THE STUDENTS AND THE STUDENTS PARENTS v. MEMPHIS SHELBY COUNTY SCHOOLS AND TENNESSEE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION (2026)

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE RECORD AS TO THE FIRST N.H. CASE, DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE RECORD AS TO THE RETALIATION CASES, DENYING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE RECORD

Before the Court are three Motions. For the reasons that follow, Defendant Memphis-Shelby County Schools' (“MSCS”) Motion for Judgment on the Record as to the First N.H. Case (Doc. 85) is GRANTED. Defendant's Motion for Judgment on the Record as to the Retaliation Cases (Doc. 86) is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. Plaintiffs' Motion for Judgment on the Administrative Record (Doc. 87) is DENIED to the extent it concerns the First N.H. Case and DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE to the extent it concerns the Retaliation Cases. A briefing deadline relating to structuring future proceedings is provided at the end of this Order.

BACKGROUND

A. During the relevant period, Plaintiff N.H. was an elementary school student with a disability as defined by the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400–1409 (“IDEA”). Doc. 28 at 2. N.H. lives with his parents, F.H. and K.H., and his younger sister, G.H. Id. He attended Grahamwood Elementary School, part of the Memphis-Shelby County School District, through his third-grade year. Id. at 2. While there, N.H. had an Individualized Education Program (“IEP”) for intellectual giftedness (“IG”) and for his dyslexia, a learning disability. Id. His parents then sent him to the Bodine School, a private school “designed specifically for high potential students whose primary diagnosis is a specific reading disability.” Id.

Defendant MSCS is the educational entity providing public education to students who live in Shelby County, Tennessee. Id. MSCS receives state and federal funding to provide special education to children with disabilities under the IDEA; Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (“Section 504”); and Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 12101–1203, 12131–12165 (“ADA”). Id. As a condition of receiving federal funding, the IDEA requires the state of Tennessee, through MSCS, to identify, locate, and evaluate all children with disabilities who need special education and related services and then provide them with a Free and Appropriate Public Education (“FAPE”). Woods v. Northport Pub. Sch., Nos. 11–1493, 11–1567, 2012 WL 2612776, *1 (6th Cir. 2012); 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A). A FAPE “comprises ‘special education and related services’—both ‘instruction’ tailored to meet a child's ‘unique needs’ and sufficient ‘supportive services’ to permit the child to benefit from that instruction.” Fry v. Napoleon Cmty. Sch., 580 U.S. 154, 158 (2017). An IEP “serves as the ‘primary vehicle’ for providing each child” with a FAPE under the IDEA. Id.

The IDEA “establishes formal administrative procedures for resolving disputes between parents and schools concerning the provision of a FAPE.” Id. at 159. Parents may file a complaint with the local or state educational agency “with respect to any matter relating to the identification, evaluation, or education placement of the child, or the provision of a [FAPE] to such child.” 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(6); Fry, 580 U.S. at 159. Filing a complaint generally triggers a “preliminary meeting” where the parents discuss their complaint and try to come to a resolution. Fry, 580 U.S. at 159. If the disagreement continues, the parents may file a due process complaint with the state administrative agency, which then assigns an impartial hearing officer. Somberg ex rel. Somberg v. Utica Cmty. Schs., 908 F.3d 162, 170 (6th Cir. 2018). In Tennessee, the hearing officers are Administrative Law Judges (“ALJ”) in the Tennessee Administrative Procedures Division (“APD”). Doc. 1-2 at 1, 34. “Finally, a parent unhappy with the outcome of the administrative process may seek judicial review by filing a civil action in state or federal court.” Fry, 580 U.S. at 159; 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(A).

Here, Plaintiffs filed two complaints on behalf of N.H. First, they filed a complaint in April 2023 (APD Case No. 07.03-230615J, “First N.H. Case”) with the Tennessee Department of Education Division of Special Education. Doc. 28 at 3. ALJ Shannon Barnhill held a due process hearing in the First N.H. Case from April 3–5, 2023, and later denied the complaint on April 18, 2023. Id. at 3, 22.

On April 11, 2023, Plaintiffs filed a second complaint alleging that MSCS retaliated against them for filing the First N.H. Case when G.H.'s second grade teacher, Ms. Mendillo, refused to speak with the parents until the First N.H. Case concluded. Id. at 22-23. The APD split the case into two separate cases: APD Case No. 07.03-232067J on behalf of G.H. and APD Case No. 07.03-232068J on behalf of N.H. (“Retaliation Cases”). (Id.; Docs. 28-2, 28-3.) ALJ D. Kim Summers dismissed both cases sua sponte. Docs. 28-2, 28-3.

B. Plaintiffs filed this lawsuit challenging the ALJ's decision as to each of the above-discussed administrative proceedings on June 19, 2023. Doc. 1. The case was originally assigned to Judge Thomas L. Parker. Doc. 2.

Judge Parker allowed Plaintiffs to file an amended complaint (Doc. 27) and denied a motion to dismiss that amended complaint in part on June 6, 2024 (Doc. 57).¹ Judge Parker held an evidentiary hearing on the retaliation claim on February 10, 2025. Doc. 80. On April 25, 2025, MSCS filed the present Motions for Judgment on the Record as to the First N.H. Case and the Retaliation Cases. Docs. 85, 86. Plaintiffs filed their own Motion for Judgment on the Administrative Record. Doc. 87. The Parties filed their respective responses on June 6, 2025, closing the briefing and leaving the matters ripe for decision. Docs. 93-95. Judge Parker transferred the case to the undersigned in March 2026. Doc. 96.

THE FIRST N.H. CASE

In a lawsuit challenging an IDEA administrative decision, the district court will undertake a “modified de novo review,” meaning that it may set aside administrative findings in an IDEA case “ ‘only if the evidence before the court is more likely than not to preclude the administrative decision from being justified based on the agency's presumed educational expertise, a fair estimate of the worth of the testimony, or both.’ ” M.G. by & through C.G. v. Williamson Cnty. Schs., 720 F. App'x 280, 283 (6th Cir. 2018). In doing so, the district “should make an independent decision based on the preponderance of the evidence but also should give ‘due weight’ to the determinations made during the state administrative process.” Bd. of Educ. of Fayette Cnty., Ky. v. L.M., 478 F.3d 307, 312–13 (6th Cir. 2007) (quoting Deal v. Hamilton Cty. Bd. of Educ., 392 F.3d 840, 849 (6th Cir. 2004)).

The district court “(i) shall receive the records of the administrative proceedings; (ii) shall hear additional evidence at the request of a party; and (iii) basing its decision on the preponderance of the evidence, shall grant such relief as the court determines is appropriate.” 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(C). The court may not “simply adopt the state administrative findings without an independent re-examination of the evidence,” but neither may it “substitute [its] own notions of sound educational policy for those of the school authorities which [it] review[s].” Doe v. Metro. Nashville Pub. Schs., 133 F.3d 384, 387 (6th Cir. 1998); Bd. of Educ. of Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist., Westchester Cnty. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 206 (1982).

The district court's review is characterized as a two-part inquiry concerning: (1) whether the subject school district complied with the procedures set forth in the IDEA; and (2) whether the school district complied with the substantive provisions of the IDEA by providing an IEP that is “reasonably calculated to enable the child to receive educational benefits.” Deal, 392 F.3d at 853–54. Although the IEP at issue must be “strictly review[ed] ․ for procedural compliance,” a procedural violation does not constitute a denial of a FAPE unless it also produces substantive harm. Id. (citing Knable v. Bexley City Sch. Dist., 238 F.3d 755, 764 (6th Cir. 2001)). That is, “technical deviations will not render an IEP invalid.” Knox Cnty. v M.Q., 62 F.4th 978, 991 (6th Cir. 2023) (quoting Deal, 392 F.3d at 854). If the school system meets procedural requirements of the IDEA, “greater deference is to be afforded to” the school district's decision. Dong v. Bd. of Educ., 197 F.3d 793, 800 (6th Cir. 1999). The party challenging the ALJ's decision has the burden of proof to show by a preponderance of the evidence that the IEP was inappropriate. Deal, 392 F.3d at 854.

A. IDEA's Child Find Mandate

Plaintiffs argue that Defendant violated the child find mandate of the IDEA because it did not timely identify N.H. with a specific learning disability (“SLD”) in reading. Doc. 93 at 5. MSCS, as a school system covered by the IDEA, has an obligation to take appropriate steps to identify students with disabilities pursuant to what is referred to as the IDEA's “child find” obligation. See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(3). The IDEA's child find requirement is an affirmative obligation of every local educational agency to identify children who are suspected of having disabilities and to evaluate those students to determine whether they are eligible for special education services. Id. “The IDEA provides relief for a school's failure to adhere to a procedural requirement, such as its child-find mandate, where that failure ‘cause[s] substantive harm to the student.’ ” G. E. v. Williamson Cnty. Bd. of Educ., No. 24-5969, 2026 WL 384250, at *7 (6th Cir. Feb. 11, 2026).

To establish a procedural child find violation, Plaintiffs “must show that school officials overlooked clear signs of disability and were negligent in failing to order testing, or that there was no rational justification for not deciding to evaluate.” Ja. B. v. Wilson Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 61 F.4th 494, 502 (6th Cir. 2023). “A school's failure to diagnose a disability at the earliest possible moment is not per se actionable, in part because some disabilities are notoriously difficult to diagnose…” Id. (internal citation omitted). “Ultimately, ‘determining whether a child find violation occurred is a fact-intensive inquiry[.]’ ” Id.

1. N.H. attended Grahamwood Elementary school beginning in 2016 and received a diagnosis of dyslexia in November 2021. Doc. 87-1 at 8. During N.H.'s preK and kindergarten year, a June 2016 psychoeducational evaluation showed a discrepancy between a nonverbal IQ score of 143 and a basic reading subscore of 79, at which time N.H. could not identify his written name. Id. at 4-5. His reading ability placed him ahead of most of his peers, but he continued to have difficulty with fluency and sight words. Id. By first grade, his reading deficits placed him second from the bottom of his class, prompting the school to initiate before-school Response to Instruction and Intervention (“RTI”) services and 1:1 reading support. Id. at 12-13.

In third grade, his teacher noted that his ongoing writing and spelling struggles required a specific strategy, and he demonstrated measurable progress in written expression after receiving private instruction utilizing the Orton-Gillingham (“OG”) methodology, an intervention specifically designed for individuals with dyslexia. Id.; Doc. 42-69 at 2.

Plaintiffs assert that Defendant failed to recognize N.H.'s potential dyslexia despite his “persistent difficulties in reading and written expression,” which they attribute to Defendant's failure to “have the appropriately trained personnel in place to identify and/or provide appropriate interventions to any child with dyslexia.” Doc. 87-1 at 15. Dr. Mary Berk, MSCS's supervising psychologist, testified the only person on her staff with experience in evaluating children with dyslexia was Re'Khel Burke, who graduated with a masters in psychology in May 2021. Doc. 42-91 at 17.

This argument fails because it does not adequately account for N.H.'s intellectual giftedness, which often masked the difficulty he had with reading. N.H. was enrolled in a competitive optional program at Grahamwood Elementary School beginning in first grade, which required N.H. to perform at the 80th percentile in reading. Doc. 42-4 at 129. During N.H.'s second grade year, he took three teacher diagnostic tests for grade level performance in English Language Arts, two Illuminate-Fastbridge Universal Screeners ² , and the Tennessee Comprehensive Assessment Program (“TCAP”), and he performed at or above grade level on each of them. Doc. 42-72. For example, during May 10-12, 2021, N.H. took the TCAP without any accommodations and scored a 381 in English Language Arts, which corresponds to the 94th percentile of Tennessee students.³ Doc. 42-9 at 651; Doc. 42-72. Furthermore, N.H. attended school virtually during most of his second-grade year due to the COVID-19 pandemic, where his teacher was unable to see his handwritten work. Doc. 42-91 at 14.

Plaintiffs' expert, Katherine Mendez, a speech language pathologist, testified that when a student has a high level of academic performance, it is more difficult to identify indicators of dyslexia. Doc. 42-7 at 38, 68. She also testified that in her time identifying children with dyslexia, she had only ever identified “maybe three” out of an estimated 200 that were twice exceptional (both intellectually gifted and diagnosed with an SLD). Id. at 11, 33. Sherri James ⁴ , Director of Student Services and Transition at Bodine School, a private school that exclusively serves students with dyslexia, testified that Bodine does not require its first-grade students to have dyslexia diagnoses for admission because “psychologists are hesitant to label them with that diagnosis at that age.” Doc. 42-6 at 323. Re'Khel Burke, the only member of the IEP team identified as having expertise in evaluating dyslexia, disagreed with the decision to identify N.H. as a child with an SLD in reading because she believed N.H. did not have severe enough characteristics of dyslexia ⁵ to meet the eligibility criteria.⁶ Doc. 42-91 at 19.

N.H. continued to perform well on diagnostic tests and maintained his place in the optional program throughout his time at Grahamwood. At the end of April 2021, K.H. had begun to suspect N.H. had dyslexia and requested MSCS to conduct testing, which occurred on or around May 18, 2021. Doc. 87-1 at 6; Doc. 85 at 10-11. The IEP team then met to review the results of the screener on May 21, 2021, where they found N.H. had characteristics of dyslexia. Doc. 87-1 at 6-7; Doc. 85 at 11. The IEP team determined that with read-aloud accommodations, N.H. could make academic progress in his existing placement. Id. At the start of N.H.'s third grade year, in September 2021, his parents pushed for the IEP team to evaluate him for SLD. Id. at 12; Doc. 87-1 at 7-8. Despite performing well on early screeners, the team agreed and N.H. was evaluated and subsequently identified with an SLD on November 4, 2021. Doc. 85 at 12. A new IEP was created November 9, 2021. Doc. 42-74 at 2.

2. The record does not support that “school officials overlooked clear signs of disability and were negligent in failing to order testing,” Bd. of Educ. of Fayette Cnty., Ky. v. L.M., 478 F.3d 307, 312–13 (6th Cir. 2007) (emphasis added)—and certainly does not do so when one gives “ ‘due weight’ to the determinations made during the state administrative process.” Plaintiffs state that other interventions, such as RTI, cannot be used to delay identification and evaluation of dyslexia. Doc. 87-1 at 14-15. But the record does not support the accusation that Defendant was avoiding an evaluation. Rather, when Defendant was made aware of K.H.'s suspicions, it acted quickly to test N.H. and provide accommodations deemed reasonable to ensure his progress. Furthermore, the Sixth Circuit has noted that “[c]hild [f]ind does not demand that schools conduct a formal evaluation of every struggling student.” Ja. B., 61 F.4th at 502 (quoting D.K. v. Abington Sch. Dist., 696 F.3d 233, 249 (3d Cir. 2012)). Even where a school may suspect a disability, “a school [does] not violate its child-find responsibilities by first attempting other interventions for a student instead of immediately referring for an evaluation.” G. E. v. Williamson Cnty. Bd. of Educ., No. 24-5969, 2026 WL 384250, at *7 (6th Cir. Feb. 11, 2026). Attempting RTI and 1:1 reading support were acceptable first steps.

Dyslexia can take time to identify, particularly in intellectually gifted students. Indeed, Plaintiffs acknowledge as much. Doc. 87-1 at 10. As ALJ Barnhill noted, “[d]iagnosing an average student prior to the third grade is difficult. Diagnosing a gifted student who is able to more easily overcome and adapt his reading skills is especially challenging.”⁷ Doc. 42-92 at 28. Under these circumstances, the record does not support the conclusion that “school officials overlooked clear signs of disability and were negligent in failing to order testing, or that there was no rational justification for deciding not to evaluate.” L.M., 478 F.3d at 313.

For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendant's Motion for Judgment on the Record with respect to ALJ Barnhill's judgment as to Defendant's child find obligation. Plaintiffs' Motion is DENIED to the extent it addresses that issue.

B. Individual Education Plan

Plaintiffs next argue that Defendant never offered N.H. a FAPE because it never offered to provide dyslexia-specific intervention. Doc. 93 at 6.

A State must provide a FAPE to all eligible “children with disabilities.” 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1). “A FAPE, as the Act defines it, includes both ‘special education’ and “related services.’ ” Endrew F. ex rel. Joseph F. v. Douglas Cnty. Sch. Dist. RE-1, 580 U.S. 386, 390–91 (2017) (citing § 1401(9)). “ ‘Special education’ is specially designed instruction ․ to meet the unique needs of a child with a disability; ‘related services’ are the support services required to assist a child ․ to benefit from that instruction. Id. (internal citation omitted) (citing §§ 1401(26), (29)). A State covered by the IDEA must provide a disabled child with such special education and related services “in conformity with the [child's] individualized education program,” or IEP. Id. at 390–91 (citing § 1401(9)(D)).

“A comprehensive plan prepared by a child's ‘IEP Team’ (which includes teachers, school officials, and the child's parents), an IEP must be drafted in compliance with a detailed set of procedures.” Id. at 391 (citing § 1414(d)(1)(B)). The IDEA requires that every IEP include:

a statement of the child's present levels of academic achievement and functional performance,” describe “how the child's disability affects the child's involvement and progress in the general education curriculum,” and set out “measurable annual goals, including academic and functional goals,” along with a “description of how the child's progress toward meeting” those goals will be gauged. §§ 1414(d)(1)(A)(i)(I)-(III). The IEP must also describe the “special education and related services ․ that will be provided” so that the child may “advance appropriately toward attaining the annual goals” and, when possible, “be involved in and make progress in the general education curriculum. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(i)(IV).

Id.

“To meet its substantive obligation under the IDEA, a school must offer an IEP reasonably calculated to enable a child to make progress appropriate in light of the child's circumstances.” Id. at 399. The “reasonably calculated” qualification reflects a recognition that crafting an appropriate program of education requires a prospective judgment by school officials, and input from parents or guardians. Id. “Any review of an IEP must appreciate that the question is whether the IEP is reasonable, not whether the court regards it as ideal.” Id. This means the court must consider whether the IEP aims to provide “a level of instruction reasonably calculated to permit advancement through the general curriculum.” Id. at 402.

1. On November 9, 2021, the IEP team met to discuss the development of N.H.'s IEP to address his SLD in reading. Doc. 42-74 at 2. During the meeting, the team discussed the IDEA requirement for education in the “least restrictive environment” (“LRE”).⁸ K.H. expressed the need for pull-out services due to N.H.'s needs. Id. at 4. Dr. Luckett, Director of the Department of Exceptional Children, pointed out that N.H. was already scheduled to participate in the gifted program for 2.5 hours per week and additional pull-out services would result in greater time outside of the general education program. Id. Dr. Luckett also mentioned N.H.'s “personality of not wanting to be different or made to stand out.” Id. at 3.

The team went on to discuss two service options for N.H.: (1) pull-out services one hour three times per week in a small group, or (2) incorporation of N.H.'s goals in the general education setting. Id. at 5. The team chose option one (1). Id. While discussing the pull-out services, Dr. Luckett shared with the family that a dyslexia specialist had been trained and would support Ms. Idleman, the Special Education Teacher, and the school. Id. The parents expressed concerns that Defendant was not going to provide a specific program designed for dyslexia. Id. Dr. Luckett explained that Memphis Shelby County Schools “does not have a dyslexia program but rather has interventions specifically designed with methods and practices to address the SLD characteristics displayed by” N.H. Id. Dr. Tate, the Department of Exceptional Children Regional Manager, further stressed that Defendant would not provide any specific program but would use “research-based methodologies to address [N.H.'s] identified needs.” Id.

The IEP developed at this meeting identifies SLD as N.H.'s secondary disability and describes his deficit area as “Basic Reading Skills.” Doc. 42-49 at 1. A further description states as follows:

Nathaniel progresses at an advanced pace and needs a differentiated curriculum and interaction with his intellectual peers so that he will remain engaged in learning and reach his highest potential. At the same time, his specific learning disability adversely affects Nathaniel's reading ability to the extent that he requires intervention in order to remediate and elevate his reading ability to a level that is commensurate to his cognitive ability so that he can access his education in the least restrictive environment.

Id. at 4.

The IEP provides N.H.'s assessments regarding written expression, advanced reading, language, and pre-vocational skills. Id. at 8. As to written expression, it states, “when compared to spoken language performance, it is apparent that Nathaniel's spoken language abilities are not reflected in his written language skills.” Id. In the section titled, “Measurable Annual Goals and Benchmarks/Short-term Instructional Objectives for IEP and Transition Activities,” each area of need, the personnel responsible, and the annual goal are listed. Id. at 11-12. Goals include: “Given a specific writing topic and a completed graphic organizer, Nathaniel will be able to verbally express/describe his topic in an expressive verbal narrative prior to writing the piece in his classroom. Criteria will be met when he is able to do this for three out of five instances as measured by teacher observation, teacher made assessment, and data collection monthly.” Id. at 12. The IEP provides a description of accommodations to be used in reading, English/language arts, spelling, writing, math, science, and social studies, as well as accommodations for state and district testing. Id. 13-19, 21-22. Finally, the IEP includes the special education and related services N.H. is to receive, including three hours of intervention with the special education teacher in a special education setting to begin on November 16, 2021. Id. at 23. In total, N.H. would undergo eight hours of instruction separate from his non-disabled peers between pull-out services for both his IG and SLD. Id. at 24. The IEP does not mention the dyslexia specialist, nor does it identify the “research-based methodologies” to be implemented.

Three days after this IEP meeting, on November 12, 2021, the parents notified Defendant that they were removing N.H. from Grahamwood and requested payment for tuition at Bodine “as a matter of urgency.” Doc. 42-58; 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(C)(iii)(I)(bb) (requiring parents to give public school 10 days' notice before removal of the child if seeking reimbursement for private school placement). On November 16, 2021, Dr. Luckett declined K.H.'s request, stating:

To address your concerns regarding dyslexia interventions, SCS IEP Team members shared with you during the IEP meeting on November 9, 2021, that SCS would provide staff who are Orton Gillingham trained to support N.H.'s special education teacher. SCS is more than willing to document this support during the meeting. SCS IEP Team members object to identifying a specific program in an IEP that it will exclusively use to provide supports on grounds that a specific program that purports to address a disability is not individualized to a student's need and lacks flexibility; however, as SCS has shared during the IEP meeting, it will use evidence-based methodologies and interventions that are explicit, systematic and cumulative, multi-sensory, language based and aligned to individual student needs to provide services and supports to N.H. SCS is also willing to state this in N.H.'s IEP.

Doc. 42-78 at 2. Dr. Luckett concluded the letter by requesting an IEP meeting with the parents to discuss the addition of these provisions and the parents' proposed edits to a draft IEP. Id. at 3. The IEP meeting occurred on November 18, 2021, and the IEP was adjusted by addendum. Doc. 42-50.

2. 20 U.S.C.A. § 1414 requires every IEP to include “a statement of the special education and related services and supplementary aids and services, based on peer-reviewed research to the extent practicable, to be provided to the child, or on behalf of the child, and a statement of the program modifications or supports for school personnel that will be provided for the child.” When evaluating an IEP, courts must limit their evaluations to the terms of the document itself. Knable, 238 F.3d 755, 768 (6th Cir. 2001). The IEP written offer requirement should be “enforced rigorously.” Id.

Under 34 C.F.R. § 300.513, when a plaintiff has alleged a procedural violation, a hearing officer may find that a child did not receive a FAPE only if the procedural inadequacies—

i) Impeded the child's right to a FAPE;

ii) Significantly impeded the parent's opportunity to participate in the decision-making process regarding the provision of a FAPE to the parent's child; or

iii) Caused a deprivation of educational benefit.

The November 9 IEP failed to meet the requirements mandated by 20 U.S.C.A. § 1414 by omitting details of specific services, but once Plaintiffs shared their concerns, Defendant offered to remedy the procedural defect. However, the parents disengaged from the process. Instead, the November 18 IEP states that K.H. declined the suggested interventions because they were not dyslexia specific. Doc. 42-50 at 29. A text message prior to the meeting suggests that the parents had no intention of further engaging at that point in time: “We are well, just waiting for our notice period to expire so that we can place N.H. in a school with appropriate accommodations. But we have one more IEP meeting scheduled for tomorrow.” Doc. 42-59. The purpose of the 10-day requirement underlying the Plaintiffs' November 12 notice of withdrawal is “to afford the school a chance to remedy the IEP before removing their disabled child from the school.” Berger v. Medina City Sch. Dist., 348 F.3d 513, 523 (6th Cir. 2003); 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(C)(iii)(I)(bb). The record does not establish that either the November 9 or November 18 IEP deprived N.H. of an educational benefit or impeded his right to FAPE. 34 C.F.R. § 300.513. Because K.H. declined the interventions and N.H. was quickly removed from Grahamwood, there is no basis for concluding that the procedural violation would have resulted in a substantive denial of FAPE.

To the extent Plaintiffs requested a specific intervention be implemented in the IEP, they “are not entitled to dictate educational methodology or to compel a school district to supply a specific program for their disabled child.” Tucker by Tucker v. Calloway Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 136 F.3d 495, 506 (6th Cir. 1998). The IDEA's procedural safeguards guarantee an opportunity for parents to participate in meetings where school officials must be willing to listen to the parents and must have open minds. 20 U.S.C.A. § 1415; N.L. ex rel. Mrs. C. v. Knox Cnty. Schs., 315 F.3d 688, 694-95 (6th Cir. 2003). During the November 9 IEP meeting, the parents requested a dyslexia-specific program. Doc. 42-74 at 5. Defendant clarified it would not provide one. Id. Instead, the team stated they would use “research-based methodologies to address [N.H.'s] identified needs.” Id. They also would provide an OG-trained staff member as support. Id. at 2. The IEP team gave due consideration to the parents' concerns by providing evaluations when requested and taking into account their preferred methodology. The fact the school refused to, or perhaps was unable to, provide the parents' preferred intervention does not equate to a FAPE deprivation. The evidence establishes meaningful parental involvement at every stage.

It is not for this Court to “substitute its own notions of sound educational policy for those of the school authorities which we review.” Endrew, 580 U.S. at 404. Rather, we must determine whether the IEP is reasonable in light of N.H.'s circumstances. Considering N.H.'s IG, LRE, and parental input, the team decided on an intervention reasonably calculated to ensure N.H.'s academic progress. The record indicates N.H. consistently met and exceeded grade-level standards and that read-aloud interventions were beneficial. The decision by the IEP team to implement interventions and methods designed to address SLD characteristics instead of a dyslexia-specific program was reasonable and within their discretion. Plaintiffs have not carried their burden to show that Defendant could not or would not meet N.H.'s academic needs.

For the foregoing reasons, Defendants' Motion for Judgment on the Record as to the First N.H. Case is GRANTED, and Plaintiffs' opposing Motion is DENIED. Because Defendant did not deny N.H. a FAPE, this Court need not consider whether Bodine was an appropriate placement.

RETALIATION CASES

Plaintiffs also claim that Defendant retaliated against them due to their filing of the above due process complaint. Doc. 28 at 22-24; Doc. 87-1 at 21. Perhaps because the IDEA does not create a claim for retaliation, Plaintiffs ground their retaliation claim(s) in the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12203, and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794. Doc. 28 at 42-44. Plaintiffs explicitly seek a jury trial. Doc. 28 at 46.

All of this raises procedural questions that preclude the Court from granting judgment for either party on the retaliation claims, at least on the currently pending motions. For example, both Parties have moved for judgment on the retaliation claim, but neither Party has done so via summary judgment or some other motion one might expect to see on a claim that would otherwise be destined for the jury: Defendant moves for relief under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52 (Doc. 86)—as one might expect following a bench trial—whereas Plaintiffs have moved for judgment on the administrative record (Doc. 87-1 at 21), while at the same time (A) reiterating their invocation of the right to a jury trial, (B) asserting that the Section 504 and ADA claims should be resolved after the cross-motions for judgment on an administrative record (Doc. 93 at 19), and (C) insisting that Defendants incorrectly invoked Rule 52 (Doc. 94 at 3-6). For his part, the judge that handled the case from its inception until March 2026 did conduct an evidentiary hearing on the retaliation claims (Doc. 80), but the Parties have offered no explanation for why he chose that course approximating a bench trial (while seemingly declining to do so for the IDEA claims), and none is readily apparent from the docket. So we have Plaintiffs invoking the jury trial right for the retaliation claims and then re-asserting that invocation during motions practice; both Parties filing Motions related to those claims while neither complying with nor addressing the rules and standards governing summary judgment; and an evidentiary hearing conducted by the earlier presiding district court judge. See M.L. v. Williamson Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 772 F. App'x 287, 291 (6th Cir. 2019) (reviewing similar claim of retaliation on a summary judgment posture).

Given this state of affairs, the Court DENIES WITHOUT PREJUDICE both Defendant's and Plaintiffs' Motions insofar as they seek judgment on the retaliation claims. Perhaps there is an explanation for what has happened with respect to the retaliation claims—as nonexclusive examples, a waiver of the jury trial right, an earlier ruling from the bench, an unstated or understated nuance of law making the usual summary judgment-or-jury trial procedures inappropriate? If so, it is likely the case that no one is to blame for failing to offer the explanation; obscuration of that sort of thing is one unfortunate risk when a long-pending case is transferred to a new judge, and the risk is no doubt heightened when an evidentiary hearing has been held and resulting motions briefed before the transfer, when everyone involved had lived with the case. But for now, based on the information and arguments presented to it, the Court can only deny the motions, allowing the Parties to (if they so choose) re-present the arguments (with appropriate adjustments to reflect the governing rules and standards and this Order, if appropriate) as motions for summary judgment, proceed to trial, or offer via motion some other explanation why a different course is appropriate (including but not limited to refiling of the current motions with an explanation of their claimed procedural propriety).

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Defendant's Motion for Judgment on the Record as to the First N.H. Case (Doc. 85) is GRANTED. Defendant's Motion for Judgment on the Record as to the Retaliation Cases (Doc. 86) is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. Plaintiffs' Motion for Judgment on the Administrative Record (Doc. 87) is DENIED to the extent it concerns the First N.H. Case and DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE to the extent it concerns the Retaliation Cases.

The Parties SHALL file by September 22, 2026, a joint statement: (1) identifying all claims still undecided following this Order, and (2) a proposed schedule of proceedings for addressing those claims, identifying the relevant procedural stages with specificity, so that this long-pending case may be moved appropriately toward conclusion. If the Parties cannot agree, they SHALL submit a joint filing setting out their respective positions in concise and nonargumentative fashion. The filing SHALL NOT exceed six pages.

SO ORDERED, this 8th day of September 2026.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Also in June 2024, Judge Parker dismissed the claims against the Tennessee Department of Education. Doc. 58.

2.   Plaintiffs state that “By considering only inflated I-Ready/FastBridge scores while ignoring expert testimony, the order improperly relied almost exclusively on percentile-rank screening data.” Doc. 87-1 at 20. It is unclear from the record why Plaintiffs believe these test scores misrepresent N.H.'s academic progress.

3.   In September 2020, N.H. scored a 502 on the I-Ready teacher diagnostic, which corresponds with a 78th percentile and an overall placement at early 2nd grade. Doc. 42-72. In October 2020, N.H. took the first Illuminate-Fastbridge Universal Screener and scored a 520, which placed him at the 98th percentile nationally. Id. In January 2021, N.H. took another I-Ready teacher diagnostic, and he scored a 554, which corresponds with a 93rd percentile and an overall placement of late 2nd grade, ahead of his current stage. Id. In April 2021, N.H. took the second Illuminate-Fastbridge Universal Screener and scored a 545, which placed him at the 99th percentile nationally. Id. In June 2021, N.H. took another I-Ready teacher diagnostic, and he scored a 553, which corresponds to the 87th percentile and an overall placement in late 2nd grade. Id. In August, 2021 N.H. took the I-Ready teacher diagnostic for English Language Arts, and he scored a 548, which corresponds to the 84th percentile and an overall placement ahead of where he was to mid-3rd grade. Id. In September 2021, N.H. took the Illuminate-Fastbridge Universal Screener and scored a 508 which was at the 76th percentile. Id.

4.   Plaintiffs assert that “the ALJ simply does not discuss six of the ten witnesses, particularly Katherine Mendez. The ALJ did not explain why he credited district staff over Plaintiffs' witnesses, including Sheri James from Bodine director, and Ms. Mendez whom he qualified as an expert in the identification of dyslexia.” Doc. 87-1 at 20. The ALJ was not required to address each witness's testimony individually. Nonetheless, the ALJ's decision explicitly relies on testimony from Sherri James. Doc. 42-92 at 28.

5.   Dyslexia is a spectrum disorder, therefore, not all students with dyslexia have a severe enough form to meet the criteria for SLD under IDEA. Doc. 42-3 at 135; Doc. 42-7 at 72.

6.   Plaintiffs dispute Ms. Burke's level of expertise due to her short time in practice and conflation of certain terms related to diagnosing dyslexia. Doc. 87-1 at 8. However, it is undisputed that Ms. Burke was the MSCS licensed school psychologist and that she completed a graduate assistantship with MTSU's Center for the Research and Study of Dyslexia where she assessed children for characteristics of dyslexia. Doc. 42-3 at 25, 65, 69-70, 140.

7.   In Plaintiffs' Motion for Judgment on the Record, they assert that this Court should give no deference to ALJ Barnhill's findings. Doc. 87-1 at 20. This Court has reviewed the evidence and has made the same factual findings. ALJ Barnhill's note about the difficulty of diagnosing dyslexia is supported independently by the record. The deference due the state administrative process on issues involving expertise only underscores that conclusion.

8.   Section 1412(a)(5) requires placement in the least restrictive environment for children with disabilities: “To the maximum extent appropriate, children with disabilities, including children in public or private institutions or other care facilities, are educated with children who are not disabled, and special classes, separate schooling, or other removal of children with disabilities from the regular educational environment occurs only when the nature or severity of the disability of a child is such that education in regular classes with the use of supplementary aids and services cannot be achieved satisfactorily.”

BRIAN C. LEA UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE