Joseph Aaron Velasquez Oliva, Petitioner, v. Warden of Western Tennessee Detention Facility et al, Respondents. (2026)

ORDER DENYING § 2241 PETITION

Petitioner Joseph Aaron Velasquez Oliva filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in which he challenged his detention without a bond hearing pending the outcome of removal proceedings. Doc. 2. Respondent filed its Response on September 4, 2026. Doc. 8. Petitioner did not file a reply. For the reasons that follow, the Petition is DENIED.

As a preliminary housekeeping matter, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has held that the “district director”—now the Field Office Director—for the place of confinement is the proper respondent to a Section 2241 petition filed by an alien challenging his confinement. See Roman v. Ashcroft, 340 F.3d 314, 320–21 (6th Cir. 2003). Here, that is now Christopher Bullock, Field Office Director for the New Orleans Field Office, United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement. The Clerk SHALL modify the docket to remove additional respondents. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d). These respondents are DISMISSED.

Petitioner's petition is DENIED because he has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies by failing to seek reconsideration of the immigration judge's order denying his request for bond and/or failing to appeal that denial to the Board of Immigration Appeals. The Supreme Court “long has acknowledged the general rule that parties exhaust prescribed administrative remedies before seeking relief from the federal courts.” McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 144 (1992).¹ Exhaustion gives an agency “the opportunity to correct its own mistakes with respect to the programs it administers”; “discourages disregard of the agency's procedures”; promotes efficiency because “[c]laims generally can be resolved much more quickly and economically before an agency”; and “may produce a useful record for subsequent judicial consideration.” Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 89 (2006) (quotation marks and citations omitted). And the doctrine arguably helps to protect and promote the separation of powers, insofar as it leaves it to the Executive Branch to make the call in the first instance, without the Judicial Branch jumping in to dictate the results before the Executive has had an opportunity to reach a final decision on the Petitioner's claim through its own processes. See Smith v. U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, 178 F.4th 312, 325 (6th Cir. 2026) (“This rule is designed to afford the agency the opportunity to reconsider its position in the first instance, and to promote efficient litigation.” (citing Jones Bros., Inc. v. Sec'y of Lab., 898 F.3d 669, 673 (6th Cir. 2018))).

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff's Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 2) is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED, this 14th day of September 2026.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Petitioner in passing suggests that exhaustion should be excused because he challenges the agency's “own governing statutes,” which an agency “cannot declare ․unconstitutional.” Doc. 2 at 6-7. Even accepting the merit of those premises, which do have some support in case law (though none is cited in the Petition), the resulting rule has no application here, where Petitioner has not challenged any statute on constitutional grounds.

BRIAN C. LEA UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE