ANTONIOUS KHALAF AZIZ GABALLA v. Christopher Bullock, Respondent. (2026)

ORDER GRANTING § 2241 PETITION

Petitioner Antonious Khalaf Aziz Gaballa filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in which he challenged his detention without a bond hearing pending the outcome of removal proceedings. Doc. 1. In response, Respondent argued only that Petitioner “failed to exhaust his administrative remedies in immigration court” because he had not “requested a custody redetermination hearing or a bond hearing with the immigration court.” Doc. 9 at 1-2, 4. Petitioner has now produced evidence that he did request a bond hearing, Doc. 10-1, and that the immigration court “rejected” it outright, Doc. 10-3. (The request for a bond hearing came before Respondent's Response; the rejection came after that Response.) Respondent has offered no other argument in favor of dismissal for lack of administrative exhaustion (such as a possible right to appeal a “rejection” or an argument that Petitioner's bond request is somehow improper in a way making it effectively a nullity); nor has Respondent offered any other opposition to the Petition.

On these circumstances, based on the arguments presented to it, the Court is compelled to GRANT the Petition to the extent that Respondent is ORDERED to provide Petitioner with a bond hearing under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) within ten days of the date of this order or, in the alternative, release him from custody.

The Court grants that remedy, as opposed to immediate relief, for two reasons. First, Section 1226—the controlling provision according to the Sixth Circuit—itself only guarantees a bond hearing; it does not guarantee release. Lopez-Campos v. Raycraft, 175 F.4th 713, 735 (6th Cir. 2026) (“[O]ur understanding of § 1225(b)(2)(A)'s scope ensures that noncitizens like Petitioners should have a forum to explain that their backgrounds and connections to their communities justify release on bond while they undergo their removal proceedings. To hold otherwise would subject long-term law-abiding residents in the United States, such as Petitioners, to the hardship of mandatory detention without due process.”).¹ Petitioner has offered no persuasive justification for allowing him to obtain through the remedy of habeas something more than that to which he is entitled (according to the Sixth Circuit) under the governing law—that is, the chance to make his case for release at a bond hearing. Second, a bond hearing is in keeping with the principle of prudential exhaustion, in that it leaves it to the Executive Branch to make the call in the first instance, without the Judicial Branch jumping in to dictate the results before the Executive has had an opportunity to decide the issue under the framework the Sixth Circuit has now announced. See Smith v. U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, 178 F.4th 312, 325 (6th Cir. 2026) (“This rule is designed to afford the agency the opportunity to reconsider its position in the first instance, and to promote efficient litigation.” (citing Jones Bros., Inc. v. Sec'y of Lab., 898 F.3d 669, 673 (6th Cir. 2018))).

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff's Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1) is GRANTED. Respondent is ORDERED to provide Petitioner with a bond hearing under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) within ten days of the date of this order or, in the alternative, release him from custody.

Petitioner's Motion for a temporary restraining order (Doc. 2) is DENIED as moot.

IT IS SO ORDERED, this 28th day of September 2026.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Respondent acknowledges in its opposition that Lopez-Campos controls this case, which is in keeping with its past acknowledgement that Sixth Circuit precedent continues to control even when a petitioner has been moved beyond the geographic scope of this Court. Doc. 17, Response to Petitioner's Notice, Zelaya v. U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, No. 26-02690 (W.D. Tenn. June 30, 2026). Respondent has offered neither contrary argument nor nuance in this case.

BRIAN C. LEA UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE