Cardoso-Reyes, Petitioner, v. Mullin, et al., Respondents. (2026)

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Diesky Cardoso-Reyes is a native and citizen of Cuba currently being detained pending removal proceedings pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2). He filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus demanding immediate release or an individualized bond hearing and an injunction from transferring him outside the Western District of Texas. ECF No. 1 (“Petition”). The petition and request for injunctive relief are denied.

BACKGROUND

Petitioner last entered the United States without inspection in or about April 2022. Petitioner was initially detained by immigration authorities in April 2022 and released on conditional parole pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)(2)(B).

Petitioner filed an application for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture. On June 9, 2026, an immigration judge found that Petitioner had established a prima facie case for relief, and his application remains pending.

On June 10, 2026, Petitioner was taken into custody by federal agents and detained at the T. Don Hutto Detention Center in Taylor, Texas. On June 12, 2026, Petitioner filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus contesting his detention and seeking immediate release or an individualized bond hearing and an injunction from transferring him outside the Western District of Texas. The Court ordered Respondents to show cause why the writ should not be granted. Respondents answered, and Petitioner replied.

On June 22, 2026, Petitioner filed an application for a temporary restraining order (“TRO”) enjoining Respondents from transferring Petitioner outside the Western District of Texas and requiring Respondents to give 72 hours of notice before transferring Petitioner outside the Western District of Texas or taking any steps to remove Petitioner from the United States. ECF No. 5 (“Original TRO”). On June 24, 2026, the Court denied Petitioner's Original TRO because Petitioner had not provided evidence of imminent and irreparable harm absent emergency injunctive relief. ECF No. 6.

On July 10, 2026, Petitioner was transferred to the Central Valley Annex in McFarland, California. ECF No. 10 at p. 2 (“Renewed TRO”). The day of his transfer, Petitioner filed a Renewed TRO, informing the Court of his transfer and requesting, among other things, this Court direct Respondents to return Petitioner to a detention facility in the Western District of Texas no later than July 14, 2026 or to release him and direct Respondents to provide Petitioner's counsel and the Court with no less than 72 hours of notice before any further transfer of Petitioner transpired or any step to remove him from the United States was taken. Renewed TRO at pp. 2, 7– 8. On July 17, 2026, the Court denied Petitioner's Renewed TRO because Petitioner had not shown imminent and irreparable harm absent emergency injunctive relief. ECF No. 15.

The Court now addresses Petitioner's petition and final request for injunctive relief.

LEGAL STANDARD

“[A]bsent suspension, the writ of habeas corpus remains available to every individual detained within the United States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004) (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2). Through 28 U.S.C. § 2241, Congress authorized federal district courts to entertain habeas corpus petitions, including petitions brought by noncitizens such as Petitioner challenging the lawfulness of their immigration detention. See Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 516–17 (2003) (confirming section 2241 jurisdiction over a constitutional challenge to immigration detention); see also Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687–88 (2001). The writ exists to “grant relief from unlawful imprisonment or custody,” Pierre v. United States, 525 F.2d 933, 935–36 (5th Cir. 1976), and does not reach a challenge to a final order of removal, which Congress has channeled exclusively to the courts of appeals, see 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(5).

To obtain the writ, a petitioner must be “in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States[.]” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3); see Orellana v. Kyle, 65 F.3d 29, 31 (5th Cir. 1995) (per curiam). The petitioner bears the burden of demonstrating that the challenged custody is unlawful, and the Court must “summarily hear and determine the facts, and dispose of the matter as law and justice require.” 28 U.S.C. § 2243.

ANALYSIS

Petitioner asserts that his pre-removal detention without an individualized bond hearing is unlawful and that he is entitled to an injunction prohibiting his transfer outside the Western District of Texas. Because his detention is lawful, the petition and request for an injunction are denied.

I. Jurisdiction

The Court first considers its jurisdiction. “[W]hen the Government moves a habeas petitioner after [he] properly files a petition naming [his] immediate custodian, the District Court [where he originally filed his petition] retains jurisdiction[.]” Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 441 (2004). Petitioner properly filed a petition naming his immediate custodian before he was transferred out of the district. This Court, therefore, retains jurisdiction over Petitioner's petition despite his transfer outside the district.

II. Petition for Habeas Corpus

Petitioner asserts that his pre-removal detention without a bond hearing is unlawful for two main reasons. First, he contends that he is detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), which entitles him to an individualized bond hearing, rather than under section 1225(b)(2), which does not. He traces that classification to his 2022 release on conditional bond under that section, and he maintains that judicial estoppel bars Respondents from recharacterizing his detention as falling under section 1225(b)(2).¹ Second, Petitioner argues that even if he is being detained under section 1225(b)(2), due process entitles him to a bond hearing. Both arguments fail.

A. Section 1225 governs Petitioner's detention.

Petitioner is detained pursuant to section 1225(b)(2), not section 1226(a). Section 1225(b)(2) states that “an alien who is an applicant for admission” “shall be detained for” removal proceedings “if the examining immigration officer determines that [he] is not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2). Petitioner falls under this statutory language because, in light of Buenrostro-Mendez v. Bondi, 166 F.4th 494 (5th Cir. 2026), there is no dispute that he is an “applicant for admission.”

Petitioner nevertheless argues that his detention is instead governed by section 1226(a) because he was granted conditional parole in 2022 under that section. For this proposition, he relies on the Board of Immigration Appeals' decision in Matter of Cabrera-Fernandez, which held that an Immigration Judge's decision to parole an applicant for admission must have been an exercise of conditional parole under section 1226(a). 28 I. & N. Dec. 747, 748–50 (BIA 2023). This citation, however, is inapposite because no one disputes that he was conditionally paroled in 2022 under section 1226(a). The issue is whether that previous parole overrides Respondents' ability to detain him now under section 1225. It does not. The fact that “§ 1226 applies to aliens in the United States does not preclude § 1225 from also applying to such aliens.” Buenrostro-Mendez, 166 F.4th at 505. So, Petitioner's previous release on conditional parole under section 1226(a) does not alter his legal status as an applicant for admission subject to section 1225(b).²

This conclusion is consistent with other district courts that have addressed the issue and held that “[t]he decision of prior Administrations to decline to enforce § 1225(b)(2)(A) against individuals like Petitioner [and instead grant conditional parole under section 1226] in no way changes the plain statutory text nor otherwise abrogates the Government's authority to lawfully detain Petitioner pending his removal.” Marcelo-Aguila v. Noem, No. 4:26-cv-01376, 2026 WL 936337, at *1 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 7, 2026); see also Makhmudov v. Lyons, No. 1:26-cv-024, 2026 WL 879392, at *1 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 31, 2026) (denying the petitioner's habeas petition when the petitioner was previously released under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) and re-detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)); Martinez v. Villegas, No. 1:25-cv-256-H, 2026 WL 114418, at *7 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 15, 2026) (same).

Petitioner here, however, asserts that his situation is unique because he was not only conditionally paroled under section 1226, but also that Respondents released him under this provision specifically to deny him adjustment of status under the Cuban Adjustment Act. He argues that, “[h]aving invoked [section 1226] to deprive noncitizens like Petitioner of that benefit,” judicial estoppel prevents Respondents from “recharacteriz[ing] the identical release under [section 1225] to deprive him of a bond hearing.” ECF No. 8 at p. 4. This judicial estoppel argument fails at a few points.

First, there is no inconsistency in Respondents' position. Judicial estoppel is an equitable doctrine, intended to prevent “improper use of judicial machinery” by “generally prevent[ing] a party from prevailing in one phase of a case on an argument and then relying on a contradictory argument to prevail in another phase.” New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742, 749–50 (2001) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). There is nothing contradictory here because Respondents previously relied on section 1226 to conditionally parole Petitioner into the United States, and now that they have revoked that parole, they are detaining him under section 1225. It is not a conflict to release him under section 1226(a) in 2022 and then later detain him under 1225(b).

Second, even if there were something contradictory in Respondents' position, they never gained any “unfair advantage” from this contradiction. Huffman v. Union Pac. R.R., 675 F.3d 412, 417 (5th Cir. 2012). Petitioner seems to think that Respondents benefited from conditionally paroling him under section 1226 because this denied him adjustment of status under the Cuban Adjustment Act. But Petitioner also would not have been eligible for adjustment of status if he had been detained in 2022 under section 1225 as an “applicant for admission.” See Cabrera-Fernandez, 28 I. & N. Dec. at 748 (explaining that adjustment of status under the Act requires an alien to have been “inspected and admitted” or “paroled into the United States” under section 1182(d)(5)(A)'s humanitarian parole provision). Respondents' decision to conditionally parole him rather than detain him thus conferred no benefit on Respondents.

Finally, equitable estoppel does not require a different result. Courts are “exceedingly reluctant to grant equitable estoppel against the [G]overnment.” Robertson-Dewar v. Holder, 646 F.3d 226, 229 (5th Cir. 2011). This is especially true, when as here, the dispute concerns law enforcement. “When the Government is unable to enforce the law because the conduct of its agents has given rise to an estoppel, the interest of the citizenry as a whole in obedience to the rule of law is undermined.” Heckler v. Cmty. Health Servs. of Crawford Cnty., Inc., 467 U.S. 51, 60 (1984). “It is for this reason that it is well settled that the Government may not be estopped on the same terms as any other litigant.” Id. “In essence, [ ] Petitioner seeks to bind the current Administration to decisions made previously regarding the enforcement of a statute clearly applicable to him.” Marcelo-Aguila, 2026 WL 936337, at *1. Estoppel lends no basis for doing so.

B. Due Process does not require an individualized bond hearing.

Petitioner's pre-removal detention under section 1225(b)(2) without a bond hearing does not violate due process. Congress expressly authorized detention of an alien “for a [removal] proceeding” without an individualized bond hearing. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). And it is well-established that such “detention during deportation proceedings [is] a constitutionally valid aspect of the deportation process.” Demore, 538 U.S. at 523. Neither the statutory text nor the Due Process clause therefore requires granting the writ, and none of Petitioner's ancillary arguments require it either.³ For the reasons set forth above and in Parts I–II of this Court's decision in Cazares Tapia v. Mullin, No. 1:26-cv-01321, 2026 WL 1657240 (W.D. Tex. June 8, 2026), the Court denies the petition.

III. Injunctive Relief

Petitioner is likewise not entitled to an injunction from transfer outside the Western District of Texas. “[A] request for injunctive relief generally becomes moot upon the happening of the event sought to be enjoined.” Harris v. City of Houston, 151 F.3d 186, 189 (5th Cir. 1998). Petitioner was transferred outside the Western District of Texas on July 10, 2026. Thus, the event sought to be enjoined occurred, and the request for an injunction is moot.

Even if it was not moot, Petitioner's request for injunctive relief fails. The elements of a permanent injunction are nearly identical to those for a preliminary injunction—except the applicant must also show actual success on the merits. See VRC LLC v. City of Dallas, 460 F.3d 607, 611 (5th Cir. 2006) (listing the elements for establishing a permanent injunction). Petitioner's request for a permanent injunction fails for the reasons set forth in both orders denying Petitioner's requests for TROs, see ECF Nos. 6, 15, and because Petitioner's habeas claim fails, see Part II, supra.

* * *

The petition for a writ of habeas corpus and request for injunctive relief are denied.

The Clerk is directed to serve this Order electronically on the United States Attorney's Office for the Western District of Texas.

So ordered by the Court on July 24, 2026.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Petitioner also asserts that administrative estoppel bars his detention under section 1225(b)(2), but administrative estoppel does not fit here. Administrative estoppel precludes federal litigation of certain administratively-adjudicated claims. See Astoria Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Solimino, 501 U.S. 104, 106–14 (1991). Petitioner raises no such claims here.

2.   Petitioner does not appear to contend that revoking his conditional parole was unlawful. Nor could he, as Congress prohibited courts from reviewing such revocations. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(e) (“No court may set aside any action or decision by the Attorney General under this section regarding the detention of any alien or the revocation or denial of bond or parole.”); see also Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 295 (“As we have previously explained, § 1226(e) precludes an alien from ‘challeng[ing] a discretionary judgment by the Attorney General or a decision that the Attorney General has made regarding his detention or release.’ ” (citing Demore, 538 at 516 (internal quotation marks omitted))).

3.   The Fifth Circuit's panel decision in Rodriguez v. Ortega, No. 26-50183, 2026 WL 1906557 (5th Cir. July 2, 2026), was vacated and rehearing en banc was granted on June 10, 2026, see No. 26-50183, 2026 WL 2014647 (5th Cir. July 10, 2026) (per curiam). “[T]hus the opinion is not binding precedent[,]” Munn v. City of Ocean Springs, Miss., 763 F.3d 437, 441 n.2 (5th Cir. 2014), and the Court is not persuaded by its reasoning.

ANDREW DAVIS United States District Judge