MADISON NELSON v. CAISSA PUBLIC STRATEGY LLC BRIAN STEPHENS (2026)

ORDER

Defendants Caissa Public Strategy, LLC and Brian Stephens have filed a Partial Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 11) under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), by which they seek dismissal of: (1) the claims against Stephens under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, and the Tennessee Human Rights Act, and (2) the claims against both Defendants for intentional infliction of emotional distress. For the reasons that follow, the Motion is GRANTED.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Madison Nelson filed this civil action against Defendant Caissa and its Chief Executive Officer, Defendant Stephens, asserting claims arising of alleged sexual harassment and unlawful termination. Doc. 1. As relevant here, the complaint alleges that during her employment, Plaintiff was subjected to persistent sexual and verbal harassment by Stephens. Id. Plaintiff asserts claims against both Defendants under Title VII, the Tennessee Human Rights Act (“THRA”), 42 U.S.C. § 1981, and the common law tort of Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress (“IIED”). Id.

In their Motion to Dismiss, Defendants argue that “(1) Plaintiff has failed to state a claim against Defendant Brian Stephens under Title VII and the Tennessee Human Rights Act; and (2) Plaintiff has failed to state a claim against either Defendant for Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress under Tennessee law.” Doc. 11-1 at 1.

LEGAL STANDARD

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a complaint may be dismissed for “failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.” A court evaluating such a motion “must construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true, and examine whether the complaint contains sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.” Reichert v. Kellogg Company, -- F.4th --, 2026 WL 734673, at *4 (6th Cir. 2026).

In undertaking that analysis, the court must focus only on the allegations in the pleadings.” Bates v. Green Farms Condo. Ass'n, 958 F.3d 470, 483 (6th Cir. 2020). “The court may not ․ take into account additional facts asserted in a memorandum opposing the motion to dismiss, because such memoranda do not constitute pleadings under Rule 7(a).” Id. Therefore, a 12(b)(6) motion “requires courts to stick to the complaint's allegations.” Boykin v. Fam. Dollar Stores of Michigan, LLC, 3 F.4th 832, 838 (6th Cir. 2021).

LEGAL ANLAYSIS

I. In her Response to Defendants' Motion, Plaintiff “concedes that her claims under Title VII, the THRA, and 42 U.S.C. § 1981 are more appropriately directed towards Caissa than Stephens.” Id. Plaintiff thus concedes that, “to the extent those claims appear to be asserted against Stephens, they are properly subject to dismissal as to Stephens and Stephens only.” Id. Therefore, Plaintiff's claims under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, and THRA (Counts I, II, III, IV, and V), as they pertains to Defendant Stephens, are DISMISSED.

II. The remaining issue is whether the complaint states a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress against both Defendants. “A claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress—also referred to in Tennessee as the tort of ‘outrageous conduct’—has three elements: (1) ‘the conduct complained of must be intentional or reckless, (2) the conduct must be so outrageous that it is not tolerated by civilized society; and (3) the conduct complained of results in serious mental injury.’ ” DeSoto v. Bd. of Parks & Recreation, 64 F. Supp. 3d 1070, 1095 (M.D. Tenn. 2014) (citation omitted).

On the second element—the outrageousness of the conduct--“Tennessee has adopted a ‘high threshold standard’ for tortious conduct that is actionable as an IIED claim.” Id. (citation omitted). Specifically, the Tennessee Supreme Court “has adopted and applied the high threshold standard described in the Restatement (Second) Torts as follows”:

The cases thus far decided have found liability only where the defendant's conduct has been extreme and outrageous. It has not been enough that the defendant has acted with an intent which is tortious or even criminal, or that he has intended to inflict emotional distress, or even that his conduct has been characterized by ‘malice,’ or a degree of aggravation which would entitle the plaintiff to punitive damages for another tort. Liability has been found only where the conduct has been so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civilized community. Generally, the case is one in which the recitation of the facts to an average member of the community would arouse his resentment against the actor, and lead him to exclaim, ‘Outrageous.’

Bain v. Wells, 936 S.W.2d 618, 623 (Tenn. 1997).

More specifically, “Tennessee courts have indicated that trial courts should be wary of permitting IIED claims to move forward in employment discrimination cases, absent exceptional allegations.” DeSoto v. Bd. of Parks & Recreation, 64 F. Supp. 3d 1070, 1095–96 (M.D. Tenn. 2014). “Thus, even where courts permit claims of harassment or retaliation to proceed under state and federal statutes, courts will not permit IIED claims to proceed in most employment discrimination cases; this approach applies even where a defendant or its employees engaged in highly reprehensible conduct or otherwise intended to cause the plaintiff to suffer emotional distress.” Id.

Applying this governing standard, Plaintiff has not pleaded facts stating a claim for intentional infliction of emotion distress. Accepting Plaintiff's allegations as true and drawing all inferences in her favor, she alleges that:

1. Stephens utilized every opportunity on work trips to get her alone, including volunteering to be her partner and asking her to stay behind in his hotel room after nightly debrief meetings. Doc 1 at 2.

2. In 2019, Stephens kissed her without her consent during a work trip to Las Vegas.1

3. In October 2024, during a trip to Dallas, Stephens allegedly bought the Plaintiff multiple drinks until she was tipsy and then asked her to stay alone in his hotel room after a meeting. Id.

4. While in the Dallas hotel room, Stephens kissed Plaintiff without her consent. Id.

5. In November 2024, during a trip to New York City, Stephens again asked the Plaintiff to stay alone in his hotel room after a debrief meeting. Id. at 3.

6. During the New York City exchange, Stephens gave the Plaintiff a massage and kissed her without her permission. Id.

7. Stephens kissed the Plaintiff without her consent during a 2024 work trip to Nashville. Id.

8. Stephens frequently asked Plaintiff suggestive questions, such as “woah, am I making you uncomfortable?” and “I'm in love with you, do you think that's weird?” Id.

9. Stephens reportedly made sexist comments, including telling the Plaintiff “show me your boobs” and claiming clients only closed contracts because they “wanted to sleep with” her. Id.

10. Stephens allegedly removed Plaintiff from work projects or acted annoyed when she refused to give him attention or send him pictures of herself. Id.

11. Stephens engaged in flirty text messages, requesting pictures of the Plaintiff to “make him happy” Id. at 4.

12. Stephens reportedly used “role play” sales techniques to ask the Plaintiff to be flirtier with him and “sell herself” by sending him pictures. Id.

13. Caissa terminated Plaitiff on March 3, 2025, despite a lack of disciplinary action or documented performance issues. Id.

14. Plaintiff has suffered the following injuries as a result of Defendants' conduct: “humiliation, loss of self-esteem; increased anxiety; damage of reputation; loss of concentration; feelings she has lost control of her life and career; and sleeplessness.” Id. at *5.

The alleged facts, while unfortunate and perhaps actionable under other theories, do not evince the sort of outrageous conduct capable of supporting a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress under Tennessee law. Indeed, courts applying Tennessee law have rejected claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress premised on remarkably similar facts. Consider, for example, Briordy v. Chloe Foods Corp., No. 3:07-0295, 2008 WL 587503, at *2 (M.D. Tenn. Feb. 29, 2008): There the defendant made explicit remarks to the plaintiff, invited the plaintiff to an adult toy store, invited her to his hotel room, tried to invite himself into plaintiff's hotel room, had inappropriate conduct with her, and tried to kiss her several times—yet despite that harassing conduct, the IIED claim failed. Id. at *3. As the court put it, “[t]he facts are, unfortunately, not atypical of the fact pattern presented in most harassment cases.” Id. at *10. A perusal of the cases sadly confirms the point, as well as the conclusion that Plaintiff's allegations do not state a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. See Stacy v. MVT Servs., LLC, No. 3:11-CV-01241, 2012 WL 2281495, at *8 (M.D. Tenn. June 18, 2012) (finding supervisor screaming at plaintiff, requesting to watch her perform sexual acts, questioning her sexuality, and repeatedly commenting about the attractiveness of her breasts was not sufficient to establish an IIED claim); Barrett v. Whirlpool Corp., 704 F. Supp. 2d 746, 758 (M.D. Tenn. 2010) (finding unwanted physical contact, such as touching plaintiff's buttocks, alongside suggestive remarks was not sufficient to establish an IIED claim); Brown v. Regions Bank, No. 2:19-CV-2356-JPM-TMP, 2019 WL 13297196, at *1 (W.D. Tenn. Nov. 14, 2019) (finding rubbing the plaintiff's back and inappropriate sexual comments, including “[p]laintiff should prostitute herself up and down the street in order to generate business,” insufficient to meet the IIED standard); Sharpe v. CoreCivic of Tenn., LLC, No. 3:20-cv-00122, 2020 WL 6273919 (M.D. Tenn. Oct. 26, 2020) (granting motion to dismiss IIED claim where plaintiff alleged other employee asked for full body massage, asked to see plaintiff's “bare chest,” and moved toward her with his hand in a claw, and co-employees then spread rumors about plaintiff's sexual activity among inmates, making it impossible for her to do her job).

In arguing to the contrary, Plaintiff misplaces her reliance on Pollard v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours Co., 213 F.3d 933 (6th Cir. 2000). In Pollard, the plaintiff suffered years of “daily, consistent harassing conduct” by her male coworkers as a group—including a refusal to take direction from her, instructions from a supervisor not to speak or interact with her, degrading language about the plaintiff and women generally, sabotaging plaintiffs work area, setting off fire alarms, slashing tires on her bicycle, and attempting to run her off the road, all of which together made it impossible for her to do her job. 412 F.3d at 660-63. The Sixth Circuit reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the defendant, explaining that “[t]he sort of daily, consistent harassing behavior which Pollard endured over a period of months and years has been characterized as a type of slow torture.” 213 F.3d at 947. The allegations in this case are nothing like the facts in Pollard. Rather, as noted above, they amount to a mine-run harassment case, incapable of supporting a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress.

Finally, the Court notes that, in her Response to Defendant's Motion, Plaintiff at times seems to attempt to add new allegations to her complaint—particularly concerning Cassia's response or lack thereof to the alleged misconduct of Stephens, and the relation of Cassia's response to her theory of why Cassia should be held liable for IIED. For example, in her Response, Plaintiff says that she complained to superiors about Stephens' conduct (Doc. 13 at 1-2), but in the complaint she says only—and entirely generically—that “when she did speak with her superiors about issues in the company, the situation was turned on Plaintiff, and she was blamed for the issues she brought to their attention”—all in the context of explaining why she did not make a formal complaint about Stephens. Doc. 1 at 4 (emphasis added). And while she says in her response that she seeks to hold Cassia liable for a “gross failure” to address Stephens's misconduct (Doc. 13 at 2), in her complaint she alleges only respondeat superior (Doc. 1 at 9). It is unclear what significance, if any, Plaintiff believes these changes might have on the resolution of the Motion to Dismiss, and they can be disregarded based alone on Plaintiff's failure to argue them. But even if that were not true, the Court takes no account of them at this time, because in deciding the Motion to Dismiss, the Court is limited to the allegations in Plaintiff's complaint, not new factual assertions or legal arguments interposed in resisting a motion to dismiss. See Bates, 958 F.3d at 483. When plaintiffs believe “that they need to supplement their complaint with additional facts to withstand a motion [to dismiss] they have a readily available tool: a motion to amend the complaint under Rule 15.” Id. Plaintiffs cannot, by contrast, amend their complaint in an opposition brief or ask the court to consider new allegations (or evidence) not contained in the complaint.” Id.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Defendants' Partial Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 11) is GRANTED.

SO ORDERED, this 6th day of April, 2026.

FOOTNOTES

1.   This incident occurred during a prior period of employment, and the statute of limitations for an IIED claim is one year. T. C. A. § 28-3-104. The Court nevertheless has considered this allegation in deciding this Motion.

BRIAN C. LEA UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE