UNITED STATES v. LABOY (2023)

DECISION AND ORDER

Defendant Carlos LaBoy (hereinafter “Defendant”) has filed a pro se motion to reduce his sentence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). (Dkt. 180). For the reasons set forth below, the motion is denied.

After pleading guilty pursuant to a plea agreement to conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute, and to distribute, 100 grams or more of heroin in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846, Defendant was sentenced by the undersigned on September 21, 2017, to 180 months in prison to be followed by four years of supervised release. (Dkt. 114). The presentence report (“PSR”) prepared by the United States Probation and Pretrial Services Office indicated that Defendant had previously been convicted of the following, among other crimes: (1) Criminal Possession of a Controlled Substance, 3rd Degree in New York State Supreme Court, Erie County, in 1997; (2) Manslaughter, 1st Degree in Erie County Court in 1997; and (3) Possession with Intent to Distribute Heroin in this Court in 1998. (Dkt. 174 at ¶¶ 40, 42, 43). Defendant was determined to be a career offender pursuant to § 4B1.1 of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines (the “Guidelines”). (Id. at ¶ 27).

Defendant previously sought compassionate release on two prior occasions—one time based on the COVID-19 pandemic which was denied by this Court (see Dkt. 176), and another time based on the argument that he was misclassified as a career offender which was also denied by this Court (see Dkt. 179). As the undersigned noted in the latter decision, even if Defendant's attack on his 1997 state drug conviction was valid, the 1997 manslaughter conviction and the 1998 federal drug conviction were sufficient predicates for his career offender status. (Id. at 5-6).

Defendant now moves for compassionate release based on the argument that the detective (Rene Gil) involved in the 1997 state drug conviction referenced above was subsequently convicted of a crime. (Dkt. 180). In its response, the government acknowledges that not only was Detective Gil convicted of a federal crime, but another law enforcement officer purportedly involved with Defendant's 1997 state drug conviction was also convicted of crimes in federal court. (Dkt. 186 at 8). However, the government contends that Defendant has not provided any particulars that these officers’ criminal activities somehow undermined the legitimacy of Defendant's 1997 state drug conviction—and in any event, the means by which to pursue that relief is not through a compassionate release motion. (Id. at 9-11).

The fact that two officers purportedly involved with Defendant's 1997 state drug conviction are now convicted federal felons is, to say the least, troubling. But even assuming that the present motion is the proper means by which to raise these issues, the Court comes back to the same conclusion it reached with Defendant's prior compassionate release motion—that there are two additional predicate offenses that independently justify imposition of the career offender status separate and apart from the 1997 state drug conviction. (See Dkt. 179 at 5-6). Thus, as it did previously when Defendant sought to challenge his career offender status based on the 1997 state drug conviction, the Court concludes that Defendant has failed to establish extraordinary and compelling reasons justifying the grant of compassionate release. As a result, it does not reach the issues of whether the § 3553(a) factors support the relief sought by Defendant.

For the foregoing reasons, Defendant's motion for compassionate release pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) (Dkt. 180) is denied.

SO ORDERED.

ELIZABETH A. WOLFORD, Chief Judge