INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT NO OF OKLAHOMA COUNTY OKLAHOMA CHOCTAW NICOMA PARK SCHOOLS v. [redacted] a minor, by and through his parent and next friend, [redacted], Defendant. (2025)

ORDER 1

Before the Court are Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. 22) and Brief in Support (Dkt. 23). Defendant has not entered an appearance and did not file a response in opposition. For the reasons discussed below, the Court GRANTS IN PART the Motion (Dkt. 22) and REMANDS the case back to the Hearing Officer.

Background

Plaintiff, Independent School District No. 4 of Oklahoma County, Oklahoma (also known as Choctaw-Nicoma Park Schools), provides educational services as a political subdivision of the State of Oklahoma. Defendant, [redacted], is a minor who qualifies for special education and related services under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) based on diagnoses of [redacted] under the “Other Health Impaired” category and [redacted]. [redacted]'s parent, [redacted], acts as his next friend in this matter.

On October 28, 2022, [redacted] engaged in multiple violations of Plaintiff's Code of Student Conduct. The incident began after [redacted] failed to leave campus as directed and was observed in the hallway with his girlfriend. When approached by a teacher unfamiliar with him, [redacted] refused to identify himself, failed to return to class, and became increasingly hostile. During the encounter, [redacted] verbally threatened two teachers, at one point stating he would “slap” or “punch” them in the face. The School District subsequently determined that his behavior violated four provisions of the Code of Student Conduct, including obscenity and disorderly conduct, roaming the halls, insubordination, and making verbal threats.

Pursuant to IDEA procedures, Plaintiff convened a manifestation determination review (MDR) on November 11, 2022, to assess whether [redacted]'s conduct was a manifestation of his disabilities. The MDR team concluded that two of the incidents (obscenity/disorderly conduct and insubordination) were manifestations of disability, one (roaming the halls) was not, and that the verbal threats were not a manifestation of disability.

On November 15, 2022, Ms. [redacted] filed a due process complaint contesting the MDR findings for “roaming the halls” and “verbal threats.” After an expedited hearing on January 5, 2023, the Hearing Officer determined that roaming the halls was not a manifestation of disability but that the verbal threats were. Plaintiff appealed the latter determination.

On March 1, 2023, the State Appeal Officer affirmed the Hearing Officer's decision, concluding that [redacted]'s threats toward teachers were a manifestation of his disability and directing Plaintiff to provide additional services and behavioral support. Plaintiff filed this action on May 22, 2023, pursuant to 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(A), seeking judicial review of the Appeal Officer's order in Case No. DPH 2181. The case is now before this Court for review of the administrative record.

Legal Standard

Although this Motion is labelled as one for summary judgment, such motions “are better understood as motions for judgment on the administrative record.”² The Tenth Circuit has “dubbed this unique standard as ‘modified de novo’ review.”³ This standard requires a court to independently review the administrative record and apply a preponderance of the evidence standard to decide if the requirements of IDEA have been met.⁴ Specifically, IDEA states that a court “(i) shall receive the records of the administrative proceedings; (ii) shall hear additional evidence at the request of a party; and (iii) basing its decision on the preponderance of the evidence, shall grant such relief as the court determines is appropriate.”⁵ The court should also give “due weight” to the hearing officer's findings of fact, “which are considered prima facie correct.”⁶

Analysis

Plaintiff asks the Court to reverse the Appeal Officer's Order in DPH 2181 because the Hearing Officer purportedly erred as a matter of law in three ways. First, by misconstruing the term “disability” to include disabilities that are not recognized as a qualifying disability under IDEA. Second, by concluding that the verbal threats to teachers were a manifestation of [redacted]'s disability. Third, by finding that the Defendant met her burden of proof at the due process hearing. The Court addresses each argument in turn.

I. The MDR team is only required to consider IDEA-qualifying disabilities.

IDEA “was designed ‘to ensure all children with disabilities have available to them a free appropriate public education that emphasizes special education and related services designed to meet their unique needs.’ ”⁷ To further this purpose, IDEA requires a manifestation determination review to occur within 10 school days of any decision to change the placement of a “child with a disability” because of a violation of student code of conduct.⁸ At the MDR, certain officials and parents form a team to review “all relevant information” in the student's file and determine, as pertinent here, “if the conduct in question was caused by, or had a direct and substantial relationship to, the child's disability.”⁹

IDEA defines “child with a disability” as a child that falls into one or more of the following disability categories:

intellectual disability, a hearing impairment (including deafness), a speech or language impairment, a visual impairment (including blindness), a serious emotional disturbance (referred to in this part as “emotional disturbance”), an orthopedic impairment, autism, traumatic brain injury, an other health impairment, a specific learning disability, deaf-blindness, or multiple disabilities, and who, by reason thereof, needs special education and related services.10

D.S. is IDEA-eligible because of his [redacted] diagnosis, which falls under other health impairment, and his [redacted] His [redacted] and [redacted] diagnoses are not IDEA-qualifying disabilities.¹¹

Plaintiff and the Appeal Officer disagree as to whether the text of IDEA requires MDR teams and hearing officers to consider non-IDEA disabilities. Plaintiff contends that the Hearing Officer erred by considering [redacted]'s [redacted] and [redacted] diagnoses. Specifically, Plaintiff argues that the use of “child's disability” in § 1415 references IDEA's definition for “child with a disability,” limiting the manifestation determination review to IDEA's disability categories.

By contrast, the Appeal Officer asserts that the phrase “all relevant information” in § 1415 includes non-IDEA disabilities. The Appeal Officer makes two primary arguments. First, the disability categories do not strictly limit what services a student receives during the initial evaluation process.¹² Second, the Department of Education indicated during the rulemaking process that “any relevant information” should be broadly construed.¹³

The Appeal Officer's first argument improperly imports evaluation standards into the disciplinary context. IDEA evaluations assess a child's unique situation to design appropriate educational services, taking into account all areas of suspected disability.¹⁴ While evaluations must consider all special needs, manifestation determinations are tethered by statute to the child's IDEA-qualifying disability.¹⁵ Section 1415(k)(1)(E) links “any relevant information” to the requirement that the student's violation be caused by, or directly and substantially related to, his IDEA-qualifying disability.¹⁶ And the Appeal Officer's reliance on federal regulations governing the evaluation process cannot surmount the plain text of § 1415(k)(1)(E). Erasing the distinction between the evaluation and disciplinary context ignores the careful balance Congress struck between protecting students with disabilities and preserving schools' disciplinary authority.¹⁷

The Appeal Officer's second argument fails on similar grounds. The order quotes the following statement made by the Department of Education while responding to commentators:

We believe the criteria in § 300.530(e)(1) that the ․ relevant members of the IEP team must determine whether a child's conduct is a manifestation of the child's disability is broad and flexible, and would include such facts as the inter-related and individual challenges associated with many disabilities.18

However, the Appeal Officer's conclusion that the above response incorporates non-IDEA disabilities—unconnected to the IDEA-qualifying disability—ignores the use of the word “associated.” The “inter-related and individual challenges” must still be associated with, or put differently, related to the underlying disability. And this interpretation is confirmed by the next response from the Department of Education that states:

The intent of Congress in developing section 615(k)(1)(E) was that, in determining that a child's conduct was a manifestation of his or her disability, it must be determined that “the conduct in question was caused by, or had a direct and substantial relationship to, the child's disability, and was not an attenuated association, such as low self-esteem, to the child's disability.” The regulation, which follows the statutory language, thus accurately reflects the manner in which the Act describes the behavior of the child is to be considered in the manifestation determination.19

Thus, read in context, both the statutory text and the Department of Education's own commentary make clear that the manifestation inquiry is tied to the child's qualifying disability itself: not to unrelated traits or conditions. This Court finds that MDR teams and hearing officers are not required to consider non-IDEA disabilities. The MDR team here should have only reviewed whether [redacted].'s verbal threats were directly or substantially related to his [redacted] or [redacted], not his [redacted] or [redacted]. There is “no statutory basis to infer that IDEA contemplated an intermediate step between a child's conduct and his IDEA disability and imposing such an intermediate step involving the consideration of a non-IDEA disability would force plaintiff to abide by a standard inconsistent with the MDR procedures set out in 20 U.S.C. § 1415(k)(1)(E)(i)(I).”²⁰

II. Remand is appropriate.

Plaintiff also asks this Court to hold that [redacted]'s verbal threats were not a manifestation of his disability and that Defendant did not meet her burden of proof. Typically, the Court must give due weight to the hearing officer's findings of fact because this Court “may not substitute its own notions of sound educational policy for those of the school authorities.” But a hearing decision “without reasoned and specific findings deserves little deference,”²¹ and in such instance, a “district court may determine that the ‘appropriate’ relief is a remand to the hearing officer for further proceedings.”²²

Here, the Hearing Officer failed to make a reasoned and specific finding that the verbal threats were a manifestation of [redacted]'s [redacted]. Because the administrative proceedings were premised upon the faulty conclusion that the Hearing Officer must consider [redacted]'s [redacted] and [redacted], the Court finds it is most appropriate to remand this case back to the Hearing Officer.

Conclusion

For the reasons above, the Plaintiff's Motion (Dkt. 22) is GRANTED IN PART. The Hearing Officer's January 20, 2023, decision is vacated, and the case is REMANDED to the Hearing Officer for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

IT IS SO ORDERED this 8th day of October 2025.

FOOTNOTES

2.   J.P. v. Enid Public Schs., No. CIV-08-0937-HE, 2009 WL 3104014, at *2 (W.D. Okla. Sept. 23, 2009).

3.   Sytsema ex rel. Sytsema v. Acad. Sch. Dist. No. 20, 538 F.3d 1306, 1311 (10th Cir. 2008) (quoting Murray v. Montrose Cnty. Sch. Dist. RE-1J, 51 F.3d 921, 927 (10th Cir. 1995)).

4.   Murray, 51 F.3d at 927.

5.   20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(C).

6.   Murray, 51 F.3d at 927.

7.   Cudjoe v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 12, 297 F.3d 1058, 1063–64 (10th Cir. 2002) (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A) (2000)).

8.   20 U.S.C. § 1415(k)(1)(E)(i).

9.   Id.

10.   34 C.F.R. § 300.8(a)(1).

11.   App. Order (Dkt. 23-1), at 12.

12.   Id. at 13–14.

13.   Id. at 14–15.

14.   20 U.S.C. § 1414(b)(3)(B).

15.   Compare 20 U.S.C. § 1414 (discussing the initial evaluation process for determining a student's IDEA eligibility and needs), and 54 C.F.R. § 300.304(c)(6) (directing schools to look at all special needs during the evaluation process), with 20 U.S.C. § 1415(k)(1)(E) (discussing manifestation determination review).

16.   20 U.S.C. § 1415(k)(1)(E)(i).

17.   See cf. Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305 (1988) (discussing the Education of the Handicapped Act, the statutory predecessor to IDEA, and finding that Congress intended to “strip schools of the unilateral authority” to exclude disabled students from school, without “leaving school administrators powerless to deal with dangerous students”).

18.   71 Fed. Reg. 46720 (Aug. 24, 2006) (emphasis added).

19.   Id. (emphasis added).

20.   Fulton Cnty. Sch. Dist. v. S.C. by and through E.C., No. 1:07-CV-1907-MHS, 2009 WL 10701902, at *10 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 11, 2009).

21.   Reid ex rel. Reid v. District of Columbia, 401 F.3d 516, 521 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (quoting Kerkam v. Superintendent, D.C. Pub. Schs., 931 F.2d 84, 87 (D.C. Cir. 1991)).

22.   Id. at 526; see J.H. ex rel. JD v. Henrico Cnty. Sch. Bd., 395 F.3d 185, 196–97 (4th Cir. 2005) (ordering the district court to remand the case back to the hearing officer when the hearing officer failed to make a specific finding).

PATRICK R. WYRICK UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE