SEHRA WAHEED v. SM MMS LLC (2025)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

To the Honorable Analisa Torres, United States District Judge:

Plaintiff filed an “Emergency Motion for Interim Payments,” ECF No. 187, which the undersigned construes as a motion for preliminary injunctive relief under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65. While the motion was pending, Plaintiff filed two subsequent motions seeking largely duplicative relief. ECF Nos. 236–38. For the reasons described below, the undersigned respectfully RECOMMENDS that Plaintiff's motions be DENIED.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Sehra Waheed brought this action seeking declaratory relief, injunctive relief, and monetary damages after the contents of her rental storage units were sold through an online auction. She is suing SM 1 MMS, LLC d/b/a Manhattan Mini Storage, LLC (“Manhattan Mini Storage”)—the company that owns the storage units—and its corporate officers and affiliates, Burnam Smartco, LLC, Cris Burnam, and Mike Burnam (together, the “Storage Defendants”), as well as Storage Treasures, LLC—the company that conducted the auction—and its affiliates and principals, OpenTech Alliance, Inc. and Robert Chiti (together, the “Auction Defendants” and, collectively with the Storage Defendants, “Defendants”).

Plaintiff rented storage units from Manhattan Mini Storage, where she kept personal possessions and items relating to her business. Final Amended Complaint (“FAC”), ECF No. 211 at 2. Plaintiff signed storage contracts with Manhattan Mini Storage to rent two units with leases beginning on December 7, 2023. ECF No. 207-1. Plaintiff claims that the rental payments were often made via public assistance from New York's Human Resources Administration Family Independence Office (“HRA”). FAC at 4.

Neither Plaintiff nor HRA made a payment in December 2023 or January 2024. Id. at 5. Manhattan Mini Storage sent Plaintiff a “Notice of Default and Intent to Sell at Public Auction” for each unit, reflecting past due rent for December 2023 and January 2024, as well as various outstanding fees. ECF Nos. 207-2, 207-3. The notices advised Plaintiff that if the total charges were not paid in full by February 19, 2024, the property stored in the units would be auctioned off on February 28, 2024, at 11:00 a.m. ECF Nos. 207-2, 207-3. On February 28, 2024, Manhattan Mini Storage sold the contents of the rental storage units through an online auction conducted by Storage Treasures, LLC. ECF Nos. 207-2, 207-3.

The purchasers of Plaintiff's belongings at auction were former defendants Androniki Rentoulis, Nickolaos Rentoulis, and Irini's Originals, LLC. FAC at 5. These former defendants were dismissed from the case for lack of personal jurisdiction by Order dated June 3, 2025. ECF No. 168.

On July 25, 2025, Plaintiff filed the instant “Emergency Motion for Interim Payments” with supporting documents. ECF Nos. 187–90. Plaintiff seeks an immediate monetary payment of over $200,000.00 to pay past due rent, ongoing rent, tax debt, medical debt, and legal fees. See, e.g., ECF Nos. 187 at 3; 188 at 2, 10; 208 at 4–5; 236 at 9; 237 at 6, 8. Plaintiff claims that Defendants’ unlawful sale of her property has prevented her from paying these expenses.

On July 30, 2025, Judge Torres amended the Order of Reference to include the instant motion. ECF No. 196. Defendants filed their responses on August 6 and 7, 2025. ECF Nos. 206–07. Plaintiff filed additional submissions in support of her motion. ECF Nos. 208–10, 213. The undersigned held a conference on this motion on August 20, 2025. During the conference, and by Order dated August 21, 2025, the undersigned directed Defendants to submit supplemental briefing on certain issues. ECF No. 219. Defendants filed supplemental letter briefs on September 5, 2025. ECF Nos. 223–24. Plaintiff made numerous additional filings in support of her motion or requesting the same relief. ECF Nos. 222, 230–31, 234, 236–38, 250, 255.

II. Plaintiff's Requests for Preliminary Injunctive Relief Should Be Denied

A preliminary injunction will not be granted unless the rights of the parties are “indisputably clear.” Brown v. Gilmore, 533 U.S. 1301, 1303 (2001); Turner Broad. Sys. Inc. v. F.C.C., 507 U.S. 1301, 1303 (1993); Rosemont Enters. v. Random House Inc., 366 F.2d 303, 311 (2d Cir. 1966) (“A preliminary injunction is always a drastic remedy and the one seeking to invoke such stringent relief is obliged to establish a clear and compelling legal right thereto based upon undisputed facts.”) (internal quotation omitted). Moreover, “[t]he burden upon the moving party is heightened when the movant seeks to disturb the status quo by ordering affirmative relief, as opposed to preserving the status quo by prohibiting the non-movant from altering the status quo.” West v. Keane, No. 93-CV-6680, 1995 WL 434306, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. June 24, 1995); accord Johnson v. Kay, 860 F.2d 529, 541 (2d Cir. 1988).

In order to obtain a preliminary injunction, a movant must demonstrate: (1) irreparable harm absent injunctive relief; (2) either (a) a likelihood of success on the merits, or (b) a serious question going to the merits, or a serious question going to the merits to make them a fair ground for trial, with a balance of hardships tipping decidedly in the movant's favor; and (3) that the public's interest weighs in favor of granting an injunction. See Metro. Taxicab Bd. of Trade v. City of New York, 615 F.3d 152, 156 (2d Cir. 2010) (citing Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008)). Plaintiff does not satisfy any of these requirements.

A. Likelihood of Success on the Merits

In order to demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits, Plaintiff focuses on claims arising under four statutes: (1) New York Lien Law Section 182; (2) U.C.C. Article 7; (3) Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act (the “ADA”); and (4) the Fair Housing Act (the “FHA”). ECF No. 188 at 3-7.¹ While Plaintiff's most viable claim is for violation of the New York Lien Law, even that claim faces significant challenges and Plaintiff's recovery under that statute would likely be much less than the substantial “interim payments” that Plaintiff seeks. The remaining claims that Plaintiff highlights are not likely to succeed. ECF No. 188 at 4–7.

Even where a court cannot find that the moving party is likely to succeed on the merits, it can consider whether there is a “serious question going to the merits” and the “balance of hardships tip[ ] decidedly in the movant's favor.” Metro. Taxicab Bd. of Trade, 615 F.3d at 156. However, in the Second Circuit there are three circumstances in which a movant may not rely on the “serious questions” standard: (1) where it seeks to stay government action taken in the public interest, see Able v. U.S., 44 F.3d 128, 131 (2d Cir. 1995); (2) where the requested injunction would provide substantially all of the relief to which plaintiff would be entitled, and could not be undone if the requesting party does not ultimately prevail on the merits, see Tom Doherty Assocs., Inc. v. Saban Ent., Inc., 60 F.3d 27, 33–34 (2d Cir. 1995); and (3) where the requesting party seeks a mandatory injunction that would alter the status quo. See id.

Plaintiff's request for interim payments seeks a mandatory injunction that would alter the status quo. Additionally, as explained in greater detail below, the monetary relief to which Plaintiff could reasonably be entitled is far less than the interim payments that Plaintiff seeks. Further, Plaintiff's precarious financial situation suggests that any interim payments would be unrecoverable if Defendants ultimately prevail on the merits. Thus, this motion falls into two of the three categories of circumstances in which the “serious questions” standard cannot be applied. Accordingly, Plaintiffs must demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits.

1. New York Lien Law

According to Plaintiff, her “strongest claim” arises under Section 182 of the New York Lien Law. ECF No. 188 at 4. In short, Plaintiff contends that Defendants failed to provide the required notice before selling her property and refused Plaintiff's offered payment to cure the default. ECF No. 187 at 4.

Lien Law Section 182(6) provides that “[t]he owner of a self-storage facility has a lien upon all personal property stored at a self-storage facility” and that “[t]he lien attaches as of the date the personal property is brought to the self-storage facility.” Plaintiff agreed to this lien when she signed the storage contracts for each unit. See ECF No. 207-1 at 6, 15. Such lien “may be enforced by public or private sale of the occupant's goods ․ on any terms which are commercially reasonable after notice to all persons known to claim an interest in the goods.” N.Y. Lien L. § 182(7). For the notice to be valid, certain statutory requirements must be met, including that the notice “include the time and place of any public or private sale.” Id. A storage facility that fails to properly notice the sale of an occupant's property is liable for damages resulting from the sale. See Anderson v. Pods, Inc., 70 A.D.3d 820, 822 (2d Dep't 2010).

The Storage Defendants argue that they sent Plaintiff notices in accordance with the requirements of Section 182. ECF No. 207 at 3. Specifically, the Storage Defendants sent Plaintiff two letters stating that there was unpaid rent and fees due on units 5-2-1 and 5-2-2 and advising that the property in the units would be auctioned or disposed of on February 28, 2024 at 11:00 a.m. through StorageTreasures.com if the outstanding charges were not paid in full by February 19, 2025. ECF No. 207 at 3; ECF No. 207-2; ECF No. 207-3. However, it is not clear from the face of these notices whether the Storage Defendants fully complied with their obligations under the New York Lien Law.

Plaintiff claims she arrived at the storage facility at or around 5:00 p.m. on February 28, 2024, which was after the auction had concluded, at which point the Storage Defendants refused to accept a promised future payment. ECF No. 211 at 5. The Storage Defendants sent Plaintiff two notices on March 1, 2024, advising her of the excess proceeds from the auctions of the items stored in units 5-2-1 and 5-2-2, held on February 28, 2024, which Plaintiff could claim from the Storage Defendants within one year of the sales. ECF No. 207 at 3; ECF No. 207-4; ECF No. 207-5.

Plaintiff states that she did not receive these notices from the Storage Defendants because they were sent to an old address. ECF No. 213 at 2–3. However, the notices contained the mailing address that Plaintiff had provided in the storage contracts. ECF No. 207-1 at 2, 11. Plaintiff claims that the facility managers knew that she no longer resided at that address, but did not offer any evidence that she formally submitted a change of address. Further, Plaintiff entered the agreement for a lease beginning on December 7, 2023, making it more reasonable to assume that the address she provided at that time was accurate just a short time later. Any argument that mail service was invalid due to an outdated mailing address is therefore unlikely to succeed.

Plaintiff also argues that she did not consent to notice by electronic mail. But the agreement states, “you may choose to be contacted for legal matters related to late or lien notices, via electronic mail by providing your electronic mail address in at least two (2) locations within the occupancy agreement. One of those locations is here: sehrany@aol.com.” Id. at 10, 19. Plaintiff provided her email address in this location and also in the preamble, id. at 2, 11, and in her signature line, id. at 10, 19. Thus, any argument that Plaintiff did not consent to receive electronic notice is also unlikely to succeed.

The Storage Defendants argue that, even if Plaintiff were to succeed on her Lien Law claims, any recovery would be limited pursuant to the terms of the storage contracts. ECF No. 207 at 2, 6. Section 182(2)(a)(v) expressly contemplates that a written occupancy agreement will include a statement of a limitation on damages. See Goldberg v. Manhattan Mini Storage Corp., 225 A.D.2d 408 (1st Dep't 1996) (rejecting argument that limitation on liability contained in occupancy agreement should not be enforced).

Paragraph 4 of the storage contracts states, “personal property stored in customer's unit will be sold or otherwise disposed of if no payment has been received for a continuous thirty-day period after default. ECF No. 207-1 at 2, 11. Paragraph 9(c) of the storage contracts also limits any liability for the sale or disposal of stored property after default to $100.00 per unit. Id. at 4, 13. Even if there was no default, the storage contracts limit liability to the lesser of the value of the property or the amount stated in the Limitation On Value of Stored Property paragraph (i.e., $5,000.00 per unit). Id. at 4, 13. The Limitation on Value of Stored Property paragraph expressly states that “CUSTOMER agrees not to store property with a total value in excess of $5,000 without the written permission of the OPERATOR” and the “limitation on liability on the part of the OPERATOR may be increased on the written request of the CUSTOMER if accepted in writing by OPERATOR[.]” Id. at 4, 13.

Plaintiff claims that she told the Storage Defendants’ employees that her property exceeded $5,000.00 in value, ECF No. 211 at 4–5, but she has put forth no evidence that the Storage Defendants agreed to increase their limitation on liability in writing, as required by the storage contacts. Thus, pursuant to the plain terms of the storage contracts, the maximum amount Plaintiff could recover with respect to the contents of her two units is limited: only $200.00 if there was a default, which there appears to have been, or $10,000.00 if there was no default.²

Plaintiff could potentially prevail on her Lien Law claim, but she has not quite demonstrated a likelihood of success on this record. But even if she had made such a showing, her damages for this claim would most likely be limited to an amount far less than the “interim payments” that Plaintiff seeks by this motion.

2. Uniform Commercial Code

Plaintiff argues that Defendants failed to conduct a commercially reasonable sale of the goods stored in her units under UCC Article 7. ECF No. 187 at 4–5. A warehouse's lien “may be enforced by public or private sale of the goods ․ at any time or place and on any terms that are commercially reasonable, after notifying all persons known to claim an interest in the goods.” N.Y.U.C.C. § 7-210. However, Lien Law Section 182(1)(a) provides that self-storage facilities are not warehousemen under the UCC unless they issue a warehouse receipt, bill of lading, or other document of title for the stored goods. Plaintiff has not demonstrated that such a document of title was provided by Defendants for her stored property. Therefore, Plaintiff fails to demonstrate a likelihood of success on her claim under the New York UCC.

3. Americans with Disabilities Act

Plaintiff argues that the Storage Defendants failed to provide a reasonable accommodation for her disability under Title III of the ADA by not accepting a promised late payment from HRA. ECF No. 187 at 4; ECF No. 188 at 6. Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181 et seq., prohibits discrimination in access to public accommodations operated by private entities. PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 532 U.S. 661, 675 (2001).

Plaintiff claims that storage facilities are places of public accommodation that must provide reasonable accommodations for disabilities under Title III of the ADA, citing Hollywood v. Marr, No. 22-CV-2270, 2024 WL 1356218 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 28, 2024). ECF No. 187 at 4. In Hollywood, the court dismissed plaintiff's claim that a storage facility failed to accommodate his disability by keeping a bathroom door locked. That court explained, “Title III ․ addresses the need for owners of facilities to remove ‘architectural barriers’ to individuals with disabilities.” Hollywood, 2024 WL 1356218, at *6. Because unlocking a bathroom door is not removing an architectural barrier, the court found there was no ADA violation. Id. Further, the court found that failing to unlock the bathroom door was not discriminatory because it affected all persons, regardless of disability. Id. at *7.

Applying Hollywood's reasoning here, Plaintiff does not complain of an architectural barrier at the storage facility. Instead, she claims that the Storage Defendants discriminated against her by refusing to accept a late payment from HRA. In essence, Plaintiff argues that because HRA was responsible for paying Plaintiff's storage fees due to her disability, the Storage Defendants’ refusal to delay foreclosure when HRA failed to make timely payment constituted a failure to accommodate Plaintiff's disability. While creative, this argument fails to demonstrate a likelihood of success in claiming that Defendants discriminated against Plaintiff because of her disability. Plaintiff would have a better argument if the Storage Defendant had a policy of not accepting payments from HRA at all. But Plaintiff admits that Defendants had accepted HRA payments in the past. ECF No. 220 at 26.

Instead, Plaintiff's complaint is that the Storage Defendants refused to wait for a late payment that Plaintiff said was forthcoming from HRA. This argument suffers several flaws. First, it appears that Plaintiff asked the Storage Defendant to accept a late payment after the auction had already occurred. Second, without more, a refusal to accept a late payment cannot reasonably be viewed as discrimination. As Hollywood explained, the purpose of the ADA is to provide equal access to services that are available to those without disabilities. Hollywood, 2024 WL 1356218, at *5. Even assuming that the ADA extends beyond the removal of architectural barriers in this context, Plaintiff makes no showing that the Storage Defendants routinely accepted late payments from others and treated Plaintiff differently in this regard.

For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff is not likely to succeed on her ADA claim.

4. Fair Housing Act

The FHA “broadly prohibits discrimination in housing,” Gladstone Realtors v. Vill. of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 93 (1979), based on an individual's race, color, religion, sex, familial status, national origin, or disability, 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a), (f)(1). Generally, to state a claim of intentional discrimination under the FHA, a plaintiff must allege facts showing that (1) she is a member of class of individuals protected under the FHA; (2) she suffered “adverse treatment”; and (3) the defendant discriminated against her based on her protected classification. Palmer v. Fannie Mae, 755 F. App'x 43, 45 (2d Cir. 2018) (summary order) (quoting Littlejohn v. City of New York, 795 F.3d 297, 311 (2d Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks omitted)).

A self-storage facility, however, does not constitute “housing” under the FHA, which uses the term “dwelling.” See 42 U.S.C. § 3604. A “dwelling” is defined as “any building, structure, or portion thereof which is occupied as, or designed or intended for occupancy as, a residence by one or more families, and any vacant land which is offered for sale or lease for the construction or location thereon of any such building, structure, or portion thereof.” 42 U.S.C. § 3602(b). On the face of the statute, a self-storage facility is not occupied or intended for occupancy as a residence and therefore does not fall within the definition of a “dwelling.” Plaintiff does not advance any persuasive argument to the contrary and thus cannot support a claim that the FHA applies to her rental of self-storage units.

Instead, Plaintiff repackages the same argument she makes under the ADA—that she is entitled to accommodations regarding payment processing delays due to her disability. The first case she cites, Utah Lab. Comm'n v. Paradise Town, 660 F. Supp. 2d 1256 (D. Utah 2009), involves reasonable accommodations with respect to zoning ordinances and land use regulations, neither of which are at issue here. The second case she cites, Stephens v. New York State Div. of Hum. Rts., 187 A.D.3d 622 (1st Dep't 2020), concerns allegations that HRA sidetracked an individual's job center application due to her disability, which the court concluded were unfounded because the plaintiff in that case alleged that she had an unsubstantiated “hidden disability.” Neither case supports Plaintiff's argument that Defendants discriminated against her on the basis of her claimed disability in violation of the FHA by refusing to accept late rent payments for her self-storage units.

In short, while Plaintiff is correct that her “strongest claim arises under New York Self-Storage Facilities Lien Law § 182,” ECF No. 188 at 4, Plaintiff has not demonstrated on this record that it is likely to succeed. Plaintiff's other claims are not likely to succeed.

B. Irreparable Harm

The Second Circuit has stated that the irreparable harm requirement is “the single most important prerequisite for the issuance of a preliminary injunction.” Rodriguez v. DeBuono, 175 F.3d 227, 234 (2d Cir. 1999) (per curiam). Courts cannot “presume that the plaintiff will suffer irreparable harm[, but] ․ must actually consider the injury the plaintiff will suffer if he or she loses on the preliminary injunction but ultimately prevails on the merits.” Salinger v. Colting, 607 F.3d 68, 80 (2d Cir. 2010). “Irreparable harm is injury that is neither remote nor speculative, but actual and imminent and that cannot be remedied by an award of monetary damages.” New York ex rel. Schneiderman v. Actavis PLC, 787 F.3d 638, 660 (2d Cir. 2015) (emphasis added). “The relevant harm is the harm that (a) occurs to the parties’ legal interests and (b) cannot be remedied after a final adjudication, whether by damages or a permanent injunction.” Salinger, 607 F.3d at 81.

Applying these standards, Plaintiff might have been able to demonstrate irreparable harm had she sought injunctive relief in early 2024, before her property was sold. Had she done so, she could have claimed that the Storage Defendants’ alleged failure to comply with Lien Law Section 182 threatened an irreparable loss of her unique personal property. The problem Plaintiff faces now is that whatever irreparable harm she may have faced in early 2024 has already occurred. The purpose of a preliminary injunction is to prevent such harm, not to provide prejudgment monetary compensation after the harm has occurred. At this point in the litigation, particularly now that the purchasers of her property have been dismissed from the case for lack of personal jurisdiction, all that Plaintiff has is a claim for money damages.

Accordingly, the “interim relief” that Plaintiff seeks on this motion is effectively an award of money damages. Specifically, Plaintiff seeks an immediate monetary payment of over $200,000.00 to pay past due rent, ongoing rent, tax debt, medical debt, and legal fees. See, e.g., ECF Nos. 187 at 3; 188 at 2, 10; 208 at 4–5; 236 at 9; 237 at 6, 8. The problem for Plaintiff is that “[m]ere injuries, however substantial, in terms of money, time and energy necessarily expended in the absence of a stay, are not enough. The possibility that adequate compensatory or other corrective relief will be available at a later date, in the ordinary course of litigation, weighs heavily against a claim of irreparable harm.” Sampson v. Murray, 415 U.S. 61, 90 (1974). Indeed, courts deny preliminary injunctions when the requested relief “would essentially award plaintiff all of the ultimate relief it seeks.” 200 E. 84th St. Owners, Inc. v. Salomone & Co., No. 89-CV-5035, 1989 WL 111105, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 20, 1989). Here, Plaintiff is effectively asking to accelerate the money damages she ultimately seeks.

Plaintiff identifies no authority supporting injunctive relief in the form of monetary payments in these circumstances, and the undersigned has found none. For example, Plaintiff cites Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7 (2008), to assert that “Federal Courts may grant interim Monetary Relief,” ECF No. 188 at 3, but that case did not provide for interim damages. Plaintiff also cites Baker v. Buckeye Cellulose Corp., 856 F.2d 167, 169 (11th Cir. 1988), ECF No. 188 at 3. While this decision held that “courts are to presume irreparable harm” in Title VII cases, it provides no support for the unusual “interim payments” remedy sought here.³

There is authority for monetary injunctive relief where a non-movant's assets may be dissipated before final relief can be granted, or where the non-movant threatens to remove its assets from the court's jurisdiction, such that an award of monetary relief would be meaningless. See, e.g., S.E.C. v. Am. Bd. of Trade, Inc., 830 F.2d 431, 438–39 (2d Cir. 1987); In re Feit & Drexler, Inc., 760 F.2d 406, 416 (2d Cir. 1985); Drobbin v. Nicolet Instrument Corp., 631 F. Supp. 860, 912 (S.D.N.Y. 1986). But Plaintiff has made no showing that Defendants will be unable to satisfy a money judgment or that they will attempt to render themselves judgment-proof.

Putting aside the general unavailability of monetary payments as a form injunctive relief without a showing of dissipation of assets, Plaintiff's motion suffers another flaw: Plaintiff seeks to prevent a set of harms that are not the direct result of Defendants’ actions. For example, Plaintiff seeks over $100,000.00 to pay past-due rent and $55,000.00 for unpaid taxes. ECF No. 187 at 3. However, these tax debts date back to at least 2021, ECF No. 188-1 at 7, and the unpaid rent payments began in December 2022 at the latest, ECF No. 224-5, long before Defendants sold Plaintiff's property in February 2024. Plaintiff also asks for $18,000.00 to pay for “ongoing fertility treatments,” ECF No. 187 at 2, but there is no serious claim that Defendants caused any infertility. Additionally, Plaintiff seeks $25,000.00 for legal representation costs for this action. Id. at 3. But it is well established that “[m]ere litigation expense, even substantial and unrecoupable cost, does not constitute irreparable injury.” Renegotiation Bd. v. Bannercraft Clothing Co., 415 U.S. 1, 24 (1974) (citing Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U.S. 41, 51–52 (1938)).

At bottom, “there must be ‘a relationship between the injury claimed in the party's motion and the conduct asserted in the complaint.’ ” Little v. Jones, 607 F.3d 1245, 1251 (10th Cir. 2010) (quoting Devose v. Herrington, 42 F.3d 470, 471 (8th Cir. 1994)). See also Mostaghim v. Fashion Inst. of Tech., No. 01-CV-8090, 2001 WL 1537545, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 3, 2001) (denying preliminary injunctive relief where the only potential irreparable harm stated “has no causal nexus” with the violation alleged in the complaint); Adams v. Freedom Forge Corp., 204 F.3d 475, 489–90 (3d Cir. 2000) (affirming denial of injunction where plaintiffs’ harm was “insufficiently related to the complaint and [did] not deserve the benefits of protective measures that a preliminary injunction affords”); Ayco Co., L.P. v. Feldman, No. 10-CV-1213, 2010 WL 4286154, at *8 (N.D.N.Y. Oct. 22, 2010) (noting that a cause of action must be “linked to one of the ․ bases for a finding of irreparable harm” to be “sufficient for this Court to grant preliminary injunctive relief”).

There is no such relationship here. The “injunctive” relief that Plaintiff seeks (i.e., the payment of rent, back taxes, and medical expense) is not directly related to her claims in this action, which center on the auction sale of Plaintiff's property. To be sure, Plaintiff claims that the loss of her property has exacerbated these other problems that she faces. There is undoubtedly some truth to this assertion, but holding Defendants responsible for these unrelated financial obligations, some of which predate the auction sale that Plaintiff challenges, is a bridge too far. In essence, Plaintiff seeks a preliminary injunction awarding her an extreme form of consequential damages. However real Plaintiff's financial hardships may be, they do not constitute the type of irreparable harm needed to support a preliminary injunction tied to the particular claims at issue in this litigation, which are for money damages due to an allegedly improper sale of Plaintiff's belongings.

C. Public Interest and Balance of Equities

Plaintiff has not made a showing that either the balance of equities or public interest weigh in favor of granting the relief she seeks.

In determining whether the balance of equities tips in the plaintiff's favor and whether granting the preliminary injunction would be in the public interest, courts “must balance the competing claims of injury and must consider the effect on each party of the granting or withholding of the requested relief, as well as the public consequences in employing the extraordinary remedy of injunction.” Yang v. Kellner, 458 F. Supp. 3d 199, 216 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd sub nom. Yang v. Kosinski, 805 F. App'x 63 (2d Cir. 2020), and aff'd sub nom. Yang v. Kosinski, 960 F.3d 119 (2d Cir. 2020).

As discussed above, Plaintiff has not established that she will suffer irreparable harm with respect to the causes of action referenced in her motion. Even if Plaintiff ultimately prevails on the merits, she would most likely recover relatively small damages due to the limitation on liability in her storage contracts. On the other hand, Defendants would need to pay hundreds of thousands of dollars that they would be unlikely to recover later. Further, the requested relief is monetary in nature, which is highly unusual for a preliminary injunction. Thus, the balance of equities tip in Defendants’ favor and against an injunction.

As the requested relief involves only the transfer of money between private parties, there is no public interest in the preliminary relief sought. The cases in which the public interest factored into the court's analysis are very different from this case. See, e.g., Bionpharma Inc. v. CoreRx, Inc., 582 F. Supp. 3d 167 (S.D.N.Y. 2022) (considering burden on individuals who rely on a medication when assessing whether to grant preliminary injunction that would remove that medication from the market); Juicy Couture, Inc. v. Bella Int'l Ltd., 930 F. Supp. 2d 489 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (considering interest in preventing public confusion over competing trademarks). Thus, the public interest does not weigh in favor of granting the relief Plaintiff seeks.

III. Plaintiff's Requests for Other Relief Should Also Be Denied

A. Return of Property

Plaintiff seeks an order directing Defendants to return all of Plaintiff's property that was stored in her units. ECF No. 237 at 7. But Defendants already auctioned off her belongings to third-party purchaser who took possession of them. Those purchasers are Nickolaos Rentoulis, Androniki Rentoulis, and Irini's Originals, LLC, who were initially sued in this action but who were dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction. See ECF No. 168 (adopting Report and Recommendation). Plaintiff seems to recognize this and frames her requests such that Defendants would have to obtain her belongings and return them to her, but there is no getting around the fact that this relief cannot be granted without the third-party purchasers who are not before the Court. This request for relief should be denied.

B. Referral to Criminal Authorities

Plaintiff asks the Court to refer this action to criminal authorities for prosecution. ECF No. 237 at 8. Even assuming that the Storage Defendants violated the New York Lien Law, which is Plaintiff's strongest claim, the Storage Defendants indisputably had a valid lien upon Plaintiff's delivery of her property. Even if they foreclosed improperly, this fact pattern hardly suggests criminal activity. Indeed, Plaintiff frequently claims that she has been in contact with law enforcement about this matter, yet no prosecutor has initiated criminal proceedings to date. The undersigned therefore recommends that this request be denied.

C. Award of Monetary Damages

Plaintiff prematurely seeks an award of monetary damages, i.e., an attempt to modify the case schedule and reach the ultimate resolution of this action, ECF No. 236 at 9, and the request should be denied.

The undersigned denied Plaintiff's requests to modify the case schedule in an Order dated September 17, 2025, ECF No. 235, explaining that there is already a case management schedule in place that takes into account both Plaintiff's interest in a swift adjudication of this action and the parties’ interests in obtaining discovery regarding the claims and defenses in this action.

Further, the undersigned has explained that a party generally only has one opportunity to move for summary judgment, after the close of all discovery. Expert discovery is not yet closed. See ECF No. 163 (setting expert discovery deadline of November 25, 2025). Finally, to the extent Plaintiff is attempting to move for summary judgment, her motion should be denied without prejudice for the independent reason that it is procedurally improper and fails to comply with the Court's pre-motion requirements.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons described above, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that Plaintiff's motions seeking preliminary injunctive and other relief, ECF Nos. 187, 236–38, be DENIED.

The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to mail a copy of this Report and Recommendation to the pro se Plaintiff.

PROCEDURE FOR FILING OBJECTIONS

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Rule 72(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the parties have fourteen (14) days (including weekends and holidays) from service of this Report and Recommendation to file any objections. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), (b), (d). Such objections, and any responses to objections, shall be filed with the Clerk of Court, with courtesy copies delivered to the chambers of the Honorable Analisa Torres, United States Courthouse, 500 Pearl Street, New York, New York 10007-1312. Any requests for an extension of time for filing objections must be directed to Judge Torres.

FAILURE TO FILE OBJECTIONS WITHIN FOURTEEN (14) DAYS WILL RESULT IN A WAIVER OF OBJECTIONS AND WILL PRECLUDE APPELLATE REVIEW. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wagner & Wagner, LLP v. Atkinson, Haskins, Nellis, Brittingham, Gladd & Carwile, P.C., 596 F.3d 84, 92 (2d Cir. 2010).

FOOTNOTES

1.   Although Plaintiff's motion papers address four of her claims, Plaintiff's Final Amended Complaint asserts numerous other causes of action. These claims, however, appear less likely to succeed than the claims Plaintiff has addressed. In comparison to the four claims that Plaintiff has briefed, these other causes of action are either duplicative (e.g., claims for breach of contract, conversion, bailment, unjust enrichment, replevin, deceptive acts and practices in violation of the New York General Business Law), more attenuated (e.g., tortious interference, fraudulent and negligent misrepresentation), or seemingly frivolous (e.g., criminal trespass, wrongful continuing looting, pre- and post-deprivation, grand larceny in the first degree, violations of the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act, intentional damage to religious and deceased persons’ items, copyright infringement and trade secret theft, aggravated identity theft, HIPAA violations, discrimination in violation of the New York Human Rights Law, violations of the First, Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth amendments to the U.S. Constitution). See ECF No. 211.

2.   The Storage Defendants also argue that Plaintiff's claims related to the alleged improper sale of her property are subject to a mandatory arbitration clause, which a New York state court already found to be enforceable. ECF No. 207 at 4. Storage Defendants, however, have never made a motion to dismiss or stay this action in favor of arbitration.

3.   Plaintiff also cites Hughes v. Tennessee Department of Corrections, No. 3:20-cv-00670 (M.D. Tenn. June 11, 2021). The undersigned has searched for this case and is unable to find a case with a matching name and number in any legal research database or the Middle District of Tennessee's electronic case filing system. While this may just be a mistake, in combination with the misstated holdings of other cases Plaintiff cites, it is also possible that this is a hallucinated citation generated by AI. See Damien Charlotin, AI Hallucination Cases, (Aug. 6, 2025) https://www.damiencharlotin.com/hallucinations/ (database tracking legal decisions “in cases where generative AI produced hallucinated content,” evidencing a steadily increasing trend in court filings in this country and abroad).

Henry J. Ricardo United States Magistrate Judge