STEPHEN JACKSON v. JANET YELLEN SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY (2024)

ORDER

Before the Court is the United States' motion to dismiss the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction (Doc. #7). The Court, being duly advised of the premises, grants said motion.

BACKGROUND

On May 6, 2024, Plaintiff filed a complaint in this Court asserting claims under the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) (Doc. #1). The facts giving rise to the complaint are as follows. On January 24, 2024, Plaintiff's brother, Phil Jackson, was the subject of an Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) action wherein government agents seized certain property located at Trinity Consulting, 10356 Venice Lane, Stark City, Missouri 64886 (the “subject location”). However, Plaintiff was also storing certain property at that location. Upon notification of the seizure, Plaintiff went to his brother's house and attempted to inform government agents that his and his brother's property was intermingled at the subject location. However, Plaintiff asserts government agents told him he needed to vacate the area, or he would be arrested. Plaintiff complied with the request.

Plaintiff then became aware of a Notice of Public Auction Sale including his personal property (the “subject property”) as part of the “forfeited personal property” seized at the subject location on January 24, 2024. See (Doc. #1-2). However, Plaintiff asserts due process was not afforded to him because he never received a Notice of Forfeiture, Notice of Demand for Payment, or a Final Notice of Intent to Levy and Notice of his Right to a hearing. Additionally, Plaintiff asserts, under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2001 & 2002, the Government is only authorized to sell forfeited real property and not personal property. Accordingly, Plaintiff asserts three distinct claims in the complaint: Count I, violation of 26 U.S.C. § 6331; Count II, violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7403; and Count III, violation of due process rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution.

On May 6, 2024, Plaintiff filed a motion for temporary restraining order (“TRO”) to restrain the sale of the subject property. (Doc. #2). On May 9, 2024, the Court denied the motion. (Doc. #5). The Court explained that the motion was ultimately moot because the subject property had been sold before entry of its Order denying the TRO; however, the Court also explained Plaintiff's motion failed on its merits because Plaintiff had failed to demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits or discuss any of the Dataphase factors.

On June 28, 2024, the United States filed the instant motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction (“motion to dismiss”) (Doc. #7). Plaintiff did not timely file a response such that the instant motion is unopposed.

LEGAL STANDARD

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) provides for a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. A motion filed under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) may be a facial challenge, or a factual challenge. Moss v. United States, 895 F.3d 1091, 1097 (8th Cir. 2018). In the context of a factual challenge the party asserting federal jurisdiction must establish the existence of federal subject matter jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence and the proponent is not entitled to any presumption of truthfulness based on the complaint's factual allegations. Id. Furthermore, in considering a factual attack to subject matter jurisdiction, the Court may properly “look outside the pleadings to affidavits or other documents,” without converting the motion into one for summary judgment. Moss, 895 F.3d at 1097. “Because at issue in a factual 12(b)(1) motion is the trial court's ․ very power to hear the case ․ the trial court is free to weigh the evidence and satisfy itself as to the existence of its power to hear the case.” Osborn v. United States, 918 F.2d 724, 730 (8th Cir. 1990).

In the context of a facial challenge, “all of the factual allegations concerning jurisdiction are presumed to be true and the motion is successful [only] if the plaintiff fails to allege an element necessary for subject matter jurisdiction.” Titus v. Sullivan, 4 F.3d 590, 593 (8th Cir. 1993); Carlsen v. GameStop, Inc., 833 F.3d 903, 908 (8th Cir. 2016) (citing Osborn v. United States, 918 F.2d 724, 729 n.6 (8th Cir. 1990) (in facial attack to subject matter jurisdiction “the non-moving party receives the same protections as it would defending against a motion brought under Rule 12(b)(6).”)).

Here, the United States argues Plaintiff's complaint cannot survive a facial or a factual attack under Rule 12(b)(1).

ANALYSIS

In the instant motion, the United States argues the complaint should be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. (Doc. #7). Specifically, the United States argues: (1) sovereign immunity bars Plaintiff's claims, and (2) the relief Plaintiff seeks is moot and/or precluded by the APA.

Since Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, the Court considers the content of the proposed complaint pursuant to “less stringent standards” than might otherwise apply. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976); Lomholt v. Holder, 287 F.3d 683, n. 1 (8th Cir. 2002). Therefore, “if the essence of an allegation is discernible, even though it is not pleaded with legal nicety, then the district court should construe the complaint in a way that permits the layperson's claim to be considered within the proper legal framework.” Topchian v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 760 F.3d 843, 849 (8th Cir. 2014) (citing Stone v. Harry, 364 F.3d 912, 915 (8th Cir. 2004)). However, a pro se litigant must still comply with court rules and procedures. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106.

In the complaint, Plaintiff asserts he brings this action pursuant to the APA based on the deprivation of his personal property. (Doc. #1). Plaintiff emphasizes his right to administrative due process and due process under the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution has been violated due in part to the IRS's “failure to initiate civil forfeiture proceedings required by law to enforce purported tax liens.” (Doc. #1 at 2). The Court construes Plaintiff's claims under the APA as a challenge to the Court's Order regarding the sale of the subject property in Case No. 3:16-CV-05096-BCW. As the Court explained in its Order denying Plaintiff's motion for TRO, “the Court ordered the subject property sold to satisfy the unpaid 1998-2002 federal tax liabilities of William Phillip Jackson.” (Doc. #5 at 3).

The United States and its agencies are shielded from suit by sovereign immunity, absent the federal government's consent. F.D.I.C. v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 475 (1994). The APA can provide a limited waiver of the United States' sovereign immunity, but only for lawsuits seeking judicial review of an “[a]gency action made reviewable by statute.” Iowa League of Cities v. E.P.A., 711 F.3d 844, 860 (8th Cir. 2013) (citing 5 U.S.C. § 704). Here, Plaintiff is not seeking judicial review of an agency decision; rather, he seeks to challenge the Court's Order regarding the sale of the subject property in Case No. 3:16-CV-5096-BCW. However, the APA does not apply to court decisions. In re Killian, 45 F.4th 1373, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2022) (citing 5 U.S.C. § 701(b)(1)(B)) (explaining that courts are not considered “agencies” under the APA). This is true even though the Order Plaintiff seeks to challenge concerns litigation that originated from IRS administrative action. Sec. People, Inc. v. Iancu, 971 F.3d 1355, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (explaining that “a judicially mandated outcome occurring because of judicial review intrinsically is not agency decision-making.”). Therefore, Plaintiff has not shown that the United States' sovereign immunity is waived under the APA and the Court lacks subject mater jurisdiction over his claims. V S Ltd. P'ship v. Dep't of Hous. & Urb. Dev., 235 F.3d 1109, 1112 (8th Cir. 2000).

Even if Plaintiff could show that the United States' sovereign immunity was waived, the relief he seeks is either moot or precluded by the APA. In the Complaint, Plaintiff's prayer for relief requests “(1) An immediate Order to Stay the Sale of Plaintiff's property scheduled to be sold on May 8, 2024, at 10am; (2) An Order ordering the return of Plaintiff's property listed in Appendix A ․; (3) An Order ordering the return of five (4) Charolais cattle that were seized on January 24, 2024; [and], (5) All other relief the Court deems just and fair under the circumstances.” (Doc. #1 at 13). However, as referenced above, the subject property was sold even before the Court had a chance to enter an Order on Plaintiff's motion for TRO. Moore v. Thurston, 928 F.3d 753, 757 (8th Cir. 2019) (courts should dismiss cases as moot when “changed circumstances have ․ eliminated the need for court action”) (citation omitted). Additionally, to the extent Plaintiff's request for “[a]ll other relief the Court deems just and fair under the circumstances” can be construed as a request for monetary damages, such damages are precluded under the APA. Olson v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 243 F. Supp. 3d 1037, 1054 (D.N.D.), aff'd, 709 F. App'x 398 (8th Cir. 2017) (APA's waiver of sovereign immunity excludes monetary damages). Therefore, the instant motion is granted, and the complaint is dismissed. Accordingly, it is hereby

ORDERED the United States' motion to dismiss (Doc. #7) is GRANTED and the complaint is DISMISSED for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

JUDGE BRIAN C. WIMES UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT