UNITED STATES v. MUNIZ JURADO (2025)

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

On this day, the Court considered Defendant Felipe Muniz-Jurado's (“Defendant”) “Motion to Dismiss,” ECF No. 27, filed on September 29, 2025. In his motion, Defendant asks the Court to dismiss the indictment against him with prejudice because “the Government's five-year delay in charging him with unlawful re-entry violated the Due Process Clause.” Id. at 1. After careful consideration of the pleadings and applicable law, Defendant's Motion is denied for the reasons stated herein.

BACKGROUND

On May 15, 2019, Defendant Felipe Muniz-Jurado was arrested “by the El Paso Sheriff's Office and charged with manufacture or delivery of a controlled substance.” ECF No. 27 at 1 (footnote omitted). Following his arrest, Defendant was “interviewed by Deportation Officer Cecilia Yague at the El Paso County Detention Facility, who determined that Mr. Muniz was a citizen of Mexico and did not have legal authorization to be in the United States.” Id. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) filed an immigration detainer against Mr. Muniz [the] same day.” Id. On May 4, 2020, Defendant was convicted of “manufacture or delivery of a controlled substance PG 1> 4G < 200G and sentenced to six years confinement with the Texas Department of Criminal Justice.” Id. at 1–2. No action was taken as it pertained to Defendant's immigration status until March 15, 2024, when the ICE/Enforcement and Removals Operation (“ERO”) office in Houston, Texas informed the El Paso ICE/ERO office that the statute of limitations to prosecute Mr. Muniz for illegal re-entry was about to expire. Id. at 2. Then, on April 10, 2024, “a grand jury returned an indictment charging Mr. Muniz with one count of illegal re-entry, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a), (b)(2).” Id. Defendant was arrested for the instant offense on May 15, 2024, approximately five years after ICE initially determined that Defendant did not have legal authorization to be in the country. Id. Defendant now moves to dismiss the indictment against him, arguing that the five-year delay between offense and indictment violated his Due Process Rights. Id. at 1.

ANALYSIS

Generally, it is the applicable statute of limitations that serves as the “primary guarantee against bringing overly stale criminal charges.” United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 322 (1971) (quoting United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116, 122 (1966)). As such, “pre-indictment delay rarely constitutes grounds for dismissal.” United States v. Hendricks, 661 F.2d 38, 39 (5th Cir. 1981). However, the Supreme Court has acknowledged that “the statute of limitations does not fully define [a defendant's] rights with respect to the events occurring prior to indictment[,]” Marion, 404 U.S. at 324, and that “the Due Process Clause has a limited role to play in protecting against oppressive delay.” United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 789 (1977). Therefore, there may be instances where a substantial delay between offense and indictment may warrant dismissal.

The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment requires dismissal of an indictment only when “(1) the pre-indictment delay caused actual prejudice to the defendant, and (2) such delay was an intentional device used by the government to obtain a tactical advantage over the accused.” United States v. Johnson, 802 F.2d 833, 835 (5th Cir. 1986); see also Hendricks, 661 F.2d at 39–40. When the indictment or arrest occurred within the applicable statute of limitations, the defendant bears the burden of establishing that a due process violation occurred. Id. As it pertains to the first prong of the test, a defendant must demonstrate substantial, actual prejudice. Id. Speculative prejudice is insufficient. Marion, 404 U.S. at 326. To satisfy the second prong, a defendant must demonstrate that “the [government] purposely delayed the indictment to gain tactical advantage or for other bad faith purpose.” United States v. Crouch, 84 F.3d 1497, 1500 (5th Cir. 1996). In this case, Defendant has failed to satisfy either prong.

A. Defendant has failed to demonstrate actual, substantial prejudice.

“[W]hen preindictment delay is asserted, actual prejudice and not merely ‘the real possibility of prejudice inherent in any extended delay,’ ․ is a necessary element which must be shown before the restraints of the due process clause will be applied to bar a prosecution․” United States v. McGough, 510 F.2d 598, 604 (5th Cir. 1975) (quoting Marion, 404 U.S. at 313) (citation omitted). In addition to being “actual, rather than presumed or potential,” the prejudice suffered “must also be substantial.” Crouch, 84 F.3d at 1515 (collecting cases).

Defendant argues that he has suffered substantial, actual prejudice because (1) he has been incarcerated for over six years and (2) was denied the opportunity for a concurrent sentence. ECF No. 27 at 3. As it pertains to Defendant's first argument, Defendant's term of incarceration alone cannot justify a finding of actual, substantial prejudice. Such an argument is more appropriate in the post-indictment context, where length of delay can contribute to a presumption of prejudice. See Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 655–656 (1992) (“[W]e generally have to recognize that excessive delay presumptively compromises the reliability of a trial ․ [w]hile such presumptive prejudice cannot alone carry a Sixth Amendment claim ․ it is part of the mix of relevant facts, and its importance increases with the length of delay.”). However, in the pre-indictment context, “[t]he law is well settled that it is actual prejudice, not possible or presumed prejudice, which is required to support a due process claim.” United States v. Beszborn, 21 F.3d 62, 66 (5th Cir. 1994). This is because “[t]he applicable statute of limitations is the mechanism established by law to guard against possible, as distinguished from actual, prejudice resulting from the passage of time between crime and the charge․” Id. (citation omitted). Indeed, the Fifth Circuit has consistently upheld district court decisions declining to dismiss an indictment on the grounds that a multi-year preindictment delay prejudiced defendant. See e.g., United States v. Jimenez, 256 F.3d 330, 345–46 (5th Cir. 2001) (holding the district court did not err in finding that defendant's due process rights were not prejudiced by five-year preindictment delay); United States v. Stapleton, 65 F. App'x 508, 4 (5th Cir. 2003) (holding the district court did not err in finding that that defendant was not prejudiced by four-year preindictment delay).

As it pertains to Defendant's second argument, whether Defendant was prejudiced by the loss of the opportunity for a concurrent sentence is entirely “speculative,” therefore insufficient to carry Defendant's burden. Marion, 404 U.S. at 324. The decision to impose a concurrent sentence is a discretionary one, and the default position under 18 U.S.C. § 3584 is that, when multiple terms of imprisonment are imposed at different times, each term is to “run consecutively” unless the district court orders otherwise. 18 U.S.C. § 3584(a) (“[I]f a term of imprisonment is imposed on a defendant who is already subject to an undischarged term of imprisonment, the terms may run concurrently or consecutively) (emphasis added). As such, there was never any guarantee that the Court would have agreed to run Defendant's sentence concurrent with his state sentence.

Additionally, Defendant's reliance on United States v. Washington, 626 F. App'x 485 (5th Cir. 2015), as revised (Feb. 1, 2016) to support his position is misplaced. In Washington, the court found that prejudice to the defendant could be presumed in part because the defendant had been deprived of “any incentive to offer arguments in support of a lesser term of incarceration or supervised release” since the district court did not have the “the opportunity to conduct a meaningful de novo re-sentencing proceeding[.]” Id. at 488. However, as previously noted, “[t]he concept of presumed prejudice has no place in a due process analysis.” Beszborn, 21 F.3d at 66. Furthermore, Defendant has not been deprived of the incentive to offer arguments in support of a lesser term of imprisonment because the Court is permitted to consider the time Defendant has served in state custody to grant a downward departure. United States v. Barrera-Saucedo, 385 F.3d 533, 537 (5th Cir. 2004) (holding that it is permissible for a sentencing court to “grant a downward departure to an illegal alien for all or part of time served in state custody from the time immigration authorities locate the defendant until he is taken into federal custody” and that a delay in commencing federal proceedings after the defendant is discovered by immigration authorities in state custody “may be a factor in the district court's analysis of whether a downward departure is warranted by the facts, and, if so, to what extent.”). Defendant, once again, fails to demonstrate actual, substantial prejudice.

B. Defendant has failed to demonstrate a bad faith motive for the delay.

Even if Defendant had succeeded in demonstrating actual, substantial prejudice, his motion would still fail for failure to demonstrate bad faith on the part of the Government. “[P]roof of prejudice is generally a necessary but not sufficient element of a due process claim.” Lovasco, 431 U.S. at 790. In addition to demonstrating actual, substantial prejudice, a defendant seeking dismissal of an indictment on the basis of preindictment delay must also show that “the [government] purposely delayed the indictment to gain tactical advantage or for other bad faith purpose.” Crouch, 84 F.3d at 1500.

Here, Defendant argues that “[b]ecause the Government provides no explanation as to why it did not initiate the 1326 prosecution in May 2019, the Court should find that that the preindictment delay constitutes a Due Process Violation.” ECF No. 27 at 5. This argument, however, misconstrues the burden of proof as it pertains to dismissal of an indictment for preindictment delay. It is the defendant who bears the “burden of establishing that a due process violation has occurred.” Johnson, 802 F.2d at 835. The Government is not required to provide an explanation for their delay. The defense, on the other hand, is required to demonstrate bad faith on the part of the Government. See Hendricks, 661 F.2d at 40 (“While the government offers no explanation for the nine-month period between offense and indictment, [defendant] has produced no evidence even tending to show that the delay was a deliberate tactical maneuver by the government․ The District Court correctly denied appellant's motion to dismiss for denial of due process.”). Because the Defendant fails to allege any facts demonstrating that the Government's preindictment delay was motived by a bad faith purpose, dismissal of the indictment against him is unwarranted.

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that “Defendant's Motion to Dismiss,” ECF No. 27, is DENIED.

DAVID BRIONES, SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE