JONES v. FREE ACCEPTED MASONS L3 (2023)

DECISION AND ORDER

INTRODUCTION

Pro se plaintiff Tedric K. Jones (“Plaintiff”) commenced the instant action alleging violations by defendants Free & Accepted Masons, L3 Harris Communications, and Level 3 Communications (collectively, “Defendants”). (Dkt. 1; Dkt. 7). Plaintiff has also filed a motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (Dkt. 2), a motion to appoint counsel (Dkt. 3), a notice to cease and desist (Dkt. 5), and a motion for a permanent injunction (Dkt. 4; Dkt. 6 (amended motion for restraining order and motion for permanent injunction)).

The Court has reviewed Plaintiff's motion for in forma pauperis status (Dkt. 2), and it is granted. The Court has also reviewed Plaintiff's amended complaint as required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and concludes that his claims must be dismissed as frivolous.

BACKGROUND 1

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants have committed antitrust violations and “non-consensual human experimentation.” (Dkt. 7 at 1). Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants have “monopolized [his] entire life” by using their company and organizational resources to control his “computer networks, business relationships, and [his] physical body.” (Id. at 3). He requests that the Court enforce a permanent injunction and enter a restraining order for him and his family. (Id. at 4).

Plaintiff provides further detail about his claims in his amended motion for a permanent injunction and a restraining order. (See Dkt. 6). Plaintiff, who is a United States Army veteran, alleges that he is subject to the “community policing Cops program,” which is run by the Department of Homeland Security, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Department of Justice, the Central Intelligence Agency, and L3 Harris Communications, as well as the Freemasons and the Rochester Police Department. (Id. at 1-2). Plaintiff contends that he and his family have experienced community policing tactics such as those experienced by individuals who are suspected of committing a crime or terrorism, that he has been experiencing these tactics for his entire life, and that he does not understand why he has been placed in the Cops program illegally. (Id. at 1; see also Dkt. 4). Attached to Plaintiff's first motion for a permanent injunction is a letter from an organization called “PACTS International,” purportedly located in California, which states in conclusory fashion that Plaintiff is subject to organized stalking by groups using “covert microwave technologies.” (Dkt. 4 at 2).

Plaintiff further contends that his network communications are being monitored and manipulated, and that he has been the subject of non-consensual human experimentation funded and employed by defendant L3 Harris using its nanotechnology, weapons companies, and possibly the United States military, and that L3 Harris has complete control over all telecommunications locally and abroad. (Dkt. 6 at 1). Specifically, Plaintiff contends that L3 Harris “created a software that can track any individual in the world as they see fit and [he] has been subjected to this illegal experimentation without knowledge or consent for years now.” (Id.). Plaintiff further states that L3 Harris has control over his apartment complex, and they have installed 5G cell towers, which have “undisclosed capabilities that can track and harm citizens.” (Id.). Plaintiff contends that the Cops program lacks oversight, including because it has employed citizens’ corps and infrared people to monitor and harass him daily, and as a result he and his family have experienced severe emotional and mental distress. (Id. at 2).

DISCUSSION

I. Plaintiff's Motion for In Forma Pauperis Status is Granted

Plaintiff's affirmation of poverty has been reviewed in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1). Plaintiff has met the statutory requirements for in forma pauperis status and permission to proceed in forma pauperis is granted. The Court now turns to its obligation to screen Plaintiff's amended complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915.

II. Legal Standard

“Section 1915 requires the Court to conduct an initial screening of complaints filed by civil litigants proceeding in forma pauperis, to ensure that the case goes forward only if it meets certain requirements.” Guess v. Jahromi, No. 6:17-CV-06121(MAT), 2017 WL 1063474, at *2 (W.D.N.Y. Mar. 21, 2017), reconsideration denied, 2017 WL 1489142 (W.D.N.Y. Apr. 26, 2017). In evaluating the complaint, a court must accept as true all of the plaintiff's factual allegations and must draw all inferences in the plaintiff's favor. See, e.g., Larkin v. Savage, 318 F.3d 138, 139 (2d Cir. 2003). Upon conducting this initial screening, a court must dismiss the case pursuant to § 1915(e)(2)(B) “if the [c]ourt determines that the action (i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” Eckert v. Schroeder, Joseph & Assocs., 364 F. Supp. 2d 326, 327 (W.D.N.Y. 2005). “In addition, if the Court ‘determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the Court must dismiss the action.’ ” West v. Sanchez, No. 17-CV-2482 (MKB), 2017 WL 1628887, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. May 1, 2017) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3)); see also English v. Sellars, No. 07-CV-6611L, 2008 WL 189645, at *1 (W.D.N.Y. Jan. 18, 2008) (“[E]ven pleadings submitted pro se must fit within the subject matter jurisdiction of an Article III court․”).

III. Plaintiff's Claims are Dismissed

On their face, Plaintiff's allegations—like those previously asserted in lawsuits filed in this District (see note 1, supra)—are fanciful, delusional, and purely conclusory with no factual basis. Plaintiff alleges that he has been subjected to cyberstalking by Defendants, and also that Defendants have somehow committed antitrust violations. (Dkt. 6; Dkt. 7). The factual allegations lack any basis in reality, and they do not withstand legal scrutiny.

To the extent Plaintiff contends that Defendants conspired together to cyberstalk and monitor him, and that he and his family have been injured by this conduct, it is well-settled that “there is no private cause of action for stalking or general ‘harm.’ ” See Robinson v. Williams, No. 6:22-CV-0982 (GTS/ML), 2023 WL 3352758, at *9 (N.D.N.Y. Jan. 12, 2023), adopted, 2023 WL 2986825 (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 18, 2023) (citing Sonnick v. Budlong, 20-CV-0410, 2020 WL 2999109, at *5, 9 n.8, 11 (N.D.N.Y. June 4, 2020) (“[F]ederal stalking is a crime pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2261A, and does not provide for a private cause of action․ New York does not recognize private causes of action for stalking, harassment, or trespass.”); Cain v. Christine Valmy Int'l Sch. of Esthetics, Skin Care, and Makeup, 216 F. Supp. 3d 328, 335 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (“Case law is ․ unanimous that no private right of action is available under § 2261A.”) (collecting cases).

The same can be said for Plaintiff's claims for alleged antitrust violations. “[A] private antitrust plaintiff must plausibly allege that ‘it suffered a special kind of antitrust injury,’ and, second, that it is an ‘efficient enforcer’ of the antitrust laws, meaning that the plaintiff is suited ‘to pursue the alleged antitrust violations.’ ” Nirvana, Inc. v. Nestle Waters of N. Am. Inc., 123 F. Supp. 3d 357, 369 (N.D.N.Y. 2015) (citation omitted). Plaintiff has not included any facts in his complaint suggesting that either of these requirements has been met. Further, other than to state generally that Defendants have control over all telecommunications locally and abroad, he has failed to identify the anticompetitive practice about which he complains.

Plaintiff also contends that he has been harassed because he has been the subject of “community policing tactics.” Plaintiff does not provide further detail about these alleged community policing tactics. To the extent he is attempting to bring a claim for malicious prosecution, any such claim would be brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which requires a plaintiff to show “(1) the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and its laws; (2) by a person acting under the color of state law.” Young v. Suffolk Cnty., 705 F. Supp. 2d 183, 195 (E.D.N.Y. 2010). Specifically, Plaintiff is required to allege that Defendants initiated a proceeding against him, that the proceeding terminated in his favor, a lack of probable cause, and malice. See Gonzalez v. Hahl, 850 F. App'x 127, 128 (2d Cir. 2021), cert. denied, ––– U.S. ––––, 142 S. Ct. 862, 211 L.Ed.2d 569 (2022). However, Plaintiff's allegations that Defendants are monitoring his telecommunications fall far short of making out any such claim.² Further, Plaintiff does not allege discriminatory intent or that he has been subject to harassment based on his race, or any other protected characteristic. See, e.g., White v. City of New York, 206 F. Supp. 3d 920, 930-31 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (discussing requirements for alleging Equal Protection claim).

“To the extent that a complaint filed in forma pauperis which fails to state a claim lacks even an arguable basis in law, Rule 12(b)(6) and § 1915(d) both counsel dismissal.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 328, 109 S.Ct. 1827, 104 L.Ed.2d 338 (1989); see also Siri v. Doe, No. 21-CV-8777 (LTS), 2022 WL 280987, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 31, 2022) (dismissing pro se plaintiff's complaint pursuant to § 1915 without leave to amend where the complaint lacked an arguable basis in fact or in law, the court could not identify any legal basis for his claim, and the defects in his complaint could not be cured by amendment). Here, even construing his allegations generously, Plaintiff's claims are wholly frivolous. The substance of his allegations of cyberstalking and harassment against Defendants—including that he is being illegally monitored by 5G cell towers installed outside his apartment complex—lack not only specificity, but they also lack any basis in fact or in law, and granting him leave to replead would be futile. This is particularly the case where Plaintiff has already amended his complaint as of right, and yet not alleged any facts based in reality or claims based in the law. Accordingly, Plaintiff's amended complaint is dismissed as frivolous.

Likewise, Plaintiff's motion for a restraining order and for a permanent injunction (Dkt. 4; Dkt. 6) and his motion to appoint counsel (Dkt. 3) are denied as moot.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff's motion to proceed in forma pauperis (Dkt. 2) is granted. Plaintiff's amended complaint has been screened in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), and the Court concludes that his claims must be dismissed.

The Court certifies, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that any appeal from this Decision and Order would not be taken in good faith. Accordingly, the Court hereby revokes Plaintiff's in forma pauperis status, and leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals as a poor person is denied. Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 82 S.Ct. 917, 8 L.Ed.2d 21 (1962). Any request to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal should be directed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in accordance with Rule 24 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure.

SO ORDERED.

FOOTNOTES

2.   Plaintiff states in his original motion for a permanent injunction that he and his family “have been illegally placed on a watchlist of some sort to monitor us.” (Dkt. 4 at 1). Plaintiff provides no further detail regarding the nature of this alleged watchlist, and beyond the general allegations that his communications are being monitored, Plaintiff has failed to identify any constitutional violation caused by his placement on the alleged watchlist, such as that his movements have been restricted or that he has been precluded from engaging in certain activities. See, e.g., Platsky v. Nat'l Sec. Agency, 547 F. App'x 81, 82 (2d Cir. 2013) (“[W]e also note Platsky's argument that the FBI may not, consistent with due process, place him or any citizen on a terrorist watch list without notice and an opportunity to be heard. As to this claim, we agree with the District Court's determination the Platsky does not have standing, because he appears to be claiming a hypothetical and speculative injury.”).

ELIZABETH A. WOLFORD, Chief Judge