.) The Government filed a response on August 28, 2025. (Dkt. # 30.) The Court held a hearing on October 7, 2025. After careful consideration of the memoranda and exhibits filed in support of and in opposition to the motion, as well as the arguments of counsel and testimony at the hearing, the Court—for the reasons that follow—GRANTS Defendant's Motion.

BACKGROUND

Defendant was indicted in a five-count Sealed Indictment on July 10, 2019. (Dkt. # 4.) The counts included Fraud with Identification Documents, Financial Institution Fraud, and Aggravated Identity Theft. (Id.) Defendant was not arrested for another five-and-a-half years on January 31, 2025, in the Western District of Missouri.

At the hearing, the Court heard extensive testimony from Defendant Dixon and U.S. Secret Service Agent Rebecca Hernandez regarding the investigation, indictment, and later attempts to arrest Defendant in the years between his initial arrest in Bexar County on January 16, 2019, his federal indictment on July 10, 2019, and his eventual arrest for the federal charges on January 31, 2025. The testimony reflects that after the Government made initial attempts to investigate and locate Defendant following his indictment in 2019, little to no attempt was made to arrest Defendant until he was arrested in 2025.

After the case was removed to the Western District of Texas, Defendant filed a Waiver of Detention Hearing (Dkt. # 16) and entered a plea of Not Guilty (Dkt. # 15). On March 28, 2025, Defendant filed a Motion to Continue. (Dkt. # 22.) On June 10, 2025, Defendant filed a second Motion to Continue (Dkt. # 24), followed by a third Motion to Continue on August 4, 2025 (Dkt. # 26).

On August 15, 2025, Defendant filed the instant motion to dismiss, arguing that the Government's five-and-a-half-year delay between his indictment and arrest violated his Sixth Amendment speedy-trial right. (Dkt. # 28.) Defendant argues that where delay is unjustified and prejudicial, Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 48(b) dismissal of the indictment is appropriate. (Id.)

LEGAL STANDARD

I. Sixth Amendment Violation

The Sixth Amendment states that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial.” U.S. Const. amend VI. The right attaches at the time a federal accusation is made, whether by arrest or indictment. See United States v. MacDonald, 456 U.S. 1, 6, 102 S.Ct. 1497, 71 L.Ed.2d 696 (1982) (citing United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 92 S.Ct. 455, 30 L.Ed.2d 468 (1971)). To determine whether a defendant has been deprived of his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial, courts consider four factors: (1) the length of the delay, (2) the reason for the delay, (3) the defendant's assertion of his right, and (4) prejudice to the defendant. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972).

The first factor is a “threshold consideration;” the Court must determine “whether the delay is of sufficient length to be deemed presumptively prejudicial, thus requiring an inquiry into the other Barker factors.” Millard v. Lynaugh, 810 F.2d 1403, 1406 (5th Cir. 1987) (internal quotation omitted). The Fifth Circuit has found that a delay from indictment to trial of more than a year calls for “[a] full-fledged four-factor analysis.” United States v. Hernandez, 457 F.3d 416, 420 (5th Cir. 2006). Here, there was a delay of five-and-a-half years, and the Government concedes that this delay warrants a full four-factor Barker analysis. (Dkt. # 29 at 2–3.)

II. Rule 48

According to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 48(b), a court may dismiss an indictment if unnecessary delay occurs in: (1) presenting a charge to a grand jury; (2) filing an information against a defendant; or (3) bringing a defendant to trial. Fed. R. Crim. P. 48(b). Dismissal pursuant to Rule 48(b) is mandatory only when “the constitutional speedy trial right has been flouted.” United States v. Hill, 622 F.2d 900, 908 (5th Cir. 1980). The Court “has extremely broad discretion regarding whether to dismiss under Rule 48(b).” United States v. Garcia, 995 F.2d 556, 561 n. 8 (5th Cir. 1993). While Rule 48(b) requires dismissal only when the right to a speedy trial has been violated, it “is not confined to constitutional violations but also embraces the inherent power of the court to dismiss for want of prosecution.” United States v. Novelli, 544 F.2d 800, 803 (5th Cir. 1977).

DISCUSSION

I. Sixth Amendment Violation

Defendant seeks dismissal of the Indictment based upon his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 48. (Dkt. # 28.) Having already found that the five-and-a-half-year delay in this case warrants a full four-factor Barker analysis, the Court will precede by analyzing each remaining factor in turn.¹

A. Reason for the Delay

The Supreme Court has established a three-tiered framework for evaluating the second Barker factor—the reason for the delay—by assigning different weights based on the government's conduct: (1) if the government diligently pursues the defendant from indictment to arrest, no presumption of prejudice arises; (2) if the government acts in bad faith, the delay weighs heavily against the government; and (3) “if a case involves neither diligent prosecution nor bad faith delay but instead official negligence, the case occupies a ‘middle ground’ where the weight assigned to the factor increases as the length of the delay increases.” United States v. Serna–Villarreal, 352 F.3d 225, 232 (5th Cir. 2003) (quoting Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 656–57, 112 S.Ct. 2686, 120 L.Ed.2d 520 (1992)).

Defendant argues that the Government has not provided him with a reason for the delay. (Dkt. # 28 at 4.) He also points out that despite his several outstanding warrants between 2019 and 2025 and his active permanent residence in New York, he was not arrested until January 2025. (Id.) In response, the Government acknowledges that its own negligence may have contributed to the delay but argues that it was not deliberate and was also a result of Defendant's own evasive efforts. (Dkt. # 30 at 3–4.) The Government contends that there is evidence that Defendant possessed and presented fictitious driver's licenses from different states to conceal his identity and evade arrest. (Id.) Lastly, the Government argues that Defendant's requests for three separate continuances contributed to the delay and should be weighed against him. (Id. at 4–5.)

While it is true that a defendant's continuances may weigh against him, the cases that the Government points to in support may be differentiated as involving significantly more continuances over a longer period of time. The Government cites both Robinson v. Whitley, 2 F.3d 562 (5th Cir. 1993), and United States v. Duran-Gomez, 984 F.3d 366 (5th Cir. 2020), to support its argument that Defendant's continuances should be weighed against him. However, in Robinson, 2 F.3d at 569, the defendant's four requests for continuance were responsible for a nineteen-and-a-half-month delay. Here, Defendant's three requests for continuance were responsible for only a five-month post-indictment delay. (See Dkts. ## 22, 24, 26.) In Duran-Gomez, 984 F.3d at 375, the defendant sought or explicitly consented to seventeen continuances. Here, Defendant sought only three continuances. (Id.) Therefore, any weight against the Defendant due to his request for continuances is nominal.

Regarding Defendant's alleged attempts to evade arrest using fictitious driver's licenses, while it is true that such attempts to evade apprehension should weigh against Defendant, the case that the Government relies on can again be distinguished. The Government cites a Fifth Circuit opinion affirming the district court's holding that the defendant's deliberate withholding of his full name and misstatement on his visa application should weigh against him. (Dkt. # 30 at 4) (citing to United States v. Ansari, 48 F.4th 393 (5th Cir. 2022)). The circuit court reasoned that the record revealed “no shortage of diligence on the Government's part” to arrest the defendant, including monitoring air travel and attempting a sting operation to lure the defendant back to the U.S. Id. at 399.

Here, however, the Government itself admits that “there were few efforts to locate and arrest [Defendant].” (Id. at 3.) The hearing testimony reflects the following. After Defendant's January 2019 arrest in San Antonio, he remained in San Antonio for around a month before his probation supervision was transferred to New York on a state charge arising from the same facts that resulted in the federal indictment at issue here. On July 15, 2019, Agent Holt entered an IOD requesting that secret service agents in New York locate and arrest Defendant. After visiting his New York address, the New York agents were told that Defendant had not lived there for around three years. On August 1, 2019, New York agents contacted Defendant's mother but were unsuccessful in locating Defendant. On August 8, 2019, a detective from the SAPD informed Special Agent Jason Holt that Defendant told him he was in North Carolina, but there was no attempt to retrieve Defendant. The Government made no further attempts to locate or arrest Defendant until his eventual arrest in January 2025.

Furthermore, the Government has presented no evidence that Defendant had any knowledge of his federal indictment in the years preceding his 2025 arrest. At the hearing, Defendant presented an email between Defendant's close friend, Brandy Weir, and Agent Holt. (See Dkt. # 34-1.) Agent Holt informs Ms. Weir of Defendant's outstanding federal arrest warrant and asks for her assistance in advising Defendant that it is in his best interest to cooperate and turn himself in. (Id. at 1.) Defendant also testified that he spoke with Tom Moore, the federal prosecutor at the time, on the day of his San Antonio arrest on January 16th, 2019. Defendant testified that he had cooperated with Mr. Moore and was thus surprised when he learned of the federal indictment upon his arrest in 2025. While testimony from Ms. Weir and Mr. Moore about their conversations with Defendant would have shed light on whether Defendant knew of his federal indictment, the Government did not call either Ms. Weir or Mr. Moore as witnesses at the hearing. Absent such testimony or any other evidence that Defendant knew of his indictment, the only evidence on this point the Court has before it are the uncontradicted testimony of Defendant that he was unaware of the existence of the sealed indictment until he was arrested in 2025, and thus the Court cannot infer that Defendant was deliberately contributing to the delay in his arrest.

Therefore, the Government's negligence and the minimal counterweight given to Defendant's own contribution to the delay together occupy a “middle ground” regarding the second factor weighing in favor of Defendant.

B. Defendant's Assertion of the Right

While the Court will not fault Defendant for the delay because of his continuances, it does bear on the third factor—Defendant's assertion of the right. This factor presents a close issue in this case.

Under the third factor, the “defendant's assertion of his speedy trial right” receives “strong evidentiary weight,” while “failure to assert the right will make it difficult for a defendant to prove that he was denied a speedy trial.” Barker, 407 U.S. at 531–32, 92 S.Ct. 2182. The Fifth Circuit has noted that “mere assertion” of the right does not automatically cause this factor to weigh in a defendant's favor, and a defendant who waits too long to assert his right will have his silence weighed against him. E.g., United States v. Parker, 505 F.3d 323, 329–30 (5th Cir. 2007) (weighing third factor against defendant when he waited until eight months after indictment to first give an indication that he wished trial to proceed). The Fifth Circuit “assesses the totality of the proceedings in considering the amount of time that passed before a defendant should have raised his speedy trial rights.” United States v. Molina-Solorio, 577 F.3d 300, 306 (5th Cir. 2009).

As noted above, there is no evidence that Defendant knew of the charges against him until his arrest, and thus he will not be “taxed for invoking his speedy trial right only after his arrest.” Doggett, 505 U.S. at 653, 112 S.Ct. 2686. However, Defendant did not file his motion to dismiss until seven-and-a-half months after his arrest and filed three continuances in between his arrest and motion.² In Robinson v. Whitley, the defendant asserted his speedy trial right on eight separate occasions, five of which took place after he was indicted, but the Court considered his four post-indictment continuances to be “indicative of the degree of seriousness with which [the defendant] asserted his right to a speedy trial” and found that his continuances outweighed whatever weight would ordinarily be given to his speedy trial assertions. Robinson v. Whitley, 2 F.3d 562, 569 (5th Cir. 1993). Therefore, the Court finds that Defendant's post-indictment continuances slightly outweigh the assertion of his speedy trial right. Although Defendant has asserted his speedy trial right, he has not diligently pursued it.

C. Prejudice to the Defendant

Lastly, Defendant is entitled to a presumption of prejudice. Ordinarily, the burden is on the defendant to demonstrate actual prejudice but it may be presumed in cases where the government's negligence or bad faith led to a delay of at least five years. United States v. Duran-Gomez, 984 F.3d 366, 379 (5th Cir. 2020) (citing United States v. Cardona, 302 F.3d 494, 498 (5th Cir. 2002)). Here, the Government has conceded that Defendant is entitled to a presumption of prejudice due to the five-and-a-half-year delay. (Dkt. # 30 at 6.)

Thus, the Court must next determine whether the Government has rebutted “the presumption by proving that the prejudice is ‘extenuated by the defendant's acquiescence.’ ” Id. (quoting Cardona, 302 F.3d at 499); see also Doggett, 505 U.S. at 656, 112 S.Ct. 2686 (“presumptive prejudice cannot alone carry a Sixth Amendment claim without regard to the other Barker criteria ․”).

The Government argues that they have rebutted the presumption of prejudice because Defendant acquiesced to the delay by asking for continuances and contributing to the delay in his arrest. (Dkt. # 30 at 6–7.) Despite Defendant's three continuances, the Court has already found that Defendant's own acquiescence only slightly weighs against him. Thus, the Government cannot rebut the presumption of prejudice on this basis. Defendant's continuances spanned a five-month period, compared to a five-year delay caused by the Government's negligence. Such a relatively minimal addition to the delay does not significantly extenuate the prejudice already created by a five-year delay in trial. Therefore, the Court holds that the fourth Barker factor of prejudice weighs in favor or Defendant. Regarding Defendant's alleged evasion of arrest, the Court has already found that absent any evidence to the contrary, Defendant cannot have intentionally evaded arrest for an indictment he did not know existed.

Because the Government has failed to persuasively rebut the presumption of prejudice, the Defendant is excused of the need to demonstrate actual prejudice. See United States v. Molina-Solorio, 577 F.3d 300, 308 (5th Cir. 2009). Thus, the final factor—prejudice to the defendant—weighs in favor of Defendant.

II. Rule 48 Claim

Defendant contends that the delay entitles him to dismissal under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 48(b). (Dkt. # 28 at 1.) “The appropriate analysis under [Rule 48(b)] requires the application of the Barker factors.” United States v. Harrison, 918 F.2d 469, 474 (5th Cir. 1990). Thus, for the reasons previously indicated in reference to those factors, the Court finds dismissal under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 48(b), while rare, is appropriate under the facts of this case.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated, the Court GRANTS Defendant's Motion to Dismiss the Indictment (Dkt. # 28). IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the indictment against Steven Andrew Dixon is DISMISSED. The Government may file a notice of appeal on or before October 14, 2025. Failure to appeal will result in the release of Defendant from the custody of the U.S. Marshals.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

FOOTNOTES

1.   At the hearing, there was uncertainty regarding which party bears the burden. The Court again clarifies that Sixth Amendment speedy trial claims are analyzed using the balancing test set forth in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972). Under this framework, the Court balances all factors and considers the totality of circumstances. To say that one party bears a single, fixed burden would be a mischaracterization of the Barker balancing test. Regardless, the Court notes that no matter how the framework is characterized, it bears no difference on the Court's conclusion.

2.   Defendant was arrested on January 31, 2025. He filed a motion to continue on March 28, 2025 (Dkt. # 22), June 10, 2025 (Dkt. # 24), and August 4, 2025 (Dkt. # 26). Defendant filed his motion to dismiss indictment on August 15, 2025. (Dkt. # 28.)

David Alan Ezra, Senior United States District Judge