SHANNON CARTIER LUCY v. LUBOV FINE ART LLC (2025)

REPORT & RECOMMENDATION

Plaintiff Shannon Cartier Lucy brought this suit against defendants Lubov Fine Art LLC (“Lubov”) and Francisco Correa Cordero, alleging that they breached a pair of agreements to sell her artwork and also violated N.Y. Arts & Cult. Aff. Law § 12.01. See Complaint, filed Nov. 13, 2024 (Docket # 1) (“Compl.”). Defendants have defaulted. See Order, dated June 10, 2025 (Docket # 34). Lucy now seeks a judgment against them for compensatory and punitive damages, interest, and attorneys’ fees and costs.¹ For the following reasons, Lucy should be awarded a judgment of $90,717.18, plus pre-judgment interest.

I. BACKGROUND

Lucy filed this diversity action on November 13, 2024, see Compl., and served defendants on November 18, 2024, see Affidavits of Service, filed Nov. 20, 2024 (Docket ## 9, 10). Defendants never responded to her complaint, and on March 21, 2025, Lucy moved for a default judgment. See Notice of Motion for Default Judgment, filed Mar. 31, 2025 (Docket # 28). The district judge granted Lucy's motion on June 10, 2025, see Order, dated June 10, 2025 (Docket # 34), and referred this action to the undersigned for an inquest on damages after default, see Amended Order of Reference, dated June 10, 2025 (Docket # 35). Plaintiff served on defendants her proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law, see Affidavit of Service, filed July 7, 2025 (Docket # 41), but defendants failed to respond.

On July 18, 2025, the district judge stayed the inquest on damages and ordered Lucy to show cause why this action should not be dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. See Order, dated July 18, 2025 (Docket # 42). Thereafter, Lucy and her attorney submitted affidavits setting forth the Court's subject-matter jurisdiction. See Affidavit of Shannon Cartier Lucy, filed Aug. 22, 2025 (Docket # 48); Affidavit of Alan S. Hock, filed Aug. 22, 2025 (Docket # 49). The district judge found that these affidavits satisfied her order to show cause. See Memorandum Endorsement, dated Oct. 29, 2025 (Docket # 50).

II. LEGAL STANDARDS FOR AN INQUEST

“It is an ancient common law axiom that a defendant who defaults thereby admits all well-pleaded factual allegations contained in the complaint” except those relating to damages. City of New York v. Mickalis Pawn Shop, LLC, 645 F.3d 114, 137 (2d Cir. 2011) (citation and internal quotations marks omitted); accord Finkel v. Romanowicz, 577 F.3d 79, 84 (2d Cir. 2009) (“In light of [defendants’] default, a court is required to accept all ․ factual allegations as true and draw all reasonable inferences in [plaintiff's] favor”) (citation omitted).

As to damages, the Court “must instead conduct an inquiry in order to ascertain the amount of damages with reasonable certainty.” Credit Lyonnais Sec. (USA), Inc. v. Alcantara, 183 F.3d 151, 155 (2d Cir. 1999) (citation omitted). This inquiry requires the Court to: (1) “determin[e] the proper rule for calculating damages on ․ a claim” and (2) “assess[ ] plaintiff's evidence supporting the damages to be determined under this rule.” Id.

Lucy “bears the burden of establishing [her] entitlement to the amount” sought. Trs. of Loc. 813 Ins. Tr. Fund v. Rogan Bros. Sanitation Inc., 2018 WL 1587058, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 28, 2018) (citation omitted). While a court must “take the necessary steps to establish damages with reasonable certainty,” Transatlantic Marine Claims Agency, Inc. v. Ace Shipping Corp., 109 F.3d 105, 111 (2d Cir. 1997), a court need not hold a hearing “as long as it ensure[s] that there [is] a basis for the damages specified in a default judgment,” Fustok v. ContiCommodity Servs., Inc., 873 F.2d 38, 40 (2d Cir. 1989). In cases of default where defendants have never appeared, a court may determine damages “solely on the plaintiff's submissions.” Trs. of Loc. 813 Ins. Tr. Fund, 2018 WL 1587058, at *5 (citing Fustok, 873 F.2d at 40).

Here, the Court notified the parties that the Court might conduct this inquest into damages based upon the written submissions of the parties and that a party may seek an evidentiary hearing. See Order, dated June 16, 2025 (Docket # 36), ¶ 3. No party has requested an evidentiary hearing. Moreover, because plaintiff's submissions provide a basis for an award of damages, none is required.

III. FACTS ALLEGED IN THE COMPLAINT

Lucy is an artist. See Compl. ¶ 1. In May 2024, Lucy entered into an agreement with Lubov, an art gallery, to sell three of her paintings on consignment. See id. ¶¶ 5, 8. Cordero, as Lubov's president, personally guaranteed Lubov's obligations under the consignment agreement. See id. ¶¶ 11-12.

Pursuant to the consignment agreement, Lubov offered one of Lucy's paintings (entitled “I am the bright morning star”) for sale for $120,000. Id. ¶ 9. If Lubov sold the painting, it was to remit half the price (i.e., $60,000) to Lucy within 10 days. Id. ¶ 10. Lubov sold the painting for $120,000, id. ¶ 14, but only remitted $26,000 to Lucy, see id. ¶ 15.

The consignment agreement also specified that “in any litigation between the Parties, the prevailing party shall be entitled to recover its costs and attorneys’ fees as part of its damages.” Id. ¶ 13.

Separately, on an unspecified date, Lucy and Lubov entered into another agreement “to sell prints of Lucy's paintings.” Id. ¶ 17. Lubov failed to pay Lucy under this agreement. Id. ¶ 18.

IV. LIABILITY

A plaintiff is entitled to default judgment only if her complaint states a claim upon which relief can be granted. See Mickalis Pawn Shop, LLC, 645 F.3d at 137. Here, Lucy purports to bring (1) a claim for breach of contract and (2) a claim under N.Y. Arts & Cult. Aff. Law § 12.01.

To establish breach of contract under New York law, a plaintiff must demonstrate “(1) the existence of a contract, (2) the plaintiff's performance under the contract, (3) the defendant[s’] breach of the contract, and (4) resulting damages.” E.g., Palmetto Partners, L.P. v. AJW Qualified Partners, LLC, 83 A.D.3d 804, 806 (2d Dep't 2011) (citations omitted).²

N.Y. Arts & Cult. Aff. Law § 12.01(1)(a) provides in relevant part that,

Whenever an artist or craftsperson ․ delivers or causes to be delivered a work of fine art, craft or a print of such artist's or craftsperson's own creation to an art merchant for the purpose of exhibition and/or sale on a commission, fee or other basis of compensation, the delivery to and acceptance thereof by the art merchant establishes a consignor/consignee relationship as between such artist or craftsperson ․ and such art merchant with respect to the said work[.]3

Id. § 12.01(1)(a). Section 12.01(3) further provides that,

Any person who has been injured by reason of a violation of this article may bring an action in his or her own name to enjoin such unlawful act, to recover his or her actual damages, or both. The court may award reasonable attorneys’ fees, costs and expenses to a prevailing plaintiff in any such action.

Id. § 12.01(3). We next address whether a claim has been stated as to each cause of action with respect to the two agreements.

A. Consignment Agreement

With respect to the consignment agreement, Lucy has demonstrated each element of her breach of contract claim. She entered into the consignment agreement with defendants in May 2024, see Compl. ¶ 8, and has produced a copy of the agreement, see Consignment Agreement. She performed under the consignment agreement: Lucy was obligated to consign her painting “I am the bright morning star” to Lubov for sale, see Consignment Agreement ¶ 2.1, and evidently did so, inasmuch as Lubov sold the painting, see Compl. ¶ 14. Defendants did not perform under the consignment agreement in that they were obligated to remit $60,000 of the sale price to Lucy but only sent her $26,000. Id. ¶ 15. Lucy has therefore stated a claim for breach of contract.

She has also stated a claim under § 12.01. “I am the bright morning star” is a work of “fine art” for purposes of § 12.01; Lucy, an “artist”; and Lubov, an “art merchant.” See N.Y. Arts & Cult. Aff. Law § 11.01 (defining a “fine art” as a “painting”; an “artist” as a “creator of a work of fine art”; and an “art merchant” as a “person who is in the business of dealing, exclusively or non-exclusively, in works of fine art”). Further, Lucy “delivered or cause[d] to be delivered” the painting “I am the bright morning star.” Delivery of “I am the bright morning star” is shown by virtue of Lucy's allegations that Lubov agreed to “display” the painting at “the Independent Art Fair at Spring Studios Tribeca New York” and “offer [it] for sale,” Compl. ¶ 8, and that the painting was in fact sold, id. ¶ 14.

B. Prints Agreement

With respect to the agreement to sell prints of Lucy's paintings, Lucy's complaint fails to allege the elements of a breach of contract claim. Instead, in a single sentence, the complaint conclusorily alleges the existence of this agreement without providing any information about its terms. More egregiously, Lucy's complaint to allege with any specificity her performance under this agreement. See Gunawan v. Sake Sushi Rest., 897 F. Supp. 2d 76, 83 (E.D.N.Y. 2012) (“[A] default does not establish conclusory allegations, nor does it excuse any defects in the plaintiff's pleading”). Lucy attempts to shore up the conclusory allegations in her own affidavit. See Lucy Aff. ¶¶ 16-18. While we doubt the few additional factual allegations in Lucy's affidavit would satisfy the pleading standard under Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a), we do not address them because a defendant's liability for a default must be judged based on the complaint's “well-pleaded allegations,” not on a supplementary affidavit. Mickalis Pawn Shop, LLC, 645 F.3d at 137; see also U.S. ex rel. Nat. Dev. & Const. Corp. v. U.S. Env't Universal Servs., Inc., 2014 WL 4652712, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 2, 2014) (“[i]t is the ․ [c]omplaint, not the inquest submissions, that establishes defendants’ liability”) (quoting Gutman v. Klein, 2010 WL 4975593, at *10 (E.D.N.Y. Aug, 19, 2010)) (alterations in original).

The complaint also fails to state a claim under § 12.01 as there is no allegation that Lucy's prints were “deliver[ed]” or “cause[d] to be delivered” to defendants.

V. DAMAGES TO BE AWARDED

A. Compensatory Damages and Interest

Under New York law governing breach of contract, “where the breach of contract was a failure to pay money, the plaintiff is entitled to recover the unpaid amount due under the contract plus interest.” House of Diamonds v. Borgioni, LLC, 737 F. Supp. 2d 162, 172 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (citing Scavenger, Inc. v. GT Interactive Software Corp., 289 A.D.2d 58, 58 (1st Dep't 2001)). Lucy's affidavit as to damages repeats the material allegations of the complaint as to defendants’ failure to pay, see Lucy Aff. ¶¶ 4-12, and thus there is sufficient evidence to find that defendants failed to pay $34,000 of the money owed under the consignment agreement. In addition, Lucy has produced a text message from Cordero in which he acknowledged, “I still owe you 4k ․ + 30k remaining for the piece.” Message from Franciso Correa Cordero to Shannon Cartier Lucy, annexed as Ex. C. to Lucy Aff. (Docket # 39).

Lucy is entitled to these damages not only for her breach of contract claim but also under § 12.01, as that statute allows a consignee who has been “injured by reason of a violation of this article” to recover “actual damages.” N.Y. Arts & Cult. Aff. Law § 12.01(3).

New York awards prejudgment interest of nine percent per annum for “breach of contract” or “because of an act or omission depriving” a person of “property.” N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 5001(a); see id. § 5004(a). The starting date from which a court computes prejudgment interest is “the earliest ascertainable date the cause of action existed.” N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 5001(b). We accept July 18, 2024 – the date proposed by Lucy – for this date because it is the date of Cordero's text message acknowledging his debt. See PFFCL ¶¶ 37-38. Accordingly, Lucy is entitled to $8.38 per day from July 18, 2024, until the date of judgment. ($34,000 × .09/365 = $8.38.)

B. Punitive Damages

Lucy asserts that the “egregiousness” of defendants’ conduct and defendants’ violation of N.Y. Arts & Cult. Aff. Law § 12.01 entitles her to punitive damages. PFFCL ¶ 28.

Section 12.01 cannot provide a basis for punitive damages as its text allows suit only for “actual damages.” Id. § 12.01(3). While other provisions of the Arts and Cultural Affairs Law allow for “punitive damages,” see id. § 31.01(4), § 12.01 does not, thus reflecting that such damages are not available. Indeed, one New York case specifically notes this omission in concluding that punitive damages are not available under § 12.01. See Koeniges v. Woodward, 183 Misc. 2d 347, 357 (Civ. Ct. 2000) (“This absence of statutory authority is in clear contrast to other articles covered by the Arts and Cultural Affairs Law, and also in contrast to other statutes where the Legislature, by specific provisions or other expressions of intent, authorizes or mandates the award.”).⁴ As in Koeniges, “plaintiff cannot point to any provision of [§ 12.01] that entitles him to an award of punitive damages.” Id.

Under New York law, punitive damages are available for a breach of contract claim only if the plaintiff can demonstrate four elements: “(1) defendant's conduct must be actionable as an independent tort; (2) the tortious conduct must be of [an] egregious nature ․; (3) the egregious conduct must be directed to plaintiff; and (4) it must be part of a pattern directed at the public generally.” New York Univ. v. Continental Ins. Co., 87 N.Y.2d 308, 316 (1995) (citations omitted); accord Rocanova v Equitable Life Assur. Socy. of U.S., 83 N.Y.2d 603, 613 (1994) (“[A] private party seeking to recover punitive damages must not only demonstrate egregious tortious conduct by which he or she was aggrieved, but also that such conduct was part of a pattern of similar conduct directed at the public generally.”); Cookware Co. (USA), LLC v. Austin, 2016 WL 7378762, at *5-6 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 8, 2016) (applying the four factors to a breach of contract dispute). Further, “[s]uch damages are available only where ‘the fraud, aimed at the public generally, is gross and involves high moral culpability,’ or ․ ‘evince[s] a high degree of moral turpitude and demonstrate[s] such wanton dishonesty as to imply a criminal indifference to civil obligations.’ ” Hobish v. AXA Equitable Life Ins. Co., 43 N.Y.3d 442, 453 (2025) (quoting Walker v. Sheldon, 10 N.Y.2d 401, 405 (1961)). New York's Court of Appeals has stressed that “[t]he bar for subjecting a defendant to punitive damages on a contract claim is high.” Id.

We need not address the first three elements because the fraud here is not part of a pattern of conduct that is “aimed at the public generally.” TVT Records v. Island Def Jam Music Grp., 412 F.3d 82, 94 (2d Cir. 2005) (setting aside punitive damages award even though conduct “had an impact upon the public”), cert. denied, 548 U.S. 904 (2006). While Lucy states that Cordero “ha[s] been deceiving and stealing from three other artists who showed at Lubov,” Lucy Aff. ¶ 23, these statements are conclusory and lacking in detail as to what occurred. Additionally, the statement at best reflects that defendants’ conduct was aimed at four individuals, and not at the public generally. See Cherotti v. Exphand, Inc., 2023 WL 5526625, at *16 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 28, 2023) (conduct not “so far-reaching as to have been ‘aimed at the public generally’ ” when defendants defrauded five people) (quoting Living the Dream Films, Inc. v. Aloris Ent., LLC, 2021 WL 4342700, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 24, 2021)); see also Walker, 10 N.Y.2d at 506 (punitive damages warranted where “defrauding the general public into entering publishing contracts ․ was the very basis of the defendants’ business” but not in the case of “an isolated transaction incident to an otherwise legitimate business”). We thus conclude that the “public” requirement has not been shown.

Lucy cites to Clark v. Castor and Pollux LLC, 2019 WL 4467117 (Sup. Ct. Sept. 18, 2019), see PFFCL ¶ 49, which cites to New York case law holding that “[w]here the conduct is criminal in nature ․ there is no need to show a ‘pattern’ of similar conduct towards others” because it “amounts to an attack upon a fundamental public interest.” Id. at *12 (citation omitted).

On the issue of whether a violation of § 12.01 amounts to criminal conduct, Clark observed that

if an art merchant fails to treat consigned artworks “in accordance with the requirements of fiduciaries in section 11-1.6 of the estates, powers and trusts law, such failure shall constitute a violation of [that] section ․ and shall be subject to the penalties provided therein.” N.Y. Arts & Cult. Aff. Law § 12.01(2). The cross-referenced section ․ provides that “[e]very fiduciary shall keep property received as a fiduciary separate from his individual property” and that “[a]ny person violating any of the provisions of this section shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.” Estates, Powers and Trusts Law § 11-1.6. Thus, the Arts and Cultural Affairs Law “makes clear that a breach of such obligations include the penalties for committing a misdemeanor.” N.Y.C. Bar Ass'n, Report on Legislation by the Art Law Committee (May 2012), at 4.

Id. at *11 (alterations in original). It follows, Clark reasoned, that a violation of § 12.01 is “criminal in nature and amounts to an attack on a fundamental public interest.” Id. (quoting Muhlfield v. Bak, 174 Misc.2d 396, 399 (Sup. Ct. 1997)).

The problem for Lucy, however, is that there is no claim or evidence that Cordero failed to “keep property received as a fiduciary separate from his individual property.” N.Y. Est. Powers & Trusts Law § 11-1.6. Although it is clear that Cordero has kept $34,000 of Lucy's portion of the “I am the bright morning star” proceeds, there is no basis for the Court to conclude that Cordero has comingled these funds with his individual property. Further, unlike in Clark, there is no claim here that Cordero took possession of and refused to return works of fine art belonging to Lucy. See Clark, 2019 WL 4467117, at *2-4. As a result, the criminal provisions of Estates, Powers and Trusts Law § 11-1.6 are not triggered, and we cannot find that Cordero engaged in criminal conduct.

Accordingly, Lucy is not entitled to punitive damages.

C. Attorneys’ Fees and Costs

“Where attorneys’ fees are provided for by a provision of a contract, such a provision is enforceable under New York law and courts ‘will order the losing party to pay whatever amounts have been expended ․ so long as those amounts are not unreasonable.’ ” Griffen Sec., LLC v. Citadel Car Alarms, LLC, 2020 WL 3264173, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. June 17, 2020) (quoting F.H. Krear & Co. v. Nineteen Named Trs., 810 F.2d 1250, 1263 (2d Cir. 1987)), adopted by, 2020 WL 3791896 (July 6, 2020). Here, the consignment agreement provides for an award of attorneys’ fees and costs. See Compl. ¶ 13; Consignment Agreement ¶ 7.1. Additionally, § 12.01 also provides for an award of attorneys’ fees and costs. N.Y. Arts & Cult. Aff. Law § 12.01(3).

Under New York law, an award of attorney's fees must be “calculated on the basis of the hours actually and reasonably spent on the matter by counsel, multiplied by counsel's reasonable hourly rate[.]” Stefaniak v. NFN Zulkharnain, 180 A.D.3d 1366, 1367 (4th Dep't 2020) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Additionally,

[a]n award of an attorney's fee pursuant to a contractual provision may only be enforced to the extent that the amount is reasonable and warranted for the services actually rendered. In determining reasonable compensation for an attorney, the court must consider such factors as the time, effort, and skill required; the difficulty of the questions presented; counsel's experience, ability, and reputation; the fee customarily charged in the locality; and the contingency or certainty of compensation. While a hearing is not required in all circumstances, the court must possess sufficient information upon which to make an informed assessment of the reasonable value of the legal services rendered. There must be a sufficient affidavit of services, detailing the hours reasonably expended and the prevailing hourly rate for similar legal work in the community.

Sterling Natl. Bank v. Alan B. Brill, P.C., 186 A.D.3d 515, 520 (2d Dep't 2020) (citations and internal punctuation omitted).

Because of the similarity between principles governing attorney fee awards under New York law and under federal law, we will sometimes cite to federal cases to guide our decision-making. Indeed, New York cases themselves commonly cite to federal case law in articulating principles relating to an award of attorney's fees. See, e.g., Albunio v. City of New York, 23 N.Y.3d 65, 73-74 (2014); Degregorio v. Richmond Italian Pavillion, Inc., 90 A.D.3d 807, 809 (2d Dep't 2011).

As noted, the “starting point for determining the amount of a reasonable fee is the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate.” Arbor Hill Concerned Citizens Neighborhood Ass'n v. Cnty. of Albany, 522 F.3d 182, 186 (2d Cir. 2008) (quoting Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983)). This calculation yields a “presumptively reasonable fee” commonly referred to as the “lodestar.” Id. at 183.

1. Hours

Lucy must establish that the number of hours her attorneys spent on her case was reasonable. See Arbor Hill, 522 F.3d at 186. In evaluating this number, the Court considers “not whether hindsight vindicates an attorney's time expenditures, but whether, at the time the work was performed, a reasonable attorney would have engaged in similar time expenditures.” Grant v. Martinez, 973 F.2d 96, 99 (2d Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1053 (1993). “Because attorney's fees are dependent on the unique facts of each case, the resolution of this issue is committed to the discretion of the district court.” Clarke v. Frank, 960 F.2d 1146, 1153 (2d Cir. 1992). In exercising its discretion, the Court draws upon “its own familiarity with the case and its experience with the case and its experience generally as well as to the evidentiary submissions and arguments of the parties.” Id. (quoting DiFilippo v. Morizio, 759 F.2d 231, 236 (2d Cir. 1985)).

Further, “any attorney ․ who applies for court-ordered compensation in this Circuit ․ must document the application with contemporaneous time records ․ specify[ing], for each attorney, the date, the hours expended, and the nature of the work done.” N.Y. State Ass'n for Retarded Children, Inc. v. Carey, 711 F.2d 1136, 1148 (2d Cir. 1983). Lucy has provided her counsel's billing records showing the date on which their work was performed, the hours they expended, and descriptions of the work. See Billing Records, annexed as Ex. B to PFFCL (Docket # 38). While New York law does not strictly enforce the requirement of contemporaneity, see Riordan v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 977 F.2d 47, 53 (2d Cir. 1992), one of Lucy's attorneys, Robert L. Schonfeld, attests that these billing records are based on contemporaneous time entries. See Schonfeld Aff. ¶¶ 6-7.

The billing records indicate that two attorneys litigated this case on Lucy's behalf: Schonfeld and Alan S. Hock. See Billing Records. Schonfeld devoted 69 hours to the case, and Hock, 15.30, for a total time expenditure of 84.30 hours. Billing Records at 7. While this number of hours appears high for a breach of contract case, there were some complicating factors here, including that suit was also brought under section 12.01. We thus accept that additional legal research and factual development was required. Accordingly, we view the number of hours spent as reasonable.

2. Rates

Lucy must establish that the rate charged by her attorneys is “what a reasonable, paying client would be willing to pay,” Arbor Hill, 522 F.3d at 184, and “in line with those [rates] prevailing in the community for similar services by lawyers of reasonably comparable skill, experience, and reputation,” Reiter v. MTA N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 457 F.3d 224, 232 (2d Cir. 2006) (quoting Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 896 n.11 (1984)) (alteration in original), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1211 (2007). In assessing this rate, a district court considers the case-specific Johnson factors, which include

(1) the time and labor required; (2) the novelty and difficulty of the questions; (3) the level of skill required to perform the legal service properly; (4) the preclusion of employment by the attorney due to acceptance of the case; (5) the attorney's customary hourly rate; (6) whether the fee is fixed or contingent; (7) the time limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances; (8) the amount involved in the case and the results obtained; (9) the experience, reputation, and ability of the attorneys; (10) the “undesirability” of the case; (11) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client; and (12) awards in similar cases.

Arbor Hill, 522 F.3d at 186 n.3 (citing Johnson v. Ga. Highway Exp., Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 717-719 (5th Cir. 1974)); see id. at 190. The district court “need not ‘recite and make separate findings as to all twelve Johnson factors’ ․ provided that it ‘takes each into account in setting the attorneys’ fee award.’ ” E.F. ex rel. N.R. v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Educ., 2014 WL 1092847, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 17, 2014) (first quoting Lochren v. Cnty. of Suffolk, 344 F. App'x 706, 709 (2d Cir. 2009) (summary order); then quoting G.B. ex rel. N.B. v. Tuxedo Union Free Sch. Dist., 894 F.Supp.2d 415, 428 (S.D.N.Y. 2012)). The district court may also “rely on its own familiarity with prevailing rates in the District.” Noble v. Crazetees.com, 2015 WL 5697780, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 28, 2015) (citing A.R. ex rel. R.V. v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Educ., 407 F.3d 65, 82 (2d Cir. 2005) and Miele v. N.Y. State Teamsters Conf. Pension & Ret. Fund, 831 F.2d 407, 409 (2d Cir. 1987)).

Here, Schonfeld seeks an hourly rate of $635 from November 4 to November 19, 2024, which was then raised to $650 per hour. See Billing Records at 1-2, 7. He was a senior counsel at the law firm Moritt Hock & Hamroff LLP and was admitted to practice in 1978. Schonfeld Aff. ¶¶ 1, 5. Hock seeks an hourly rate of $750. Billing Records at 7. He is “the head of [the] firm's Intellectual Property Section” and was admitted to practice in 1982. Schonfeld Aff. ¶ 5.

“Courts in this district have held that rates between $400 per hour and $750 per hour were reasonable for partners in New York City who specialized in intellectual property, trademark, and copyright law.” Patsy's Brand, Inc. v. I.O.B. Realty, Inc., 2025 WL 3012879, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 28, 2025). Courts awarding attorneys’ fees in cases involving breach of contract claims have “found rates for partners and senior attorneys in the range of $350 to $650 to be reasonable.” Utica Leaseco, LLC v. Spatium Ent., LLC, 2025 WL 3243883, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 15, 2025), adopted by, 2025 WL 3242950 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 20, 2025); accord Byline Bank v. SDS Dining Corp., 2024 WL 1422812, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 3, 2024), adopted by, 2024 WL 5716765 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 18, 2024). Accordingly, we will reduce Hock's rate to $650 and allow the rates sought by Schonfeld.

3. Costs

Lucy also seeks costs in the amount of $2,068.43, comprising $1,633.13 for process service, $405 in filing fees, and $10.10 in postage. See PFFCL ¶ 36; Billing Records at 7. Such costs are compensable. See, e.g., Zavala v. Top Shelf Electric Corp., 2024 WL 1543605, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 10, 2024), adopted by 2024 WL 2116457 (S.D.N.Y. May 10, 2024).

* * *

Lucy's recommend attorneys’ fees and cost award is summarized in the following table:

Tabular or graphical material not displayable at this time.

The total amount to be awarded to plaintiff is $90,717.18, consisting of $34,000 in damages and $56,717.18 in attorney's fees and costs, plus pre-judgment interest.

VI. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Lucy should be awarded a judgment against Lubov Fine Art LLC and Francisco Correa Cordero for $90,717.18, plus pre-judgment interest to be calculated by the Clerk at the rate of $8.38 per day from July 18, 2024, until the date judgment is entered.

PROCEDURE FOR FILING OBJECTIONS TO THIS REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 72(b), the parties have fourteen (14) days (including weekends and holidays) from service of this Report and Recommendation to file any objections. See also Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), 6(b), 6(d). A party may respond to any objections within 14 days after being served. Any objections and responses shall be filed with the Clerk of the Court. Any request for an extension of time to file objections or responses must be directed to Judge Rearden. If a party fails to file timely objections, that party will not be permitted to raise any objections to this Report and Recommendation on appeal. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), 6(b), 6(d), 72; Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 155 (1985); Wagner & Wagner, LLP v. Atkinson, Haskins, Nellis, Brittingham, Gladd & Carwile, P.C., 596 F.3d 84, 92 (2d Cir. 2010).

FOOTNOTES

1.   See Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, filed July 7, 2025 (Docket # 38) (“PFFCL”); Affidavit of Shannon Cartier Lucy, filed July 7, 2025 (Docket # 39) (“Lucy Aff.”); Affidavit of Robert L. Schonfeld, filed July 7, 2025 (Docket # 40) (“Schonfeld Aff.”).

2.   Paragraph 7.1 of the consignment agreement states that it is governed by New York law. Consignment Agreement, annexed as Ex. A to Lucy Aff. (Docket # 39), ¶ 7.1. There is no indication as to what law governs the agreement to sell prints of Lucy's paintings, but because Lucy points to New York law in her proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law, the Court deems New York law to apply. See PFFCL ¶ 46.

3.   Once the consignor/consignee relationship is established:(i) such consignee shall thereafter be deemed to be the agent of such consignor with respect to the said work;(ii) such work is trust property in the hands of the consignee for the benefit of the consignor; [and](iii) any proceeds from the sale of such work are trust funds in the hands of the consignee for the benefit of the consignor[.]N.Y. Arts & Cult. Aff. Law § 12.01(1)(a)(i)-(iii).

4.   Koeniges also stated that the statute did not permit an award of “attorneys’ fees.” 183 Misc. 2d at 357. At the time the decision was written, the statute did not permit such an award. See 2012 N.Y. Sess. Laws. ch. 450 (A. 8604-B), § 2 (amending § 12.01).

GABRIEL W. GORENSTEIN United States Magistrate Judge