UNITED STATES v. HERNANDEZ LEDEZMA (2025)

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Before the Court is Defendant Eli Alejandro Hernandez-Ledezma's Motion to Suppress Statements (the “Motion”), ECF 27, filed on September 10, 2025. The Court held a hearing on the matter on October 29, 2025. Upon review of the record and applicable law, the Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART the Motion.

I. BACKGROUND

To violate a suspect's Miranda rights is one thing; to conduct an illegal search is another. Although easy to conflate, the facts here provide a window into how the law distinguishes the two.

Hernandez-Ledezma, a Mexican citizen and primarily Spanish speaker, attempted to cross into the United States through Eagle Pass on March 16, 2025. (Indict., ECF No. 9). A Z-Portal scan of Hernandez-Ledezma's vehicle revealed what the Government alleges was nearly nine kilograms of cocaine hidden in the vehicle. (Gov. Resp. at 2, ECF No. 35). Hernandez-Ledezma was taken into custody. (Id. at 3). That day, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (“CBP”) Officer Rodriguez and Homeland Security Investigations (“HSI”) Special Agent McGlothlin (collectively, the “Officers”) conducted a two-part interview of Hernandez-Ledezma. (Id.).

The interview took place in a windowless six-foot by eight-foot room. (Mot. Hrg. Oct. 29, 2025). The Officers testified that Hernandez-Ledezma was not handcuffed, they never drew their weapons, and no promises were made to elicit information. (Id.).

Much of the interview went like this: Agent McGlothlin asked questions in English, Hernandez-Ledezma spoke in Spanish, and Officer Rodriguez translated. (Id.). The record, however, is fraught with overlapping conversations in English and Spanish. There are many times when Officer Rodriguez spoke Spanish to Hernandez-Ledezma without prompting from Agent McGlothlin and without translating the exchange into English. (Gov. Resp., Ex. 1) (hereinafter, “Gov.'s Ex. 1”). There are other times when Agent McGlothlin responded to Hernandez-Ledezma in English without first hearing Officer Rodriguez's translation. (Id.). And at a critical moment near the end of part one of the interview, Hernandez-Ledezma simultaneously had a conversation about one topic with Officer Rodriguez and another with Agent McGlothlin. (Id.).

What the Court can definitively discern is three references to a lawyer that Hernandez-Ledezma made during the interview. The first was directly after the Officers advised Hernandez-Ledezma of his Miranda rights, when Defendant asked, “So can I request a lawyer?” (Gov.'s Ex. 1, at 9). Agent Rodriguez responded, “Yes, that is your right.” (Id.). Hernandez-Ledezma then signed a Miranda waiver form, thereby waiving his right to counsel. (Id.).

The second occurred just as the Officers began seeking permission to search Hernandez-Ledezma's cellphone. The transcript reads:

Hernandez-Ledezma: At this point, I can't ask for a lawyer or anything, right?

Rodriguez: It's your ․ It's your right. But understand, right now is your opportunity, right?

Hernandez-Ledezma: Can I ask for one? It's just, honestly, no ․ I mean, I'm explaining this and I'm needing [the opinion] from another person.1

Rodriguez: It's your right. But understand, right now is your opportunity, right?

Hernandez-Ledezma: It's what I'm telling you about.2

Rodriguez: No, that's not it.

(Gov.'s Ex. 1, at 39) (original translated from Spanish) (ellipses in original). Officer Rodriguez then began reading a form to Hernandez-Ledezma seeking consent to search Hernandez-Ledezma's cellphone. (Id.).

Soon thereafter, Hernandez-Ledezma made a third reference to a lawyer:

Hernandez-Ledezma (Spanish): So am I going to go to court?

Rodriguez (Spanish): It's very ․ it's likely, but that decision is going to be made ․

McGlothlin (English): It's possible, yeah.

Rodriguez (Spanish): of the uh. Of the sheriffs here in the United States. Well, the lawyers in the United States.

Hernandez-Ledezma (Spanish): And in the best ․ in the best-case scenario, what is the ․ the least ․ ?

Rodriguez (Spanish): I can't give you that. More or less ․

McGlothlin (English): I'd be happy to explain the process and everything, but right now, I'm trying to find out what's going on with you.

Hernandez-Ledezma (Spanish): And in the case of a lawyer?

McGlothlin (English): I get it, you got a lot of questions for me, but the reality is ․

Hernandez-Ledezma (Spanish): Ah, yes, I understand. Orders are higher up.

McGlothlin (English): Yeah.

Rodriguez (Spanish): This, the ․ as I said, is your right.

Hernandez-Ledezma (Spanish): Okay.

Rodriguez (Spanish): Okay?

Hernandez-Ledezma (Spanish): But ․

Rodriguez (Spanish): But if by ․ by asking for a lawyer, it's your partner. We're not going to see any more ․ the reality of what's happening to you. We want to understand the situation you're in.

(Id. at 41) (ellipses in original) (indicating language in which the speaker conversed). After some back and forth, the Officers secured Hernandez-Ledezma's written consent to search his cellphone and ended part one of the interview. (Id. at 43).

Throughout that first interrogation session, the Officers frequently stressed the legal consequences of drug smuggling and appealed to Hernandez-Ledezma's relationship with his pregnant wife. (Id. generally). The Officers warned Hernandez-Ledezma that he might go to a “rough prison” and be considered a terrorist. (Id. at 22, 28). The Officers also repeatedly confronted Hernandez-Ledezma about perceived dishonesty. (Id. generally). Agent McGlothlin testified that those techniques were intended to communicate the “severity” of Hernandez-Ledezma's situation in an attempt to obtain his complete and truthful cooperation. (Motion Hrg.).

The Officers reapproached Hernandez-Ledezma approximately 20 minutes after part one of the interview concluded. (Gov. Resp. Ex. 2). The Officers did not advise Hernandez-Ledezma of his Miranda rights at that time, and Hernandez-Ledezma made no further mention of a lawyer. Hernandez-Ledezma was subsequently charged with Conspiracy to Import Cocaine ³ and Importation of Cocaine.⁴ (Indict).

On September 19, 2025, Hernandez-Ledezma filed the Motion to Suppress at bar, arguing that his Fifth Amendment rights under Miranda were violated and that the Officers invalidly obtained consent to search his cellphone.⁵ (Def.'s Mot. at 2, ECF No. 27). The Court extended the Government's time to file a response to allow the preparation of translated transcripts of the interview, and the Government filed its response on October 14, 2025. A hearing was held on the matter on October 29, 2025, at which the Court heard the testimony of Officer Rodriguez, Agent McGlothlin, and CBP Officer Carranco.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 12(b)(3)(c), a defendant may seek the suppression of evidence in a pre-trial motion. Where a defendant seeks to suppress statements under Miranda, the defendant bears the burden of demonstrating that a custodial interrogation occurred. United States v. Webb, 755 F.2d 382, 390 (5th Cir. 1985). The burden then shifts to the Government to show “that the defendant was given Miranda warnings before custodial interrogation began, that he had the opportunity to exercise the rights to which he was so advised throughout the interrogation, and that he knowingly, intelligently waived these rights and agreed to answer questions or make a statement; otherwise, use against [the defendant] of evidence obtained as a result of custodial interrogation is error.”⁶ United States v. Montos, 421 F.2d 215, 222 (5th Cir. 1970) (quotations omitted), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1022, 90 S.Ct. 1262, 25 L.Ed.2d 532.

Alleged Fourth Amendment violations are subject to a similar burden-shifting framework. In general, the proponent of a motion to suppress must show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that their Fourth Amendment rights were violated. United States v. Garcia, 99 F.4th 253, 267 (5th Cir. 2024). Where, as here, it is alleged that a search occurred without a warrant, the defendant is obligated to produce evidence of a warrantless search. Id. The Government then bears the burden of validating the warrantless search. Id. And “where the validity of a search rests on consent, the State has the burden of proving that the necessary consent was obtained and that it was freely and voluntarily given.”⁷ Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 497, 103 S.Ct. 1319, 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983).

III. ANALYSIS

The issues before the Court invoke two fundamental concepts in Fifth and Fourth Amendment jurisprudence: first, that the Fifth Amendment right to counsel must be unambiguously invoked; and second, that consent must be given voluntarily to validate a warrantless search under the Fourth Amendment.

The Court first finds that Hernandez-Ledezma did eventually invoke his Fifth Amendment right to counsel under Miranda and that the Officers failed to honor that invocation. Accordingly, Hernandez-Ledezma's subsequent testimonial statements, including those given after the Officers reapproached, are subject to suppression.

Second, the Court finds that Hernandez-Ledezma's consent to search his phone was given voluntarily, despite it being elicited through interrogation that violated Miranda. Thus, the cellphone and its contents are not subject to suppression on Fourth or Fifth Amendment grounds.

A. Hernandez-Ledezma's Invocation of the Right to Counsel

Under the Fifth Amendment, “No person ․ shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself ․” U.S. Const. amend V. Miranda established that a criminal defendant's “right to have counsel present” during interrogation “is indispensable to the protection of the Fifth Amendment privilege ․” Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 469, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966).

A suspect validly invokes their Miranda right to counsel by making an unambiguous statement “that can reasonably be construed to be an expression of a desire for the assistance of an attorney.” Soffar v. Cockrell, 300 F.3d 588, 595 (5th Cir. 2002) (citing Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 459, 114 S.Ct. 2350, 129 L.Ed.2d 362 (1994)). In Davis, the Supreme Court espoused the often-cited standard for evaluating purported invocations of a suspect's right to counsel:

Although a suspect need not speak with the discrimination of an Oxford don, he must articulate his desire to have counsel present sufficiently clearly that a reasonable police officer in the circumstances would understand the statement to be a request for an attorney.

512 U.S. at 459, 114 S.Ct. 2350 (internal citations omitted). What Davis created is an objective inquiry not based on specific words or phrases, but instead on the perspective of a reasonable officer in the interrogator's shoes. United States v. Sanders, 133 F.4th 341, 361 (5th Cir. 2025).

Courts consider references to attorneys in their full context to evaluate whether a reasonable officer would interpret statements as invocations of Miranda, but a suspect's post-invocation responses to further interrogation “may not be used to cast doubt on the clarity of his initial request for counsel.” Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. 91, 92, 105 S.Ct. 490, 83 L.Ed.2d 488 (1984); United States v. Oehlschlager, 602 F. Supp. 3d 967, 971–73 (N.D. Tex. 2022).

If a suspect does unequivocally request counsel during an interview, questioning must immediately cease until an attorney is made available to the suspect or the suspect reinitiates interrogation. Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484–85, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981). Nonetheless, if “a reasonable police officer in the circumstances would understand only that the suspect might be invoking the right to counsel,” officers need not cease questioning or seek clarification, even if doing so is considered the better practice. Davis, 512 U.S. at 459, 461, 114 S.Ct. 2350 (emphasis in original).

Here, Hernandez-Ledezma's first reference to a lawyer was insufficient to invoke Miranda. His second, however, was an unequivocal invocation of his Miranda right to counsel.

Finally, even if the second reference was ambiguous, the cumulative effect of all of Hernandez-Ledezma's statements would have operated to trigger Miranda upon his third reference to an attorney.

1. First Reference to an Attorney: Government's Exhibit 1, Page 9

It is well settled that a suspect does not invoke their Miranda right to counsel by seeking clarification about their rights. United States v. Montes, 602 F.3d 381, 385 (5th Cir. 2010) (holding that the statement, “Do I need an attorney?”, was not an unambiguous invocation of the right to counsel.); United States v. Whitmore, 386 F. App'x 464, 470 (5th Cir. 2010). Courts have held that questions such as, “Can I talk to a lawyer first?”, standing alone, are inquiries into whether the suspect had the right to talk to a lawyer, not signals of their desire to have an attorney present. Obershaw v. Lanman, 453 F.3d 56, 65 (1st Cir. 2006).

Hernandez-Ledezma posed his question, “So can I request a lawyer?”, in response to the Officers asking him if he understood the Miranda form, and he made no other mention of an attorney when his question was answered in the affirmative. Under those circumstances, a reasonable officer would interpret Hernandez-Ledezma's words, and likely be correct, to merely be clarifying the Miranda form with which he was presented. Accordingly, the Officers were under no obligation to terminate the interview then.

2. Second Reference to an Attorney: Government's Exhibit 1, Page 39

Hernandez-Ledezma's second reference to an attorney is more aptly characterized as a group of two references, one explicit and one implicit: first, he explicitly asks, “I can't ask for a lawyer or anything, right?”; and second, he says, “Can I ask for one,” and, “I'm needing the opinion of another person.” The first, more explicit reference is more akin to a clarification question that would not alone function to invoke Miranda. The references to “one” and “another person,” however, require further consideration.

The first issue is whether a reasonable officer under the circumstances would interpret “one” and “another person” to be referring to an attorney. The Government argues that both are vague and could be referring to anyone whom Hernandez-Ledezma considers a confidant. But in common vernacular, the word “one,” when referring to another, invokes not just any person; it invokes a specific type of person to which the speaker has previously referred, e.g., a “friend,” a “judge,” or a “doctor.” In this case, the type of person to which Hernandez-Ledezma referred in his statement immediately preceding his use of the word “one” was a lawyer. Moreover, Officer Rodriguez and Hernandez-Ledezma were actively engaged in a conversation about Miranda rights when Hernandez-Ledezma referenced “one.” Any reasonable officer would understand “one” to mean “lawyer” under those circumstances, and, having been spoken as part of the very same thought, it also stands to reason that Hernandez-Ledezma meant, “I'm needing the opinion of a lawyer,” when he said, “I'm needing the opinion of another person.” Any mistaken belief to the contrary by Officer Rodriguez is irrelevant to the objective Miranda inquiry.

Having found that “one” and “another person” unambiguously referred to a lawyer, the second question becomes whether any of those statements unequivocally invoked the right to a lawyer. As explained, supra, questions like “Can I talk to a lawyer?”, standing alone, are generally considered clarifying question not sufficient to invoke Miranda. Obershaw, 453 F.3d at 65. But context matters; and in different contexts, courts have arrived at different conclusions.

For example, in Smith v. Endell, the suspect asked, “Can I talk to a lawyer? At this point, I think maybe you're looking at me as a suspect, and I should talk to a lawyer.” 860 F.2d 1528, 1531 (9th Cir. 1988). After the interviewing officers indicated that the suspect was indeed under investigation, the suspect stated, “Because if you are, it's ․ it's a serious charge and I think I should have counsel ․” Id. The court reasoned that “there was no ‘might’ or ‘maybe’ or ‘perhaps’ ” in the suspect's statements; rather, the officers should have known that it was the suspect's intent to have a lawyer present if he were considered a suspect. Id. Thus, the suspect validly invoked their Miranda right to counsel.

This case is analogous to Smith. Hernandez-Ledezma's question, “Can I ask for one,” did not serve a clarifying function, as he had just clarified his right to an attorney moments before by asking, “I can't ask for a lawyer or anything, right?” He then became frustrated with the Officers—“I mean, I'm explaining this ․”—and communicated his “need” to obtain “the opinion of,” as the Court now finds, a lawyer. Even that expression of “need” could alone arguably have been enough to invoke Miranda, as it was unaccompanied by any qualifying language. Contrast United States v. Contreras-Zamora, No. 21-10813, 2022 WL 1467449, at *1 (5th Cir. May 10, 2022) (noting that the statement, “I need my lawyer,” “might be viewed as an unequivocal invocation” had the suspect not voluntarily reinitiated the interrogation) with United States v. Parks, No. 1:18-CV-00317, 2019 WL 2931460, at *4 (D.Md. July 8, 2019), aff'd, 849 F. App'x 400 (4th Cir. 2021) (finding that the statement, “I think I need an attorney,” was ambiguous).

Taken together, it is clear from those series of statements that Hernandez-Ledezma was no longer considering his options: he unequivocally desired the presence of an attorney during questioning. Accordingly, Hernandez-Ledezma effectively invoked his Fifth Amendment right to counsel under Miranda, and all questioning should have ceased immediately.

3. Third Reference to an Attorney: Government's Exhibit 1, Page 41

Even if the first two references were not sufficiently unambiguous to invoke Hernandez-Ledezma's Miranda right to counsel, his third—“And in the case of an attorney?”—would have sealed the deal.

Repeated references to an attorney, even ambiguous ones, can sufficiently put an interrogating officer on notice that a suspect is trying to halt questioning until a lawyer is present. In United States v. Oehschlager, the court recognized that a suspect stating, “I think I need the advice of an attorney,” three times within less than 20 minutes was sufficient to invoke Miranda. 602 F. Supp. 3d 967, 971–73 (N.D. Tex. 2022). As the Oehschlager court put it, “Though his words remained largely the same, their context and their effect on the constitutionality of the subsequent interrogation did not.” Id. at 973. Similarly, in Alvarez v. Gomez, the suspect asked three questions: (1) “Can I get an attorney right now, man?”; (2) “You can have attorney right now? [sic]”; and (3) “Well, like right now you got one?” 185 F.3d 995, 998 (9th Cir. 1999). The court held that the questions, “when considered together, constituted an unequivocal request for an attorney.” Id.

By the time Hernandez-Ledezma made this final reference to a lawyer, the Officers should have known that he had made up his mind. He had now referenced an attorney, either explicitly or implicitly, many times and in multiple different phrasings. It is apparent to the Court, and would be to any reasonable officer, that Hernandez-Ledezma was attempting to have an attorney present for questioning.

It could be argued that the overlapping conversations occurring when the third reference to a lawyer was made renders it ambiguous and ineffective under Miranda. It is true that the record here is a confusing web of two simultaneous conversations between Hernandez-Ledezma, Officer Rodriguez, and Agent McGlothlin. The nature of Agent McGlothlin's questioning suggests that Hernandez-Ledezma was inquiring into how an attorney would impact his chances in court. But of course, a bi-lingual transcript of a three-person interview will create a noisy record in hindsight; so noisy that it likely greatly exaggerates what confusion was actually present in the interrogation room. Officer Rodriguez, at least, understood that Hernandez-Ledezma was referring to his right to counsel at the time, as Officer Rodriguez responded with, “That is your right,” and, “But if by asking for a lawyer [․] We're not going to see the reality of what's happening to you. We want to understand the situation you're in.” That exchange tends to resolve some ambiguity created by the record and suggests that Hernandez-Ledezma was talking to Officer Rodriguez about his right to counsel, not to Agent McGlothlin about legal consequences.

Accordingly, in the event that Hernandez-Ledezma's second reference was considered too equivocal to invoke Miranda, the Court would find that his third reference was sufficient to do so.

B. Voluntariness of Consent

The Fourth Amendment shields the people from “unreasonable searches and seizures ․” U.S. Const. amend. IV. Searches conducted without a warrant “are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment—subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.” Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967). A search conducted pursuant to voluntary consent is one such exception. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973). Whether consent is voluntary is a question of fact considering the totality of the circumstances. Id. at 227, 93 S.Ct. 2041. The Fifth Circuit has adopted a six-factor test to evaluate voluntariness in the Fourth Amendment context:

(1) the voluntariness of the defendant's custodial status; (2) the presence of coercive police procedures; (3) the extent and level of the defendant's cooperation with the police; (4) the defendant's awareness of his right to refuse consent; (5) the defendant's education and intelligence; and (6) the defendant's belief that no incriminating evidence will be found.

United States v. Perales, 886 F.3d 542, 546 (5th Cir. 2018). “Although all six factors are relevant, no single factor is dispositive.” Id.

As an initial matter, consent to search obtained in violation of Miranda—that is, obtained during a custodial interrogation where a defendant's Miranda rights have not been honored—is still valid consent if it is given voluntarily. United States v. Garcia, 496 F.2d 670, 674 (5th Cir. 1974). Thus, although the Court finds that the Officers did violate Hernandez-Ledezma's Miranda rights before consent was obtained to search his cellphone, such violations will not render the search unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. That aside, the voluntariness factors, on balance, favor the Government: the first factor suggests involuntariness, factors two through five suggest voluntariness, and the sixth factor is neutral.

