HEIDARNEJAD v. UNITED STATES CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVICES USCIS USCIS USCIS (2024)

ORDER

Before the Court is Defendants United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”); Ur Jaddou (“Jaddou”), Director of the USCIS; and Tracey Tarango (“Tarango”), Director of California Service Center of the USCIS's (collectively, “Defendants”) motion to dismiss Plaintiff Farid Heidarnejad's (“Plaintiff”) complaint. (Dkt. 6). Plaintiff filed a response in opposition, (Dkt. 7), and Defendants replied, (Dkt. 8). Having considered the parties’ briefs, the record, and the relevant law, the Court finds that the motion to dismiss should be granted.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff alleges the following facts in his complaint. He is a lawful permanent resident of the United States. (Compl., Dkt. 1, ¶ 1). Plaintiff's spouse, Ayda Jafari (“Jafari”), is a citizen of Iran and currently resides in Iran, a predominantly Muslim country. (Id. ¶¶ 2, 11). Plaintiff filed a spouse visa petition (the “I-130”) for Jafari with USCIS on January 28, 2022. (Id. ¶ 12). Defendant USCIS is authorized by federal immigration law to approve a spouse visa petition filed by a lawful permanent resident and to issue an immigrant visa to allow the spouse to enter the United States and obtain lawful permanent resident status. (Id. ¶ 10). Defendant Jaddou, sued in an official capacity as Director of the USCIS, is responsible for the implementation of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the “INA”) and for ensuring compliance with all applicable federal laws, including the Administrative Procedure Act (the “APA”). (Id. ¶ 4). The California Service Center has jurisdiction over spouse visa petitions, such as the one filed by Plaintiff on behalf of his spouse. (Id. ¶ 5). Defendant Tarango, sued in an official capacity as the Director of the USCIS California Service Center, is responsible for the implementation of the INA and for ensuring compliance with all applicable federal laws, including the APA. (Id.).

Plaintiff filed this suit on September 11, 2023 because USCIS had not yet adjudicated Plaintiff's I-130 spouse visa petition, a little over 19 months after he had filed it. (Id. ¶ 14). Plaintiff brings two claims for relief: (1) a claim that Defendants are unlawfully withholding and unreasonably delaying under the APA by intentionally refusing to rule on his I-130 petition because of a Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) policy that allegedly delays adjudication of benefits for beneficiaries, like his spouse, who are from predominantly Muslim countries, (id. ¶¶ 17–30), and (2) a claim that his due process rights have been violated by USCIS's delay in adjudicating his I-130, including being harmed by a loss of consortium with Jafari, (id. ¶¶ 32–34). Plaintiff seeks mandamus relief for his APA claim. (Id. ¶ 17).

Defendants moved to dismiss Plaintiff's complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). (Dkt. 6). Plaintiff filed a response in opposition, (Dkt. 7)¹ , and Defendants replied, (Dkt. 8).

II. LEGAL STANDARDS

A. Rule 12(b)(1)

Rule 12(b)(1) allows a party to assert lack of subject-matter jurisdiction as a defense to suit. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). Federal district courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and may only exercise such jurisdiction as is expressly conferred by the Constitution and federal statutes. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). A federal court properly dismisses a case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction when it lacks the statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate the case. Home Builders Ass'n of Miss., Inc. v. City of Madison, 143 F.3d 1006, 1010 (5th Cir. 1998). “The burden of proof for a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss is on the party asserting jurisdiction.” Ramming v. United States, 281 F.3d 158, 161 (5th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 536 U.S. 960 (2002). “Accordingly, the plaintiff constantly bears the burden of proof that jurisdiction does in fact exist.” Id. In ruling on a Rule 12(b)(1) motion, the court may consider any one of the following: (1) the complaint alone; (2) the complaint plus undisputed facts evidenced in the record; or (3) the complaint, undisputed facts, and the court's resolution of disputed facts. Lane v. Halliburton, 529 F.3d 548, 557 (5th Cir. 2008).

B. Rule 12(b)(6)

Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), a court may dismiss a complaint for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). In deciding a 12(b)(6) motion, a “court accepts ‘all well-pleaded facts as true, viewing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.’ ” In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litig., 495 F.3d 191, 205 (5th Cir. 2007) (quoting Martin K. Eby Constr. Co. v. Dallas Area Rapid Transit, 369 F.3d 464, 467 (5th Cir. 2004)). “To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a complaint ‘does not need detailed factual allegations,’ but must provide the [plaintiffs’] grounds for entitlement to relief—including factual allegations that when assumed to be true ‘raise a right to relief above the speculative level.’ ” Cuvillier v. Taylor, 503 F.3d 397, 401 (5th Cir. 2007) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). That is, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ ” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).

A claim has facial plausibility “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. “The tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions. Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. Generally, a court ruling on a 12(b)(6) motion may rely on the complaint, its proper attachments, “documents incorporated into the complaint by reference, and matters of which a court may take judicial notice.” Dorsey v. Portfolio Equities, Inc., 540 F.3d 333, 338 (5th Cir. 2008) (citing Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322 (2007)). “[A] motion to dismiss under 12(b)(6) ‘is viewed with disfavor and is rarely granted.’ ” Turner v. Pleasant, 663 F.3d 770, 775 (5th Cir. 2011) (quoting Harrington v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 563 F.3d 141, 147 (5th Cir. 2009)).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Plaintiff's APA Claim

The APA allows courts to compel agency action when the action has been “unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(1); see also 5 U.S.C. § 555(b) (“[W]ithin a reasonable time, each agency shall proceed to conclude a matter presented to it.”). However, “ ‘a claim under § 706(1) can proceed only where a plaintiff asserts that an agency [1] failed to take a discrete action that [2] it is required to take.’ ” Li v. Jaddou, No. 22-50756, 2023 WL 3431237, at *1 (5th Cir. May 12, 2023) (unpublished) (citing Norton v. S. Utah Wilderness All., 542 U.S. 55, 64 (2004)). “A court's authority to compel agency action is limited to instances where an agency ignored ‘a specific, unequivocal command’ in a federal statute or binding regulation.” Fort Bend Cnty. v. United States Army Corps of Engineers, 59 F.4th 180, 197 (5th Cir. 2023) (quoting SUWA, 542 U.S. at 63).

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants are unlawfully withholding and/or unreasonably delaying under the APA by intentionally refusing to rule on his I-130 petition because of an alleged Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) policy that allegedly delays adjudication of benefits for beneficiaries, like his spouse, who are from predominantly Muslim countries. (Compl., Dkt. 1, ¶¶ 17–30). Defendants argue that “no statutory or regulatory deadline exists binding Defendants to a certain timeframe during adjudications” and that there has not been an unreasonable delay in adjudicating the I-130 petition. (Mot. Dismiss, Dkt. 6, at 5). Defendants argue that the Court lacks jurisdiction because “there is no timeframe during which the agency is mandated by statute to act.” (Id.).

Plaintiff, a lawful permanent resident, filed an I-130 petition on behalf of his spouse so that Jafari will be issued an immigrant visa to allow her to enter the United States and obtain lawful permanent resident status. Plaintiff filed his complaint on September 11, 2023, a little over 19 months after he filed the I-130 petition. (Id. ¶ 14). It has now been a little over 25 months since Plaintiff filed the I-130 petition. The current posted processing time for I-130 petitions at the California Service Center is 39.5 months. See https://egov.uscis.gov/processing-times/ (last accessed Feb. 28, 2024) (showing that the processing time for I-130 petitions filed by lawful permanent residents on behalf of their spouses at the California Service Center is currently 39.5 months).

Here, even though Plaintiff is presumptively entitled to the relief he seeks in his I-130 (as a lawful permanent resident, he is entitled to a spouse immigrant visa for Jafari, pursuant to review, see 8 U.S.C. §§ 1151(b), 1153(a)), there is no requirement that this relief be granted on a particular timeline. In fact, a review process is expressly built into the law. The USCIS is required to investigate the facts underlying I-130 petitions, and petitioners must establish that they and their beneficiaries are entitled to the benefit they seek. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1151, 1153(a), 1154(b); 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(b). USCIS's nondiscretionary duty to adjudicate I-130 petitions only attaches “[a]fter an investigation of the facts of each case.” 8 U.S.C. § 1154(b). The Fifth Circuit recently found that there was “no clear mandate” requiring USCIS “to act within six months, or even within a year,” even though “Congress enacted an aspirational goal of six months, 8 U.S.C. § 1571(b) (‘180 days’)” to rule on I-485 petitions (for lawful permanent residency). Li, 2023 WL 3431237, at *1. By extension, a similar logic applies to Plaintiff's claim. There is no clear mandate or binding regulation stating USCIS is required to act on I-130 petitions within a particular timeframe. See Bian v. Clinton, 605 F.3d 249 (5th Cir. 2010), vacated due to mootness, No. 09-10568, 2010 WL 3633770 (5th Cir. Sept. 16, 2010). While the Court is sympathetic to Plaintiff's concerns regarding the amount of time that he and his spouse have been waiting for the I-130 petition to be approved, the Court cannot find that this delay is unreasonable under the APA. Plaintiff filed his I-130 petition a little over 25 months ago, but the current expected processing time for his petition at the California Service Center is 39.5 months—in other words, based on the average processing time, Plaintiff's I-130 petition may not be processed for another 14.5 months. The Court cannot find that there is an unreasonable delay. Without a clear mandate, the Court has no jurisdiction over Plaintiff's APA claim and must dismiss it under Rule 12(b)(1).

B. Plaintiff's Request for a Writ of Mandamus

A writ of mandamus is only available if a plaintiff makes three showings: (1) that the plaintiff has a clear right to the relief, (2) that the defendant has a clear duty to perform the act in question, and (3) that “no other adequate remedy is available.” Newsome v. EEOC, 301 F.3d 227, 231 (5th Cir. 2002) (citations omitted). Even where these requirements are met, mandamus is considered an extraordinary remedy, and a district court should only choose to exercise jurisdiction as a matter of “sound judicial discretion.” Mustafa v. Pasquerell, No. SA-05-CA-658-XR, 2006 WL 488399, at *4 (W.D. Tex. Jan. 10, 2006) (quoting Newsome, 301 F.3d at 231).

Plaintiff seeks mandamus relief for his APA claim. (Compl., Dkt. 1, ¶ 17). Defendants argue that Plaintiff's mandamus claim is duplicative of his APA claim. (Mot. Dismiss, Dkt. 6, at 7). The Court agrees with Defendants. Mandamus relief is not available to Plaintiff because it would be duplicative of his cause of action under the APA. See Fort Bend Cnty. v. United States Army Corps of Engineers, 59 F.4th 180, 197 (5th Cir. 2023) (“[T]he APA carried forward the traditional practice prior to passage, when judicial review was achieved through ․ writs of mandamus.”) (quotation and citation omitted); see also Sawan v. Chertoff, 589 F. Supp. 2d 817, 826 (S.D. Tex. 2008) (“The APA provides a remedy for unlawfully delayed agency action; mandamus is not necessary for relief.”). This makes little practical difference—Plaintiff's APA claim “is essentially in the nature of mandamus relief”—but as a formal matter, the Court is barred from exercising jurisdiction under the Mandamus Act. Ahmadi v. Chertoff, 522 F. Supp. 2d 816, 818 n.3 (N.D. Tex. 2007) (quoting Mt. Emmons Mining Co. v. Babbitt, 117 F.3d 1167, 1170 (10th Cir. 1997)).

Further, even if Plaintiff's request for a writ of mandamus were not blocked by his APA claim, Plaintiff's claims would also fail on the merits at this point in time. Plaintiff has no clear right to mandamus relief under the Mandamus Act, as his I-130 petition has only been pending for 25 months and is well within the current expected processing time of 39.5 months, as discussed above.

Accordingly, Plaintiff is not entitled to a writ of mandamus, and his claim for mandamus relief must be denied for lack of jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1).

C. Plaintiff's Due Process Claim

Plaintiff also alleges that his due process rights have been violated by USCIS's delay in adjudicating his I-130, including being harmed by a loss of consortium with Jafari. (Compl., Dkt. 1, ¶¶ 32–34). In response, Defendants contend that “courts have long held that there is no constitutional right to receive a visa for a spouse to remain in the United States.” (Mot. Dismiss, Dkt. 6, at 11–12). The Court agrees with Defendants. “[U]nder Fifth Circuit precedent, an American spouse ‘has no constitutional right to have [their noncitizen] spouse remain in the United States.’ ” Jaime v. Blinken, No. EP-22-CV-248-KC, 2023 WL 2657651, at *3 (W.D. Tex. Mar. 24, 2023), appeal dismissed, No. 23-50270, 2023 WL 7141121 (5th Cir. Sept. 6, 2023) (quoting Bright v. Parra, 919 F.2d 31, 33 (5th Cir. 1990) and collecting cases). By extension, a lawful permanent resident has no constitutional right to obtain a visa for his or her spouse. Accordingly, Plaintiff lacks a due process right. Plaintiff's due process claim must be dismissed for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6).

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons given above, IT IS ORDERED that Defendants’ motion to dismiss, (Dkt. 6), is GRANTED. Plaintiff's claims against Defendants are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

As amendment would be futile and because Plaintiff has not requested leave to amend his complaint, IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this case is CLOSED.

FOOTNOTES

1.   In his response, Plaintiff argues that the motion to dismiss is “premature” since discovery and cross-examination have not yet occurred. (Resp., Dkt. 7, at 2). But courts routinely rule on motions to dismiss at the beginning of cases. Here, Defendants have moved to dismiss the complaint under Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). (Mot. Dismiss, Dkt. 6). As detailed below, the Court is able to determine at this stage that it lacks jurisdiction over two of Plaintiff's claims and that Plaintiff fails to state a claim on the third.

ROBERT PITMAN, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE