JOSE ROBERTO RIOS GUTIERREZ v. BRIGGS TRADITIONAL TURF FARM INC (2025)

ORDER

Before the Court is Plaintiffs' Pretrial Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Against All Defendants (Doc. No. 130). Plaintiffs seek judgment as a matter of law that Defendants are alter egos of one another, and further seek entry of a judgment on damages as to Plaintiffs' Missouri overtime, Section 1981 and FLSA claims.

I. Background

Plaintiffs Jose Roberto Rios-Gutierrez, Jose Juan Mendoza-Servin, Francisco Javier Martinez-Mendez, Jonathan Rodriguez-Anaya, and Cesar Edgardo Avendaño-Martinez, are Mexican nationals. Plaintiffs worked for Defendants between 2018 and 2021. Plaintiffs allege that they and the other workers on whose behalf they bring this action came to work in the United States as guestworkers on H-2A visas. Under the H-2A visa program, the visa holder is required to perform agricultural labor or services as defined by the Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C. § 3121(g) and the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 203(f). See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(H)(ii)(a). H-2A visas only allow the visa holders to work in agriculture, and accordingly the Defendants reported to the government that they needed the workers to perform sod production on Defendants' sod farm.

Agriculture workers, as defined in 29 U.S.C. § 203(f), are generally exempt from overtime. See 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(6). Thus, if Plaintiffs performed only agriculture work (as required by the H-2A visas), Defendants would not be liable for overtime payments. However, Plaintiffs allege that they were required to perform landscaping work at commercial, residential, and government properties in western Missouri and eastern Kansas. Plaintiffs assert that landscaping workers, as opposed to agricultural workers, should be paid overtime for weeks where they worked more than 40 hours, as landscaping work is not considered agricultural labor or services. See 26 U.S.C. § 3121(g), 29 U.S.C. § 203(f), 2nd Am. Compl. ¶¶ 61-62. Plaintiffs assert that they regularly worked more than 40 hours in a week, but Defendants rarely paid an overtime premium. Therefore, Plaintiffs argue they should have been paid overtime for those weeks in which they worked over 40 hours.

On September 3, 2024, the Court granted in part Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment against Defendants Briggs Traditional Turf Farm, Inc. and Lawrence Capen Briggs (Doc. No. 116) as to (a) a finding on Count I that Plaintiffs' typical work does not qualify for the agriculture exemption under the FLSA and Plaintiffs are entitled to an amount of overtime to be determined later; (b) a finding on Count II that Plaintiffs' work activities generally do not qualify for the agricultural exemption from overtime; (c) a finding that a three-year statute of limitations applies to MMWL claims in Count II; and (d) a finding that Defendants Briggs Traditional and Capen Briggs violated Section 1981 in Count VI. See Order, Doc. No. 124. Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 116) was denied in part as to (a) whether a two-year or three-year statute of limitations applies to Plaintiffs' FLSA claims in Count I; (b) entitlement to liquidated damages in Count I; (c) Count III (Kansas overtime law); and (d) Count V, as questions of fact remain for trial regarding Defendants' state of mind. Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 114) was granted in part as to the claims in Count III (Kansas overtime law), and Count III was dismissed. Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment was denied in part in all other relevant aspects.

Plaintiffs have now moved for summary judgment as to their alter ego theories and as to certain amounts of damages.

II. Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 130)

A. Facts

1. The Parties

Plaintiff José Roberto Rios-Gutiérrez maintains his permanent residence in Mexico and came to Missouri as an H-2A worker in 2018, 2019, and 2020 to work for Defendants. Plaintiff José Juan Mendoza-Servín currently resides in and maintains his permanent residence in Mexico and came to Missouri as an H-2A worker in 2019 and 2020 to work for Defendants. Plaintiff Francisco Javier Martínez-Méndez currently resides in and maintains his permanent residence in Mexico and came to Missouri as an H-2A worker in 2018 and 2020 to work for Defendants. Plaintiff Jonathan Rodríguez-Anaya currently resides in and maintains his permanent residence in Mexico and came to Missouri as an H-2A worker in 2019 and 2020 to work for Defendants. Plaintiff César Edgardo Avendaño-Martinez currently resides in and maintains his permanent residence in Mexico and came to Missouri as an H-2A worker in 2019 and 2020 to work for Defendants.

Defendant Briggs Traditional (“Traditional”) is a Missouri corporation that grows and installs sod at businesses, homes, and government buildings in western Missouri and eastern Kansas. Briggs Traditional hired Plaintiffs, other H-2A workers, and non-H-2A workers to install sod. Traditional's income tax returns show receipts well more than $500,000 for each year it employed Plaintiffs and other class members. Traditional does not own any properties; instead, it and Capen Briggs grew turf on farms owned by Defendants Briggs Turf and Larry Briggs. Traditional maintains separate bank accounts from the other defendants.

Defendant Capen Briggs is the sole shareholder, Director, President, and Secretary of Traditional. Capen Briggs managed and supervised the operations of Briggs Traditional, exercised operational control over significant aspects of its day-to-day functions, and exercised control over Plaintiffs' and other H-2A workers' work. Capen Briggs established the Plaintiffs' and other H-2A workers' terms of employment and had the power to hire and fire Plaintiffs and other H-2A workers. No other Defendant in this case has management control over Briggs Traditional, and Defendant Lawrence Clyde Briggs does not have an ownership interest in Traditional. Traditional employed approximately twenty-four workers in 2018 and 2019 (12.5 percent on the farm); and approximately twenty-six in 2020 and 2021 (11.5 percent on the farm). At all relevant times, Defendant Traditional directly employed two or three workers (the same two or three) who worked principally on the farm, though they also laid sod off the farm. Except for the two or three H-2A workers who principally worked on the farm, the H-2A workers “pretty much exclusively” worked at the sod installation sites. (Mainard Depo. at 107:15-23). Defendants' employees routinely installed sod in Missouri and Kansas, and nearly all the sod installed in Kansas was transported across the state line from Missouri.

Defendant L.C. Briggs Turf Farm, LLC (“Turf”), a Missouri corporation, operates farms, and harvests sod for purchase and wholesale and retail sale. Turf principally grows sod. The land on which it grows the sod is owned by the Lawrence Clyde Briggs Revocable Trust (hereinafter, the “Briggs Family Trust”), and Kenosha, LLC (“Kenosha”). As of December 2021, Briggs Turf directly employed four or five sod harvesters or cutters (non-H-2A workers) who worked on the farm. Capen Briggs has no ownership interest in Briggs Turf; however, he is an employee on Briggs Turf's payroll (listed as Operations Manager) and he is a designated beneficiary of the Briggs Family Trust. Turf maintains separate bank accounts from the other defendants.

Defendant Lawrence Clyde Briggs (“Larry Briggs”) is the settlor of the Briggs Family Trust. Larry Briggs owns Turf.

Defendant Kenosha, a Missouri company, maintains the same office address as Traditional and Turf. Larry Briggs and Capen Briggs are the sole members of Kenosha, and each own a 50% interest in Kenosha. Kenosha rents property to Briggs Traditional for the purpose of growing sod. It also owns the Knight Road Farm and the location of Traditional's Office.

Defendant Naudi-D Investments, LLC (“Naudi-D Investments”), a Missouri company, is a real estate company owned by Capen Briggs. Naudi-D's only property is the bunkhouse, where Plaintiffs and other H-2A workers lived while employed by Defendants. Other than Traditional and Turf, Defendants contend the other LLC Defendants had no direct employees. Naudi-D maintains separate bank accounts from the other defendants.

2. Defendants' Relationships

Defendants claim Briggs Turf and Briggs Traditional are totally separate entities. During the relevant time, however, employees of Briggs Turf and Briggs Traditional worked out of the same office space which is owned by Kenosha. Defendants Briggs Turf and Briggs Traditional used and shared (1) office supplies; (2) computers; (3) QuickBooks server (splitting the monthly bill on the account); (4) a website, see http://lcbriggsturffarm.net/ (last viewed September 16, 2025), and a LinkedIn page, see https://www.linkedin.com/company/briggs-traditional-turf-farm/about (last viewed September 16, 2025); and (5) filing cabinets and company paperwork. Additionally, Briggs Traditional and Briggs Turf shared Office Manager Elizabeth Francie Mainard, who has been employed by Briggs Traditional since January 2019. Ms. Mainard testified that her wages were paid by Briggs Traditional, and only rarely would Larry Briggs give her any kind of direction. During the relevant time, Ms. Mainard maintained an email address for both Briggs Traditional and Briggs Turf, although she testified that she did not really use the Briggs Turf email. Naudi-D and Kenosha, LLC also maintain the same office address as Briggs Traditional and Briggs Turf.

On occasions, Capen Briggs directed employees of Turf. Capen Briggs also assisted Larry Briggs with running the business operations of Turf. During the relevant time period, Capen Briggs owned fields in which Traditional grew sod; Traditional also leased sod from and harvested sod from the fields owned by Turf. During the relevant time period, once or twice per year, Turf hauled loads of sod to worksites where Plaintiff and other H-2A workers were working, for them to install. As employees of Traditional, some H-2A workers also performed occasional work for Turf, such as grading soil and removing fence panels, which work was then billed from Traditional to Turf.

All the worksites listed in Traditional's 2020, 2019, and 2018 Job Orders and Labor Certification applications—and the vast majority in 2021—were farms owned by the Briggs Family Trust or Kenosha and operated by Turf. In the 2018 Job Orders and Labor Certification Applications, Capen Briggs affirmed that he would provide free housing for all employees. While employed for Defendants, Plaintiffs and other H-2A workers lived in a bunkhouse that was formerly owned by Defendant Larry Briggs and Briggs Family Trust, and currently owned by Defendant Naudi-D Investments, which company is owned by Defendant Capen Briggs. From 2017 through the present, Traditional paid rent to Naudi-D at varying rates, and sometimes not at all. The lease agreement between Traditional and Naudi-D was not signed until January 1, 2023; almost six years after Traditional's rental of the bunk house ostensibly began. The bunkhouse is located in Peculiar, Missouri.

In 2018, Defendants required Plaintiffs Rios-Gutiérrez and Martínez-Méndez (Defendants did not employ the remaining named Plaintiffs in 2018), along with all other H-2A visa holders to pay $25 per week as rent to live in the worker housing. Employees made these rent payments to a man named Arturo, whom the Defendants put in charge of the worker housing. Employees made rent payments in cash when they received their wages.

In 2018 and 2019, Kenosha owned only the Defendants' shared office and a house, where Felix Rodriguez lived. Though Plaintiffs requested documents regarding Kenosha's financial relationship with the other Defendants in their discovery demands, Defendants have produced no lease, receipts, transaction reports, or any other document showing the purpose or basis of the rents paid, nor who paid those rents.

On or about January 1, 2015, Capen Briggs and Larry Briggs signed a “Lease Agreement” on behalf of Traditional and Turf, respectively, by which “Lessor” Traditional would lease certain farm properties to “Lessee” Turf for the purpose of growing and harvesting sod. However, in actuality, Traditional leased farms from Turf. When asked in his deposition testimony how Turf could lease land it does not own, Larry Briggs responded, “I own it all, so same person.” (Larry Briggs Dep. 34:14-19 (Doc. 117-29)). The “Lease Agreement” did not specify the amount of rent to be paid. The amount Traditional paid Turf to lease the land varied. According to Capen Briggs, “․we'd usually just split it or figure out how it worked out for both of us․” There was nothing in writing showing how Capen Briggs and Larry Briggs would decide how to split the lease payments. Per the agreement, Lessee Turf would be able to unilaterally renew the “Lease Agreement” in one-year increments upon written notice to Lessor Traditional. Defendants produced no record showing that Turf provided any written notice to Traditional affirming renewal of the agreement.

The properties leased to Traditional were owned by the Briggs Family Trust. Larry Briggs owns both Turf and the Briggs Family Trust. Traditional and Turf harvest sod from the same farms, including the farm owned by Defendant Kenosha, which in turn is owned by Larry Briggs and Capen Briggs. With the exception of the land owned by Kenosha, Larry Briggs owns all of the land that Traditional and Turf harvest and utilize sod from. Kenosha owns two (2) properties.

Landscaping companies, as well as owners of commercial, residential, and government properties entered directly into contracts with Turf and Traditional for the purchase and installation of sod. The decision about which company was contracted was determined by who had contacts with the particular contractor. Capen Briggs handled the contracting at Turf, along with other Turf office employees. Capen Briggs communicated and dealt with all customers who contracted through Turf. Traditional does not own any properties of its own. Traditional grew turf on farms owned by Turf and Larry Briggs.

During the relevant time period, for each rent payment that Traditional made with respect to office space, Capen Briggs signed a check on behalf of Traditional, which he then passed off to Ms. Mainard to deposit into Kenosha's bank account. Ms. Mainard was also responsible for drafting checks on behalf of Traditional for purported rental payments towards the house owned by Naudi-D that Plaintiffs and other H-2A lived in while working for Traditional and Capen Briggs; thereafter, the checks were signed by Capen Briggs, and then deposited into Naudi-D's bank account by Ms. Mainard.

3. Defendants' Payments and Plaintiffs' Missouri Work

Plaintiffs do not dispute the accuracy of Defendants' electronic payroll records presented to Plaintiffs over the course of discovery, and Defendants acknowledge the authenticity of these payroll records. The Defendants' payroll records accurately reflect the hours Plaintiffs worked, Plaintiffs' hourly pay rate, and the hours Plaintiffs worked. Plaintiffs and other H-2A workers were not paid an overtime rate of one-and-one-half their regular rate of pay for any hours worked over forty (40), unless they were working on a union job site. Capen Briggs specifically testified this was the case “between 2018 and the present” at his December 13, 2021, deposition.

Based upon the payroll records for Briggs Traditional in 2018 overtime in the total amount of $677.77 was not paid for all the H-2A workers employed by Briggs Traditional. Based upon the payroll records for Briggs Traditional in 2019 overtime in the total amount of $17,168.81 was not paid for the H-2A workers listed by Plaintiffs on their spreadsheet. Defendants contend (based on Ms. Mainard's declaration), however, that in 2019, employee Mario Miranda was a full-time farm worker and, therefore, the true total amount of overtime that was not paid to the subject H-2A workers was actually $14,355.48 (less the $2,813.33 that was not paid to Mario Miranda. (Exhibit “3”, p. 2, ¶ 7). Based upon the payroll records for Briggs Traditional in 2020 overtime in the total amount of $40,300.05 was not paid for the H-2A workers listed by Plaintiffs on their spreadsheet. (Exhibit “3”, p. 2, ¶ 8). However, Defendants contend that in 2020, Mario Miranda and Ansemlo Miranda were full time farm workers and, therefore, the true total amount of overtime that was not paid to the subject H-2A workers was actually $32,197.71. (Exhibit “3”, p. 2, ¶ 9). Based upon the payroll records for Briggs Traditional in 2021 overtime in the total amount of $47,613.08 was not paid for the H-2A workers listed by Plaintiffs on their spreadsheet. (Exhibit “3”, p. 2, ¶ 10). Again, however, Defendants contend that in 2021, Ansemelo Miranda, Julio Miranda and Mario Miranda were full time farm workers and, therefore the true total amount of overtime that was not paid the subject H-2A workers was actually $37,823.26. (Exhibit “3”, p. 2, ¶ 11).

The Defendants drove the H-2A workers from the employer housing in Peculiar, Missouri to the remote worksite, at times stopping at the shop to pick up equipment and distribute workers onto the crews (this depended in part on the availability of transportation). There was also a period during which Defendants picked up the H-2A workers directly at the shop, which is located in Peculiar, Missouri. Defendants dropped off the H-2A workers at the Peculiar, Missouri shop at the end of the day.

In 2018, 2019, 2020, and 2021, Defendant Capen Briggs submitted Job Orders to Missouri's Department of Economic Development (“MDED”). The Job Orders from 2018 through 2020 exclusively listed worksites in Missouri. The 2021 Job Order listed fifteen worksites, all but three of which were in Missouri. Plaintiffs' payroll was processed by Defendants at their office in Missouri. Plaintiffs collected their paychecks at Defendants' office in Missouri.

B. Standard

Summary judgment is appropriate if the movant demonstrates that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 327, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 91 L. Ed. 2d 265 (1986). The facts and inferences are viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586–90, 106 S. Ct. 1348, 89 L. Ed. 2d 538 (1986). The moving party must carry the burden of establishing both the absence of a genuine issue of material fact and that such party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586–90.

A nonmoving party must establish more than “the mere existence of a scintilla of evidence” in support of its position. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202 (1986).

The nonmovant must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts, and must come forward with specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no genuine issue for trial. Torgerson v. City of Rochester, 643 F.3d 1031, 1042 (8th Cir. 2011) (en banc) (citations and quotations omitted).

C. Analysis

1. Alter Ego Theories

Plaintiff argues that the web of connections between the various defendants in this matter supports a finding that they are a single, unified entity that acted in furtherance of unlawful objectives. Defendants, on the other hand, argue that they maintained sufficient corporate separation from one another that they should not be found to be alter egos of each other (and, at the very least, this should be an issue for trial).

Under Missouri law, “A corporation acts as another's alter ego if the corporation is (1) controlled by another to the extent it has independent existence in form only and (2) used as a subterfuge to defeat public convenience, justify wrong, or perpetuate a fraud.” Johnson Trustee of Operating Engineers Local #49 Health and Welfare Fund v. Charps Welding & Fabricating, Inc., 950 F.3d 510, 520 (8th Cir. 2020) (citing Greater Kansas City Kansas City Laborers Pension Fund v. Superior Gen. Contractors, Inc., 104 F.23d 1050, 1055 (8th Cir. 1997)). To determine whether one corporation has acted as another's alter ego, courts look to: the ownership and creation of both corporations, the management of the corporations, the physical location of corporate offices, and the transfer of assets, contracts, and employees between the corporations. See Operating Engineers Local No. 101 Pension Fund v. K.C. Excavating & Grading, Inc., No. 01-0087-CV-W-SOW, 2002 WL 1492103, at *6 (W.D.Mo. March 11, 2002); Edward D. Gevers Heating & Air Conditioning Co. v. R. Webbe Corp., 885 S.W.2d 771, 774 (Mo.Ct.App.1994).

In certain circumstances a court may disregard a corporate entity and hold its owner(s) personally liable for corporate debts. 66, Inc. v. Crestwood Commons Redevelopment Corp., 998 S.W.2d 32, 40 (Mo.1999); Mobius Management Systems, Inc. v. West Physician Search, L.L.C., 175 S.W.3d 186, 188-89 (Mo.App.2005); Owner-Operator Independent Drivers Assoc. v. Ledar Transport, No. 00-0258-CV-W-FJG, 2004 WL 5249148, *10 (W.D.Mo. Dec. 30, 2004). In order to “pierce the corporate veil” a plaintiff must show: 1) control that amounts to complete domination of finances, policy and business practice with respect to the transaction, such that the corporate entity had no separate mind, will, or existence of its own; and 2) that control used by the corporation to commit fraud or wrongdoing in violation of the plaintiffs' legal rights; and 3) the control and breach of duty proximately caused the Plaintiffs' injury. 998 S.W.2d at 40. “The Eighth Circuit has not identified an exhaustive list of factors to determine whether one company is controlled by another to the extent that it is independent in form only.” Iron Workers St. Louis District Council Pension Trust v. Samron Midwest Contracting, Inc., Case No. 4:21-cv-00223-JAR, 2024 WL 1344808, at *6 (E.D. Mo. Mar. 29, 2024). Factors considered by other courts include, “ ‘whether the entities share a business purpose, whether they share management and control, whether funds have been commingled, whether the entities share employees, whether the entities transact with each other at arm's length, and so on.’ ” Id. (citing Cement Masons, Plasterers & Shophands Serv. Corp. v. Quality Coatings, LLC, File No. 22-cv-712 (ECT/BRT), 2022 WL 3359682, at *3 (D. Minn. Aug. 15, 2022)).

Here, Plaintiff argues that Defendants' corporations were so intertwined with their owners and with each other that they had an “independent existence in form only.” In re B.J. McAdams, Inc., 66 F.3d 931, 937 (8th Cir. 1995). Plaintiff notes that all of the business share the ownership and management of father and son Larry and Capen Briggs. They also share a physical location, employees, and customers. Plaintiff argues that Traditional and Turf acted as two prongs of a single enterprise, and the remaining Defendants supplied land and assets to make the entire enterprise work. In particular, Larry Briggs (via the Briggs Family Trust) supplied farmland that was used by the remaining defendants.

Plaintiff asserts that the Defendants should be considered alter egos of one another because (1) the businesses have close and interlocking familial ties (see Carpenters' District Council of Greater St. Louis and Vicinity v. F.G. Lancia Custom Woodworking, LLC, 155 F. Supp. 3d 951, 957 (E.D. Mo. 2015); Truck & Dock Servs., Inc., 272 N.L.R.B. 592, 592 n.2 (1984); (2) the businesses share dominant figures who are involved in their day-to-day operations (Carpenters' District Council of Greater St. Louis, 155 F. Supp. 3d at 958), and the transactions between the business were not at arms' length; (3) the defendants share resources (physical locations, supplies, employees, customers), and Kenosha and Naudi-D relied upon Traditional and Turf's employees to sustain their businesses given that neither of these companies had direct employees (Operating Engineers Local No. 101 Pension Fund, 2002 WL 1492103, at *6); (4) the land upon which the sod is grown is shared among the defendants, and the lease agreements between the parties do not list the correct parties to the lease and contain no terms of payment or other monetary arrangements (and, as between Traditional and Turf, there was nothing in writing showing how the businesses split the lease payments); (5) the lease agreement for the bunkhouse owned by Naudi-D where the H-2A workers lived was not signed until January 1, 2023, over a year and a half after the filing of this lawsuit, showing a unity of interest among the businesses (Carpenters Dist. Council of Kansas City Pension Fund v. JNL Const. Co., Inc., 596 F.3d 491, 495 (8th Cir. 2010)); and (6) Traditional and Turf interacted with third parties as a joint entity, sharing contacts and jointly marketing their services and products.

Plaintiffs also assert that Capen Briggs and Traditional, who have already been found to have violated the FLSA, Section 1981, and the MMWL, used the other defendants as a means to carry out their illegal schemes. In particular, Plaintiffs note that Traditional and Capen Briggs represented that the nature and location of Plaintiffs' work was on farms owned by Briggs Family Trust or Kenosha and operated by Turf. In other words, Capen Briggs could not have misrepresented Plaintiffs' work locations without the cooperation of the other defendants. Traditional leased land from Turf (which did not own the land) through what appears to be a dubious lease. The H-2A workers were housed at Naudi-D's bunkhouse, which was formerly owned by Defendant Larry Briggs and is now owned by Naudi-D Investments which is owned by Capen Briggs. No lease agreement was entered into between Naudi-D and Traditional until six years after Traditional's rental of the bunkhouse ostensibly began (and after the filing of this lawsuit). Thus, Plaintiffs argue that Capen Briggs and Traditional could not have carried out their wrongful acts without the assistance of Larry Briggs, Turf, Naudi-D and Kenosha.

In response, Defendants argue that they should not be treated as alter egos of one another with regard to the employment of Plaintiffs or of the class members. Defendants argue that the Plaintiffs and class members were only employed by Traditional, and even if Traditional and Turf worked out of the same office, they were in completely different lines of business. Defendants assert that each company had its own bank accounts, and while they did business together, they always compensated each other when they did business together.

As discussed by Plaintiffs in their reply, however, Defendants do not introduce new case law in their response, nor do they distinguish Plaintiffs' applications of the facts to the case law cited in Plaintiffs' opening brief. The Court finds quite persuasive Plaintiffs' arguments that the Defendant businesses are not truly separate entities doing arms'-length transactions, but rather are closely tied family businesses that entered into haphazard business relationships that were made possible by those close family ties. As discussed in Plaintiffs' briefs, Traditional received sod from Turf through unwritten and varying financial terms; Turf leased land that it did not own and without any financial terms or conditions; Kenosha did not provide evidence in discovery regarding its financial relationships with other defendants, and cannot now rely on conclusory declarations from its ownership to paint its transactions as arms'-length; and Naudi-D purportedly had a lease agreement with Traditional but which was not signed until January 1, 2023 (and, again, Traditional paid varying rates to Naudi-D, sometimes paying no rent at all).

For the reasons stated by Plaintiffs, the Court finds that all Defendants in this matter are alter egos of one another, and that Capen Briggs and Traditional could not have carried out their wrongful acts without the assistance of the remaining Defendants. Therefore, Plaintiffs' motion is GRANTED and the Court finds the Defendants to be alter egos of one another.

2. Damages Issues

Plaintiffs request partial judgment on their claims for unpaid wages, seeking to establish an amount of damages for claims under Missouri overtime law, Section 1981, and FLSA damages (excluding liquidated damages). Plaintiffs recognize, however, that additional damages claims and other issues will remain for trial, such as entitlement to liquidated damages for FLSA violations, and whether Defendants had the requisite intent to be found liable for RICO violations and filing of false information returns.

The parties appear to agree, in large part, as to the calculation of base unpaid overtime for the years 2018, 2019, 2020, and 2021. However, Defendants claim that certain of the members of the Plaintiff class performed solely agricultural duties rather than landscaping duties, and therefore should be excluded from the overtime amounts calculated by Plaintiffs. The Court finds that questions of material fact exist as to whether class members Ansemelo Miranda, Julio Miranda and Mario Miranda were agricultural workers who are exempt from overtime or whether they performed landscaping work and should be compensated for overtime (and, if so, for how many hours of work). Therefore, the Court will DENY Plaintiffs' motion insofar as it requests judgment reflecting overtime hours worked by Ansemelo Miranda, Julio Miranda and Mario Miranda. However, the parties agree that base overtime calculations for the remaining members of the Plaintiff class amount to: (1) for 2018, unpaid overtime in the total amount of $677.77; (2) for 2019, unpaid overtime in the total amount of $14,355.48; (3) for 2020, unpaid overtime in the total amount of $32,197.71; and (4) for 2021, unpaid overtime in the total amount of $37,823.26. Therefore, for the years 2018-2021, the total amount of unpaid overtime agreed-to by the parties is $85,054.22, and Plaintiffs will have the potential to demonstrate the entitlement to additional unpaid overtime for Ansemelo Miranda, Julio Miranda and Mario Miranda at trial. Additionally, Plaintiffs will be entitled to present evidence at trial that the $25 weekly housing kickback that certain Plaintiffs were required to pay in 2018 may have violated the FLSA and Missouri overtime law.

The base overtime calculations above are not dispositive as to the amount of damages that should be awarded to Plaintiffs for their various claims. Instead, they are simply a necessary first step in making calculations toward Missouri minimum wage law damages, Section 1981 damages, and FLSA damages. The Court will consider each of these claims, below. The Court finds, however, that it should reserve entering judgment on damages until Plaintiff has had an opportunity to elect which of these theories they intend to proceed on because they are not entitled collect multiple recoveries of the same damages using different theories. See Contitech USA, Inc. v. McLaughlin Freight Services, Inc., 91 F.4th 908, 914 (8th Cir. 2024)(quoting EFCO Corp. v. Symons Corp., 219 F.3d 732, 742 (8th Cir. 2000)) (holding “it is well established that ‘[a]lthough a party is entitled to proceed on various theories of recovery, a party is not entitled to collect multiple awards for the same injury.’ ”)

a. Missouri Overtime Claims

The Court already has granted summary judgment as to liability on Plaintiffs' Missouri overtime claims against Defendants Capen Briggs and Traditional. Order, Doc. No. 124. The Court further found that the statute of limitations was three years on this claim, making class claims for Missouri overtime law violations from May 28, 2018, forward subject to entry of judgment.

Plaintiffs note that the standard for determining liquidated damages under Missouri overtime law changed in the middle of the class period. Specifically, in November 2018, Missouri passed a ballot measure making damages for unpaid overtime under Missouri law to be “the full amount of the wage rate and an additional amount equal to twice the unpaid wages as liquidated damages.” R.S. Mo. § 290.527 (emphasis added). Before the ballot measure passed, the statute provided damages for “the full amount of the wage rate and an additional equal amount as liquidated damages.” 1990 Mo. Legis. Serv. H.B. 1881, § 12. Therefore, treble damages apply to unpaid overtime wages in 2019 through 2021, and double damages to unpaid overtime wages in 2018. Defendants acknowledge that R.S. Mo. § 290.527 allows for treble damages for unpaid overtime claims from 2019-2021, and double damages for such claims in 2018.

The remaining question in calculating damages under Missouri overtime law is the applicability of Missouri law to work performed in Kansas rather than in Missouri. Plaintiffs performed landscaping work in both Missouri and Kansas. Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment on liability was granted on the Missouri overtime law claims, but Defendants' summary judgment motion was granted on Plaintiffs' Kansas overtime law claims. See Order, Doc. No. 124. Plaintiffs argue that Missouri's overtime law should be found to cover all Plaintiffs, regardless of whether the work they performed was in Kansas or Missouri.

Federal courts apply the choice-of-law rules in the state where they sit when examining supplemental jurisdiction claims. Quintero Cmty. Ass'n, Inc. v. Hillcrest Bank, No. 04-11-CV-00893-DGK, 2014 WL 1764791, at *3 (W.D. Mo. May 2, 2014). Missouri courts apply the “most significant relationship” test from the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws to determine the applicable law. Winter v. Novartis Pharms. Corp., 739 F.3d 405, 410 (8th Cir. 2014). The factors to be considered in determining the state with the most significant relationship are: (1) the place where the injury occurred, (2) the place where the conduct causing the injury occurred, (3) the domicile, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place of business of the parties, and (4) the place where the relationship, if any, between the parties is centered. Am. Guarantee & Liab. Ins. Co. v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 668 F.3d 991, 996 (8th Cir. 2012).

The only case located by the parties where a Missouri court has evaluated a choice-of-law question regarding Missouri's overtime law is Bigham v. McCall Serv. Stations, Inc., 637 S.W.2d 227, 231 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982). In Bigham, the Court of Appeals found that Missouri rather than Kansas overtime law should apply to the plaintiff's claims, where the plaintiff performed the majority of his work in Missouri, all of plaintiff's computations of overtime and checks were prepared in Missouri, the paychecks were delivered in Missouri, the plaintiff was a resident of Missouri, the defendant had its home office in Missouri, and the plaintiff filed suit in Missouri. Id.at 231-32. In the present matter, Plaintiff notes that Defendants contracted with Plaintiffs from Missouri, Defendants are located in Missouri, Plaintiffs resided in employer-provided housing in Missouri for the duration of their employment, Plaintiffs' work days began in Missouri and ended with being dropped off in Missouri (whether they spent their days working in Kansas or Missouri), Plaintiffs' payroll was processed in Missouri, Plaintiffs received their wages in Missouri, and Defendants' job orders from 2018 through 2020 exclusively listed worksites in Missouri and all but three of the jobsites in 2021 were in Missouri. Given these circumstances, Plaintiffs argue that Missouri's overtime law should apply to all their work performed from 2018-2021, regardless of the place of performance of the daily work. Further, Plaintiffs note that other states have found that their state's employment laws should apply to periodic out-of-state employment in circumstances similar to the present action See Bostain v. Food Exp., Inc., 159 Wash. 2d 700, 712, 153 P.3d 846, 852-53 (2007) (applying Washington Minimum Wage Act to all hours worked despite employee driving out of state periodically); Dow v. Casale, 83 Mass. App. Ct. 751, 989 N.E.2d 909, 912-14 (2013) (applying Massachusetts wage law to interstate salesperson); Browne v. P.A.M. Transp., Inc., Case No. 5:16-CV-5366, 2019 WL 333569, at *5 (W.D. Ark. Jan. 25, 2019) (applying Arkansas minimum wage law to drivers who traveled out of state).

In response, Defendants argue that the Court has already found that any claims under the laws of the state of Kansas should be dismissed (Doc. No. 124), and further argue that Missouri law should not be applied to any H-2A employee's work in the state of Kansas over the relevant time period. Defendants argue that only those individuals who have made claims under the FLSA should be allowed to collect overtime pay for their work done in Kansas. The Court finds, however, that just because Kansas overtime laws do not apply to Plaintiffs' claims, their claims under Missouri's overtime laws are not foreclosed. Here, almost all the factors examined in the choice-of-law analysis point to Missouri as having the most significant relationship between the parties, regardless of the situs of Plaintiff's workdays. The Court believes that Missouri's overtime law should be applied to all the hours worked by Plaintiffs during the relevant time period.

Given this finding, the Court notes that at the bare minimum, Plaintiffs are entitled to the following class-wide damages: (1) for 2018, unpaid overtime in the amount of $677.77, liquidated damages in the amount of $677.77, for total damages in the amount of $1,355.54; (2) for 2019, unpaid overtime in the amount of $14,355.48, liquidated damages in the amount of $28,710.96, for total damages in the amount of $43.066.44; (3) for 2020, unpaid overtime in the amount of $32,197.71, liquidated damages in the amount of $64,395.42, for total damages in the amount of $96,593.13; and (4) for 2021, unpaid overtime in the amount of $37,823.26, liquidated damages in the amount of $75,646.52, for total damages in the amount of $113,469.78. In short, the total minimum amount of damages under Missouri overtime law that are awardable to the class is $254,484.89. This amount could be significantly higher if the trier of fact finds that overtime should be awarded to class members Ansemelo Miranda, Julio Miranda and Mario Miranda.

Entry of judgment on this amount will be deferred until further order of this Court. Plaintiffs may submit a petition for attorneys' fees and costs after entry of final judgment.

b. Section 1981 Claims

Plaintiffs note that the Court found Defendants liable for violations of Section 1981 in its previous ruling. Order, Doc. No. 124. Plaintiffs request entry of judgment for the class and against Defendants on the Section 1981 claims in the amount of the unpaid overtime (excluding the alleged 2018 housing kickbacks) for the entirety of the 2018-2021 seasons. Plaintiffs further indicate that they will request leave to submit an attorneys' fees petition and bill of costs upon entry of judgment, and that the Court then supplement the judgment to include those fees and costs. Plaintiffs further reserve for trial their claims for additional economic and non-economic damages, as well as punitive damages, arising out of the Section 1981 violations.

In response, Defendants argue that the damages sought by Plaintiffs on the Section 1981 claims are largely identical to the recovery sought on the Missouri overtime law claims. Therefore, Defendants request that the Court not enter multiple awards for the same injury. In reply, Plaintiffs agree that a damages judgment on the MMWL claims would almost entirely mitigate the amount of the judgment for the Section 1981 claims; the only component of the Section 1981 claims that falls outside the MMWL judgment would be the 2018 season prior to May 28, 2018, a difference of only $224.86. Plaintiffs note, however, that they include these claims in the event that (1) the Court finds that the MMWL does not apply to Plaintiffs' work in Kansas; and/or (2) the Court finds prejudgment interest not awardable on MMWL claims. Additionally, Plaintiffs note that punitive damages are awardable under Section 1981, but that such issues would be reserved for trial. Plaintiffs indicate, therefore, that they seek the full amount of Section 1981 damages, to be reduced by damages awarded for the MMWL and FLSA claims.

While the Court finds that Plaintiffs would potentially be entitled to damages on Section 1981 claims, the Court finds that entering judgment at this time would be premature until trial can be held on any punitive damages that may be awarded on this claim. Therefore, the Court will defer ruling on this request until after trial (or upon further order of this Court).

c. FLSA Claims

Plaintiff notes that the fifteen claimants' FLSA claims from 2021, 2020 and 2019 (the seasons subject to the Court's summary judgment order) are duplicative of the damages requested for Plaintiff's Missouri overtime law and Section 1981 claims. Plaintiffs therefore note that if the Court were to deny entry of judgment on the Missouri overtime law and Section 1981 claims, Plaintiffs would request leave to supplement this motion with data supporting the FLSA claims.

The Court finds that supplementation is not required at this time; however, if circumstances change, the Court will allow supplementation in the future.

d. Prejudgment Interest

Plaintiffs request an award of prejudgment interest. The Court believes it is premature to consider the amount of prejudgment interest, if any, to award Plaintiffs in this matter, given that Plaintiffs have not yet specific which of these claims they would prefer to proceed on. The Court, therefore, will defer making any award of prejudgment interest until the conclusion of this case and entry of final judgment.

III. CONCLUSION

Therefore, for the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs' Pretrial Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Against All Defendants (Doc. No. 130) is GRANTED IN PART as to (1) Plaintiffs' alter ego claims against all Defendants, (2) the calculation of the total amount of unpaid overtime from 2018 through 2021 as $85,054.22 (with entitlement of unpaid overtime for Ansemelo Miranda, Julio Miranda and Mario Miranda at trial to be determined at trial, as well as entitlement to damages for $25 housing kickbacks made in 2018); and (3) preliminary damages calculation for MMWL claims in the total amount of $254,484.89, which again is a minimum amount of damages with potential additional amounts due to Anselmo Miranda, Julio Miranda and Mario Miranda to be determined at trial. Plaintiffs' remaining claims in their summary judgment motion are DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE to their reassertion at trial or upon further order of this Court.

The parties are ORDERED to meet and confer on or before October 15, 2025, to discuss trial dates and a schedule for all remaining pretrial filings. The parties shall file a joint status report setting forth their proposals on or before October 29, 2025. Thereafter, the Court will set this case for further proceedings.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Kansas City, Missouri

Fernando J. Gaitan, Jr. United States District Judge