UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. MICHAEL STEIN (2025)

DECISION AND ORDER

Pending before the Court is a pro se motion filed by defendant Michael Stein (hereinafter “Defendant”) for compassionate release pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). (Dkt. 34).¹ Defendant was convicted pursuant to a plea agreement of wire fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343. (Dkt. 3; Dkt. 4). The offense of conviction involved Defendant's scheme to embezzle $228,573.31 between 2018 and 2022 from his employer—a family-owned winery. (Dkt. 22 at ¶ 9). Defendant's conduct caused devastating impacts to the victims in this case, as addressed in further detail at the sentencing in this matter. (See id. at ¶¶ 18-20; see also Dkt. 37 at 9-10). On July 19, 2023, the undersigned sentenced Defendant to 27 months in prison to be followed by three years of supervised release. (Dkt. 24; Dkt. 25).

Defendant, who is 44 years old, is currently serving the sentence at a residential reentry center with a scheduled release date of March 25, 2025. See Find an Inmate, Fed. Bureau of Prisons, https://www.bop.gov/inmateloc/ (last visited Feb. 17, 2025).² Defendant only served approximately five months of the 27-month prison sentence before being released to the halfway house. (See Dkt. 37 at 2).

On November 7, 2024, Defendant filed the pending motion, based on his medical conditions and the need to support his mother. (Dkt. 34). The government opposes the motion, arguing that Defendant failed to exhaust his administrative remedies, that he has failed to establish extraordinary and compelling reasons for a sentence reduction, and that the factors set forth at 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) do not support the requested relief. (Dkt. 37). The United States Probation Office (“USPO”) submitted a memorandum dated November 22, 2024, recommending that the Court deny the requested relief. (Dkt. 38).

“A court may not modify a term of imprisonment once it has been imposed except pursuant to statute.” United States v. Gotti, 433 F. Supp. 3d 613, 614 (S.D.N.Y. 2020). The compassionate release statute, as amended by the First Step Act, is such a statutory exception, and provides as follows:

The court may not modify a term of imprisonment once it has been imposed except that ․ the court, upon motion of the Director of the [BOP] ․, or upon motion of the defendant after the defendant has fully exhausted all administrative rights to appeal a failure of the [BOP] ․ to bring a motion on the defendant's behalf or the lapse of 30 days from the receipt of such a request by the warden of the defendant's facility, whichever is earlier, may reduce the term of imprisonment (and may impose a term of probation or supervised release with or without conditions that does not exceed the unserved portion of the original term of imprisonment), after considering the factors set forth in section 3553(a) to the extent that they are applicable, if it finds that ․ extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction ․ and that such a reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission[.]

18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). Relief is appropriate pursuant to § 3582(c)(1)(A) when the following conditions are met: (1) the exhaustion requirement of the statute is satisfied; (2) extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant a reduction of the prison sentence; (3) the factors set forth at 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) support modification of the prison term; and (4) the reduction is consistent with the policy statement set forth at U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13. If any “one of those conditions is lacking, [the district court] need not address the remaining ones.” United States v. Keitt, 21 F.4th 67, 73 (2d Cir. 2021).³ “The defendant carries the burden of showing that he or she is entitled to a sentence reduction under the statute.” United States v. Roney, No. 10-CR-130S, 2020 WL 2846946, at *2 (W.D.N.Y. June 2, 2020), aff'd, 833 F. App'x 850 (2d Cir. 2020); see also United States v. Fernandez, 104 F.4th 420, 427 (2d Cir. 2024) (“The burden of showing that the circumstances warrant a sentence reduction is on the defendant.”).

The Court agrees that Defendant has failed to establish that he satisfied the administrative exhaustion requirements, and on that basis alone, the motion is denied. But even if Defendant had met the exhaustion requirements, the Court would deny the motion because, for all the reasons detailed in the government's submission (Dkt. 37) and the USPO memorandum (Dkt. 38), Defendant has not established extraordinary and compelling reasons for the requested relief, nor has he demonstrated that the § 3553(a) factors support a sentence reduction. The Court is deeply troubled that Defendant only served five months of the 27-month prison sentence before being released to a halfway house, which certainly was not the Court's intent when it imposed the sentence. Even more troubling is Defendant's misrepresentation that the director of the halfway house supports his requested relief. (See Dkt. 37 at 10). The Court has significant concerns that once released (which appears to be imminent), Defendant will resort to his history of deceptive and manipulative behavior.

For the foregoing reasons, Defendant's motion for compassionate release pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) (Dkt. 34) is denied.

SO ORDERED.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The motion appears to have been submitted twice, at both Docket Nos. 34 and 36. The Clerk of Court is directed to terminate the duplicative motion filed at Docket 36.

2.   According to the submissions from the parties, Defendant actually may be eligible for release to home confinement at an earlier date in February 2025. (See, e.g., Dkt. 37 at 2).

3.   At the time the Second Circuit decided Keitt, the policy statement set forth at U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 was not applicable to motions for compassionate release filed before a district court. 21 F.4th at 71 n.2. But with the November 1, 2023 amendments to the Sentencing Guidelines, that policy statement is now relevant to a motion filed in the district court.

ELIZABETH A. WOLFORD Chief Judge United States District Court