NUBIA PETERS v. CBS VIACOM (2026)

REPORT & RECOMMENDATION

Plaintiff Nubia Peters, who is proceeding pro se, has sued defendant ViacomCBS Inc. for alleged violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 to 12213; the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-96; Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17; the New York State Human Rights Law (“NYSHRL”), N.Y. Exec. Law §§ 290-97; and the New York City Human Rights Law (“NYCHRL”), N.Y.C. Admin. Code §§ 8-101 to 8-131. See Amended Complaint, filed Aug. 5, 2024 (Docket # 36) (“Compl.”). She also brings a contract claim under the “SAG-AFTRA Return to Work Agreement” between the parties and a claim relating to an entity called the “Vaccine Control Group.” See id. Plaintiff's lawsuit centers on the allegation that defendant unlawfully refused to accommodate her medical and religious objections to the COVID-19 vaccine, then fired her. See id. ¶¶ 36-37. Defendant has moved for summary judgment.¹ For the reasons set forth below, the motion should be granted except as to one state law claim, over which the court should decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Facts

The following facts are undisputed unless otherwise noted.

Defendant owns Showtime, a television network which produced the television show Billions. See Washington Decl. ¶¶ 5-8. Plaintiff, an actor, worked as a “stand-in” on Billions. See Excerpts from Deposition of Nubia Peters, dated Jan. 29, 2025, annexed as Ex. 7 to Kulak Decl. (Docket # 81-7) and filed in unredacted form (Docket # 77-5 (“Peters Dep.”) at 73:19-21).

A stand-in “substitute[s] for a principal actor before filming for technical purposes such as lighting and camera setup.” Scali Decl. ¶ 6; accord Peters Dep. at 73:24-74:21. Plaintiff stood in for Condola Rashad, a principal actor on Billions whom she physically resembled, and also for “multiple white/male actors of varying builds.” Peters Decl. ¶ 4; see Peters Dep. at 87:11-88:4.

As Giorgio Scali, Billions’ director of photography (“DP”), explains, “When the stand-in's height, weight, and skin tone match the height, weight, and skin tone of the principal actor,” the DP can “understand how the light will hit the principal actor and make decisions regarding how to light the set.” Scali Decl. ¶ 11. “To properly check how the light hits a person's face,” the DP “needs the stand-in's face to be unobstructed.” Id. ¶ 12; see also Peters Dep. 83:19-23 (Q: “Is that an essential part of the job as a stand-in, to let the director and the camera[-]person see how the light is hitting your face?” A: “Yes.”)

In March 2020, production of Billions was shut down due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Washington Decl. ¶ 9. Production subsequently resumed pursuant to safety protocols set out in the SAG-AFTRA Return to Work Agreement, a contract between various companies and unions in the entertainment industry. See id. ¶ 11. These safety protocols divided the set into zones. See Zone System Chart, annexed as Ex. 4 to Kulak Decl., dated Dec. 14, 2020 (Docket # 81-4). Zone A was the most restricted part of the set, where Billions’ principal actors would not be wearing personal protective equipment (“PPE”) in order to be filmed. See id. Other than principal actors, those working in Zone A were required to wear PPE, such as face masks and face shields. See id.

As a stand-in, plaintiff worked in Zone A. See Peters Dep. at 67:17-19. Plaintiff would come into close contact with the principal actors (and others) in Zone A. See id. at 129:24-133:4. She wore a face mask or face shield while on set. See Peters Dep. at 68:6-11.

Plaintiff testified that Scali, the DP, “never had a problem with [her] wearing” PPE. Peters Dep. at 70:11-12. She explained that “if there was an issue[,] then we wouldn't be shooting.” Id. at 70:22-23. However, Scali affirms that PPE “made it difficult to accurately light the set using the stand-ins.” Scali Decl. ¶ 15; see id. ¶ 17. “The lighting would look correct when the stand-in was masked; however, when the principal actor was on set and unmasked in order to film, the lighting looked different and needed to be corrected with the principal actor,” id. ¶ 15, which was “inefficient,” id. ¶ 16. Plaintiff claims Scali “exaggerates” the effect PPE had on his work as DP, but she offers no evidence that contradicts his affirmation. R. 56.1 Counter-Statement ¶ 4.

In August 2021, defendant implemented a policy requiring those working in Zone A to be vaccinated against COVID-19. Washington Decl. ¶ 10. The SAG-AFTRA Return to Work Agreement provided that defendant could implement such a policy “subject to reasonable accommodations as required by law for individuals who cannot be vaccinated due to disability or a sincerely held religious belief, practice, or observance.” SAG-AFTRA Return to Work Agreement, dated July 19, 2021, annexed as Ex. 2 to Kulak Decl. (Docket # 81-2) at 6. Defendant “advised” employees that it imposed this policy in response to “the increase of more aggressive COVID-19 variants, including the Delta variant,” and guidance from public health officials that “vaccination was the most effective tool to reduce the spread of this virus and limit its severity.” Washington Decl. ¶ 12.

On August 23, 2021, plaintiff wrote to LaChondra Washington, human resources director for defendant, to request an exemption to the policy on both medical and religious grounds. See Email from Nubia Peters, dated Aug. 23, 2021 (10:28 AM), annexed as Ex. A to Washington Decl. at *7.² Washington asked plaintiff to explain the religious grounds for her request and to contact a third party, UNUM, to document her claimed disability. See Email from LaChondra Washington, dated Aug. 23, 2021 (1:39 PM), annexed as Ex. A to Washington Decl. at *6. Plaintiff explained that she objected to vaccination because of her Roman Catholic faith. See Email from Nubia Peters, dated Aug. 23, 2021 (2:17 PM), annexed to Compl. at *35. Plaintiff asserted that “the vaccines were made using fetus[es]” and that it is “immoral and unethical to use a fetus for science.” Id. She also indicated that she would contact UNUM. See id.

Later that day, Washington denied plaintiff's request, writing:

We have carefully considered your request for an exemption from the vaccination requirements in Zone A on Billions, including an evaluation of your job duties and whether any reasonable accommodation can be offered. Unfortunately your proposed accommodation cannot be reasonably granted in this situation. Because your role requires you to be within six feet of others at times, there is not an ability to socially distance at all times. In addition, you would be required to be unmasked at times for the DP to see how the light is hitting your face. That would require us to waive safety protocols that are in place on this production, which would compromise workplace safety in light of the current circumstances with the highly transmissible Delta variant. Accordingly, the request is denied.

Email from LaChondra Washington, dated Aug. 23, 2021 (8:52 PM), annexed as Ex. A to Washington Decl. at *5.

Despite the denial, plaintiff arranged for Liana Dao, her doctor, to fill out a form documenting her claimed disability. See Kulak Decl. ¶ 9. The form asked, “Does patient have a medical condition that currently affects their ability to perform their job?” UNUM Form, annexed as Ex. 6, to Kulak Decl. (Docket # 81-6) and filed in unredacted form (Docket # 77-4 at *2). Dr. Dao checked a box indicating “Yes.” Id. The form prompted Dr. Dao to identify “the major life activities and/or bodily functions impacted by patient's medical condition” and describe “how the patient's medical condition interferes with” these activities or functions. Id. Dr. Dao circled “Concentrating” from a list, and in the space provided for a description, she wrote the words “anxiety” and “overwhelmed.” Id. The form also required Dr. Dao to state “why the vaccine is inappropriate based on the patient's medical condition.” Id. at *4. She wrote (in shorthand), “[increased] anxiety/depress[ion] due to possible allergic reaction,” adding “[patient] has many allergies.” Id.

Plaintiff testified that she is allergic to iodine, shellfish, dairy, nuts, and gluten. See Peters Dep. at 193:22-195:25. Her allergies can trigger severe reactions: for example, plaintiff's throat once “closed up” after consuming shellfish. See id. at 191:22. Plaintiff was not aware if any of the above allergens were in any of the COVID-19 vaccines available circa August 2021 and did not know the vaccines’ composition, except that, according to her pastor, they contained “aborted fetus cells.” Id. at 202:11; see id. at 201:20-202:10. Plaintiff has taken other vaccines in the past, see id. at 39:5-11, apparently without incident.

Based on the form filled out by Dr. Dao, UNUM found that plaintiff's condition was “[l]ikely disabling” under the ADA. Email from Angelia Beck, dated Sept. 13, 2021, annexed as Ex. B to Washington Decl., at *11. UNUM proposed various accommodations defendant could adopt in light of this finding, including “[r]equir[ing] the employee to wear mask and/or face shield until necessary for the employee to be filmed/stand in.” Id. at *10. However, when UNUM shared these proposals with Washington, she responded, “The production was unable to accommodate Nubia Peters[’] request as her role as a stand-in would not allow her to work safely while unmasked. Nubia was made aware of this decision on 8/23/2021.” Email from LaChondra Washington, dated Sept. 14, 2021, annexed as Ex. B to Washington Decl., at *9.

Because her medical and religious accommodation requests were denied, and she refused to take the COVID-19 vaccine, plaintiff's employment was terminated. Peters Dep. at 194:17. Defendant refused to grant similar accommodations to at least five other actors on Billions. See Accommodation Requests Chart, annexed to Plaintiff's Exhibits at *1-*2. However, it granted exemptions to two employees: a video playback technician and a craft services crew member. See id.

Plaintiff testified that “the production was supposed to go into quarantine” if anybody on the set of Billions contracted COVID-19. Peters Dep. at 168:25-169:1; see also Additional Excerpts from Deposition of Nubia Peters, dated Jan. 29, 2025, annexed as Ex. 3 to 2d Kulak Decl. (Docket # 107-3) and filed in unredacted form (Docket # 106 (“2d Peters Dep.”) at 162:14-16) (“[A]s far as the SAG-AFTRA rules, if there is someone that tests [positive for COVID-19], the production should shut down.”). According to Veronique Huyghebaert, Showtime's financial controller, “If Billions had shut down due to a COVID-19 infection or exposure, the daily cost ․ would have been at least $373,634.18.” Huyghebaert Decl. ¶ 8.

B. Procedural History

Plaintiff filed her complaint on July 24, 2022, see Complaint, filed July 14, 2022 (Docket # 1) (“Original Compl.”), after first filing a charge of discrimination with the EEOC, see Charge of Discrimination, dated Apr. 25, 2022, annexed as Ex. 1 to Original Compl. (Docket # 1-1). The EEOC made no determination as to plaintiff's charge but authorized her to sue. See Determination and Notice of Rights, dated July 11, 2022, annexed as Ex. 2 to Original Compl. (Docket # 1-2). Plaintiff's suit was initially dismissed for failure to prosecute, see Order, dated Feb. 7, 2023 (Docket # 14), but the Second Circuit reversed this decision, see Peters v. CBS Viacom, 2023 WL 8270781 (2d Cir. Nov. 30, 2023).

Plaintiff later filed the operative complaint, see Compl., which defendant answered, see Answer, filed Sept. 10, 2024 (Docket # 39). Following discovery and an unsuccessful attempt at mediation, defendant filed the instant summary judgment motion.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a) states, “The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Such a dispute exists “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). In assessing whether a genuine dispute of material fact exists, the nonmoving party's evidence “is to be believed,” and the court must draw “all justifiable inferences” in the nonmoving party's favor. Id. at 255 (citing Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 158-59 (1970)).

Once the moving party has shown that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, “the nonmoving party must come forward with specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial,” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis in original), and “may not rely on conclusory allegations or unsubstantiated speculation,” Scotto v. Almenas, 143 F.3d 105, 114 (2d Cir. 1998).

“When the nonmoving party bears the burden of proof at trial, summary judgment is warranted if the nonmovant ‘fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to [its] case.’ ” Nebraska v. Wyoming, 507 U.S. 584, 590 (1993) (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986)) (alteration in original). Thus, “[a] defendant moving for summary judgment must prevail if the plaintiff fails to come forward with enough evidence to create a genuine factual issue to be tried with respect to an element essential to its case.” Allen v. Cuomo, 100 F.3d 253, 258 (2d Cir. 1996) (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247-48).

Because plaintiff is proceeding pro se, we construe her papers “liberally and interpret them to raise the strongest arguments that they suggest.” McPherson v. Coombe, 174 F.3d 276, 280 (2d Cir. 1999) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Nonetheless, “our application of this different standard does not relieve plaintiff of [her] duty to meet the requirements necessary to defeat a motion for summary judgment.” Jorgensen v. Epic/Sony Records, 351 F.3d 46, 50 (2d Cir. 2003) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

III. DISCUSSION

Construing plaintiff's complaint liberally, she brings claims for discrimination and retaliation under the ADA, the Rehabilitation Act, Title VII, the NYSHRL, and the NYCHRL. She also brings a claim for failure to engage in an interactive process under the NYCHRL, and claims related to the SAG-AFTRA Return to Work Agreement and the Vaccine Control Group. See Compl.

A. ADA

1. Discrimination

“Disability discrimination claims under the ADA ‘may be brought under a theory of adverse employment action or of failure to provide reasonable accommodation.’ ” Samuels v. City of New York, 2023 WL 5717892, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 5, 2023) (quoting Piligian v. Icahn Sch. of Med. at Mount Sinai, 490 F. Supp. 3d 707, 716 (S.D.N.Y. 2020)). Under either theory, “the plaintiff must be disabled within the meaning of the ADA.” Betances v. MetroPlus Health Plan, Inc., 2021 WL 2853363, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. July 7, 2021). The ADA defines disability to mean “(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities of such individual; (B) a record of such an impairment; or (C) being regarded as having such an impairment.”³ 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1). Under the statute, “major life activities” include “caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, seeing, hearing, eating, sleeping, walking, standing, lifting, bending, speaking, breathing, learning, reading, concentrating, thinking, communicating, and working.” Id. § 12102(2)(A).

The complaint indicates that plaintiff has a disability in the form of unspecified allergies which make it unsafe for her to be vaccinated against COVID-19. See Compl. at 4. There is undisputed evidence that plaintiff is allergic to certain substances. See Peters Dep. at 190:25-195:25. But there is no evidence that these substances are in any COVID-19 vaccine or that plaintiff is allergic to any component the vaccine, let alone that her claimed allergy substantially limits one or more of her major life activities.⁴ Such “[a]n alleged medical contraindication to a vaccine ․ is insufficient to allege a protected disability if it does not result in ‘a substantial limitation of a major life activity.’ ” Mercer v. ViacomCBS/Paramount, 2024 WL 3553133, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. July 26, 2024) (quoting Norman v. NYU Langone Health Sys., 492 F. Supp. 3d 154, 164 (S.D.N.Y. 2020)). Plaintiff has received other vaccines in the past, apparently without incident. See Peters Dep. at 39:5-11. Moreover, plaintiff's doctor did not state that plaintiff was allergic to the COVID-19 vaccine. Her doctor stated that she should not receive the vaccine because of “[increased] anxiety/depress[ion] due to possible allergic reaction.” UNUM Form at *4. Nothing in the record indicates, however, that plaintiff's vaccine-related anxiety and depression substantially limited her major life activities. Dr. Dao did indicate that plaintiff suffered from a condition that “impacted” her ability to concentrate, but she did not identify this condition as plaintiff's vaccine-related anxiety and depression. See id. at *2. Even assuming Dr. Do was referring to plaintiff's vaccine-related anxiety and depression, the Court must “distinguish impairments which merely affect major life activities from those that substantially limit those activities,” and Dr. Dao provided no indication that plaintiff's concentration was substantially limited. Ryan v. Grae & Rybicki, P.C., 135 F.3d 867, 870 (2d Cir. 1998). And although plaintiff testified that her concentration “was really [a]ffected” by her allergies to iodine, shellfish, dairy, nuts, and gluten, there has been no showing that these allergies are actually at issue. Peters Dep. at 205:12.

Applying a more lenient standard at the motion-to-dismiss stage, courts have “routinely dismiss[ed] claims under the ADA alleging discrimination and failure to accommodate an alleged allergy to a vaccine that was mandated by an employer” where plaintiffs “failed to allege ․ that the allergy to the vaccine substantially limited a major life activity such as the ability to work.” Wood v. ViacomCBS/Paramount, 2024 WL 4451742, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. July 15, 2024) (collecting cases), adopted by, 2024 WL 4263117 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 23, 2024); accord Carnett v. TIAA Ins. Co., 2026 WL 35348, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 6, 2026) (noting that courts have dismissed ADA claims “premised ․ solely on hypothetical allergies to the COVID-19 vaccine, which were, in turn, cursorily alleged and only thinly supported by evidence”). Here, at the summary judgment stage, plaintiff must “come forward with enough evidence to create a genuine factual issue to be tried with respect to” her claimed disability. Allen, 100 F.3d at 258 (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247-48). She has not. She is unable to point to competent evidence that she has an allergy to any component of any COVID-19 vaccine, let alone that this claimed allergy substantially limits one or more of her major life activities. Defendant is therefore entitled to summary judgment on her ADA discrimination claim. We therefore need not reach the argument that accommodating plaintiff's claimed disability would have imposed an undue hardship on defendant.

2. Retaliation

A showing of disability is not an essential element of a retaliation claim under the ADA. As the Second Circuit has explained:

An employer may not take adverse action against an employee for engaging in “protected activity.” See Tafolla v. Heilig, 80 F.4th 111, 125 (2d Cir. 2023) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). An employee can satisfy the protected activity requirement even if “his condition was not a disability within the meaning of the ADA” so long as “he can establish that he possessed a good faith, reasonable belief that the underlying challenged actions of the employer violated” the ADA. Sarno v. Douglas Elliman-Gibbons & Ives, Inc., 183 F.3d 155, 159 (2d Cir. 1999) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

Sharikov v. Philips Med. Sys. MR, Inc., 103 F.4th 159, 170 (2d Cir. 2024).

Sharikov makes clear that a retaliation claim under the ADA requires a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse action. “To prove a causal connection, a plaintiff must show that ‘but for’ the protected activity, the adverse action would not have been taken.” Id. (quoting Tafolla, 80 F.4th at 125).

Plaintiff's retaliation claim under the ADA fails because she cannot show causation. We accept that plaintiff engaged in a protected activity by seeking an exemption from defendant's mandatory vaccination policy on the basis of her claimed allergy. See Fiore v. N. Shore Radiation Therapy, 2026 WL 1469451, at *12 (E.D.N.Y. May 26, 2026) (noting that “requesting reasonable accommodation of a disability is an ADA-protected activity”). But, as observed in Matos v. Discovery Communications, LLC, 750 F. Supp. 3d 307 (S.D.N.Y. 2024):

Courts have consistently held that plaintiffs cannot establish but-for causation where they are terminated pursuant to a policy that pre-dates any protected activity. See, e.g., Adams v. New York State Unified Ct. Sys., No. 22-CV-9739, 2023 WL 5003593, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 4, 2023). The logic works like this: when an employer establishes a vaccine requirement and an employee fails to comply, the employee's termination “follow[s] ineluctably from the policy” regardless of whether the employee requests a religious accommodation. See id. In other words, the adverse action is set in motion before the allegedly protected activity occurred. Id. (citing Belton v. Borg & Ide Imaging, P.C., 512 F. Supp. 3d 433, 446 (W.D.N.Y. 2021) (“It is well-settled that an adverse employment action cannot serve as the basis for a retaliation claim if the action was set in motion before a plaintiff engaged in protected activity.”) (quotation marks and alteration omitted)); Cayemittes v. City of New York Dep't of Hous. Pres. & Dev., 974 F. Supp. 2d 240, 262 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (same), aff'd, 641 Fed. Appx. 60 (2d Cir. 2016) (summary order); see also Heron v. Medrite Testing, LLC, No. 21-CV-9471, 2022 WL 1214179, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 25, 2022) (“[W]here the adverse action was already ongoing at the time of the protected activity ․ logic precludes any inference of causation.” (alteration adopted) (quotation marks and citation omitted)) ․

Id. at 325-26. There can be no dispute here that defendant set plaintiff's termination in motion when it imposed a mandatory vaccination policy, not when plaintiff sought an exemption from this policy. Accordingly, there is no causal connection between a protected activity and plaintiff's termination.

In Sharikov, the Second Circuit held, “In the Title VII context, which utilizes the same standards as ADA claims, allegations of adverse actions that occur as a result of generally applicable workplace policies” — such as a mandatory vaccination policy — do not state a claim of retaliation “absent allegations of more direct hostile conduct.” Sharikov, 103 F.4th at 171 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). This is because without “more direct hostile conduct, a reasonable employee would not be dissuaded from taking protected action simply because [she is] subject to the same policies as other employees.’ ” Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). The record before the Court is devoid of any evidence of “more direct hostile conduct.” Therefore, defendant is entitled to summary judgment on plaintiff's ADA retaliation claim. We need not reach the argument that plaintiff has not exhausted her retaliation claim with the EEOC.

B. Rehabilitation Act

Plaintiff's claims under the Rehabilitation Act fail for multiple reasons.

First, “[a] plaintiff bringing a Rehabilitation Act claim must ․ establish that the defendant receives federal funding.” Davis v. Shah, 821 F.3d 231, 260 n.17 (2d Cir. 2016) (citation omitted). Here, plaintiff has not established that defendant, a private corporation, receives federal funding, and thus defendant is entitled to summary judgment on plaintiff's Rehabilitation Act claims. See Daly v. Westchester Cnty. Bd. of Legislators, 2023 WL 4896801, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 1, 2023) (granting summary judgment for defendant on Rehabilitation Act claims where plaintiff “failed to establish that [it] received federal financial assistance”), aff'd, 2024 WL 3264125 (2d Cir. July 2, 2024).

Apart from the federal funding issue, plaintiff's claims under the Retaliation Act fail also because, as with her ADA claims, she has not identified any competent evidence creating a triable issue with respect to any claimed disability and has shown no causal connection between any protected activity and her termination. The Rehabilitation Act “adopts the ADA's definition of ‘disability’ by reference,” Rodriguez v. Hogar, Inc., 2024 WL 86285, at *3 n.3 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 3, 2024), appeal dismissed, 2024 WL 3559735 (2d Cir. June 27, 2024), and it “contain[s] similar provisions against retaliation and [is] governed in this respect by the same standards as the ADA,” Treglia v. Town of Manlius, 313 F.3d 713, 719 (2d Cir. 2002). Thus, plaintiff's claims for discrimination and retaliation under the Rehabilitation Act fail for the reasons her claims for discrimination and retaliation under the ADA do.

C. Title VII

1. Discrimination

A plaintiff alleging discrimination under Title VII on the basis of religious belief must make a prima facie case by showing that “(1) [she] held a bona fide religious belief conflicting with an employment requirement; (2) [she] informed [her] employer of this belief; and (3) [she was] disciplined for failure to comply with the conflicting employment requirement.” Russo v. Patchogue-Medford Sch. Dist., 129 F.4th 182, 185-86 (2d Cir. 2025) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). If a prima facie case is established, the employer must offer a reasonable accommodation, “unless doing so would cause the employer to suffer an undue hardship” by imposing “a burden that is substantial in the overall context of an employer's business.” Id. at 186 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). The inquiry into whether a proposed accommodation creates an undue hardship is “fact-specific” and considers “all relevant factors ․ including the particular accommodations at issue and their practical impact in light of the nature, size and operating cost of an employer.” Groff v. DeJoy, 600 U.S. 447, 468, 470-71 (2023) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). “It is the employer who must demonstrate undue hardship by showing that the burden of accommodation is substantial in the overall conduct of their operations.” Chavez v. City of New York, 2026 WL 323019, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 6, 2026) (citing Groff, 600 U.S. at 472).

Defendant makes no argument that plaintiff has not made a prime facie case. Instead, defendant argues that exempting plaintiff from Billions’ vaccine mandate would have imposed an undue hardship. See Mem. at 27. Specifically, defendant argues that plaintiff's job required her to be within six feet of coworkers (at times, without PPE); that letting her work unvaccinated “would have exposed the other individuals with whom she was working in Zone A to COVID-19”; and that production would be shut down in the event plaintiff sickened anyone, at a cost of at least $373,634 per day. Id. at 19-21. As to these contentions, there are no genuine disputes of material fact.

First, while plaintiff does not dispute that her job required her to be within six feet of coworkers, she questions whether it required her to go unmasked. She states that she wore PPE before the mandatory vaccination policy was implemented and that she did not need to unmask. See Peters Decl. ¶¶ 4-5. But defendant offers uncontroverted evidence that the DP could not properly light the set of Billions when plaintiff wore PPE.⁵ See Scali Decl. ¶¶ 12-15. This was costly: the DP had to use the precious time of principal actors (who obviously performed without masks) to properly light the set. See id. ¶ 16 (“As the purpose of using a stand-in was to work out the variables before the actors came on set, and minimize the principal actors’ time on set, lighting the stand-ins while they were masked was inefficient.”). Vaccination made it practicable for stands-ins not to wear PPE, allowing defendant to eliminate the cost of using principal actors to properly light the set. That defendant bore this cost before availability of vaccines does not mean that plaintiff could reasonably continue to impose this cost on defendant once vaccines became available. Cf. Stanley v. City Univ. of N.Y., 2023 WL 2714181, at *20 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2023) (dismissing claim for failure to accommodate where plaintiff did not “address whether [his employer's] needs and [his] responsibilities after the initial phase of the pandemic, when he had worked remotely, tracked those thereafter”), aff'd, 2024 WL 1453872 (2d Cir. Apr. 4, 2024). Because a court considers the hardship posed by accommodating plaintiff in the “overall context of [defendant's] business,” Groff, 600 U.S. at 468, this context understandably “may change,” Richardson v. Nat'l Basketball Ass'n, 2025 WL 2402614, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 18, 2025), appeal dismissed, 2026 WL 1202476 (2d. Cir. Apr. 8, 2026).

Relatedly, while wearing PPE “was necessitated by the extraordinary circumstances of the early stages of the COVID-19 pandemic,” this “did not permanently change the essential function of” a stand-in. Schwartz v. Middletown City Sch. Dist., 2025 WL 2930754 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 15, 2025). Allowing plaintiff to wear PPE indefinitely would permanently change her job as a stand-in, and “a reasonable accommodation under Title VII ‘can never involve the elimination of an essential function of a job,’ which would necessarily constitute an undue hardship.” Devita v. Mount Sinai Hosp., 2024 WL 3046121, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. June 18, 2024) (quoting Shannon v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 332 F.3d 95, 100 (2d Cir. 2003)); see also We The Patriots USA, Inc. v. Hochul, 17 F.4th 266, 292 (2d Cir. 2021) (“Title VII does not require covered entities to provide ․ a blanket religious exemption allowing [employees] to continue working at their current positions unvaccinated.”), opinion clarified, 17 F.4th 368 (2d Cir. 2021). Although defendant exempted others from the mandatory vaccination policy, there is no record evidence that these employees were similarly situated to plaintiff: that is, there is nothing to suggest that their jobs — in craft services and video playback, see Accommodation Requests Chart —required them to unmask.⁶ By contrast, the nature of plaintiff's work required her to unmask.

Second, plaintiff does not contest that letting her work unvaccinated “would have exposed the other individuals with whom she was working in Zone A to COVID-19.” Mem. at 20. While plaintiff questioned the efficacy of vaccination in her deposition testimony, see Peters Dep. at 171:15-173:24, she offers nothing to create a genuine dispute as to defendant's reasonable belief in the necessity of imposing a mandatory vaccination policy. See Zdunski v. Erie 2-Chautauqua-Cattaraugus Boces, 2022 WL 816010, at *11 (W.D.N.Y. Feb. 16, 2022) (“Given that the phrases ‘undue hardship’ and ‘reasonable accommodation’ are relative terms and undefined by statute, ‘[e]ach case necessarily depends upon its own facts and circumstances, and in a sense every case boils down to a determination as to whether the employer has acted reasonably.’ ”) (citation omitted), aff'd, 2023 WL 2469827 (2d Cir. Mar. 13, 2023). There is no evidence to controvert that defendant imposed this policy to protect against “the increase of more aggressive COVID-19 variants, including the Delta variant,” and in response to guidance from public health officials that “vaccination was the most effective tool to reduce the spread of this virus and limit its severity.” Washington Decl. ¶ 12. “[A]n employer's reliance on the recommendations of public health officials is reasonable” under the extraordinary circumstances of the COVID-19 pandemic. Dodson v. Lutheran Vill. at Millers Grant, Inc., 2025 WL 1474319, at *10 (D. Md. May 22, 2025), aff'd, (4th Cir. Mar. 2, 2026). While plaintiff references various reports and studies which might undermine the reasonableness of defendant's reliance, see Opp at *5-*8, there is no evidence that these materials were available to defendant in 2021. See Byam v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Educ., 2024 WL 4198475, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 16, 2024) (“[A]n employer is permitted to draw conclusions based on evidence and information that was available at the time.”) (quoting Lavelle-Hayden v. Legacy Health, 744 F. Supp. 3d 1135, 1152 (D. Or. 2024)).

Defendant's policy was also approved by the SAG-AFTRA Return to Work Agreement, a contract whose object was “preventing the spread of COVID-19 and maintaining a safe and healthy work environment.” SAG-AFTRA Return to Work Agreement at 2. In Richardson, the court held that accommodating a National Basketball League (“NDA”) referee's objection to the COVID-19 vaccine would have created undue hardship because it threatened the NBA's efforts to keep the league safe amid the COVID-19 pandemic. Richardson, 2025 WL 2402614, at *9. Richardson reasoned:

[B]y no later than early December 2021, the NBA understood, based on scientific evidence and medical advice regarding the COVID-19 pandemic, that permitting unvaccinated referees to work would increase the likelihood of COVID-19 infection and transmission among players and other staff and the risk of game cancellations and postponements. This is a risk that the NBA decided it could not incur. It constitutes an undue hardship.

Id. Here, the record reflects that the defendant made substantially the same choice. That defendant made this choice in service to the well-being of Billions’ cast and crew distinguishes the case at bar from plaintiff's only case, Bobnar v. AstraZeneca Pharms. LP, 758 F. Supp. 3d 690 (N.D. Ohio 2024). Bobnar held that accommodating an employee's objection to the COVID-19 vaccine would not have created an undue hardship because the employer “rel[ied] on unsupported third-party health and safety risks to demonstrate an undue hardship to itself.” Id. at 728. That is, there was no contention that the defendant's own employees were at risk based on the plaintiff's unvaccinated status (nor did Bobnar find that there would be harm to the non-employees that plaintiff interacted with as part of his job). Id. Here, by contrast, defendant relies on “the risk posed to [its] other employees” to demonstrate undue hardship. Id. at 727; see Washington Decl. ¶¶ 10-12.

Third, plaintiff offers no competent evidence to dispute that production would have been shut down if she sickened anyone (or herself fell ill), at a cost of at least $373,634 per day. Although plaintiff takes issue with redactions to the materials underlying defendant's calculation of this cost, see R. 56.1 Counter-Statement ¶ 26, she supplies no reason whatsoever to doubt the bottom-line $373,634-per-day figure.⁷ Plaintiff also questions whether defendant truly followed a policy of shutting down production in the event of a COVID-19 infection. At her deposition, she testified that “one of the stand-ins who worked with me on Billions who was vaccinated did get [COVID-19]” and that “the production did not shut down.” 2d Peters Dep. 161:10-13. She was not present at the time and conceded that she did not know the complete circumstances of this incident. See id. at 163:25-162:3; 163:24-164:4. Plaintiff's knowledge of the incident came from the stand-in she claimed contracted COVID-19, an individual she could only identify by first name. See id. at 161:16-20, 162:5-6, 163:10-14. Plaintiff's testimony on this point is hearsay. “Even a pro se party ‘cannot rely on inadmissible hearsay in opposing a motion for summary judgment ․ absent a showing that admissible evidence will be available at trial.’ ” Kamal v. Singh, 2025 WL 3012790, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 28, 2025) (quoting Ferguson v. City of New York, 2025 WL 1793890, at *1 (2d Cir. June 30, 2025)). Moreover, even if we could consider plaintiff's testimony, it is so light on detail that it does not suffice to create a genuine dispute with respect to the fact that production would shut down when someone contracted COVID-19. Plaintiff acknowledges that defendant's policy was to do so. See 2d Peters Dep. at 162: 15-16. We are left with the undisputed $373,634-per-day price of a shutdown. In Bordeaux v. Lions Gate Entertainment, Inc., 703 F. Supp. 3d 1117 (C.D. Cal. 2023), aff'd, 2025 WL 655065 (9th Cir. Feb. 28, 2025), the court held that the $300,000-per-day risk an unvaccinated actor might force production to shut down created undue hardship. See id. at 1137-39. We reach the same conclusion.

Plaintiff also argues that defendant could have accommodated her objection to vaccination without causing undue hardship by assigning her to “non-Zone A stand-in roles” or to various background actor roles on Billions that she identified during discovery. See Opp. at *3. But stands-in and background actors work on-camera, which means they work in Zone A, which means they were subject to defendant's mandatory vaccination policy. Further, as defendant points out, each of roles plaintiff identified “specifically state that Defendant's COVID-19 mandatory vaccination policy applies to these positions.” Reply at 12.

In conclusion, defendant is entitled to summary judgment on plaintiff's Title VII religious discrimination claim. The evidence is such that no reasonable jury could find that exempting plaintiff from Billions’ vaccine mandate would not have imposed an undue hardship.

2. Retaliation

Plaintiff's Title VII retaliation claim fails for the same reasons that her retaliation claim under the ADA fails. See Matos, 750 F. Supp. 3d at 325; Sharikov, 103 F.4th at 171.

D. State Law

1. Discrimination

While the NYSHRL and the NYCHRL incorporate a broader definition of disability than the ADA, see, e.g., Williams v. N.Y.C. Health & Hosps. Corp., 2026 WL 350876, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 9, 2026), both laws provide that an employer need not accommodate an employee's disability “if it would cause an undue hardship for [the] employer,” Greenbaum v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 2022 WL 3347893, at *3 (2d Cir. Aug. 15, 2022); accord Ong v. Deloitte Consulting, LLP, 2025 WL 886947, at *17 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 21, 2025); see N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(3)(b); N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107(15)(b). Likewise, an employer need not accommodate an employee's religious belief under the NYSHRL and the NYCHRL if it is unable to do so without “undue hardship.” N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(10)(a); N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107(3)(b).

The NYSHRL's “undue hardship” standard mirrors the standard under Title VII. See, e.g., De Souza v. New York, 2026 WL 783732, at *20 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 19, 2026). As explained above, exempting plaintiff from defendant's mandatory vaccination policy would have imposed an undue hardship under Title VII. See Wilson v. Mid-Hudson Forensic Psychiatric Ctr., 2025 WL 1295655, at *12 (S.D.N.Y. May 5, 2025) (exempting plaintiff from mandatory vaccination policy would have imposed undue hardship under NYSHRL for the same reasons it would have imposed undue hardship under Title VII); Robin v. Bon Secours Cmty. Hosp., 2025 WL 623766, at *15 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 25, 2025) (same). Therefore, defendant is entitled to summary judgment on plaintiff's claims for discrimination under the NYSHRL.

Less clear is whether the NYCHRL's “undue hardship” standards mirrors Title VII's, and in any event, we are required to give claims under this statute “an independent liberal construction.” Loeffler v. Staten Island Univ. Hosp., 582 F.3d 268, 278 (2d Cir. 2009) (quoting Williams v. N.Y.C. Hous. Auth., 61 A.D.3d 62, 66 (1st Dep't 2009)). We believe plaintiff's claims for discrimination under the NYCHRL fail on the statute's own terms. The NYCHRL provides an employer with an affirmative defense to a disability discrimination claim if it can demonstrate that “the employee was [in]capable of performing the core functions of the employee's position at the time that the employer refused to accommodate the employee's disability.” Jacobsen v. N.Y.C. Health & Hosps. Corp., 22 N.Y.3d 824, 843 (2014). Here, there is undisputed evidence that in August 2021, defendant determined that plaintiff needed to work without a mask and that plaintiff could not work without a mask unless she was vaccinated against COVID-19. Separately, if accommodating an employee's religious belief would “require[e] significant expense or difficulty” — such as “significant interference with the safe or efficient operation of the workplace” — then a religious discrimination claim will not lie under the NYCHRL. N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107(3)(b). Here, the undisputed evidence is that permitting plaintiff to remain unvaccinated would have endangered her coworkers and exposed Billions to the risk of an expensive shutdown. Therefore, defendant is entitled to summary judgment on plaintiff's claims for discrimination under the NYCHRL.

2. Retaliation

Both the NYSHRL and the NYCHRL employ a looser causation standard for a retaliation claim than the ADA. See, e.g., Owens v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 2025 WL 278024, at *11 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 23, 2025). The plaintiff “need only show that retaliatory animus ‘was a motivating factor,’ that is, that it played any role at all in the challenged conduct.” Edelman v. NYU Langone Health Sys., 141 F.4th 28, 49 (2d Cir. 2025) (quoting Bennett v. Health Mgmt. Sys., 92 A.D.3d 29, 40 (1st Dep't 2011)). Nevertheless, plaintiff has not shown causation even under this looser standard. There is simply no causal connection between plaintiff's engaging in protected activity (seeking an exemption from defendant's mandatory vaccination policy) and the adverse action at issue (her termination pursuant to that very policy) because defendant had effectively chosen to terminate plaintiff before she sought an exemption. Defendant's mandatory vaccination policy amounted to a decision to fire everyone in Zone A of the set of Billions unless they took a COVID-19 vaccine. In other words, when plaintiff pursued an exemption, it was already defendant's policy to fire employees in plaintiff's situation; thus, her seeking an exemption did not play a role in her being fired. See Doe v. N.Y.C. Police Dep't, 190 A.D.3d 411, 412 (1st Dep't 2021) (holding, under the NYSHRL and the NYCHRL, that “[a]n employer's conduct after the employee engaged in protected activity does not constitute retaliation where it is a continuation of the course of the employer's conduct before the employee engaged in the protected activity”). Accordingly, the retaliation claims under the NYSHRL and the NYCHRL fail.

3. Interactive Process

Plaintiff asserts in her opposition that defendant failed to engage in an interactive process as required under the ADA. See Opp at *3, *12. However, “there is no valid independent claim under the ADA for failure to engage in an interactive process.” Sheng v. M&TBank Corp., 848 F.3d 78, 87 (2d Cir. 2017). Nor is there one under Title VII or the NYSHRL. See Greenbaum, 2022 WL 3347893, at *5; Shahid-Ikhlas v. New York & Presbyterian Hosp., Inc., 2023 WL 3628151, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. May 5, 2023), adopted by, 2023 WL 3626435 (S.D.N.Y. May 24, 2023).

Nonetheless, “a failure to engage in the interactive process is independently actionable as a separate claim under the NYCHRL.” Greenbaum, 2022 WL 3347893, at *5; see N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107(28)(a). While we have construed plaintiff's complaint as raising such a claim, neither party offers any briefing on it.

A court “may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim” if it “has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c). Typically, where “all federal-law claims are eliminated before trial, the balance of factors to be considered under the pendent jurisdiction doctrine — judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity — will point toward declining to exercise jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims.” Valencia ex rel. Franco v. Lee, 316 F.3d 299, 305 (2d Cir. 2003) (citation omitted). We believe these factors favor declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiff's NYCHRL interactive process claim. Although this case is at the summary judgment stage, declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction would not waste the Court's resources, given that plaintiff's NYCHRL interactive process claim has not been briefed. See Socorro-Prospero v. M. Booth & Assocs., 2025 WL 2695609, at *6-7 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 22, 2025), reconsideration denied, 2026 WL 1134854 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 27, 2026). And we think it prudent to avoid “[n]eedless decisions of state law ․ both as a matter of comity and to promote justice between the parties, by procuring for them a surer-footed reading of applicable law.”⁸ United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966); see Cruz v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 2025 WL 551809, at *15 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 19, 2025) (“state and local law claims under the NYSHRL and NYCHRL ․ are better suited for the state courts of New York”).

E. Remaining Claims

Plaintiff purports to bring claims with respect to the SAG-AFTRA Return to Work Agreement and an entity called the “Vaccine Control Group.” See Compl. at 4. These claims fail as a matter of law.

1. SAG-AFTRA Return to Work Agreement

Plaintiff alleges that defendant breached the SAG-AFTRA Return to Work Agreement. See id. at *13-*14. Plaintiff alleges two specific violations of the Agreement. First, she claims that defendant “denied” her “due process to submit her religious and medical documents as outlined” in the Agreement. Compl. at *13. But the Agreement did not provide for “due process.” See SAG-AFTRA Return to Work Agreement. It did not lay out how requests for exemptions from vaccination mandates should be documented, nor did it establish a process for the adjudication of these requests. It only stated that vaccination mandates must be “subject to reasonable accommodations as required by law for individuals who cannot be vaccinated due to disability or a sincerely held religious belief, practice, or observance.” Id. at 6.

Second, plaintiff claims that defendant “denied” her “the opportunity to complete a COVID test prior to work establish proof that she had never contracted COVID and did not pose ․ a health risk” in violation of the Agreement. Compl. at *13-*14. But the Agreement did not require defendant to give plaintiff this opportunity.

Because plaintiff's purported contract claims do not show any violation of the SAG-AFTRA Return to Work Agreement, defendant is entitled to summary judgment. We need not reach the argument that plaintiff's claims under the Agreement are time-barred.

2. Vaccine Control Group

Plaintiff's claim with respect to the “Vaccine Control Group” is similarly meritless. Plaintiff alleges that, as a participant in the “Vaccine Control Group,” she “is not allowed to be vaccinated.” Compl. at *10. However, it is undisputed that plaintiff joined this group — which is a private, United Kingdom-based business association — in October 2021, months after she was terminated. See Certification of Participation, annexed to Plaintiff's Exhibits at *5. More to the point, there is no evidence that plaintiff's participation imposed any legal obligations on defendant.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, defendant's motion for summary judgment dismissing this action (Docket # 78) should be granted, excerpt as to plaintiff claims that defendant failed to engage in an interactive process under the NYCHR. As to this claim, the Court should decline to exercise supplementary jurisdiction.

PROCEDURE FOR FILING OBJECTIONS TO THIS REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 72(b), the parties have fourteen (14) days (including weekends and holidays) from service of this Report and Recommendation to file any objections. See also Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), 6(b), 6(d). A party may respond to any objections within 14 days after being served. Any objections and responses shall be filed with the Clerk of the Court. Any request for an extension of time to file objections or responses must be directed to Judge Caproni. If a party fails to file timely objections, that party will not be permitted to raise any objections to this Report and Recommendation on appeal. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), 6(b), 6(d), 72; Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 155 (1985); Wagner & Wagner, LLP v. Atkinson, Haskins, Nellis, Brittingham, Gladd & Carwile, P.C., 596 F.3d 84, 92 (2d Cir. 2010).

FOOTNOTES

1.   See Notice of Motion, filed Nov. 22, 2025 (Docket # 78); Defendant's Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, filed Nov. 22, 2025 (Docket # 79) and filed in unredacted form (Docket # 77) (“Mem.”); Defendant's Rule 56.1 Statement, filed Nov. 22, 2025 (Docket # 80) and filed in unredacted form (Docket # 77-1) (“R. 56.1 Statement”); Declaration of Marjorie B. Kulak, filed Nov. 22, 2025 (Docket # 81) (“Kulak Decl.”); Declaration of LaChondra Washington, filed Nov. 22, 2025 (Docket # 82) and filed in unredacted form (Docket # 77-2) (“Washington Decl.”); Declaration of Giogio Scali, filed Nov. 22, 2025 (Docket # 83) (“Scali Decl.”); Declaration of Veronique Huyghebaert, filed Nov. 22, 2025 (Docket # 84) and filed in unredacted form (Docket # 77-3) (“Huyghebaert Decl.”); Plaintiff's Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment, filed Jan. 12, 2026 (Docket # 97) and filed in unredacted form (Docket # 96) (“Opp.”); Response to Defendant's Rule 56.1 Statement, filed Jan. 12, 2026 (Docket # 95) (“R. 56.1 Counter-Statement”); Declaration of Nubia Peters, filed Mar. 3, 2026 (Docket # 109) (“Peters Decl.”); Plaintiff's Exhibits, filed Jan. 11, 2026 (Docket # 99); Defendant's Reply Memorandum of Law in Further Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, filed Jan. 27, 2026 (Docket # 104) and filed in unredacted form (Docket # 103); Declaration of Marjorie B. Kulak, filed Jan. 28, 2026 (Docket # 107) (“2d Kulak Decl.”).

2.   “* ___” refers to the page number assigned by the ECF system.

3.   Neither party has suggested that plaintiff had a record of a disability or was regarded as having a disability.

4.   Plaintiff's opposition states that she “submitted medical documentation of severe allergic reactions to vaccines and/or vaccine components.” Opp. at *11. However, we are not aware of any such evidence in the record.

5.   The fact that plaintiff was personally unaware of the difficulty of properly lighting a set using masked actors, as she expressed at her deposition, see Peters Dep. at 67:23-71:9, is insufficient to rebut defendant's evidence --- from the person actually responsible for lighting --- that this was not feasible.

6.   Plaintiff seems to suggest that defendant exempted principal actors (whose jobs did require them to unmask) from Billions’ mandatory vaccination policy, but there is no evidence that this was the case. See id. at *4-*5. Plaintiff may not rely on “unsubstantiated speculation” to defeat summary judgment. Scotto, 143 F.3d at 114. At best, plaintiff states that she “does not know whether principal actors were vaccinated but sought this information through discovery interrogatories, to which Defendant objected citing privileged.” Opp. at *4. We required that any disputes about discovery had to be brought to the Court's attention before discovery closed. Docket # 34, ¶ 10; see also Owen v. No Parking Today, Inc., 280 F.R.D. 106, 112 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (“A party ordinarily must file a motion to compel before the close of discovery and if it fails to do so, the motion will be deemed untimely.”). No dispute was ever brought to the Court's attention. The undisputed evidence before the Court is that everyone who worked in Zone A was subject to defendant's mandatory vaccination policy. See Washington Decl. ¶ 10.

7.   Plaintiff claims defendant “produced incomplete/redacted financials.” R. 56.1 Counter-Statement ¶ 26. As we pointed out in the previous footnote, any complaint about defendants’ response to discovery is untimely. Thus, the undisputed evidence before the Court is that “the daily cost of [any] shutdown would have been at least $373,634.18.” Huyghebaert Decl. ¶ 8.

8.   By contrast, it makes sense to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiff's NYSHRL and NYCHRL discrimination and retaliation claims because the elements of these claims overlap to a significant extent with the elements of her ADA and Title VII claims. See Norman v. NYU Langone Health Sys., 2021 WL 5986999, at *6 (2d Cir. Dec. 17, 2021).

GABRIEL W. GORENSTEIN United States Magistrate Judge