ONEFLIGHT INTERNATIONAL v. STALLION AVIATION LLC (2025)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

To the Honorable John G. Koeltl, United States District Judge:

Plaintiff ONEflight International, Inc. (“ONEflight”) brought this case against defendant Stallion Aviation, LLC (“Stallion”) to recover funds paid to lease an aircraft. ONEflight seeks the entry of judgment in the amount of $546,000.00, plus pre-judgment and post-judgment interest. After the Court entered a default judgment against Stallion, the case was referred to the undersigned for an inquest into damages. For the reasons described below, the undersigned respectfully RECOMMENDS that the Court award ONEflight $546,000.00 in damages, plus pre-judgment and post-judgment interest.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background

The following facts, which are drawn from ONEflight's Complaint and submissions related to this inquest, are deemed established for the purposes of determining the damages to which ONEflight is entitled. See, e.g., City of New York v. Mickalis Pawn Shop, LLC, 645 F.3d 114, 137 (2d Cir. 2011) (“It is an ‘ancient common law axiom’ that a defendant who defaults thereby admits all ‘well-pleaded’ factual allegations contained in the complaint.”) (quoting Vt. Teddy Bear Co. v. 1-800 Beargram Co., 373 F.3d 241, 246 (2d Cir. 2004)); Au Bon Pain Corp. v. Artect, Inc., 653 F.2d 61, 65 (2d Cir. 1981) (“[The court should accept] as true all of the factual allegations of the [plaintiff's] complaint, except those relating to damages [and plaintiff is] also entitled to all reasonable inferences from the evidence offered.”).

On November 13, 2023, ONEflight and Stallion entered into an Aircraft Dry Lease Agreement (the “Lease”), executed by Ferren Rajput, President and CEO of ONEflight, and Mark Silber, Authorized Signatory for Stallion, pursuant to which ONEflight leased a Gulfstream GV-SP G550 aircraft (the “Aircraft”) from Stallion. Complaint (“Compl.”), ECF No. 1 ¶ 6; ECF Nos. 28–29 (“Stefanski 5/12/2025 Decl.”); Ex. A to Stefanski 5/12/2025 Decl., ECF No. 29-1. In the Lease, ONEflight agreed to pay a security deposit of $364,000.00 “no later than three (3) days” after the Lease was executed and a monthly payment of $182,000.00 (the “Rent”) to lease the Aircraft. Compl. ¶ 7, 9; Lease at 7.¹

As lessor, Stallion provided a warranty that ONEflight's “quiet use, possession, and enjoyment of the Aircraft shall not be interrupted by Lessor or anyone claiming through or under Lessor.” Lease at 16. Stallion also agreed to Sections 10.3 and 10.4 of the Lease, entitled “Event of Default by Lessor” and “Lessee's Remedies,” respectively. Id. at 18, 19. Section 10.3 provides:

Any one or more of the following occurrences or events shall constitute a “Lessor Event of Default”: (a) Lessor fails to deliver the Aircraft to Lessee as required hereunder; (b) Lessor shall fail to maintain title to the Aircraft (except as authorized herein, provided it does not interfere with Lessee's quiet enjoyment under Section 8.6) and such failure to pay shall continue for a period of ten (10) Business Days after written notice is given to Lessor by Lessee; ․ (e) Lessor interferes with Lessee's quiet enjoyment under Section 8.6 ․

Id. at 18. Section 10.4 provides remedies for such default, including that Stallion must “reimburse Lessee for any advance Rent and Other Lessee Costs or other payments and refund the Security Deposit in accordance with this lease ․” Id. at 19.

On March 26, 2024, ONEflight received notice from Stallion's lender, KeyBank National Association (“KeyBank”), that Stallion had defaulted on the terms of its loan with KeyBank. Ex. B to Stefanski 5/12/2025 Decl. (the “Notice of Intent to Repossess Aircraft”), ECF No. 29-2 at 2. KeyBank sought to repossess the Aircraft, which would constitute an “Event of Default by Lessor” under Section 10.3. Id. On April 4, 2024, ONEflight sent a Notice of Default to Stallion, providing information regarding Stallion's default, KeyBank's demands to repossess the Aircraft, and demanding that Stallion cure its default. Ex. C to Stefanski 5/12/2025 Decl. (the “Notice of Default”), ECF No. 29-3 at 2. On May 1, 2024, ONEflight paid $182,000.00 in Rent to Stallion for the month of April 2024. ECF No. 31 (“Stefanski 10/6/2025 Decl.”) ¶ 3. On May 2, 2024, KeyBank obtained a Final Order of Possession for the Aircraft from the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. Ex. D to Stefanski 5/12/2025 Decl. (the “Final Order of Possession”), ECF No. 29-4. That same day, ONEflight made a second $182,000.00 rental payment for April 2024 to KeyBank. Stefanski 10/6/2025 Decl. ¶ 4.

