STOKES v. WAYNE COUNTY (2025)

DECISION AND ORDER

INTRODUCTION

Pro se plaintiff Richie A. Stokes, Jr. (“Plaintiff”) brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that defendants Wayne County, Deputy Thomas D'Amato (“Deputy D'Amato”), and Deputy Scribner (collectively “Defendants”) violated his constitutional rights in connection with an arrest on August 29, 2020. (Dkt. 1). The Court issued a Decision and Order on Defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings and summary judgment on March 10, 2025 (“March Decision”). (Dkt. 93). Plaintiff now requests that the Court reconsider its March Decision. (Dkt. 96). For the following reasons, Plaintiff's motion for reconsideration is denied.

BACKGROUND

The Court assumes the parties’ familiarity with the factual and procedural background of this case through the March Decision. In the March Decision, the Court terminated the Wayne County Sheriff's Office, Wayne County District Attorney, and all John Does as defendants, and dismissed Plaintiff's Fifth Amendment, Fourteenth Amendment equal protection, municipal liability under Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 694-95, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978), substantive due process, and procedural due process claims, and the state-law claims under the New York State Constitution and for negligent hiring, supervision, and retention. (See Dkt. 93). But the Court permitted the following claims to proceed to trial: (1) the false arrest claim against Deputy D'Amato; (2) the malicious prosecution claim against Deputy D'Amato; (3) the excessive force claim against Deputy D'Amato and Deputy Scribner; and (4) the assault and battery claim under state law against Deputy D'Amato, Deputy Scribner, and Wayne County. (Id. at 49-50).

DISCUSSION

“Since the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not expressly provide for motions for reconsideration, such a motion may be construed as a motion to alter or amend judgment under Rule 59(e) or Rule 60(b).” Hill v. Washburn, No. 08-CV-6285-CJS, 2013 WL 5962978, at *1 (W.D.N.Y. Nov. 7, 2013). Plaintiff does not refer to Rule 59(e), but entitles a section of his motion “Rule 60(b)” and attaches several exhibits as purported new evidence in support of his motion, so the Court will accordingly analyze the motion under Rule 60(b).¹ (See Dkt. 96 at 3-5).

I. Rule 60(b) Legal Standard

“A motion for relief from judgment is generally not favored and is properly granted only upon a showing of exceptional circumstances. The burden of proof is on the party seeking relief from judgment.” United States v. Concepcion, 668 F. Supp. 3d 153, 158 (W.D.N.Y. 2023) (quoting United States v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 247 F.3d 370, 391 (2d Cir. 2001)). Rule 60(b) provides:

[T]he court may relieve a party or its legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons:

(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect;

(2) newly discovered evidence that, with reasonable diligence, could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b);

(3) fraud (whether previously called intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or misconduct by an opposing party;

(4) the judgment is void;

(5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged; it is based on an earlier judgment that has been reversed or vacated; or applying it prospectively is no longer equitable; or

(6) any other reason that justifies relief.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). A party moving for relief under Rule 60(b)(2) based on newly discovered evidence must demonstrate:

(1) the newly discovered evidence was of facts that existed at the time of trial or other dispositive proceeding, (2) the movant must have been justifiably ignorant of them despite due diligence, (3) the evidence must be admissible and of such importance that it probably would have changed the outcome, and (4) the evidence must not be merely cumulative or impeaching.

Mirlis v. Greer, 952 F.3d 36, 50 (2d Cir. 2020) (quoting Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 247 F.3d at 392). “In order to succeed on a motion pursuant to Rule 60(b)(2), the movant must present evidence that is truly newly discovered or could not have been found by due diligence.” United States v. Potamkin Cadillac Corp., 697 F.2d 491, 493 (2d Cir. 1983) (cleaned up). “Evidence that was ‘clearly available’ at the time of the judgment is ‘not “newly discovered” ’ for the purposes of a motion under Rule 60(b)(2).” Pryor v. Berryhill, 286 F. Supp. 3d 471, 474 (E.D.N.Y. 2017) (quoting Whitaker v. N.Y. Univ., 543 Fed. App'x. 113, 114 (2d Cir. 2013)).

Plaintiff attaches over 200 pages of documents to his motion, most of which are unrelated to this proceeding. The attached documents include: a sworn statement from Sacha Santana, dated March 25, 2025 (Dkt. 96 at 23-25); affidavits prepared for and submitted in connection with an unrelated state court matter and a proceeding before the New York State Public Employment Relations Board (id. at 26-43); documents and communications relating to Freedom of Information Law submissions from Plaintiff and another individual unrelated to this action (id. at 45-57, 87-92, 98-106, 124-26, 137-42, 210-12); documents regarding a closure plan for the Town of Lyons Ambulance service (id. at 59-68); portions of policies and policy recommendations from various emergency medical services organizations (id. at 72-85, 107-15); communications related to a complaint filed by Plaintiff on November 16, 2021, with the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Office for Civil Rights (id. at 93-97); disciplinary letters from Wayne County Advance Life Support Services regarding individuals unrelated to this action (id. at 116-22); documents related to Plaintiff's arrest on November 4, 2024, and a Wayne County EMS care report (id. at 127-36); Plaintiff's medical records from a hospital admission on November 4, 2024 (id. at 144-89); portions of a use of force policy post-dating Plaintiff's 2020 arrest (id. at 191-207); the subject resistance report involving Plaintiff on the morning of August 29, 2020 (id. at 208-09); other subject resistance reports involving Deputy D'Amato and Deputy Scribner (id. at 213-31, 236-37); and a letter dated June 15, 2022, regarding an investigation involving Deputy D'Amato (id. at 232-34).

Only a few of these documents are even potentially related to this litigation, including: the affidavit of Sacha Santana, dated March 25, 2025, which contains statements about the vehicle in the underlying criminal matter of this proceeding (id. at 23-25); the other subject resistance reports involving Deputy D'Amato and Deputy Scribner (id. at 213-31, 236-37); the subject resistance report involving the arrest that is the subject of this litigation (id. at 208-09); and the June 15, 2022, letter about an investigation into Deputy D'Amato’s conduct during an incident on April 1, 2022 (id. at 232-34). The remaining documents involve individuals or entities that are not parties to this action ² or relate to a separate incident involving Plaintiff's arrest on November 4, 2024.

Most of these documents cannot be considered newly discovered because they were previously filed with the Court. The subject resistance report involving Plaintiff's arrest on August 29, 2020, was previously submitted by Defendants in connection with the dispositive motions. (See Dkt. 69-8). Plaintiff also submitted that report, in addition to the other subject resistance reports and the June 15, 2022, investigation letter involving Deputy D'Amato, in connection with his second motion to compel discovery in mid-April 2023. (See Dkt. 41 at 125-47, 151-52, 154-58). Because these documents were in Plaintiff's possession when he opposed Defendants’ dispositive motions, they are not new evidence.

The only “new” document is the sworn statement of Sacha Santana, but the information contained in that statement is not new. Ms. Santana describes the vehicle that Plaintiff was allegedly driving in the underlying criminal action and suggests that Plaintiff was a passenger rather than the driver. (Dkt. 96 at 24). But Plaintiff fails to explain why he did not obtain Ms. Santana's statement in connection with the prior motion practice. That said, Ms. Santana has no personal knowledge about Plaintiff's status vis-à-vis the vehicle, and moreover, even if admissible, there is no explanation for how Plaintiff's status as a passenger would have changed the March Decision—particularly since the Court recognized that issue as a disputed fact. (See Dkt. 93 at 3 n.5).

Likewise, Plaintiff provides no explanation for why he was unable to include the subject resistance reports in his opposition to Defendants’ dispositive motions and there are significant questions about the admissibility of these documents—none of which are authenticated—as well as their relevance to the issues before the Court. In other words, the fact that Deputy D'Amato and Deputy Scribner may have been involved in other incidents with individuals being arrested—both before and after the arrest involving Plaintiff—is not only unsurprising, but does nothing to alter this Court's conclusions in the March Decision.

Finally, as to the June 15, 2022, investigation letter, Plaintiff again does not explain why he failed to submit this letter in opposition to Defendants’ dispositive motions. And even if appropriate to consider, it would not alter the March Decision. The letter states that Deputy D'Amato “engage[d] in a verbal confrontation” with two individuals and violated training policies that prohibit members of the Wayne County Sherrif's Office from using profane language. (Dkt. 96 at 232-33). But the incident occurred after Plaintiff's August 2020 arrest and thus, even if somehow probative of Wayne County's knowledge about Deputy D'Amato’s conduct or lack of training, it post-dates the relevant time period at issue here. Furthermore, under New York law, “[a] cause of action for negligent hiring or retention requires allegations that the employer ․ failed to investigate a prospective employee notwithstanding knowledge of facts that would lead a reasonably prudent person to investigate that prospective employee.” Tsesarskaya v. City of New York, 843 F. Supp. 2d 446, 464 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (citation omitted). The letter provided by Plaintiff explains that Deputy D'Amato’s employer conducted an investigation, and indeed found he violated Wayne County Sherrif's Office policies, which undermines Plaintiff's claim for negligent hiring, supervision, and retention. Moreover, the subject resistance reports and investigation letter could not save Plaintiff's negligent hiring, supervision, and retention claim because, as discussed in the March Decision, it was improperly pleaded. (See Dkt. 93 at 48) (“As Plaintiff concedes that the individual defendants were acting within the scope of employment, his negligent hiring, supervision, and retention claim must be dismissed against Wayne County (citing Velez v. City of New York, 730 F.3d 128, 137 (2d Cir. 2013))).

In sum, even if the material attached to Plaintiff's motion was newly discovered, Plaintiff has not provided a justifiable excuse, as required, for why he failed to offer these documents before judgment was entered. Plaintiff only states that the material attached to his motion includes “supporting Affirmations that were withheld from the petitioner as of October 18, 2021.” (Dkt. 96 at 3). Such an assertion does not establish that Plaintiff was “justifiably ignorant” of these documents despite due diligence. See Apex Emp. Wellness Servs., Inc. v. APS Healthcare Bethesda, Inc., No. 11 CIV. 9718 (ER), 2017 WL 456466, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 1, 2017) (denying reconsideration motion in part where the movant “failed to meet [Rule 60(b)(2)’s] standard because it ha[d] not shown that it was diligent in seeking out [the new] evidence”).

And, as detailed above, none of the documents Plaintiff now submits would have altered the outcome of the March Decision. Accordingly, Plaintiff has not made the requisite showing necessary to justify reconsideration of the March Decision and his motion is denied.

II. Request to Appoint Pro Bono Counsel

Plaintiff also requests the appointment of pro bono counsel, stating that “a skilled professional that has a law degree and specializes in 1983 claims can litigate and make sure that the petitioner [sic] claims are fully litigated according to law.” (Dkt. 96 at 4). This is at least the fourth request for counsel made by Plaintiff. (See Dkt. 31; Dkt. 51; Dkt. 57). It is unclear if Plaintiff's request relates to the instant motion for reconsideration or if Plaintiff is requesting counsel to assist with the trial.

“When analyzing a request for counsel, the court should take a ‘flexible and sensitive case-by-case approach.’ ” Bonilla v. Future Sales, Inc., 378 F. Supp. 2d 170, 171 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) (quoting Jenkins v. Chem. Bank, 721 F.2d 876, 880 (2d Cir. 1983)). “The court should consider, inter alia, the complexity of the legal issues raised in the complaint, the plaintiff's ability to conduct a factual investigation, and the plaintiff's ability to present the case.” Id. (quoting Hodge v. Police Officers, 802 F.2d 58, 60-61 (2d Cir. 1986)).

Plaintiff has ably represented himself at all stages of litigation, including through discovery and summary judgment.³ The remaining legal issues are not complex and Plaintiff has shown his competency in prosecuting this action, including filing and opposing motions supported by facts and case law. (See, e.g., Dkt. 53; Dkt. 81). The Court also notes that Plaintiff is no stranger to litigating matters pro se. He represented himself after his attorneys withdrew in a prior matter before this Court, submitting a motion in limine and participating in a pre-trial conference (see Stokes v. Wayne County, 6:18-cv-06203-EAW-MJP, 2018 WL 1251016 (W.D.N.Y. March 10, 2018)), and he has another matter pending before this Court in which he is proceeding pro se (see Stokes v. Newark Police Dep't, 6:23-cv-06482-EAW-CDH (W.D.N.Y. Aug. 22, 2023)).

On this record and in consideration of Plaintiff's ambiguous request, the Court denies the appointment of pro bono counsel at this time without prejudice.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons Plaintiff's motion for reconsideration (Dkt. 96) is denied, as is his related request for appointment of counsel.

SO ORDERED.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Defendant argues in part that the motion is time-barred under Rule 59(e) as it was filed more than 28 days after the Court entered the March Decision. (Dkt. 98 at 4). As noted, Plaintiff seeks reconsideration under Rule 60(b) rather than Rule 59(e). (See Dkt. 96 at 3-5). A motion is timely under Rule 60(b) if it is filed within a “reasonable time” but no more than one year if the motion is brought under Rule 60(b)(1)-(3). Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(c)(1). Because Plaintiff primarily seeks reconsideration due to the alleged discovery of new evidence (Rule 60(b)(2)) and filed this motion 35 days after the Court entered the March Decision, the motion is timely.

2.   Plaintiff previously moved to reopen discovery to obtain documents concerning the Town of Lyons and the Court denied that request. (Dkt. 93 at 8-10). Plaintiff again focuses on the Town of Lyons with the current motion, but as explained in Defendants’ response in opposition (Dkt. 98 at 6), the fact that Town of Lyons’ emergency responders tried to treat Plaintiff at the Sheriff's Office after his arrest or that Plaintiff was not provided a refusal of care form in connection with those efforts has nothing to do with the claims here. The Town of Lyons is not a defendant.

3.   Plaintiff represented himself throughout the entirety of this matter apart from a four-day stint. An attorney noted an appearance on Plaintiff's behalf on February 1, 2022, shortly after Plaintiff filed the complaint himself. (Dkt. 9). The attorney's oral application to withdraw as counsel was granted three days later. (Dkt. 13).

ELIZABETH A. WOLFORD, Chief Judge