1. Voluntariness of Custodial Status

Whether custodial status was voluntary “turns on whether a reasonable person in the defendant's position would feel free to terminate the encounter.” United States v. Soriano, 976 F.3d 450, 457 (5th Cir. 2020). That a defendant was under arrest cuts strongly against the custodial status being voluntary. United States v. Alkheqani, 78 F.4th 707, 720 (5th Cir. 2023). And where custodial status was involuntary, consent to search was also more likely involuntary. Id. Hernandez-Ledezma's custodial status was, of course, involuntary in the sense that he was under arrest as a suspect for drug smuggling. Thus, this factor weighs in Hernandez-Ledezma's favor.⁸

2. Coercive Police Procedures

Police conduct amounting to coercion general involves “threats of force, promises, trickery, or deceit designed to pressure a suspect into consenting to searches ‘or more subtle forms of coercion that might flaw his judgment.’ ” Id. (quoting United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 424, 96 S.Ct. 820, 46 L.Ed.2d 598 (1976)). Fourth Amendment jurisprudence makes room for “some gamesmanship” from police that is not intended to trick a suspect into providing consent. Id. at 721.

Police may confront a suspect with inconsistent statements without crossing the line into coercion. For example, in Soriano, the officer questioned the suspect about disparities in the suspect's statements and accused the suspect of being untruthful. 976 F.3d at 456. The officer then obtained consent to search the suspect's vehicle. Id. The court reasoned that because the officer's interrogation techniques were not employed in an attempt to trick the suspect into consenting to the search, but, rather, served to “prompt [the suspect's] truthfulness,” the officer's conduct was not unduly coercive under the Fourth Amendment. Id.

Police are also not prohibited from appealing to a suspect's emotions with truthful references to the reality or gravity of the suspect's situation. In United States v. Anderson, in an attempt to obtain consent to search the suspect's home, an officer informed the suspect that they could be arrested if a fugitive was found in the home and the suspect knew of the fugitive's presence. 568 F. App'x 332, 335 (5th Cir. 2014). After the suspect refused consent, the officer then appealed to the suspect as a grandmother, asking her whether she would want someone else to give consent so that police could find her granddaughter. Id. at 333–34. The court reasoned that the officers' suggestion that the defendant could be subject to arrest was ultimately consistent with reality, and that the defendant's “will was not overborne” by the officer's statements. Id. at 334; see also United States v. Barber, 124 F.4th 325, 359 (5th Cir. 2024) (holding that “there is nothing wrong with police officers truthfully informing citizens of ongoing threats.”).

Here, first, none of the techniques that the Officers used were intended to trick or force Hernandez-Ledezma into consenting to a search: Agent McGlothlin testified that the purpose his conduct was to communicate the “severity” of Hernandez-Ledezma's situation and encourage Hernandez-Ledezma to tell the truth.

Second, the Officers' references to legal consequences—namely, that Hernandez-Ledezma could be considered a “terrorist,” that prison was “rough,” that “it was not looking good for him,” and that he was likely to go to court—were credibly truthful representations of Hernandez-Ledezma's situation. Some of those statements were even prompted by Hernandez-Ledezma's own questions about the American legal system.

Finally, although the Officers' strategies of invoking Hernandez-Ledezma's relationship with his wife and confronting him with his dishonesty amounted to some interrogative pressure, that pressure was not such that Hernandez-Ledezma's will was overborne. Accordingly, the Court finds that this factor weighs in favor of the Government.

3. The Extent and Level of Defendant's Cooperation

A defendant's cooperation with police weighs in favor of voluntariness if the defendant “is more cooperative than not.” Alkheqani, 78 F.4th at 721 (citing Soriano, 976 F.3d at 456). The record here shows that Hernandez-Ledezma answered most of the Officers' questions politely, and there is no indication that he was combative or obstructive. See id. (defendant was generally responsive and polite); United States v. Michalik, 5 F.4th 583, 590 (5th Cir. 2021). Hernandez-Ledezma even specifically stated that he would cooperate. (Gov.'s Ex. 1 at 18). This factor also weighs in favor of the Government.

4. Defendant's Knowledge of Right to Refuse Consent

Hernandez-Ledezma signed a form, printed in his first language, that informed him of his right to refuse consent to the search of his cellphone. Officer Rodriguez also read the form to Hernandez-Ledezma in Spanish before prompting Hernandez-Ledezma to sign. Such written acknowledgement and contemporaneous oral advisement weighs strongly in favor of a finding of voluntariness. Michalik, 5 F.4th at 590.

5. The Defendant's Education and Intelligence

Hernandez-Ledezma has a college degree in mechanical engineering from the Piedras Negras Institute of Technology and is familiar with logistics associated with crossing into the United States, demonstrating that he is at least of “average intelligence” and not uniquely “susceptible to coercion.” Soriano, 976 F.3d at 457 (holding that this factor weighed in favor of voluntariness where 37-year-old defendant had only six years of formal education in Mexico and had previous interactions with police). Moreover, his questions about the criminal justice system and the consequences of his arrest suggest that he understood the nature of the interrogation and his circumstances. See Alkheqani, 78 F.4th at 721–22 (26-year-old with ninth grade education found sufficiently intelligent to give voluntary consent). This factor favors the Government.

6. Defendant's Belief that No Incriminating Evidence Would Be Found

Factor six weighs in favor of a finding of voluntariness where the defendant believes that no incriminating evidence would be found within the thing to be searched. Soriano, 976 F.3d at 458. Hernandez-Ledezma's statements leading up to providing consent to search his phone allow the Court to do no more than speculate as to what Hernandez-Ledezma knew at the time. Accordingly, the Court considers this factor neutral.

On balance, the Court finds that Hernandez-Ledezma's consent to the search of his cellphone was voluntary. The cellphone and its contents should not be suppressed on Fourth or Fifth Amendment grounds.

C. Evidence Subject to Suppression Pursuant to this Order

Any testimonial statement obtained from a suspect during an interrogation after the right to counsel is invoked must be suppressed in the Government's case-in-chief unless an attorney was present or the suspect reinitiated the interrogation. Edwards, 451 U.S. at 484–85, 101 S.Ct. 1880; Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 709, 99 S.Ct. 2560, 61 L.Ed.2d 197 (1979). Here, Hernandez-Ledezma was never provided an attorney for the interviews with the Officers and never reinitiated the interviews himself; in fact, the Officers “reapproached” Hernandez-Ledezma for the second part of the interview. It follows that any testimonial statements that Hernandez-Ledezma made to the Officers after the unambiguous invocation of Miranda at page 39 of the Government's Exhibit 1, ECF No. 35-1, shall be suppressed. Hernandez-Ledezma's statements prior to that invocation are not suppressed.

However, as described, supra, consent to search obtained in violation of Miranda is still valid if it is given voluntarily. Here, the Court finds that Hernandez-Ledezma gave valid, voluntary consent to search his cellphone. Thus, the cellphone and its contents are not subject to suppression.

IV. CONCLUSION

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Defendant Eli Alejandro Hernandez-Ledezma's Motion to Suppress Statements, ECF 27, is DENIED IN PART and GRANTED IN PART.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The parties agree that the transcript filed as an exhibit to the Government's Response mistranslated this statement to exclude the words, “the opinion.”

2.   It is unclear to the Court whether the statement, “It's what I'm telling you about,” was directed toward Officer Rodriguez regarding an attorney or Agent McGlothlin regarding the passcode to Hernandez-Ledezma's cellphone.

3.   21 U.S.C. §§ 952(a), 960(a)(1), (b)(1), 963.

4.   21 U.S.C. §§ 952(a), 960(a)(1), (b)(1).

5.   The thrust of Hernandez-Ledezma's argument in the Motion with regard to the search of his cellphone is that his consent was invalid as obtained in violation of Miranda. Based on Defense Counsel's representations during the hearing on the Motion, the Court also construes Hernandez-Ledezma's challenge to the search as resting on Fourth Amendment grounds.

6.   The parties do not dispute that Hernandez-Ledezma was in custody and subject to interrogation. Nor do the parties dispute the validity of the Miranda advisement and Hernandez-Ledezma's initial waiver by signing the Miranda waiver form.

7.   There is no dispute that a warrantless search of Hernandez-Ledezma's cellphone occurred.

8.   Importantly, “the fact of custody alone has never been enough in itself to demonstrate a coerced confession or consent to search.” United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 424, 96 S.Ct. 820, 46 L.Ed.2d 598 (1976); see United States v. Malagerio, 49 F.4th 911, 917 (5th Cir. 2022) (affirming denial of motion to suppress because, though defendant's “custodial status was not voluntary, [ ] most or all of the remaining factors tilt in favor of the search's being voluntary.”).

ERNEST GONZALEZ, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE