CAI v. CHAOZHOUSHI YITONG DIANZI SHANGWU YOUXIANGONGSI US (2026)

Order

Plaintiff Shaoyun Cai (“Cai”) moved to file under seal, requested alternative service, and moved for a temporary restraining order against Defendant Chaozhoushi Yitong Dianzi Shangwu Youxiangongsi (“Yitong–US”). The temporary restraining order (“TRO”) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. The expedited discovery and alternative service requests are GRANTED. All other requested relief is DENIED.

Background

Cai, a natural person residing in the People's Republic of China, brought suit in June 2026 against Yitong–US for copyright infringement. Cai is engaged in the development, design, and commercial planning of tableware products for global distribution—including within the Western District of Texas. Cai owns the registered copyrights of at least nine distinct two-dimensional artistic works entitled “Bohemian Printing.” ECF No. 2-1. Cai alleges that Yitong–US, a Chinese company operating an Amazon storefront, has been marketing, distributing, and selling tableware products to consumers in the United States, some of which infringe on Cai's copyright. Cai also alleges that Yitong–US continues to sell infringing products within Texas. ECF No. 7-1.

Cai has included screenshots of at least one completed order from Yitong–US on its Amazon storefront to be delivered to an address in Austin, Texas. Id. She also included images of the “Bohemian Printing” copyrighted works, and screenshots of Yitong–US's tableware products for comparison purposes. Id. In addition, Cai filed a motion for alternative service on Yitong–US. ECF No. 6-0.

The Court held a hearing on June 17, 2026, to address the TRO, service, sealing, and expedited discovery.

Motion for Temporary Restraining Order

I. Legal Standard

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65 authorizes federal courts to issue TROs with or without notice to adverse parties. Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b). Courts may issue a TRO without notice to the adverse party only if (1) “specific facts in an affidavit or a verified complaint clearly show that immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or damage will result” “before the adverse party can be heard” and (2) “the movant's attorney certifies in writing any efforts made to give notice and the reasons why it should not be required.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b)(1)(A)–(B). The Copyright Act also authorizes the Court to “grant temporary and final injunctions on such terms as it may deem reasonable to prevent or restrain infringement of a copyright.” 17 U.S.C. § 502(a).

As a general matter, injunctive relief is understood to be “an extraordinary remedy that may only be awarded upon a clear showing that the plaintiff is entitled to such relief.” Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 22, 129 S.Ct. 365, 172 L.Ed.2d 249 (2008) (citing Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 972, 117 S.Ct. 1865, 138 L.Ed.2d 162 (1997) (per curiam)). The criteria for analyzing whether to issue a preliminary injunction is the same standard used by federal courts to issue a TRO. See Clark v. Prichard, 812 F.2d 991, 993 (5th Cir. 1987). So, a plaintiff seeking a TRO must show “that ‘he is likely to succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest.’ ” Starbucks Corp. v. McKinney, 602 U.S. 339, 346, 144 S.Ct. 1570, 219 L.Ed.2d 99 (2024) (quoting Winter, 555 U.S. at 20, 129 S.Ct. 365). The plaintiff bears the burden of proving each element. Janvey v. Alguire, 647 F.3d 585, 595 (5th Cir. 2011).

The primary purpose of injunctive relief is “to protect the plaintiff from irreparable injury and to preserve the [Court's] power to render a meaningful decision after a trial on the merits.” Canal Auth. of State of Florida v. Callaway, 489 F.2d 567, 572 (5th Cir. 1974). The Copyright Act expressly authorizes the recovery of both “actual damages” and “any profits of the infringer that are attributable to the infringement and are not taken into account in computing the actual damages.” 17 U.S.C. § 504(b) (emphasis added).

II. Analysis

Plaintiff is entitled to a TRO enjoining infringement because she has established all four elements necessary to demonstrate that injunctive relief is appropriate. She is not entitled to an order freezing all of Defendant's assets.

A. Likelihood of Success on the Merits

Plaintiff has established a likelihood of success on the merits of her sole claim of direct copyright infringement under 17 U.S.C. § 501. To establish a copyright infringement claim, a plaintiff must show “(1) ownership of the copyrighted material and (2) copying by the defendant.” Alcatel USA, Inc. v. DGI Techs., Inc., 166 F.3d 772, 790 (5th Cir. 1999). This second element—copying—occurs when (a) “the alleged infringer actually used the copyrighted material to create his own work,” and (b) “substantial similarity exists between the two works.” Id.

A given plaintiff may show “actual use” (i.e., “factual copying”) “either with proof of direct evidence of copying or through circumstantial evidence demonstrating both [ ] that the defendant had access to the copyrighted work and [ ] that the two works are ‘probatively’ similar.” Gen. Universal Sys., Inc. v. Lee, 379 F.3d 131, 141 (5th Cir. 2004) (per curiam) (emphasis added). The access element is met if the alleged infringer “had a reasonable opportunity to view the copyrighted work.” Id. Probative similarity “requires a showing that the works, ‘when compared as a whole, are adequately similar to establish appropriation.’ ” Id. (quoting Peel & Co., Inc. v. The Rug Mkt., 238 F.3d 391, 397 (5th Cir. 2001)).

To evaluate substantial similarity, a reviewing Court must conduct “[a] side-by-side comparison ․ between the original and the copy to determine whether a layman would view the two works as substantially similar.” Id. at 142 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Creations Unlimited, Inc. v. McCain, 112 F.3d 814, 816 (5th Cir. 1997) (per curiam)). And “[s]ubstantiality is measured by considering the qualitative and quantitative importance of the copied material to the plaintiff's work as a whole.” Batiste v. Lewis, 976 F.3d 493, 502 (5th Cir. 2020) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

Plaintiff's evidence at this stage satisfies the requirements enumerated above to sustain a copyright infringement claim. The “Bohemian Printing” copyrighted works have been registered to Plaintiff by the U.S. Copyright Office since 2024. See ECF No. 2-1. The registration certificate in the record is sufficient evidence to show validity and ownership of the copyrights. See 17 U.S.C. § 410(c) (“In any judicial proceedings the certificate of a registration made before or within five years after first publication of the work shall constitute prima facie evidence of the validity of the copyright and of the facts stated in the certificate.”).

Plaintiff's evidence also establishes a likelihood of actual use. Plaintiff has presented evidence of copying, distributing, reproducing, displaying, and selling probatively similar items on Amazon. See ECF Nos. 2-1; 7-1. Finally, a side-by-side comparison of Plaintiff's designs and Defendant's wares reveals little—if any—in the way of differences between the two designs, thus meeting substantial similarity. See ECF Nos. 2-1; 7-1.

B. Irreparable Harm

Plaintiff has also established irreparable harm if a TRO is not granted. “Irreparable harm requires a showing that (1) the harm to the plaintiff is imminent, (2) the injury would be irreparable, and (3) that the plaintiff has no other adequate legal remedy.” Multipla Ltd. v. Individuals, Bus. Entities, No. 4:25-CV-00622, 2025 WL 4673003, at *3 (E.D. Tex. July 11, 2025) (Truncale, J.) (citing Chacon v. Granata, 515 F.2d 922, 925 (5th Cir. 1975)). The Fifth Circuit has noted that, “a finding of irreparable harm is appropriate even where economic rights are involved when the nature of those rights makes establishment of the dollar value of the loss ․ especially difficult or speculative.” Allied Mktg. Grp., Inc. v. CDL Mktg., Inc., 878 F.2d 806, 810 n.1 (5th Cir. 1989) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

Plaintiff states that the infringing products “sold by Defendant are likely to confuse consumers, divert sales from [her] copyrighted products, diminish the value of [her] copyrighted works, and harm [her] goodwill and business reputation.” See ECF No. 7-1, at ¶ 10. Plaintiff also avers that “the infringing products are typically of much lower quality than [her] original works” and that the sale of the infringing products “threatens [her] artistic reputation and the perceived integrity of [her] creative works.” Id. at ¶ 11.

The Court finds that Plaintiff has met her burden of showing irreparable injury because the harm for ongoing infringement cannot be compensated by monetary damages, as damages fail to address loss of control—as well as damage to reputation and goodwill. Plaintiff has shown that she will likely suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, with no alternative and adequate legal remedy at her disposal.

C. Balance of Equities

In general, “a court must balance the competing claims of injury and must consider the effect on each party of the granting or withholding of the requested relief.” Amoco Prod. Co. v. Vill. of Gambell, Alaska, 480 U.S. 531, 542, 107 S.Ct. 1396, 94 L.Ed.2d 542 (1987). Federal district courts across Texas have found that the balance of hardships supports protecting a plaintiff's copyright. See, e.g., Multipla Ltd., 2025 WL 4673003, at *4; Gunshowtees.com, LLC v. Rallis, No. 1:18-CV-796-RP, 2019 WL 9654864, at *5 (W.D. Tex. June 28, 2019); Olan Mills, Inc. v. Eckerd Drug of Texas, Inc., No. CA3-88-0333-D, 1988 WL 161314, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 14, 1988) (Fitzwater, J.) (discussing the minimal hardship defendant would suffer if enjoined as opposed to plaintiff's harm from continued infringement).

Here, the requested relief would preclude Defendant from using allegedly infringing designs. The Court concludes that the risk of irreparable harm to Plaintiff outweighs the minimal harm to Defendant. Thus, the balance of the equities favors granting the TRO.

D. Public Interest

A temporary restraining order would serve the public interest. “[I]mplicit in copyright ․ laws [is] that the public's interest in competition may be outweighed by the public's interest in preserving rights in intellectual property.” Allied Mktg., 878 F.2d at 810 n.1. The public has a strong interest in protecting the public rights of a copyright holder. The public also has a clear interest in not being deceived or confused as to the origin, source, or sponsorship of copyrighted products. Any public interest in competition is outweighed by the public's interest in preserving and protecting Plaintiff's alleged rights.

“In exercising their sound discretion, courts of equity should pay particular regard for the public consequences in employing the extraordinary remedy of injunction.” Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 312, 102 S.Ct. 1798, 72 L.Ed.2d 91 (1982) (citing R.R. Comm'n of Texas v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 500, 61 S.Ct. 643, 85 L.Ed. 971 (1941)). With public consequences in mind, the Court finds that the public interest would be served through a TRO.

E. Temporary Asset Restraint

Plaintiff requests as part of any TRO that this Court freeze Defendant's assets so that she may later recover “actual damages and Defendant's profits attributable to the infringement[.]” ECF No. 2-0 at ¶ 33. District courts may freeze assets to preserve a plaintiff's recovery of the profits attributable to infringement, but not to secure recovery of actual damages. Because Plaintiff seeks to freeze all of Defendant's assets without either showing that they are all profits or offering a way to separate the profits from the damages, her request is denied without prejudice.

This Court has the authority to freeze a defendant's assets, but only to ensure the availability of equitable relief in a final judgment. In Grupo Mexicano, the Supreme Court held that federal courts lack the equitable power to freeze a defendant's assets to secure an anticipated money judgment, “[b]ecause such a remedy was historically unavailable from a court of equity[.]” Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo S.A. v. All. Bond Fund, Inc., 527 U.S. 308, 333, 119 S.Ct. 1961, 144 L.Ed.2d 319 (1999). By contrast, federal courts may freeze assets to secure anticipated equitable relief as part of a final judgment because that relief was traditionally available from a court of equity. See Animale Grp. Inc. v. Sunny's Perfume Inc., 256 F. App'x 707, 708–09 (5th Cir. 2007) (per curiam) (“Because Defendants seek equitable relief, the district court was authorized to preserve the status quo by entering a limited asset freeze.”).

Because the Copyright Act “provides a variety of civil remedies for infringement, both equitable and legal[,]” Petrella v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 572 U.S. 663, 669, 134 S.Ct. 1962, 188 L.Ed.2d 979 (2014), an asset freeze may be appropriate in a copyright case to preserve the availability of the Act's equitable remedies. The Copyright Act provides that the “copyright owner is entitled to recover the actual damages suffered by him or her as a result of the infringement, and any profits of the infringer that are attributable to the infringement and are not taken into account in computing the actual damages.” 17 U.S.C. § 504(b). The actual damages authorized by section 504(b) are legal in nature. But an award of the “profits of the infringer that are attributable to the infringement” is equitable in nature. As the Supreme Court noted in Petrella, “equitable relief” under the Copyright Act includes “disgorgement of unjust gains and an injunction against future infringement[.]” Petrella, 572 U.S. at 686, 134 S.Ct. 1962; see also Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television, Inc., 523 U.S. 340, 352, 118 S.Ct. 1279, 140 L.Ed.2d 438 (1998) (noting “actions for monetary relief that [the Supreme Court] characterized as equitable, such as actions for disgorgement of improper profits”).

The award of profits, as section 504(b) authorizes, is properly understood as equitable in nature because “courts sitting in equity have long issued remedies designed to depriv[e] wrongdoers of their net profits from unlawful activity.” See Sripetch v. SEC, 608 U.S. ––––, ––––, 146 S. Ct. 1403, 1410, ––– L.Ed.2d –––– (2026) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Indeed, the consistent throughline among the various iterations of “disgorgement” and “restitution” is that “the final award to the plaintiff is not measured by his loss but by the defendant's gain attributable to his wrongdoing against the plaintiff.” Id. “The point of the remedy is ․ to give the plaintiff the amount by which [the defendant] has been enriched from the wrongful invasion of the plaintiff's legally protected interests[.]” Id. at 1411 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). That is exactly what section 504(b) does.

The award of profits, moreover, tracks the traditional equitable remedy of “accounting for profits.” In the days before the divided bench, the “accounting for profits” equitable remedy allowed a plaintiff to “recover profits produced by the defendant's use of that property, even if he cannot identify a particular res containing the profits sought to be recovered.” Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 214 n.2, 122 S.Ct. 708, 151 L.Ed.2d 635 (2002). As such, “an accounting for profits is fundamentally ‘transitive’ and involves ‘an accounting by A to B’ for the profits A obtained with B's property.” Sripetch, 146 S. Ct. at 1415–16 (Thomas, J., concurring) (citing Samuel L. Bray, Fiduciary Remedies, in the Oxford Handbook of Fiduciary Law 454 (2019)). Here, the “additional profits” specified in the Copyright Act closely mirror “accounting for profits,” as Defendant is (allegedly) making use of Plaintiff's copyright (i.e., property) for pecuniary gain.

Because the award of profits under section 504(b) is equitable relief, the future availability of that award can be protected by an asset freeze. But because a court cannot freeze assets to preserve a potential legal award of damages, it is critical to ensure that any asset freeze is specifically limited to preserve only the potential award of profits—nothing more.

Here, Plaintiff has not provided evidence that would let the Court distinguish Defendant's assets that are profits of infringement from those that are not, yet she asks the Court to freeze all of Defendant's assets. On this record, the Court cannot tell whether such a freeze would preserve an award of the infringer's profits (within its equitable power) or instead secure only a future legal damages award (which it cannot do). Plaintiff has shown that Defendant sells the allegedly infringing products online and earns profits from doing so, see ECF No. 7-1, and that Defendant could dissipate those assets, rendering any ill-gotten profits impossible to recover as the litigation proceeds. But Plaintiff offers no evidence of even the rough proportion of Defendant's assets attributable to infringement, and without it the Court cannot tether an asset freeze to the ultimate equitable relief Plaintiff seeks—the infringer's “additional profits.” 17 U.S.C. § 504(a)(1). Any frozen funds must be tied to Defendant's allegedly infringing conduct so that the freeze preserves Plaintiff's equitable remedy rather than securing a money judgment. See, e.g., Prep Sols., Ltd. v. Leicht, No. 2:22-CV-00123-JRG-RSP, 2022 WL 1812298, at *5 (E.D. Tex. June 2, 2022).

Moreover, all this assumes that Defendant's accounts are known—but they are not. As discussed below, Plaintiff has moved for expedited discovery to locate Defendant's financial accounts used for the alleged infringement operation. See infra. “The Court will not order the wholescale freezing of [Defendant's] financial assets, ex parte and without notice, based on sealed documents, when Plaintiff does not know [Defendant's] true identit[y] or personal information.” Steel City Enters., Inc. v. Individuals, P'ships & Unincorporated Ass'ns Identified on Schedule “A”, No. 6:25-CV-00335-LS, 2026 WL 851442, at *3 (W.D. Tex. Mar. 28, 2026) (emphasis in original). That extraordinary relief is especially concerning because “the onus on asset-freezing selection would ostensibly be on third-party Amazon, who unwittingly or unintentionally might mistakenly freeze the financial assets of innocent entities as it tries to comply with this Court's freezing order—at conceivably catastrophic cost to innocent parties.” Id. “The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and due process, do not begin to contemplate” that relief. Id.

The Court accordingly finds that, absent evidence tying Defendant's assets to its allegedly infringing profits and identifying the specific accounts and assets to freeze, an order freezing Defendant's assets must be denied.

Motion To Seal and Redact

Plaintiff filed under seal and moved to seal the following documents: portions of her complaint and her motion for a TRO. See ECF No. 3-0. She argues that sealing is necessary because Defendant is a sophisticated actor who monitors newly filed suits to stop infringing conduct and, if alerted to this suit, will close or hide its digital storefront, transfer or dissipate funds beyond the reach of this Court, open new stores to continue infringing under aliases, and share information of this suit with other infringers, before this Court can issue an order preventing these actions. See ECF No. 3-1. Plaintiff further argues that a temporary seal would help preserve the status quo until the Court can consider and enforce preliminary injunctive relief. Id.

The Fifth Circuit heavily disfavors the sealing of documents placed on the record because “the public's right of access to judicial records is a fundamental element of the rule of law.” June Med. Servs., L.L.C. v. Phillips, 22 F.4th 512, 519 (5th Cir. 2022) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Maintaining transparency through public access to judicial records “serves to promote trustworthiness of the judicial process, to curb judicial abuses, and to provide the public with a more complete understanding of the judicial system, including a better perception of its fairness.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Having reviewed and considered Plaintiff's arguments to seal and file redacted versions on the public docket, the Court finds that sealing or redacting would not promote the stated goals of the Fifth Circuit if left under seal permanently. Indeed, Plaintiff conceded as much. At the June 17, 2026, hearing, she conceded that the only basis for sealing was to prevent notice to Defendant prior to potential injunctive relief.

With no basis to seal permanently—and a requirement to serve Defendant with the complaint as well as this Order—there is no basis to seal this matter in perpetuity. Nevertheless, because of the concern that Defendant will divert assets when it learns of this suit, the Court finds there is a temporary interest in sealing. The Court thus grants the request, and seals the entirety of this case until (a) Plaintiff serves Defendant with any filing in this case, or (b) 60 days from the date of this order, whichever comes first.

Motion for Alternative Service

Plaintiff requests that the Court permit service of process by electronically uploading the relevant pleadings and court orders to a shared electronic folder (here, Dropbox) and email a link to the shared folder using email addresses identified with Defendant's e-commerce storefront. ECF No. 6-3. She alleges that e-commerce store operator-infringers typically provide false or incomplete information to conceal their identities and use electronic communication to conduct business. Id. Plaintiff contends that even when similarly-situated infringers register their seller accounts with Amazon—and so include an email and physical address—a third-party will typically verify only the email address. Id.

Service of process on a foreign individual defendant must comply with Rule 4(f) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Under Rule 4(f)(3), a party may serve the opposition “by other means not prohibited by international agreement, as the [C]ourt orders.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(f)(3). And Rule 4(f)(1) permits service on defendants “by any internationally agreed means of service that is reasonably calculated to give notice, such as those authorized by the Hague Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents[.]” Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(f)(1).

The Hague Service Convention is an international treaty governing the service abroad of foreign defendants. See Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters, opened for signature Nov. 15, 1965, 20 U.S.T. 361, 658 U.N.T.S. 163. Direct “service pursuant to Hague Convention procedures is required only if the method of serving process involves the transmittal of documents abroad.” Sheets v. Yamaha Motors Corp., U.S.A., 891 F.2d 533, 537 (5th Cir. 1990). The method of service is governed by the longarm statute of the forum state (i.e., Texas). See Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Schlunk, 486 U.S. 694, 706, 108 S.Ct. 2104, 100 L.Ed.2d 722 (1988). In Texas, the law does not require the transmittal of documents abroad when serving a foreign defendant. See Moki Mac River Expeditions v. Drugg, 221 S.W.3d 569, 574–76 (Tex. 2007) (discussing the longarm Texas statute and noting that it reaches “as far as the federal constitutional requirements of due process will allow” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).

The United States and China are signatories to the Hague Convention, and service by email is not precluded. China has also not expressly objected to email service of process. See WSOU Invs. LLC v. OnePlus Tech. (Shenzhen) Co., No. 6-20-CV-00952-ADA, 2021 WL 2870679, at *4 (W.D. Tex. July 8, 2021).

The Fifth Circuit in Nagravision thus held that a court may order alternative means of service under Rule 4(f)(3). Nagravision SA v. Gotech Int'l Tech. Ltd., 882 F.3d 494, 498 (5th Cir. 2018) (upholding the validity of email service for a Chinese defendant company); see also Viahart, L.L.C. v. GangPeng, No. 21-40166, 2022 WL 445161, at *3 (5th Cir. Feb. 14, 2022) (same). And while this Court must follow Nagravision, it notes that this holding is somewhat hotly disputed. See Smart Study Co., Ltd v. Shenzhenshixindajixieyouxiangongsi, 164 F.4th 164, 170–72 (2d Cir. 2025) (concluding that Rule 4(f)(3) did not permit email service on Chinese defendant companies); Luxottica Grp. S.p.A. v. P'ships & Unincorporated Ass'ns Identified on Schedule “A”, 391 F. Supp. 3d 816, 821–27 (N.D. Ill. 2019) (same). Regardless, Nagravision does not require ordering alternative service, but instead merely holds that alternative service by email is within the district court's discretion. See AJ's Nifty Prods. LLC v. P'ships & Unincorporated Ass'ns Identified on Schedule A, No. 3:26-CV-00944-LS, 2026 WL 1049212, at *3–4 (W.D. Tex. Apr. 14, 2026) (declining to grant alternative service by email).

The Court concludes that service by email is reasonably calculated under the particular circumstances presented in this case to apprise Defendant of this action and afford it an opportunity to present any objections. The Defendant operates a digital storefront and relies on electronic communication to conduct and operate its business, making electronic service in this case reasonably calculated to provide notice. The Court thus grants Plaintiff's request for alternative service.

Request for Expedited Discovery

As part of her motion for a TRO, Plaintiff briefly requests expedited discovery to locate Defendant's financial accounts used for the alleged infringement operation. ECF No. 7-0. The Court grants this request as part of her TRO application, and notes that the Rules of Civil Procedure leave the door open if necessary to move for more specific and calculated expedited discovery. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(d). Expedited discovery at this stage is proper because Plaintiff, in seeking injunctive relief, needs information from third parties in order to enforce this and subsequent orders from the Court. This Court has the discretion to permit early discovery. It finds exercising that discretion appropriate here. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2).

Addendum

Cases like this one requesting ex parte restraint and expedited discovery under seal—often against numerous defendants listed on a “Schedule A”—are being filed at pace throughout the federal courts. See Eric Goldman, A Sad Scheme of Abusive Intellectual Property Litigation, 123 Colum. L. Rev. 183, 193–202 (2023) (dissecting the proliferation of Schedule A cases and their legal shortcomings). For good reason, some courts have found many of these requests to fall short of the clear letter of the law. See, e.g., Price v. Individuals, P'ships, & Unincorporated Ass'ns Identified on Schedule A., 821 F. Supp. 3d 1315 (M.D. Fla. 2026) (Mizelle, J.).

Because this specific case involves only a single defendant, it appears to avoid many of the pitfalls present in Schedule A cases. But it is difficult to be sure. “The whole point of our adversarial legal system is that the robust exchange of competing views helps ensure the discovery of truth and avoid error.” United States v. Quintanilla-Matamoros, 164 F.4th 366, 375 (5th Cir. 2026) (Ho, J., concurring) (cleaned up). Yet Plaintiff in this case, like the plaintiffs in the Schedule A cases, not only demands emergency relief outside of the adversarial process, but likely anticipates seeking a default judgment that is also outside the adversarial process. In these circumstances, it is imperative for courts not only to be vigilant that any relief awarded is lawful, but to be willing to reconsider—sua sponte if necessary—relief already awarded if that relief should not have been granted in the first place.

