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NANCY VARGAS, Plaintiff, v. CREDIT CONTROL, LLC, et al., Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
To the Honorable Lorna G. Schofield, United States District Judge:
Plaintiff Nancy Vargas (“Plaintiff”), proceeding pro se, brings this action asserting claims under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”), 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq., and the Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”), 15 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq. Defendants Credit Control, LLC (“Credit Control”) and Bank of America, N.A. (“BOA” and, together with Credit Control, “Defendants”) move separately to dismiss Plaintiff's claims with prejudice under Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. For the reasons described below, the undersigned respectfully RECOMMENDS that Defendants’ motions be GRANTED.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Factual Background
Plaintiff incurred debts in three BOA credit card accounts, which BOA then turned over to Credit Control for collection. Second Amended Complaint, ECF No. 73 (“Second Amended Complaint” or “SAC”) ¶¶ 11–18. Credit Control sent Plaintiff a letter, dated March 28, 2024, which stated, “[i]n an effort to assist you in resolving this matter using your tax refund, our client has authorized us to extend to you an offer to settle your account for less than the amount you owe,” and “[t]ake advantage of your tax refund.” SAC, Ex. A at 24.1 On April 30, 2024, Plaintiff sent Credit Control a letter disputing her debts and requesting validation and verification. Id. ¶ 24. Credit Control did not respond to Plaintiff's letter. Id. ¶ 26.
In June and July 2024, Plaintiff applied for auto financing, which was later denied due, at least in part, to credit reporting by BOA. Id. ¶¶ 62–69. Additionally, Plaintiff's credit score declined from approximately 700 to 600. Id. ¶ 56.2
B. Procedural Background
Plaintiff filed her original complaint on October 7, 2024. ECF No. 1. Because the complaint was missing paragraphs, see ECF No. 22, Plaintiff filed an amended complaint on January 28, 2025, ECF No. 25 (the “Amended Complaint”).
On May 9, 2025, defendants Credit Control, PRA, LVNV, and BOA moved to dismiss the Amended Complaint, ECF No. 53 (“First Motion to Dismiss”). The undersigned issued a December 15, 2025 Report and Recommendation recommending that the First Motion to Dismiss be granted without prejudice to further amendment, ECF No. 71 (the “R&R”). The District Judge adopted the R&R on March 30, 2026, holding that Plaintiff's filings did “not adequately demonstrate that Plaintiff has standing to bring the asserted claims in federal court.” ECF No. 81 (the “Order”) at 4. The Order allowed Plaintiff to file an amended complaint to address her pleading deficiencies. Id. at 10. Because Plaintiff had already filed her Second Amended Complaint, ECF No. 73, before the Order was issued, the Order provided that the Second Amended Complaint would be deemed filed and that Plaintiff need not take additional action until instructed to do so. Order at 10.
LVNV and PRA filed notices of settlement and voluntary dismissal on May 2, 2026 and June 23, 2026, respectively. ECF Nos. 88, 98. The remaining Defendants requested a pre-motion conference in anticipation of filing motions to dismiss the Second Amended Complaint. ECF Nos. 82, 83. On May 22, 2026, the undersigned held a pre-motion conference and set a briefing schedule for the motions to dismiss. ECF No. 92.
Credit Control filed its motion to dismiss, ECF No. 93, on June 18, 2026 supported by a memorandum of law, ECF No. 94. That same day, BOA filed its motion to dismiss, ECF No. 95, supported by a memorandum of law, ECF No. 96 (“BOA Mem.”). Because Plaintiff failed to oppose these motions by the established deadline, the undersigned extended Plaintiff's response deadline. ECF No. 99. When Plaintiff failed to file an opposition to the motions by the extended deadline, the undersigned entered a July 29, 2026 order advising that these motions would be addressed based upon Defendants’ filings. ECF No. 100.
II. LEGAL STANDARDS
A. Rule 12(b)(1) and Article III Standing
“The party invoking federal jurisdiction bears the burden of establishing” standing to sue. Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992) (citations omitted). Accordingly, “the plaintiff must allege facts that affirmatively and plausibly suggest that [she] has standing to sue.” Seljak v. Pervine Foods, LLC, No. 21-CV-9561, 2023 WL 2354976, at *4 (Mar. 3, 2023) (cleaned up).
Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(1) is appropriate “when the district court lacks the statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate” the dispute. Green v. Dep't of Educ., 16 F.4th 1070, 1075 (2d Cir. 2021) (quoting Makarova v. United States, 201 F.3d 110, 113 (2d Cir. 2000)). A Rule 12(b)(1) motion may present either a facial or fact-based challenge. Harty v. W. Point Realty, Inc., 28 F.4th 435, 441 (2d Cir. 2022). A facial challenge is based on the allegations in the complaint and exhibits attached to it, whereas a fact-based challenge may rely on evidence outside the pleadings. Id.
When considering a facial challenge, the Court “must take all uncontroverted facts in the complaint ․ as true, and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the party asserting jurisdiction.” Fountain v. Karim, 838 F.3d 129, 134 (2d Cir. 2016) (quoting Tandon v. Captain's Cove Marina of Bridgeport, Inc., 752 F.3d 239, 243 (2d Cir. 2014)). The plaintiff nevertheless must allege facts that “affirmatively and plausibly suggest” standing. Carter v. HealthPort Techs., LLC, 822 F.3d 47, 56 (2d Cir. 2016) (quoting Amidax Trading Group v. S.W.I.F.T. SCRL, 671 F.3d 140, 145 (2d Cir. 2011)).
Article III standing requires a plaintiff to establish:
(1) injury-in-fact, which means an actual or imminent and concrete and particularized harm to a legally protected interest; (2) causation of the injury, which means that the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant; and (3) redressability, which means that it is likely, not speculative, that a favorable decision by a court will redress the injury.
Knight v. City of New York, 164 F.4th 173, 177–78 (2d Cir. 2026) (cleaned up). To qualify as concrete, an injury must have a “ ‘close relationship’ to a harm ‘traditionally’ recognized as providing a basis for a lawsuit in American courts.” Maddox v. Bank of N.Y. Mellon Tr. Co., N.A., 19 F.4th 58, 63 (2d Cir. 2021) (quoting TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 594 U.S. 413, 417 (2021)). Physical and monetary harms qualify as concrete, as do certain intangible harms, including reputational harm. TransUnion, 594 U.S. at 417.
In the context of FDCPA and FCRA claims, courts have held that, “absent specific evidence of reputation or monetary harm, plaintiffs lack standing.” Tschoe v. Monarch Recovery Mgmt., Inc., No. 20-CV-7331, 2024 WL 1251278, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 22, 2024) (collecting cases under the FDCPA); see Schmelczer v. Penn Credit Corp., No. 20-CV-2380, 2022 WL 862254, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 23, 2022) (“District courts following TransUnion and Maddox assessing claims brought pursuant to both the FDCPA and the FCRA ․ have uniformly held that absent specific evidence of reputational or monetary harm, plaintiffs lack constitutional standing.” (citations omitted)).
B. Rule 12(b)(6) and Standards for Pro Se Litigants
In deciding a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court accepts as true all factual allegations in the complaint and draws all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor. Ritchie v. N. Leasing Sys., Inc., 14 F. Supp. 3d 229, 233 (S.D.N.Y. 2014). A pro se complaint must be construed liberally “to raise the strongest arguments that [it] suggest[s].” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Pro se pleadings are therefore held “to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 9 (1980) (quoting Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972)). Nevertheless, a pro se complaint must still “state a plausible claim for relief.” Walker v. Schult, 717 F.3d 119, 124 (2d Cir. 2013) (citing Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 73 (2d Cir. 2009)). Pro se litigants are not excused from the ordinary pleading requirements, and dismissal is appropriate when the complaint lacks an allegation concerning an element necessary to obtain relief. Geldzahler v. N.Y. Med. Coll., 663 F. Supp. 2d 379, 387 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
In evaluating the sufficiency of a complaint, the Court may consider written instruments attached to the complaint, materials incorporated by reference, and documents that, although not incorporated by reference, are integral to the complaint. Chambers v. Time Warner, Inc., 282 F.3d 147, 153 (2d Cir. 2002). Where conclusory allegations in a complaint are contradicted by documents attached to the complaint, the documents control. See Amidax Trading Grp., 671 F.3d at 147 (holding that an allegation contradicted by the documents on which the plaintiff relied could not be credited).
