UNITED STATES v. SWARTZ (2026)

DECISION AND ORDER

INTRODUCTION

On December 4, 2024, defendant Jeffrey Swartz (“Defendant”) elected to waive indictment and, pursuant to a plea agreement, pleaded guilty to a one-count information charging him with receipt of child pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(2)(A). (Dkt. 25; Dkt. 26; Dkt. 27). Sentencing is scheduled for July 23, 2026. (Dkt. 56). This Decision and Order memorializes the Court's reasoning for denying Defendant's motion to withdraw his plea (Dkt. 44), as previously announced from the bench on December 1, 2025 (Dkt. 51).

BACKGROUND

On September 14, 2023, Defendant was charged by criminal complaint, which alleged that he was an individual previously convicted of attempted production of child pornography, and that he knowingly possessed child pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B) and (b)(2). (Dkt. 1). Petitioner was initially represented by attorney Steven G. Slawinski, Esq. (See Dkt. 2). On November 21, 2023, at Defendant's request, the Hon. Marian W. Payson, former United States Magistrate Judge, substituted attorney James L. Riotto, II, Esq. as Defendant's attorney. (Dkt. 6). Thereafter, on August 14, 2023, due to a conflict with Mr. Riotto (see Dkt. 17), Judge Payson appointed attorney Roman A. Misula, Esq. to represent Defendant (Dkt. 18).

On December 4, 2024, Defendant elected to waive indictment and, pursuant to a plea agreement, pleaded guilty to a one-count information charging him with receipt of child pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(2)(A). (Dkt. 25 (waiver of indictment); Dkt. 26 (information); Dkt. 27 (plea agreement); Dkt. 41 (plea hearing transcript)). The plea agreement was made pursuant to Rule 11(c)(1)(C) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, and the parties agreed that a term of imprisonment of 188 to 235 months would be an appropriate sentence. (Dkt. 27 at ¶ 16). On the last page of the plea agreement, Defendant affirmed as follows:

I have read this agreement, which consists of pages 1 through 18. I have had a full opportunity to discuss this agreement with my attorney, Roman A. Misula, Esq. I agree that it represents the total agreement reached between me and the government. No promises or representations have been made to me other than what is contained in this agreement. I understand all of the consequences of my plea of guilty. I fully agree with the contents of this agreement. I am signing this agreement voluntarily and of my own free will.

(Id. at 18).

Before placing Defendant under oath and questioning him concerning his plea, the Court addressed letters filed by Plaintiff and addressed to Judge Payson. (Dkt. 41 at 2; see also Dkt. 23; Dkt. 24)¹ . The letters address a statement made during a meeting between Defendant, Mr. Riotto, and the Assistant United States Attorney (“AUSA”) assigned to the case, wherein the AUSA allegedly stated that should Defendant go to trial, “all offers come off the table” and Defendant's “starting time would be 25y.” (Dkt. 23 at 1, 4; Dkt. 24 at 2, 4). The AUSA also allegedly stated that with the evidence the government would present at trial, “he'd ‘bury [Defendant].’ ” (Dkt. 23 at 1, 4; Dkt. 24 at 2, 4). In the letter, Defendant stated that he felt the statement by the AUSA was a threat to his life and he no longer felt safe in the AUSA's presence. (Dkt. 23 at 1, 4; Dkt. 24 at 2, 4). Defendant's parents also submitted a letter, explaining the effect the statement had on Defendant. (Dkt. 23 at 3; Dkt. 24 at 1).

At the plea hearing, the Court confirmed that Defendant had the opportunity to discuss the letters with Mr. Misula. (Dkt. 41 at 3, 5). The Court explained to Defendant that during the plea hearing, it would have to determine that Defendant was entering into the plea in a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent manner, including by asking Defendant if he was entering into the plea agreement because it was in his best interest to do so, and whether Defendant felt threatened or coerced to enter into a plea. (Id. at 5-8). Defendant confirmed that he understood and that he wanted to enter into a plea agreement with the government, that he was not taking the plea because he felt physically threatened by the prosecution, and that he wanted to go forward with the plea. (Id. at 8).

The Court placed Defendant under oath and questioned him concerning his understanding of the terms of the plea agreement and his decision to enter into the plea. Defendant confirmed that he understood the proceedings (id. at 10-13), as well as that he reviewed the plea agreement with his attorney, his attorney had answered any questions to his satisfaction, he had read the plea agreement, he had sufficient time to discuss the plea agreement with his attorney, and he was satisfied with his attorney's advice and representation (id. at 13-14). Defendant confirmed his understanding of various provisions in the plea agreement, including the maximum potential penalties for the counts of conviction, supervised release and his supervised release violation from his prior federal case, the Sentencing Guidelines, and the operation of Rule 11(c)(1)(C). (Id. at 15-26). Defendant also confirmed his understanding that the only basis for withdrawing his guilty plea would be if the Court rejected the agreed-upon sentence of 188 to 235 months:

THE COURT: Now, I'm not going to tell you right now whether or not I'm going to go along with this. I need to look at a lot [of] other information including this presentence investigation report that will include what the probation department believes is the correct offense level and Criminal History Category. But here's the way this will work. If at the time of sentencing, I tell you that, yes, I will accept this and I'll impose a prison sentence of 188 to 235 months in prison, then you cannot back out of your plea; do you understand that?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma'am.

THE COURT: It's only if at the time of sentencing if I were to tell you, no, I'm not going to go along with this, I'm not going to impose a prison sentence of 188 to 235 months, that at that point in time you would have an opportunity to withdraw your plea; do you understand that?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma'am.

(Id. at 26).

Defendant confirmed his understanding of the rights he was giving up by waiving indictment and pleading guilty, including the right to presentation of the case to the grand jury; the right to continue with a plea of not guilty and proceed to a jury trial; the right to various trial rights including the right to counsel and the right to testify or not testify; and the right to appeal or collaterally attack any sentence within or below a specified range. (Id. at 28-36).

In addition, the following exchange occurred during the plea hearing:

THE COURT: Have any other promises been made to you to get you to plead guilty other than those that are contained in this plea agreement?

THE DEFENDANT: No, ma'am.

THE COURT: Has anyone threatened you or coerced you in any way to get you to plead guilty?

THE DEFENDANT: No, ma'am.

THE COURT: Are you pleading guilty because, based on your discussions with your attorney, you believe it's in your best interest to do so?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma'am.

THE COURT: Are you pleading guilty because you are guilty?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma'am.

THE COURT: Have you answered my questions truthfully?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma'am.

THE COURT: Do you have any question for me or Mr. Misula?

THE DEFENDANT: No, ma'am.

(Id. at 36-37). Then, before Defendant signed the plea agreement, the Court asked him whether the two concluding paragraphs of the plea agreement were accurate, and whether Defendant was entering into the plea agreement in a knowing, voluntary and intelligent manner, and Defendant responded in the affirmative:

THE COURT: All right. What I'd like you to do, if you would, is turn to the last numbered paragraph of the plea agreement. So it's Paragraph 47. I'm going to read this into the record and you can follow along on your copy. But I want you to listen to me, too, because after I read it, I'm going to ask you whether or not it's true and it states as follows:

“This plea agreement represents the total agreement between the defendant, Jeffrey Swartz, and the government. There are no promises made by anyone other than those contained in this agreement. This agreement supersedes any other prior agreements, written or oral, entered into between the government and the defendant.” Is that true?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma'am.

THE COURT: I'm going to do the same thing with the paragraph underneath Mr. Testani's signature block and that states as follows:

“I have read this agreement which consists of Pages 1 through 18. I have had a full opportunity to discuss this agreement with my attorney Roman A. Misula, Esq. I agree that it represent[s] the total agreement reached between me and the government. No promises or representations have been made to me other than what is contained in this agreement. I understand all of the consequences of my plea of guilty. I fully agree with the contents of this agreement. I am signing this agreement voluntarily and of my own free will.” Is that true?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma'am.

THE COURT: All right. The next step, then, Mr. Swartz, is for [you to] sign the plea agreement. But understand that when you sign this, you're telling me in writing that you fully understand all the terms and conditions and you're entering into this in a knowing, voluntary and intelligent manner, is that true?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma'am.

THE COURT: All right. Then I'd ask you to sign the plea agreement now.

(Id. at 37-38).

Defendant acknowledged that the factual information contained in paragraph 8 of the plea agreement was correct—including that he had previously pleaded guilty to rape in the third degree and attempted production of child pornography, and that while on supervised release for his federal conviction, he used a cellphone to ask an individual to send nude pictures of her minor daughter to him. (Id. at 39-43). The Court found that Defendant was entering into the plea agreement in a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent manner; that there was a factual basis for the plea; and therefore, the Court accepted Defendant's plea. (Id. at 39, 43). Sentencing was scheduled for April 3, 2025. (Dkt. 31).

Thereafter, the Court held a status conference on March 11, 2025, at which time Mr. Misula was relieved as counsel, and sentencing was adjourned without a date pending assignment of new counsel. (Dkt. 35). On March 18, 2025, the Court appointed attorney Bryan Scott Oathout as counsel for Defendant. (Dkt. 37). At a status conference on June 9, 2025, Defendant advised that he would be filing a motion to withdraw his guilty plea. (Dkt. 40).

Defendant filed a motion to withdraw his plea of guilty on August 20, 2025. (Dkt. 44). The government filed response papers on August 29, 2025 (Dkt. 44), and Defendant filed a reply on October 25, 2025 (Dkt. 49). The Court held oral argument on the motion on November 12, 2025, and on December 1, 2025. (Dkt. 50; Dkt. 51). At the oral argument on December 1, 2025, the Court indicated that it was denying the motion and would issue a written decision. (Dkt. 51).

DISCUSSION

I. The Parties’ Arguments

Defendant argues that he should be permitted to withdraw his guilty plea because he received ineffective assistance of counsel, including because his prior attorneys failed to address the government's threat to “bury him” should Defendant not accept the plea agreement. (Dkt. 44 at 5). Defendant further contends that he felt coerced into accepting the plea agreement because his former attorneys pushed him to accept the agreement, failed to investigate the facts of the case and possible defenses, and could have procured a more favorable plea. (Id. at 5-6). Defendant argues that the government will not be prejudiced by the Court granting the motion to withdraw. (Id. at 6).

In support of his motion, Defendant submits an affidavit, wherein he states the following with respect to his argument that he received ineffective assistance of counsel: (1) Mr. Slawinski was disrespectful to Defendant and to his family, including because Mr. Slawinski attempted to get Defendant's parents to convince Defendant to enter a guilty plea; (2) Defendant had numerous “verbal disagreements” with Mr. Riotto, relating to Mr. Riotto's efforts to get Defendant to plead guilty, and Mr. Riotto did not take into consideration Defendant's request that he advocate for a better plea offer; and (3) Mr. Misula attempted to get Defendant's parents to convince Defendant to plead guilty. (Dkt. 44 at 10-11). Defendant further states that each of his attorneys failed to “adequately research the issues [Defendant] wanted to argue and failed to fight these allegations on [his] behalf despite [his] numerous requests to do so.” (Id. at 11). Defendant maintains that he took the plea “because [he] was scared,” and “felt [he] had no other options,” based on the AUSA's statements to him. (Id. at 12). Defendant also attaches several letters previously submitted to the undersigned as early as February 2025, wherein he expresses that he regretted taking his plea, he be permitted to withdraw his plea, he was forced to accept the plea, and he felt his attorneys ignored him. (Id. at 12, 17-27).

In response, the government argues that Defendant's motion should be denied. (Dkt. 45). The government argues that Defendant's arguments are belied by his own sworn statements made during his plea colloquy and are contradicted by other relevant undisputed facts, including that the Court had an extensive exchange with Defendant regarding the purported threat prior to taking his guilty plea, Defendant affirmed that he was entering into the plea in a knowing and voluntary manner, and Defendant affirmed that he was satisfied with his representation by counsel. (Dkt. 45 at 8-15). The government further argues that other relevant circumstances warrant upholding the plea, including due to Defendant's delay in seeking to withdraw his plea, Defendant's failure to assert his innocence, and Defendant's prior motions to withdraw his plea.² (Id. at 15-19).

II. Legal Standard

After acceptance of a plea but before imposition of the sentence, a district court has the discretion to allow a defendant to withdraw his plea of guilty if “the defendant can show a fair and just reason for requesting the withdrawal.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(d)(2)(B). The decision to allow a guilty plea to be withdrawn is committed to the discretion of the district court. United States v. Arteca, 411 F.3d 315, 320 (2d Cir. 2005). A defendant seeking to withdraw his guilty plea bears the burden to establish that the requested relief should be granted. United States v. Hirsch, 239 F.3d 221, 225 (2d Cir. 2001); see United States v. Maher, 108 F.3d 1513, 1529 (2d Cir. 1997) (“The defendant bears the burden of showing that there are valid grounds for relief.”).

“A guilty plea is no mere formality, but a ‘grave and solemn act.’ ” Arteca, 411 F.3d at 319 (quoting United States v. Hyde, 520 U.S. 670, 677, 117 S.Ct. 1630, 137 L.Ed.2d 935 (1997)). As a result, the burden to withdraw a plea is high. As explained by the Second Circuit:

The standard for withdrawing a guilty plea is stringent because “society has a strong interest in the finality of guilty pleas, and allowing withdrawal of pleas not only undermines confidence in the integrity of our judicial procedures, but also increases the volume of judicial work, and delays and impairs the orderly administration of justice.”

United States v. Schmidt, 373 F.3d 100, 103 (2d Cir. 2004) (quoting Maher, 108 F.3d at 1529); see United States v. Gonzalez, 647 F.3d 41, 57 (2d Cir. 2011) (“Whatever the basis for the motion, the standard for withdrawing a guilty plea is stringent.” (internal quotations and alteration omitted)).

“The fact that a defendant has a change of heart prompted by his reevaluation of either the Government's case against him or the penalty that might be imposed is not a sufficient reason to permit withdrawal of a plea.” Maher, 108 F.3d at 1529 (quoting United States v. Gonzalez, 970 F.2d 1095, 1100 (2d Cir. 1992)). Similarly, “a defendant's bald statements that simply contradict what he said at his plea allocution are not sufficient grounds to withdraw [his] guilty plea.” Gonzalez, 647 F.3d at 56 (internal citations omitted). Instead, “[t]o get permission to withdraw a guilty plea, a defendant must raise a significant question about the voluntariness of the original plea.” United States v. Torres, 129 F.3d 710, 715 (2d Cir. 1997).

The Second Circuit has endorsed consideration of three factors when evaluating a motion to withdraw a guilty plea: (1) whether the defendant is asserting his legal innocence; (2) the length of time between the plea and motion to withdraw; and (3) any prejudice that would inure to the government in the event the motion is granted. See, e.g., United States v. Rose, 891 F.3d 82, 85 (2d Cir. 2018); Schmidt, 373 F.3d at 102.

III. Defendant has failed to establish a sufficient basis to withdraw his plea.

Defendant has identified two bases for withdrawing his plea. First, Defendant argues that he should be permitted to withdraw his plea based on an alleged threat from the AUSA handling the case. Defendant contends that as a result of this alleged threat, his guilty plea was coerced and not voluntary. (Dkt. 44 at 5). Second, Defendant argues that he had ineffective assistance of counsel, which rendered his plea involuntary. (Id. at 5-6).

The Court turns first to Defendant's argument regarding the alleged threat. The Court questioned Defendant at length prior to his taking a plea regarding the alleged threat Defendant highlighted in his letters to Judge Payson:

THE COURT: The matter is on for a plea hearing. But before we get to that, I know that there were some letters that have been filed on the docket from Mr. Swartz to Judge Payson that I don't believe Judge Payson ever addressed because they came in relatively recently, within the last month, and I don't believe that there was an appearance in front of Judge Payson after those letters were sent. And in the letters, Mr. Swartz, you're complaining about conduct that you allege Mr. Testani engaged in and threats that you perceived him to make. And, among other things, if we go forward with this plea hearing today, I'm going to be asking you whether or not anybody's threatened you in connection with the plea hearing. So, I guess, my first question is, Mr. Misula, have you had an opportunity to talk to your client about the matters that are addressed in these letters?

MR. MISULA: I have, Judge. I've received the letters. I've spoken to him about the letters. My understanding is he's ready to proceed today with the plea. I've spoken to Mr. Testani about -- the conduct that is discussed in those letters precedes my time on this case. I wasn't there for these meetings. I'm not sure if Mr. Testani has anything to add. Obviously he was there. But my understanding is my client is ready to proceed today.

․

THE COURT: Okay. So, Mr. Swartz, first of all, have you had an opportunity to talk to your current counsel about the issues that are raised in the letters that you submitted?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma'am.

THE COURT: And do you want to go forward with this plea hearing?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma'am.

THE COURT: Well, you had a very healthy and long pause there. I'm going to be very upfront with you. I'm not going to spend the 40 minutes that it will take to go through this plea hearing if you don't want to do it. It's going to be a waste of your time. It's a waste of my time. It's a waste of the attorneys’ time and everybody's time. So if you're not ready to go forward with this, I'm not going to go forward with it. Because one of the things that I have to determine before -- it's up to me whether or not to accept your plea and I have to decide whether or not you're entering into the plea in a knowing, voluntary and intelligent manner. And if you're at all hesitant about it -- and it's a long period of time that you're agreeing to in terms of what you'd be asking me to sentence you -- as I said, I'm not going to spend the time going forward with it. So it sounds like you're not sure at this point, would that be fair to state?

THE DEFENDANT: I'm sure.

THE COURT: Why did you pause for such a long period of time after I asked you whether or not you wanted to go forward with it?

THE DEFENDANT: I just did 15, your Honor, and I came home, you know. And it's just fathoming another long stretch. It's, it's not, I mean, it's not really an easy decision to make but it's the only one that gets me home.

․

THE COURT: Are you taking it because you feel that you've been physically threatened by the prosecution in this case?

THE DEFENDANT: No, I don't feel it was a physically threatening moment. I just feel it was at the moment the way it came off, if I remember correctly, it was in the context of the conversation “if we go to trial with the evidence I have, I'll bury you”. So it wasn't -- I don't feel physically threatened to take the plea but it's just -- part of that's just been on my mind. You know, it's been, it's just been something I wanted addressed and I wanted, you know, everybody to know that that's how I felt. I felt verbally threatened, you know, so.

THE COURT: Well, there's a difference between having somebody advise you as to what they think you'd be facing from a legal perspective based on the evidence -- and it sounds like Mr. Testani's saying you'd be looking at potentially a mandatory minimum of 35 years --

THE DEFENDANT: Right.

THE COURT: -- in prison. There's a difference between that -- which is that's the way the criminal justice system works --

THE DEFENDANT: Right.

THE COURT: -- versus actually threatening somebody with either harm or in an inappropriate manner. And, so, one of the questions that I'm going to be asking you if we go forward with this plea hearing is whether or not you've been threatened or coerced in any way to go forward with the plea hearing. And what would you say in response to that?

THE DEFENDANT: No.

THE COURT: And are you entering into this plea not only because you think it's in your best interest to do so given the potential adverse consequences that you'd be facing if you decided to go to trial, but are you also doing this because, in fact, you are guilty of the charge that's in this plea agreement?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

(Dkt. 41 at 2-8). Defendant maintained that he wanted to go forward with the plea. (Id. at 8).

A review of Defendant's statements made under oath at his plea hearing in response to the undersigned's questions confirms that Defendant did not feel physically threatened by the AUSA's alleged statement about “burying” him,³ and that Defendant was not entering into the plea agreement because he felt he was threatened by the prosecution. Further, it was clarified that at the plea hearing that to the extent the AUSA did make any such statement about “burying” Defendant, he would have been referring to the strength of the evidence, and not any physical threat to Defendant—and this was an interpretation Defendant apparently agreed with at the plea hearing. (See id. at 4, 7 (Defendant stating that he did not feel that it was “a physically threatening moment,” and that it was in the context of the evidence the government would have at trial)). The conclusory allegations Defendant now makes—that he actually was threatened and coerced into entering the guilty plea (Dkt. 44 at 5 (“The defendant submits that he felt coerced into accepting the plea agreement entered into on December 4, 2024[.]”); Dkt. 49 at 3 (“The government argued in its response that I entered into this plea in a fully voluntary manner. I disagree.”))—is squarely at odds with his statements made under oath at his plea hearing. At the plea hearing, Defendant unequivocally stated that he did not feel physically threatened to take the plea, he was not threatened or coerced in any way to go forward with the plea hearing, he was only entering into the plea agreement because he felt it was in his best interest to do so, and because he was guilty of the charge in the plea agreement. Given Petitioner's assent on the record that he was entering into the plea in a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent manner, Petitioner cannot now claim that he was coerced to take the plea. Indeed, if the Court permitted Defendant to now contradict prior sworn statements he made during his plea allocution without any further explanation or clarification, it would significantly undercut the plea colloquy process and hinder the Court's ability to make a determination regarding the voluntariness of the plea.

The Court reaches the same conclusion with respect to Defendant's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Plaintiff argues that all three of his attorneys were ineffective because they did not research his case, failed to secure a more favorable plea offer, and coerced him into pleading guilty. (Dkt. 44 at 5-6). Defendant's claims in this respect are conclusory, and he fails to identify any specific, concrete actions that any of his attorneys allegedly failed to take on his behalf. See, e.g., United States v. Beardsley, No. 20-CR-49 (JLS), 2024 WL 4870867, at *6 (W.D.N.Y. Nov. 22, 2024) (denying motion to withdraw plea, where the defendant failed “to include any facts to show that his lawyers’ performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness or that, but for his counsel's errors, he would not have pled guilty,” and explaining that “generalized claims of ineffective assistance” do not provide grounds to withdraw a guilty plea); see also Torres, 129 F.3d at 716 (denying motion to withdraw guilty plea based on claim of ineffective assistance of counsel where the defendant failed to show that his attorney's actions fell below a reasonable level of competence, nor did the defendant offer evidence that, but for the attorney's deficiency, the result would have been different). Defendant's filings indicate that he had conversations with his attorneys regarding his case. (See, e.g., Dkt. 49 at 3 (“I had conversations and arguments with all of my prior counsel regarding the proof of the case against me․”)). Further, Defendant's argument that his attorneys coerced him into pleading guilty is not credible, including because Defendant previously stated under oath that he was not coerced into entering a plea, he spoke to Mr. Misula at length about the plea agreement, he did not need any additional time to speak with him, and he was satisfied with Mr. Misula's advice and representation. (Dkt. 41 at 14). In fact, Defendant described his conversations with Mr. Misula regarding the plea agreement as “we've pretty much beat this dead.” (Id.).

The record before the Court demonstrates that Petitioner's guilty plea was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary, and that he was not coerced into pleading guilty, either by the government or by his attorneys. As explained above, Petitioner affirmed on the record that he read and understood the plea agreement, he had adequate time to discuss the plea agreement with his attorney, and he was satisfied with his attorney's advice and representation. Defendant also confirmed that he discussed the issue of the threat raised in the letters addressed to Judge Payson with his attorney, and the Court engaged in extensive questioning regarding this issue at the plea hearing. Plaintiff's statements to the contrary simply are not credible. It is well-settled that “[a] defendant's bald statements that simply contradict what he said at his plea allocution are not sufficient grounds to withdraw the guilty plea.” Torres, 129 F.3d at 715; see also United States v. Hernandez, 242 F.3d 110, 112-13 (2d Cir. 2001) (denying the defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea based on his argument that his attorney misled him about the consequences of his plea, and explaining that “the district court was entitled to rely upon the defendant's sworn statements, made in open court with the assistance of a translator, that he understood the consequences of his plea, had discussed the plea with his attorney, knew that he could not withdraw the plea, understood that he was waiving his right to appeal a sentence below 120 months, and had been made no promises except those contained in the plea agreement”); United States v. Logan, 845 F. Supp. 2d 499, 511 (E.D.N.Y. 2012) (petitioner's claims with regard to ineffective assistance of counsel amounted to little more than conclusory allegations that were unsupported by the record, including because “[petitioner's] claims that [his attorney] did not undertake a sufficient investigation of the case and that [his attorney] pressured [petitioner] to accept the plea agreement are contradicted by his prior sworn statements, and are unsupported by the record,” because “[petitioner] stated both during his plea allocution and sentencing, under oath, that he was satisfied with [his attorney's] legal representation”); Jackson v. United States, No. 5:07-CV-1303 (NAM), 2009 WL 3246749, at *4 (N.D.N.Y. Oct. 5, 2009) (“As the Second Circuit noted in Adames v. United States, 171 F.3d 728 (2d Cir. 1999), a defendant's statements at his plea hearing ‘are generally treated as conclusive in the face of the defendant's later attempt to contradict them’ ”).

The Court has also considered the three factors to be assessed when evaluating a motion to withdraw a guilty plea, including (1) whether the defendant is asserting his legal innocence; (2) the length of time between the plea and motion to withdraw; and (3) any prejudice that would inure to the government in the event the motion is granted. See Rose, 891 F.3d at 85. In his initial motion papers filed at Docket 44, Defendant did not assert his legal innocence. Rather, his arguments are focused on the fact that he believes counsel could have obtained a better plea for him, had they not coerced him into accepting the plea. But in his reply papers, Defendant states that he “did not admit to asking for pornographic pictures of the other user's purported 10- to 11-year-old daughter,” and “at no point did I ask Witness 1 for pornographic pictures of a minor.” (Dkt. 49 at 1-2). Aside from these conclusory denials—again, which contradict what he stated under oath at his plea hearing—Defendant does not meaningfully assert that he is legally innocent of the charge to which he pleaded guilty, nor does he present any evidence supporting his innocence. See Hirsch, 239 F.3d at 225 (“A claim of innocence can be a basis for withdrawing a guilty plea, but the claim must be supported by evidence. A defendant's bald statements that simply contradict what he said at his plea allocution are not sufficient grounds to withdraw the guilty plea.” (quotation and citation omitted)).

With respect to the length of time between the plea and the motion to withdraw, Defendant entered his guilty plea on December 4, 2024. (Dkt. 28). Defendant referenced wanting to withdraw his plea in a letter to the Court dated February 21, 2025—almost three months later. The letter stated that Defendant wanted to withdraw his plea on the grounds of “ineffectiveness of counsel and unreasonable sentencing guidelines.” (Dkt. 44 at 18). Defendant sent the same letter to the undersigned on March 11, 2025, with additional attachments. (Dkt. 45-2). On June 9, 2025, Defendant confirmed that he planned to file a motion to withdraw his guilty plea. (Dkt. 40). After the Court granted Defendant an extension of time to file his motion (Dkt. 42), the actual motion was not filed until August 20, 2025 (Dkt. 44)—approximately eight months following his guilty plea. In other words, despite Defendant's representations in letters to the undersigned that he wished to withdraw his plea, he did not file a motion seeking that relief until August 2025. This period of delay undermines his motion.

Finally, with respect to prejudice, only if a defendant establishes that there is a valid basis to grant a motion to withdraw a guilty plea is a court required to consider whether the government has established prejudice, “and then the court must exercise its discretion in balancing these competing concerns.” Maher, 108 F.3d at 1529; see Hirsch, 239 F.3d at 225 (“[A] court should consider the potential prejudice to the government, but only if the defendant has set forth sufficient grounds to withdraw the plea.”); Torres, 129 F.3d at 715 (“[T]he government need not demonstrate prejudice where the defendant fails to show sufficient grounds to justify withdrawal of the plea.”); Gonzalez, 970 F.2d at 1100 (“The Government is not required to show prejudice when opposing a defendant's motion to withdraw a guilty plea where the defendant has shown no sufficient grounds for permitting withdrawal; however, the presence or absence of such prejudice may be considered by the district in exercising its discretion.”).

As explained above, Defendant has failed to present a valid basis for the withdrawal of his plea. Defendant's claims that his attorneys and the government coerced him into pleading guilty are not credible and are squarely contradicted by the record. Accordingly, the Court need not reach the issue of prejudice. But even if it did, as explained by the government in its filing, this case was charged by way of criminal complaint in November 2023—which at this point is approaching almost three years ago. Because Defendant waived indictment and pleaded guilty to an information, Plaintiff's withdrawal of his plea would necessitate the government charging the case by way of indictment and to rapidly proceed to trial, which would be unfair under the circumstances. Accordingly, upon considering the aforementioned factors, the Court finds that they weigh in favor of denial of Defendant's motion.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea (Dkt. 44) is denied.

SO ORDERED.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The letters on the docket appear to be the same letter, dated November 12, 2024. The filing at Docket 23 is a handwritten letter from Defendant, followed by a letter from Defendant's parents, and a typed version of Defendant's letter. The letter filed at Docket 24 is the same letter from Defendant's parents, followed by the same handwritten letter from Defendant, and the same typed version of Defendant's letter. In other words, the filings contain the same documents but are arranged in a different order.

2.   The government notes that this is not the first time Defendant has attempted to withdraw his guilty plea, and in connection with a plea of guilty entered to a charge of attempted production of child pornography in October 2008, Defendant filed motions to withdraw his plea in that case on January 20, 2009 and on June 19, 2009, the latter of which was granted. (Id. at 6; see also United States v. Swartz, Case No. 07-CR-6028, Dkt. 71; Dkt. 79; Dkt. 80; Dkt. 85; Dkt. 95). In that same prior case, Defendant entered another plea of guilty to attempted production of child pornography in June 2010, and then again attempted to withdraw that plea, but the motion was denied. (United States v. Swartz, Case No. 07-CR-6028, Dkt. 120; Dkt. 122; Dkt. 125).

3.   For his part, the AUSA did not recall making the statement that he would “bury” Defendant, but did recall discussing the strength of the evidence and the potential that Defendant would be facing 35 to 60 years in prison if convicted of the most significant potential charge. (Dkt. 41 at 3-5).

ELIZABETH A. WOLFORD, Chief Judge United States District Court