Conclusion

1. The application for a TRO is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. See ECF No. 7-0.

a. Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(c), the Court “may issue a preliminary injunction or a temporary restraining order only if the movant gives security in an amount that the court considers proper to pay the costs and damages sustained by any party found to have been wrongfully enjoined or restrained.”

i. The Court finds that a $5,000 bond would be appropriate.

ii. Here, the Court finds the amount of $5,000 to satisfy any damages from wrongful restraint. See also Phillips v. Charles Schreiner Bank, 894 F.2d 127, 131 (5th Cir. 1990) (finding reversible error in the district court's failure to follow Rule 65(c)). Within three calendar days of entry of this Order, Plaintiff shall deposit with the Court $5,000, either law firm check, cash or surety bond, as security, which amount has been deemed adequate for the payment of such damages as any person may be entitled to recover as a result of a wrongful restraint hereunder.

b. Defendant is temporarily enjoined and restrained from infringing on Plaintiff's copyrights.

c. Defendant subject to this Order may appear and move to dissolve or modify the Order as permitted by and in compliance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Local Rules of the Western District of Texas.

d. The TRO is effective upon receipt of the aforementioned funds from Plaintiff and service of the complaint and this Order on Defendant. The TRO shall expire fourteen calendar days from the date this order is entered.

2. Plaintiff's request for expedited discovery is GRANTED.

a. Plaintiff may serve an expedited discovery request on any third party with actual notice of this Order who provides services to Defendant or any online marketplace, such as online marketplace platforms like Amazon.com, Inc. (“Amazon”) (collectively, the “Third-Party Providers”), demanding that the third party, within seven calendar days after receipt of service, produce copies of all documents and records in such person's or entity's possession or control relating to:

i. the identities and locations of Defendant, its affiliates, officers, agents, servants, employees, confederates, attorneys, and any persons acting in concert or participation with it, including all known contact information and all associated e-mail addresses;

ii. the nature of Defendant's operations and all associated sales, methods of payment for services and financial information, including, without limitation, identifying information associated with the online marketplaces and Defendant's financial accounts, as well as a full accounting of Defendant's sales and listing history related to each online marketplace; and

iii. any financial accounts owned or controlled by Defendant, including its affiliates, officers, agents, servants, employees, confederates, attorneys, and any persons acting in concert or participation with them, including such accounts residing with or under the control of any banks, savings and loan associations, payment processors or other financial institutions (such as PayPal, Inc. or Amazon Pay), other merchant account providers, payment providers, and credit card associations.

b. Plaintiff may serve an expedited discovery request on any Third-Party Providers demanding that, within seven calendar days of receipt of this Order:

i. it locate and produce all accounts and funds connected to Defendant, its seller aliases, and its online marketplace accounts, including, but not limited to, any financial accounts connected to Defendant and any email addresses used by or registered to Defendant.

3. The motion for leave to file sealed documents and to file redacted versions on the public docket is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. All filings in this case shall be sealed until (a) Plaintiff serves on Defendant any filing in this case, or (b) 60 days from the date of this order, whichever comes first.

4. The motion for alternative service is GRANTED. See ECF No. 6-0.

a. Plaintiff may provide notice of these proceedings to Defendant, including notice of the TRO, service of process pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(f)(3), and any future motions, by electronically sending the complaint, this Order, and other relevant documents to the email address(es) associated with Defendant. The Clerk of the Court is directed to issue a single original summons that shall apply to the Defendant. Providing notice via e-mail shall constitute notice reasonably calculated under all circumstances to apprise Defendant of the pendency of the action and afford it the opportunity to present its objections.

5. o the extent that Plaintiff seeks a preliminary injunction at this phase, the motion is DENIED. The Court will require Plaintiff to file for a preliminary injunction in a separate instrument pursuant to Local Rule CV-65 of the Local Rules of the Western District of Texas.

Andrew Davis, United States District Judge