C. The FDCPA and FCRA
The FDCPA “grants a private right of action to a consumer who receives a communication that violates the Act.” Jacobson v. Healthcare Fin. Servs., Inc., 516 F.3d 85, 91 (2d Cir. 2008) (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1692k). To establish an FDCPA violation, a plaintiff must show that “(1) the plaintiff [is] a ‘consumer’ who allegedly owes the debt ․ (2) the defendant collecting the debt is considered a ‘debt collector,’ and (3) the defendant has engaged in any act or omission in violation of FDCPA requirements.” Schuh v. Druckman & Sinel, L.L.P., 751 F. Supp. 2d 542, 548 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (quoting Healy v. Jzanus Ltd., No. 2-CV-1061, 2002 WL 31654571, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 20, 2002)).
Congress enacted the FCRA “to ensure fair and accurate credit reporting, promote efficiency in the banking system, and protect consumer privacy.” Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Burr, 551 U.S. 47, 52 (2007) (citations omitted). The FCRA imposes obligations on furnishers of consumer credit information, consumer reporting agencies (“CRAs”), and users of consumer reports. Suluki v. Credit One Bank, NA, 138 F.4th 709, 719 (2d Cir. 2025). “Furnishers include banks, card issuers, and other financial institutions that transmit information relating to debts owed by consumers to CRAs for reporting.” Id. (citing Galper v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, NA, 802 F.3d 437, 445 (2d Cir. 2015)).
III. DISCUSSION
A. Plaintiff Has Standing To Sue BOA, but Not Credit Control
Both Defendants argue that Plaintiff lacks Article III standing. “When a defendant moves to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and also moves to dismiss on other grounds, the Court usually must consider the Rule 12(b)(1) motion first.” Al-Ahmed v. Twitter, Inc., 553 F. Supp. 3d 118, 123–24 (S.D.N.Y. 2021) (citing Rhulen Agency, Inc. v. Alabama Ins. Guar. Ass'n, 896 F.2d 674, 678 (2d Cir. 1990)).
In the Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges four injuries arising from Defendants’ conduct: (1) a “significant credit score drop” due to allegedly inaccurate reporting; (2) denial of credit opportunities; (3) emotional distress resulting from allegedly improper collection and reporting; and (4) time and resources spent disputing allegedly inaccurate information. SAC ¶¶ 58, 65, 72, 78.
Giving Plaintiff's allegations the liberal construction afforded to a pro se litigant, Plaintiff plausibly alleges a concrete injury from the denial of auto financing. SAC ¶¶ 62–71. In TransUnion, the Supreme Court addressed what qualifies as concrete harm sufficient to establish standing for violations of the FCRA. TransUnion, 594 U.S. at 422, 430. The court distinguished between an inaccuracy retained in an internal credit file and information that is disseminated or that causes a denial of credit. Id. at 434. In the latter category, the court explained that dissemination or denial of credit could constitute a concrete harm. Id. at 437. Further, in Tescher v. Experian Information Solutions, Inc., the court found that plaintiff plausibly alleged an injury where inaccurate reporting made it more difficult to obtain credit. No. 21-CV-2266, 2022 WL 564048, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 23, 2022). Here, Plaintiff alleges that she applied for auto financing in June and July 2024, that her applications were denied, and that written notices identified derogatory credit items as a basis for these denials. SAC ¶¶ 62–68. Plaintiff also sufficiently connects these denials to BOA's reporting, alleging that BOA furnished information to Equifax, that the items cited in her denial notices included the BOA accounts at issue, and that BOA's reporting contributed to the denials. SAC ¶¶ 17, 36, 67–69, 110.
BOA argues that Plaintiff attributes her injuries to the collective actions of four defendants without isolating the effect of BOA's reporting. BOA Mem. at 14–15. But conduct that causes injury indirectly may suffice “so long as the injury is ‘fairly traceable’ to that defendant,” and this traceability requirement is not onerous at the pleading stage. Carter, 822 F.3d at 55, 59. Here, Plaintiff alleges that lenders identified the reported status of her BOA accounts as a reason for denying her applications. SAC ¶¶ 67–69. These allegations support a reasonable inference that BOA's reporting contributed to the decision to deny Plaintiff auto financing.
BOA also argues that there was no injury-in-fact because its reporting was accurate, but this is not properly considered an argument about standing. See BOA Mem. at 15. The Second Circuit has cautioned against collapsing the standing inquiry into the merits inquiry. SM Kids, LLC v. Google LLC, 963 F.3d 206, 211–12 (2d Cir. 2020). Plaintiff alleges actual credit denials attributable, in part, to BOA's reporting. SAC ¶¶ 67–68. Whether the challenged reporting defects are actionable FCRA violations is a merits issue, which is addressed below in Section III(B). Plaintiff therefore has standing to pursue her claims against BOA.
In contrast, Plaintiff's allegations against Credit Control do not establish standing. Plaintiff describes Credit Control's collection letter and her unanswered validation request, but she does not identify any concrete injury resulting therefrom. SAC ¶¶ 18–21, 84–87. While Plaintiff describes anxiety and sleep disruption over eighteen months, she attributes those symptoms to Defendants’ conduct collectively and to the denial of financing. Id. ¶¶ 72–77. The SAC fails to plead facts connecting any emotional injury or denial of financing to Credit Control's letter or failure to validate. In Maddox, the Second Circuit held that “[a] perfunctory allegation of emotional distress, especially one wholly incommensurate with the stimulant, is insufficient to plausibly allege constitutional standing.” 19 F.4th at 66. While the Second Amended Complaint contains more detailed descriptions of mental and emotional distress, Plaintiff does not explain how Credit Control could have caused this distress. Indeed, it is hard to imagine how Credit Control's offer to settle her account could trigger such a reaction. Likewise, Plaintiff's description of more than forty hours spent reviewing reports, preparing disputes, and litigating cannot constitute concrete injuries sufficient to support standing. See Mohammadb v. Nat'l Enter. Sys., Inc., No. 21-CV-5606, 2023 WL 6385765, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2023) (plaintiff's claims that she expended time, money, and effort to figure out the correct course of action and suffered emotional harm were insufficient to establish standing). Plaintiff fails to adequately allege Article III standing as to Credit Control.
B. Plaintiff Fails to State a Claim Against BOA
Because Plaintiff adequately alleges Article III standing as to BOA, it is necessary to consider whether she states a claim against BOA under the FCRA. Plaintiff alleges that BOA violated § 1681s-2(a) by furnishing inaccurate information to Equifax regarding her account ending in 0289, and violated § 1681s-2(b) by failing to reasonably investigate and correct disputed information after receiving notice from Equifax. SAC ¶¶ 107–14. The particular inaccuracies that Plaintiff alleges are that BOA: (1) failed to report “high credit,” (2) reported identical dates for the date of first delinquency and date of last payment, and (3) reported “no data available” for April 2023. SAC ¶ 108.
1. Section 1681s-2(a)
Section 1681s-2(a) requires furnishers to provide accurate information to CRAs. Congress, however, expressly limited enforcement of these duties to designated federal and state authorities. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681s-2(d). Accordingly, “there is no private cause of action for violations of § 1681s-2(a).” Longman v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 702 F.3d 148, 151 (2d Cir. 2012).
Because § 1681s-2(a) does not provide a private right of action, Plaintiff cannot make duties imposed by subsection (a) privately enforceable by pleading them together with a claim under subsection (b). See Longman, 702 F.3d at 151 (the district court properly granted summary judgment on FCRA claims concerning false reporting, failure to correct false information, and investigation of disputes submitted directly to the furnisher because they were not privately actionable). Accordingly, Plaintiff's claim based on BOA's obligations under § 1681s-2(a) fails as a matter of law and should be dismissed.
2. Section 1681s-2(b)
Section 1681s-2(b) imposes duties on furnishers after receiving notice of a consumer dispute from a CRA. Suluki, 138 F.4th at 719. “In order to maintain a § 1681s-2(b) claim, [a] plaintiff must offer evidence that she notified the consumer credit reporting agencies of an inaccuracy, that those agencies followed up with a notice of a dispute to [the furnisher], and that [the furnisher] failed to correct the inaccuracy.” Holland v. Chase Bank USA, N.A., 475 F. Supp. 3d 272, 276 (S.D.N.Y. 2020) (quoting Matheson v. Ocwen Fed. Bank FSB, No. 5-CV-2747, 2008 WL 11413560, at *8 (E.D.N.Y. June 18, 2008)). A plaintiff must make a prima facie showing of inaccurate reporting to maintain a § 1681s-2(b) claim. Id.
Plaintiff alleges that Equifax notified BOA of her March 2024 disputes and that BOA failed to investigate reasonably or to correct the challenged information. SAC ¶¶ 37–40, 111–17. The threshold issue is whether Plaintiff plausibly alleges that BOA furnished inaccurate information. Holland, 475 F. Supp. 3d at 276.
a. Missing “High Credit”
Plaintiff alleges that BOA failed to report “high credit,” which she defines as the account's “credit limit or highest balance.” SAC ¶¶ 41(a), 108(a). She claims she disputed this omission in March 2024 and that the “High Credit” field remained blank as of July 10, 2024. SAC ¶ 41(a).
This allegation does not plausibly plead inaccurate reporting for several reasons. First, Plaintiff fails to describe what “high credit” figure should have been reported. The previous R&R identified this same deficiency, observing that Plaintiff did not provide “any detail as to what information should have been reported or what factually inaccurate inference would be drawn from the information BOA reported.” R&R at 15. Although the Second Amended Complaint demonstrates that a blank field appears next to “High Credit” on Plaintiff's Equifax Credit Report for her BOA account ending in 0289 (the “Equifax Report”), see SAC, Ex. C at 31, Plaintiff never says what value should have been reported or what inaccurate message this blank field conveyed.
Second, the Equifax Report attached to the SAC contains the information needed to deduce what Plaintiff defines as “High Credit.” It lists a credit limit of $7,500, id., and reflects a highest balance of $9,019 in January and February 2024, id. at 29. Thus, although the “High Credit” field itself was blank, Plaintiff fails to show that the report was “patently incorrect” or “misleading in such a way and to such an extent that it can be expected to have an adverse effect on credit decisions.” Krausz v. Equifax Info. Servs., LLC, No. 21-CV-7427, 2023 WL 1993886, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 14, 2023) (explaining what constitutes an inaccurate credit report).
At most, Plaintiff identifies an omission from a single field, although the same substantive information appears elsewhere in the report. Thus, Plaintiff fails to plead an actionable inaccurate reporting of “high credit.” See Suluki, 138 F.4th at 721 (holding that “inaccuracy was not, by itself, sufficient to create liability under FCRA.”).
b. Date of First Delinquency and Date of Last Payment
Next, Plaintiff contends that BOA reported “impossible identical dates” because both the Date of First Delinquency (“DOFD”) and Date of Last Payment (“DLP”) were reported as May 2023. SAC ¶¶ 41(b), 108(b). She asserts that this is “factually and logically impossible” because a consumer cannot simultaneously become delinquent and make a payment. Id. ¶ 41(b).
The Equifax Report attached to the Second Amended Complaint squarely contradicts Plaintiff's allegation. The payment-history grid reflects on-time payments through June 2023, with the first “30” days-past-due marker appearing in July 2023. SAC, Ex. C at 30. Separately, the Account Details section lists the DOFD as July 2023 and the DLP as April 2024. Id. at 31.3 Thus, the documents attached to the SAC directly undermine Plaintiff's allegation of the reporting of identical dates for the DOFD and DLP. Accordingly, Plaintiff's identical-dates allegation cannot support her § 1681s-2(b) claim. See Amidax Trading Grp., 671 F.3d at 147 (declining to credit an allegation contradicted by the documents on which the plaintiff relied).
c. Missing April 2023 Data
Plaintiff also alleges that BOA reported “no data available” for April 2023. SAC ¶¶ 41(c), 108(c). Again, the Equifax Report attached to the SAC directly contradicts this allegation. The payment-history grid contains a check mark for April 2023, indicating an on-time payment. SAC, Ex. C at 30. The balance table reports an April 2023 balance of $7,687, id. at 29, and the scheduled-payment table reports an April 2023 scheduled payment of $306, id. Thus, Plaintiff's own exhibit reflects that data was provided for April 2023. Accordingly, the allegation that April 2023 data was missing cannot support Plaintiff's § 1681s-2(b) claim. See Amidax Trading Grp., 671 F.3d at 147 (applying the same principle).
* * *
In sum, none of the three inaccuracies that Plaintiff alleges plausibly pleads inaccurate reporting by BOA. Because inaccurate reporting is a prerequisite to this claim, any alleged failure to investigate cannot cure this defect. See Holland, 475 F. Supp. 3d at 276 (requiring an initial showing of inaccurate reporting before a § 1681s-2(b) claim may proceed).
C. Plaintiff Fails To State a Claim Against Credit Control
Because Plaintiff fails to demonstrate that she has Article III standing to pursue her claims against Credit Control, it is not necessary to consider whether she states a claim. The undersigned nonetheless addresses the legal sufficiency of Plaintiff's allegations for the sake of completeness. Plaintiff alleges that Credit Control violated Sections 1692e(10), 1692f, and 1692g(b) of the FDCPA. SAC ¶¶ 84, 88, 91. Each claim is addressed below.
1. Section 1692e(10)
First, Plaintiff alleges that Credit Control used false representations and deceptive means to collect her debts in violation of Section 1692e(10). SAC ¶¶ 84–87. Section 1692e(10) prohibits debt collectors from using “any false representation or deceptive means to collect or attempt to collect any debt[.]” To determine whether a collection letter violates Section 1692e, courts “apply an objective test based on the understanding of the least sophisticated consumer.” Bentley v. Great Lakes Collection Bureau, 6 F.3d 60, 62 (2d Cir. 1993) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Although this standard protects unsophisticated consumers, an interpretation of a collection letter must be reasonable. Feldheim v. Fin. Recovery Servs., Inc., 257 F. Supp. 3d 361, 368 (S.D.N.Y. 2017).
Plaintiff's claim is based on Credit Control's March 28, 2024 letter, which stated, “[i]n an effort to assist you in resolving this matter using your tax refund, our client has authorized us to extend to you an offer to settle your account for less than the amount you owe,” and “[t]ake advantage of your tax refund.” SAC, Ex. A at 24. Plaintiff claims these statements were deceptive because Credit Control did not know whether she had received or would receive a tax refund, the letter falsely represented that using a refund was an “appropriate or expected” method of paying her debts, and Credit Control created a false impression that it was “assisting” her. SAC ¶ 86.
Credit Control's statements cannot reasonably be considered false or deceptive. Contrary to Plaintiff's characterization, the letter did not convey that Credit Control had reviewed Plaintiff's tax information or was “pressuring payment through a seasonal tactic.” Id. Nothing in the letter suggested that Credit Control was pressuring Plaintiff to do anything. Further, Credit Control's reference to an effort to “assist” Plaintiff was not false or deceptive merely because the offer was intended to encourage payment. The undersigned previously rejected Plaintiff's interpretation of the same language, concluding that it was unreasonable to construe the letter as making a factual representation about Plaintiff's taxes or financial circumstances. R&R at 10–12. Although the Second Amended Complaint describes Plaintiff's theory in greater detail, it does not identify any different language in the letter that would support a different conclusion. Accordingly, Plaintiff fails to state a claim under Section 1692e(10).
2. Section 1692f
Next, Plaintiff alleges that Credit Control used unfair and unconscionable means to collect her debts in violation of Section 1692f. SAC ¶¶ 88–90. Section 1692f prohibits debt collectors from using “unfair or unconscionable means to collect or attempt to collect any debt.” Although the FDCPA does not define “unfair or unconscionable means,” the Second Circuit has explained that the term refers to practices that are “shockingly unjust or unfair, or affronting the sense of justice, decency, or reasonableness.” Arias v. Gutman, Mintz, Baker & Sonnenfeldt LLP, 875 F.3d 128, 135 (2d Cir. 2017) (quoting Gallego v. Northland Grp. Inc., 814 F.3d 123, 128 (2d Cir. 2016)).
Plaintiff contends that Credit Control violated Section 1692f because it pressured her to use a particular source of funds without knowing whether those funds existed, exploited tax season to create pressure for payment, and used the phrase “take advantage” to create urgency and psychological pressure. SAC ¶ 89. But, as discussed above, Credit Control's letter cannot reasonably be construed as pressuring Plaintiff to do anything. The letter did not require Plaintiff to use a refund or threaten any consequence for failing to do so. Nor did it state that Plaintiff must accept the settlement offer within a particular period. Credit Control's letter, which was sent at a time when many individuals would expect to receive tax refunds, merely suggested that any such refund could be used to settle the account. Therefore, Plaintiff fails to state a claim under Section 1692f.
3. Section 1692g(b)
Finally, Plaintiff claims that Credit Control failed to validate her debts in violation of Section 1692g(b). SAC ¶¶ 91–96. Section 1692g(b) provides that:
[I]f the consumer notifies the debt collector in writing ․ that the debt, or any portion thereof, is disputed ․ the debt collector shall cease collection of the debt, or any disputed portion thereof, until the debt collector obtains verification of the debt ․ and a copy of such verification ․ is mailed to the consumer by the debt collector.
“§ 1692g(b) essentially gives debt collectors two options after receiving notice of a dispute: they may either provide the requested validation and continue their collection efforts or cease all collection activity.” Rivera v. NCB Mgmt. Servs., Inc., No. 23-CV-0221, 2023 WL 7553051, at *5 (D. Conn. Nov. 14, 2023) (citing Johnson v. Cap. Mgmt. Servs., No. 10-CV-467, 2011 WL 6012509, at *7 (W.D.N.Y. Dec. 1, 2011)).
Plaintiff alleges that she sent Credit Control a written communication disputing her debts and requesting validation on April 30, 2024, and that Credit Control received the request. SAC ¶¶ 92–93. She further alleges that Credit Control failed to respond, obtain verification, or mail verification to her. Id. ¶¶ 94–95. However, Credit Control's failure to provide validation would violate Section 1692g(b) only if it thereafter continued collection efforts. See Davis v. Countrywide Home Loans, No. 9-CV-8606, 2010 WL 3219306, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. July 23, 2010) (“Because defendants’ failure to respond to plaintiff's request for verification of his debt is not actionable absent continuing collection efforts by defendants, plaintiff does not state a claim for a violation of the FDCPA.” (citing Ostrander v. Accelerated Receivables, 7-CV-827, 2009 WL 909646 at *6 (W.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2009)), report and recommendation adopted, 2010 WL 3219304 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 13, 2010)). Because Plaintiff does not allege that Credit Control continued collection efforts after she disputed the debt, she fails to state a claim for violation of Section 1692g(b).
D. Plaintiff Should be Denied Leave to Amend
Further amendment of Plaintiff's claims against BOA and Credit Control is unwarranted. Plaintiff has already amended her pleading twice. Moreover, the Court afforded Plaintiff an opportunity to correct the deficiencies previously identified. Order at 10–11. The Second Amended Complaint failed to do so and Plaintiff did not even file an opposition to Defendants’ motions. At this point, further amendment would be futile.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the undersigned respectfully RECOMMENDS that Defendants’ motions to dismiss be GRANTED with prejudice.
The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to mail a copy of this Report and Recommendation to the pro se Plaintiff.
PROCEDURE FOR FILING OBJECTIONS
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Rule 72(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the parties have fourteen (14) days (including weekends and holidays) from service of this Report and Recommendation to file any objections. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), (b), (d). Such objections, and any responses to objections, shall be filed with the Clerk of Court, with courtesy copies delivered to the chambers of the Honorable Lorna G. Schofield, United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, New York, New York 10007. Any requests for an extension of time for filing objections must be directed to Judge Schofield.
FAILURE TO FILE OBJECTIONS WITHIN FOURTEEN (14) DAYS WILL RESULT IN A WAIVER OF OBJECTIONS AND WILL PRECLUDE APPELLATE REVIEW. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72; see Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wagner & Wagner, LLP v. Atkinson, Haskins, Nellis, Brittingham, Gladd & Carwile, P.C., 596 F.3d 84, 92 (2d Cir. 2010).
FOOTNOTES
1. Pages cited in court filings refer to the ECF-generated pagination.
2. Portfolio Recovery Associates, LLC (“PRA”), a debt collector, and LVNV Funding, LLC (“LVNV”), a debt buyer, were previously defendants in this action but have since settled. See ECF Nos. 88, 98. Plaintiff's allegations regarding PRA and LVNV are not described here.
3. The balance history shows a $100 reduction in March 2024, which suggests that Plaintiff made a payment that month while the account was delinquent. Id. at 29.
Henry J. Ricardo United States Magistrate Judge
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Docket No: 24-CV-7885 (LGS) (HJR)
Decided: November 06, 2026
Court: United States District Court, S.D. New York.
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