B. Procedural Background

On November 4, 2024, ONEflight filed a complaint against Stallion asserting claims for (1) breach of contract or, in the alternative, (2) unjust enrichment. Compl. at 4–6. ONEflight sought to recover “no less than $546,000” and “such other and further relief as may just and appropriate.” Compl. ¶¶ 19–28. ONEflight served Stallion on November 19, 2024. ECF No. 8. After Stallion failed to answer, the Court issued an Order directing Stallion to answer or respond by January 13, 2025, or risk a default judgment. ECF No. 9. ONEflight served Stallion with this Order by certified mail to the Delaware Secretary of State on December 17, 2024. ECF No. 11.

Following Stallion's continued failure to respond, Judge Koeltl issued an Order directing ONEflight to file a Proposed Order to Show Cause. ECF No. 12. ONEflight then filed a Proposed Clerk's Certificate of Default on January 24, 2025, and a Proposed Order to Show Cause without Emergency Relief along with supporting Declarations from Leo D. Bronshteyn and David Stefanski on January 29, 2025. ECFs Nos. 13–19. On February 3, 2025, the Court issued an Order to Show Cause directing Stallion to respond by February 19, 2025, or risk a default judgment against it without trial. ECF No. 22. On March 10, 2025, the Court entered an Order of Default Judgment in favor of ONEflight and referred the case to the undersigned to conduct an inquest into damages. ECF Nos. 25–26.

The undersigned then entered a Scheduling Order for Damages Inquest (“Scheduling Order”), directing ONEflight to file Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law or to state that it would rely on its prior submissions. ECF No. 27 ¶ 1. On May 12, 2025, ONEflight filed Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, supported by the Declaration of David Stefanski. Stefanski 5/12/2025 Decl., ECF Nos. 28–29.

On September 22, 2025, the undersigned issued an Order directing ONEflight to provide additional information to establish its damages with reasonable certainty. ECF No. 30. Accordingly, ONEflight filed a supplemental Declaration on October 6, 2025, which described Mr. Stefanski's position as ONEflight's Corporate Counsel, his basis for knowledge of ONEflight's damages, and certain payment dates. Stefanski 10/6/2025 Decl., ECF No. 31. Defendant did not respond by the response deadline on October 22, 2025.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Legal Standard

“Even when a default judgment is warranted based on a party's failure to defend, the allegations in the complaint with respect to the amount of the damages are not deemed true. The district court must instead conduct an inquiry in order to ascertain the amount of damages with reasonable certainty.” Credit Lyonnais Securities (USA), Inc. v. Alcantara, 183 F.3d 151, 155 (2d Cir. 1999) (internal citations omitted). A plaintiff “bears the burden of establishing [its] entitlement to recovery and thus must substantiate [its] claim with evidence to prove the extent of damages.” Dunn v. Advanced Credit Recovery Inc., No. 11-CV-4023, 2012 WL 676350, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 1, 2012) (citing Greyhound Exhibitgroup, Inc. v. E.L.U.L. Realty Corp., 973 F.2d 155, 158 (2d Cir. 1992)). When assessing damages, a court cannot rely on the plaintiff's statement of the damages alone; damages must be based on admissible evidence. See Transatlantic Marine Claims Agency, Inc. v. Ace Shipping Corp., 109 F.3d 105, 111 (2d Cir. 1997); House v. Kent Worldwide Mach. Works, Inc., 359 F. App'x 206, 207 (2d Cir. 2010).

B. Jurisdiction and Venue

In an inquest, a court need not accept that there is personal jurisdiction over the defendants. See, e.g., Sinoying Logistics Pte Ltd. v. Yi Da Xin Trading Corp., 619 F.3d 207, 214 (2d Cir. 2010) (concluding that a court may sua sponte dismiss an action for lack of personal jurisdiction when considering whether to enter a default judgment); Hood v. Ascent Med. Corp., No. 13-CV-628, 2016 WL 3453656, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. June 20, 2016) (concluding that, where the district court had referred the action to a Magistrate Judge for a damages inquest after granting a default judgment, the Magistrate Judge had “authority to consider personal jurisdiction sua sponte”), aff'd, 691 F. App'x 8 (2d Cir. 2017).

ONEflight asserts that the forum-selection clause in Section 13.9 of the Lease establishes personal jurisdiction over Stallion:

This Agreement, and any claim, controversy or dispute arising under or related to the Agreement, the relationship of the Parties, and/or the interpretation and enforcement of the rights and duties of the Parties (collectively “Disputes”) shall be governed, construed, and interpreted in accordance with the laws of the state of New York (without giving effect to its conflict of laws provisions other than Section 5-1401 and Section 5-1402 of the New York General Obligations Law), including all matters of construction, validity, and performance. The exclusive jurisdiction for any Disputes arising out of this Lease shall be a State or Federal Court in New York County, New York.

Compl. ¶ 3; Lease at 22. Contracting parties can consent to personal jurisdiction through a forum selection clause, and “[w]here an agreement contains a valid and enforceable forum selection clause ․ it is not necessary to analyze jurisdiction under New York's long-arm statute or federal constitutional requirements of due process.” Exp.-Imp. Bank of the U.S. v. Hi-Films S.A. de C.V., No. 09-CV-3573, 2010 WL 3743826, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 24, 2010). Thus, the relevant question is whether the forum selection clause at issue is enforceable.

The Second Circuit has established a four-part analysis to determine whether a forum-selection clause is enforceable: (1) whether the clause was reasonably communicated to the party resisting enforcement; (2) whether the clause is mandatory or permissive; (3) whether the claims and parties involved in the suit are subject to the forum selection clause; and (4) if the first three inquiries are satisfied and the forum selection clause is presumptively enforceable, whether the resisting party has rebutted the presumption of enforceability. Phillips v. Audio Active, Ltd., 494 F.3d 378, 383–84 (2d Cir. 2007).

Applying this test, the first question is whether the forum selection clause was “reasonably communicated” to Stallion. Because Stallion is a direct party to the Lease, the forum selection clause was communicated to it. Therefore, the first requirement is met. See Horvath v. Banco Comercial Portugues, S.A., 461 F. App'x 61, 63 (2d Cir. 2012) (“Absent substantive unconscionability or fraud of a type not alleged here, parties are charged with knowing and understanding the contents of documents they knowingly sign.”).

The next question is whether the forum selection clause is mandatory or permissive. Here, the clause states “[t]he exclusive jurisdiction for any Disputes arising out of this Lease shall be a State or Federal Court in New York County, New York.” See Lease at 23. The forum selection clause is therefore mandatory, as indicated by the use of words “exclusive” and “shall.”

The final inquiry is whether the claims and parties involved in the suit are subject to the forum selection clause. Here, the clause applies to “any Disputes” arising out of the Lease, defined as “any claim, controversy or dispute arising under or related to the Agreement, the relationship of the Parties, and/or the interpretation and enforcement of the rights and duties of the Parties.” See Lease at 22–23. This matter involves claims arising under the Lease and specifically pertains to the enforcement of parties’ rights and duties thereunder. Therefore, the claims and parties involved are subject to the forum selection clause.

The first three requirements are met, which means the forum selection clause is presumptively enforceable. Stallion has made no argument to rebut this presumption. Therefore, the forum selection clause is enforceable.

Because there is an enforceable forum selection clause, there is no need to conduct an analysis under New York's long arm statute and federal standards for due process. Exp.-Imp. Bank of the U.S., 2010 WL 3743826, at *4. ONEflight has thus demonstrated that this Court has personal jurisdiction over Stallion.

Next, the Court has subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1). There is complete diversity between ONEflight, a Colorado corporation with its principal place of business in Colorado, and Defendant, a Delaware limited liability company, the sole member of which resides in New York. Additionally, the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. Compl. ¶¶ 1–3; 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1).

In a diversity case, the court must apply state law to determine the principal amount owed for a breach of contract claim and the award of pre-judgment interest. See Bleecker v. Zetian Sys., Inc., No. 12-CV-2151, 2013 WL 5951162, at *7–8 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 1, 2013); Schipani v. McLeod, 541 F.3d 158, 164 (2d Cir. 2008); Morse/Diesel, Inc. v. Trinity Indus., Inc., 875 F. Supp. 165, 180 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (citing F.H. Krear & Co. v. Nineteen Named Trs., 810 F.2d 1250, 1265 (2d Cir. 1987)). On the other hand, “postjudgment interest is governed by federal statute.” Schipani, 541 F.3d at 165 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1961(a)). Furthermore, a federal court sitting in diversity must apply the choice-of-law rules of the forum state. See Schwimmer v. Allstate Ins. Co., 176 F.3d 648, 650 (2d Cir. 1999) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1652; Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 73 (1938)). Therefore, New York choice-of-law rules apply here.

C. Assessment of Damages

1. Damages Under the Lease

ONEflight claims $546,000.00 in damages for two alternative causes of action: (1) breach of contract and (2) unjust enrichment. Compl. ¶¶ 4–6. “Courts evaluating damages first look to the complaint to determine whether the plaintiff has established a prima facie case for recovery.” Bleecker, 2013 WL 5951162, at *4 (citing Lenard v. Design Studio, 889 F. Supp. 2d 518, 528 (S.D.N.Y. 2012)). Once liability has been established, the only remaining issue is “whether the plaintiff has provided adequate support for the relief it seeks.” Id. at *6 (citing Transatlantic Marine, 109 F.3d at 111).

Beginning with ONEflight's breach of contract claim, New York law gives full effect to choice-of-law provisions that import only substantive law. See Woodling v. Garrett Corp., 813 F.2d 543, 551 (2d Cir. 1987) (citing A.S. Rampell, Inc. v. Hyster Co., 3 N.Y.2d 369, 381 (1957); Gambar Enters., Inc. v. Kelly Servs., Inc., 418 N.Y.S. 2d 818, 822 (4th Dep't 1979)). The parties agreed that the Lease would be “governed, construed, and interpreted in accordance with the laws of the state of New York.” Lease at 22–23. Therefore, New York law applies in determining the damages that are recoverable for ONEflight's breach of contract.

Under New York law, a plaintiff stating a claim for breach of contract must allege (1) the existence of an agreement; (2) plaintiff's adequate performance of that agreement; (3) a breach by the defendant; and (4) damages. Jeepster Recordings Ltd. v. World's Fair Label Grp., Inc., No. 09-CV-2155, 2010 WL 653476, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 22, 2010) (citing Log On Am., Inc. v. Promethean Asset Mgmt. L.L.C., 223 F. Supp. 2d 435, 451 (S.D.N.Y. 2001)).

ONEflight submitted the Lease, thus demonstrating the existence of an agreement between the parties. The May 2025 Stefanski Declaration stated that ONEflight fully complied with its Lease obligations. Stefanski 5/12/2025 Decl. ¶ 5. ONEflight has therefore alleged adequate performance of the Lease, satisfying the second requirement for a breach of contract claim.

ONEflight also alleged Stallion's breach. Stallion's failure to maintain title constitutes a “Lessor Event of Default” under Section 10.3. Lease at 19. Additionally, the May 2025 Stefanski Declaration attached a copy of a Notice of Intent to Repossess Aircraft sent to ONEflight from KeyBank on March 26, 2024, which provided notice of Stallion's loan default and KeyBank's right to take immediate possession of the Aircraft or its parts. Notice of Intent to Repossess Aircraft at 2. The May 2025 Stefanski Declaration also provided a copy of the Notice of Default that ONEflight sent to Stallion on April 4, 2024, demanding that Stallion immediately cure the Event of Default and reimburse ONEflight for costs incurred to enforce the Lease or obtain substitute transportation. Notice of Default at 2. Finally, the Declaration attached the Final Order of Possession dated May 2, 2024, which awarded KeyBank possession of the Aircraft. See Final Order of Possession. Based on the foregoing, ONEflight sufficiently alleged Stallion's breach.

Finally, ONEflight provided two declarations from Mr. Stefanski supporting its claim of damages from Stallion's breach. See Stefanski 5/12/2025 Decl.; Stefanski 10/6/2025 Decl. ONEflight has therefore satisfied all four elements of a breach of contract claim and has adequately stated its claim.

Unjust enrichment is an “equitable theory in nature,” appropriate only when “there is no valid and enforceable contract between the parties covering the dispute at issue.” Stephan B. Gleich & Assocs. v. Gritsipis, 87 A.D.3d 216, 222 (2d Dep't 2011) (citing AHA Sales, Inc. v Creative Bath Prods., Inc., 58 A.D.3d 6, 19 (2d Dep't 2008)); see also Clark-Fitzpatrick, Inc. v. Long Island R.R. Co., 70 N.Y.2d 382, 388–89 (1987). In other words, “[i]t is impermissible ․ to seek damages in an action sounding in quasi contract where the suing party has fully performed on a valid written agreement, the existence of which is undisputed, and the scope of which clearly covers the dispute between the parties.” Clark-Fitzpatrick, Inc., 70 N.Y.2d at 389. Here, it is undisputed that the Lease governed the parties’ relationship and ONEflight seeks no damages outside this agreement. Therefore, the Court need not calculate damages for ONEflight's unjust enrichment claim.

“Under New York law, damages for breach of contract should put the plaintiff in the same economic position he would have occupied had the breaching party performed the contract.” Oscar Gruss & Son, Inc. v. Hollander, 337 F.3d 186, 196 (2d Cir. 2003). To establish damages, “the plaintiff need only show a stable foundation for a reasonable estimate of the damage incurred as a result of the breach.” Tractebel Energy Mktg., Inc. v. AEP Power Mktg., Inc., 487 F.3d 89, 110 (2d Cir. 2007) (cleaned up) (“[W]hen it is certain that damages have been caused by a breach of contract, and the only uncertainty is as to their amount, there can rarely be good reason for refusing, on account of such uncertainty, any damages whatever for the breach.”).

a. April 2024 Rental Payment

ONEflight claims $182,000.00 in damages for the April 2024 rent paid to Stallion after it defaulted on its loan with KeyBank and failed to retain title to the Aircraft. Compl. at 6. As described in Section 2.1, the purpose of the Lease was for Stallion to “dry lease the Aircraft to Lessee ․ in accordance with the terms and conditions of this Lease.” Lease at 7. In its “Recitals,” the Lease states that Stallion is the “beneficial owner and has legal possession of the Aircraft.” Id. at 3. Additionally, Stallion's failure to maintain title is defined as a “Lessor Event of Default” in Section 10.3. Id. at 19. Accordingly, Stallion promised to provide the Aircraft for ONEflight's use, and Stallion's failure to maintain legal possession of the Aircraft directly violated its obligations under the Lease.

ONEflight submitted evidence that it paid Stallion rent for the month of April after Stallion defaulted on the terms of the Lease through sworn declarations from Mr. Stefanski, ONEflight's Corporate Counsel. Stefanski 5/12/2025 Decl.; Stefanski 10/6/2025 Decl. The October 2025 Stefanski Declaration states that ONEflight paid Stallion Rent for April 2024 on May 1, 2024, after Stallion had defaulted on the terms of the Lease. Id. ¶ 3. ONEflight also provided evidence that following KeyBank's possession of the Aircraft on May 2, 2024, ONEflight entered into a direct arrangement with KeyBank, subsequently making another rent payment for April 2024 on May 2, 2024. Id. ¶ 4. ONEflight's submissions are sufficient to satisfy its obligation to “show a stable foundation for a reasonable estimate of the damage incurred” resulting from Gattani's breach under the Guaranty. Tractebel Energy Mktg., 487 F.3d at 110.

Had Stallion performed, ONEflight would have paid only $182,000.00 to Stallion for use of the Aircraft in April 2024. See Lease. See also Compl. ¶ 9. However, due to Stallion's breach, ONEflight was required to make a second $182,000.00 payment to KeyBank for the same month. Compl. ¶¶ 15–16. Therefore, to put ONEflight in the “same economic position” under full performance of the contract, an award of damages in the amount of $182,000.00 for the duplicate April 2024 Rent payment is appropriate.

b. Security Deposit

ONEflight was required to pay Stallion a security deposit of $364,000.00 “no later than three (3) days” after the Lease was executed. Lease at 8. The Stefanski Declaration states that ONEflight paid this security deposit as required. Stefanski 5/12/2025 Decl. ¶ 4. The Declaration further states that ONEflight “fully complied with its obligations under the Lease,” including making timely rent payments and “other amounts due.” Stefanski 5/12/2025 Decl. ¶ 5.

Section 10.4 of the Lease provides that, in the event the Lessor defaults, “Lessor shall reimburse Lessee ․ and refund the Security Deposit in accordance with this Lease.” Lease at 20. Accordingly, damages of $364,000.00 to refund ONEflight its security deposit are appropriate.

2. Pre-Judgment Interest

Under New York choice-of-law rules, the law of the jurisdiction that determines liability governs the award of pre-judgment interest. See Entron, Inc. v. Affiliated FM Ins. Co., 749 F.2d 127, 131 (2d Cir. 1984) (noting that “under New York choice of law principles, the allowance of pre[-]judgment interest is controlled by the law of [the state], whose law determined liability on the main claim.”). As discussed, supra, New York law governs liability.

Under New York law, “a plaintiff who prevails on a claim for a breach of contract is entitled to prejudgment interest as a matter of right.” U.S. Naval Inst. v. Charter Commc'ns, Inc., 936 F.2d 692, 698 (2d Cir. 1991); See also N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 5001(a). The pre-judgment interest rate is 9% per annum under N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 5004(a). In New York, “[i]nterest shall be computed from the earliest ascertainable date the cause of action existed, except that interest upon damages incurred thereafter shall be computed from the date incurred.” Artnet Worldwide Corp Inc. v. Gruber, No. 21-CV-10459, 2024 WL 5245562, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. July 22, 2024) (quoting N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 5001(b)). Here, the earliest ascertainable date when ONEflight had a claim for return of its security deposit was April 14, 2024, ten days after it sent the Notice of Default. Additionally, ONEflight incurred damages in the form of a duplicate rent payment on May 2, 2024.

Accordingly, I respectfully recommend that the Court award pre-judgment interest from April 14, 2024 on ONEflight's $364,000.00 security deposit, and from May 2, 2024 on its $182,000.00 April 2024 rental payment to Key Bank, running to the date of entry of final judgment, to be calculated by the Clerk of the Court pursuant to N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 5004(a).

3. Post-Judgment Interest

ONEflight seeks post-judgment interest, which is mandatory under 28 U.S.C. § 1961. “The federal post-judgment interest rate provided for in 28 U.S.C. § 1961 applies in diversity cases.” FCS Advisors, Inc. v. Fair Fin. Co., Inc., 605 F.3d 144, 147 (2d. Cir. 2010) (citing Westinghouse Credit Corp. v. D'Urso, 371 F.3d 96, 102 (2d Cir. 2004)).

Accordingly, I respectfully recommend that the Court award post-judgment interest from the date of entry of final judgment at the statutory rate to be calculated by the Clerk of the Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1961.

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the undersigned respectfully recommends that damages be awarded in the amount of $546,000.00, plus pre-judgment interest calculated as described above and post-judgment interest from the date of entry of final judgment based upon the applicable rates.

PROCEDURE FOR FILING OBJECTIONS

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Rule 72(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the parties have fourteen (14) days (including weekends and holidays) from service of this Report and Recommendation to file any objections. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), (b), (d). Such objections, and any responses to objections, shall be filed with the Clerk of Court, with courtesy copies delivered to the chambers of the Honorable John G. Koeltl, United States Courthouse, 500 Pearl Street, New York, New York 10007-1312. Any requests for an extension of time for filing objections must be directed to Judge Koeltl.

FAILURE TO FILE OBJECTIONS WITHIN FOURTEEN (14) DAYS WILL RESULT IN A WAIVER OF OBJECTIONS AND WILL PRECLUDE APPELLATE REVIEW. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wagner & Wagner, LLP v. Atkinson, Haskins, Nellis, Brittingham, Gladd & Carwile, P.C., 596 F.3d 84, 92 (2d Cir. 2010).

FOOTNOTES

1.   Unless otherwise indicated, all citations are to the ECF docket page numbers rather than to the internal pagination of documents.

Henry J. Ricardo United States Magistrate Judge