JAMES INGRAM JR ESTATE OF RONALD GENE INGRAM v. FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS (2026)

OMNIBUS ORDER

THIS CAUSE is before the Court because of the murder of Ronald Gene Ingram in 2022. The Complaint was filed in 2023, and here we are in 2026, and the defendants have not yet been made to Answer. In the interim while this case languished in another division, multiple defendants were criminally tried, convicted and sentenced to decades in prison. In fact, the guilty pleas and jury trial of four defendants had concluded by May 2024, but an Order Lifting Stay and Reopening Case was not entered until August 2025. Then, on December 17, 2025, this case was transferred to the undersigned with the following pending motions to dismiss: Defendant, Jamar Jefferson's Motion to Dismiss ․ (“Jefferson Mot.”) (DE [71]), filed on September 5, 2025; Defendant, Kevin Selva's Motion to Dismiss ․ (“Selva Mot.”) (DE [72]), filed on September 9, 2025; Defendant, Ronald Connor's Motion to Dismiss ․ (“Connor Mot.”) (DE [73]), filed on September 10, 2025; Defendant, Florida Department of Corrections’ (“FDC”) Motion to Dismiss ․ (“FDC Mot.”) (DE [74]), filed on September 11, 2025; Defendant, Jairus Marshall's Motion to Dismiss ․ (“Marshall Mot.”) (DE [75]), filed on September 12, 2025; Defendant, Centurion of Florida, LLC's (“Centurion”) Motion to Dismiss ․ (“Centurion Mot.”) (DE [78]), filed on September 16, 2025; and Defendant, Alfred Lockhart's Motion to Dismiss ․ (“Lockhart Mot.”) (DE [97]), filed on October 20, 2025.

Plaintiff, James L. Ingram, Jr. responded to FDC's Motion (DE [83]) and Centurion's Motion (DE [84]) on October 10, 2025; and FDC (DE [102]) and Centurion (DE [100]), each replied on October 27, 2025. On October 10, 2025, Plaintiff also filed a consolidated response to the Motions filed by Jefferson, Selva, Connor, and Marshall (DE [85]) to which Jefferson replied (DE [96]) on October 16, 2025; and Connor (DE [99]), Selva (DE [101]), and Marshall (DE [103]), each replied on October 27, 2025. Plaintiff responded to Lockhart's Motion (DE [98]), on October 25, 2025, and Lockhart did not file a reply. The Court has considered the record, the parties’ written submissions, and applicable law. For the following reasons, the Motions are denied.

I. BACKGROUND 1

This civil rights action stems from the fatal beating of Ronald (“Ronnie”) Ingram ² at Dade Correctional Institution (“DCI”) on February 14, 2022. See (Am. Compl. (DE [56]), ¶ 1). Plaintiff, Ronnie's brother, alleges that seven FDC guards at DCI—Christopher Rolon, Kirk Walton, Sergeant Jeremy Godbolt, Connor, Selva, Lockhart, and Jefferson (the “Officer Defendants”)—beat Ronnie to death while his hands were cuffed behind his back as punishment for his mental illness. (Id.) Their supervising officer, Marshall, allegedly “authorized [the] beating and assisted in the attempted coverup.” (Id. ¶ 3 (alteration added)).

Plaintiff brings three claims: violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and Rehabilitation Act (“RA”) against FDC (Count I) (see id. ¶¶ 146–65) and violations of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution to the United States under 42 U.S.C. section 1983 against Centurion (Count II) (see id. ¶¶ 166–82) and against the Officer Defendants and Marshall (Count III) (see id. ¶¶ 183–95).

A. Ronnie Ingram

Ronnie Ingram was born on October 6, 1961. (Id. ¶ 21). From an early age, Ronnie exhibited signs of developmental delay, intellectual disability, and paranoia, and at age seven, a psychologist determined that he had an IQ of 78. (Id. ¶¶ 22–23). He lived with his parents until he was twenty-five years old, when he was sentenced to prison. (Id. ¶ 27). Throughout his time at FDC, Ronnie received multiple mental health diagnoses, including schizophrenia, hallucinations, and personality disorder. (Id. ¶ 28).

Ronnie's family noticed a decline in his mental health throughout his incarceration, as he became increasingly obsessed with imaginary friends and enemies, ultimately becoming unable to hold conversations with actual people. (Id. ¶ 29). Plaintiff alleges that one cause of Ronnie's deterioration was “FDC's well-documented practice of punishing prisoners for exhibiting symptoms of mental illness[.]” (Id. ¶ 30 (alteration added)). Ronnie experienced uncontrollable symptoms of mental illness, including hallucinations, paranoia, and delusional thinking, which caused him to act erratically — including yelling, throwing feces or urine, and refusing to comply with officers’ commands. (Id.). FDC guards allegedly punished him by placing him in solitary confinement. (Id.). Ronnie's behavior would occasionally stabilize, particularly when he was taking medications and receiving a high level of care; however, as soon as he stabilized, FDC and Centurion would move him to a lower level of care, and his behavior would regress. (Id. ¶¶ 31–32).

Prior to October 4, 2021, Ronnie was housed at Lake Correctional Institution (“LCI”), an institution equipped to provide the highest level of mental health care provided by the FDC, and he was deemed compliant with his medications. (Id. ¶ 33). On October 4, 2021, FDC and Centurion transferred Ronnie to DCI and housed him in the West Wing of the Transitional Care Unit (“TCU”), where prisoners are confined alone. (Id. ¶¶ 34–35). Following his transfer, Ronnie immediately stopped taking all medications—including his medications for schizoaffective disorder and hypothyroidism—and became “increasingly unwell, withdrawn, unkempt, and mentally unstable.” (Id. ¶¶ 36–37). Ronnie refused to leave his cell and “viewed all correctional officers as threats.” (Id. ¶ 37). DCI's mental health provider, Centurion, allegedly “did nothing to treat Ronnie for over four months” and “allowed him to deteriorate in his cell until finally approving his transfer back to [LCI].” (Id. ¶ 38 (alteration added)).

B. The Attack on Ronnie

Ronnie was scheduled to leave for LCI on February 14, 2022, at 3:00 a.m. (Id. ¶ 39). When Godbolt went to Ronnie's cell and told him to prepare to leave, Ronnie—believing that Godbolt intended to harm him—responded by throwing urine at Godbolt. (Id. ¶¶ 41–42). After Godbolt reported the incident, Marshall, the Captain, requested and received authorization for a “cell extraction”—a procedure where at least five officers wearing protective armor and carrying shields forcibly extract a prisoner from his cell. (Id. ¶¶ 44–46). The five-officer team included Lockhart, Selva, Connor, Walton, and Rolon. (Id. ¶ 46).

Prior to executing the cell extraction, Marshall was able to successfully speak with Ronnie and calm him, and Ronnie allowed Lockhart to handcuff him behind his back. (Id. ¶¶ 48–49). Lockhart and Godbolt walked Ronnie out of his cell and down a breezeway out of view of security cameras. (Id. ¶¶ 49–50). Walton and Rolon were waiting in the breezeway for Ronnie to arrive and were later joined by Selva, Jefferson, and Connor. (Id. ¶ 52). As retaliation for Ronnie having thrown urine at Godbolt, the Officer Defendants allegedly “maliciously beat” Ronnie for up to twelve minutes. (Id. ¶¶ 53, 56). Other officers witnessed the beating directly or were otherwise aware of it and did nothing to stop it. (Id. ¶¶ 54–55). Marshall was waiting outside. (Id. ¶ 58).

Rather than taking Ronnie to receive medical care following this incident, the Officer Defendants, led by Marshall, carried him to the Admin Building at DCI. (Id. ¶¶ 59–60). Godbolt and Walton continued to assault Ronnie during this walk, and Marshall and the other Officer Defendants failed to intervene. (Id. ¶ 61). When the group arrived at the Admin Building, Godbolt, Walton, and Rolon brought Ronnie to a hallway out of view of security cameras, where he was unable to sit up without assistance. (Id. ¶¶ 65–66). Marshall and the other Officer Defendants met with the transport team. (Id. ¶ 64). A transport officer assisted Walton and Rolon in putting transport restraints on Ronnie, and they carried Ronnie to the transport van. (Id. ¶¶ 67, 69). Once Ronnie was loaded into the transport van, he laid down on a bench and asked for water. (Id. ¶¶ 69–70). Marshall denied the request. (Id. ¶ 69). No one checked on Ronnie until approximately seven hours later, and at that point, he had already been dead for hours. (Id. ¶ 71). Ronnie's cause of death was blunt force injuries to the chest due to assault, and his death was deemed a homicide. (Id. ¶ 74).

C. After the Attack on Ronnie

The Officer Defendants and Marshall did not report Ronnie's beating and failed to file an incident report. (Id. ¶ 75). Later that day, Marshall called Godbolt to inform him of Ronnie's death and advised him to “make sure y'all get y'all stories straight.” (Id. ¶ 77). Rolon, Walton, Jefferson, Lockhart, and Connor met in an area of DCI with no cameras and allegedly agreed to remain silent and not cooperate with investigators. (Id. ¶ 78).

None of the officers admitted to Florida Department of Law Enforcement (“FDLE”) investigators what happened to Ronnie until they received immunity in exchange for their testimony. (Id. ¶¶ 81–82). Marshall declined to cooperate with the investigation, and his version of events was contradicted by all other FDC officers involved. (Id. ¶ 83). Several officers testified that Marshall stated, both before and after the beating, that his team would punish Ronnie for throwing urine at Godbolt, meaning that the officers intended to beat him. (Id. ¶ 91).

Godbolt, Rolon, and Walton were each convicted of Murder in the Second Degree, Aggravated Abuse on an Elderly/Disabled Adult, and Battery on a Detainee, and received twenty-year Florida State Prison sentences.³ (Id. ¶ 84). Connor was convicted of Culpable Negligence in connection with Ronnie's death. (Id. ¶ 85). Plaintiff alleges that several of the officers involved in these events remain employed by FDC. (Id. ¶ 86).

D. Alleged Systemic Abuse of Mentally Ill Individuals at DCI's TCU

Ronnie was housed in the West Wing of the TCU, the part of the prison designated for individuals with chronic, severe mental illness. (Id. ¶ 93). Under FDC procedures, guards posted at the TCU are required to receive “Mental Health Unit” training to teach them how to manage mentally ill individuals. (Id. ¶ 103). Plaintiff alleges that this training is rudimentary and insufficient, and that Selva never received Mental Health Unit training. (Id.).

Plaintiff asserts that TCU prisoners at DCI have suffered systemic abuse and torture for years. (Id. ¶ 94). Plaintiff cites a previous incident in which guards at DCI beat a handcuffed TCU prisoner in the same breezeway where Ronnie was later beaten. (Id. ¶ 95). Plaintiff also cites several instances in which TCU prisoners were subjected to scalding hot showers. (Id. ¶¶ 96–97). In one case, a prisoner was punished with a scalding shower for smearing feces on himself and his cell walls, and ultimately died from his injuries. (Id.). As a part of a settlement in a prior lawsuit filed by Disability Rights Florida against FDC, FDC agreed to install a new camera system at DCI and improve guard training. (Id. ¶ 98). Yet, Plaintiff alleges that cameras were not installed in the TCU breezeway where Ronnie was beaten, and guards continue to beat prisoners outside camera view. (Id. ¶¶ 99–100).

Plaintiff alleges that at the time of Ronnie's death, DCI guards routinely punished prisoners informally through beatings in areas outside not visible to the facility's cameras. (Id. ¶ 104). Rolon admitted that officers regularly slapped, punched, or beat prisoners who disrespected officers. (Id. ¶ 105). Godbolt testified that other officers mocked him for only hitting a prisoner one or two times during these group beatings. (Id. ¶ 106). Marshall and Rolon were known among FDC officers and Centurion staff for being violent with prisoners. (Id. ¶ 107).

One TCU prisoner told FDLE investigators that guards routinely beat prisoners (id. ¶ 108), and a second prisoner stated that he had been handcuffed and beaten in a manner similar to Ronnie (id. ¶ 109). A third prisoner informed investigators that he avoids reporting or intervening in these abuses because he fears suffering similar beatings as retaliation. (Id. ¶ 110).

E. Centurion's Alleged Involvement in the Systemic Abuse

FDC contracted Centurion to provide healthcare to prisoners in the TCU. (Id. ¶ 111). It was common knowledge among Centurion employees assigned to the TCU that FDC guards routinely punished TCU prisoners with beatings and were engaging in systemic abuse. (Id. ¶¶ 112, 115). Centurion employees maintained close relationships with the TCU guards; for example, Lockhart and Godbolt were dating Centurion nurses. (Id. ¶¶ 113–14). Plaintiff alleges three customs, policies, or practices that could give rise to Monell liability: (1) failure to provide medical treatment to prisoners following use-of-force incidents (id. ¶ 178), (2) failure to report or intervene in the systemic abuse of TCU patients by guards (id. ¶ 177), and (3) deliberate indifference to the ongoing deterioration of TCU prisoners (id. ¶¶ 171–72).

II. LEGAL STANDARD

“To survive a motion to dismiss [under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)], a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ ” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007) (alteration added)). Although this pleading standard “does not require ‘detailed factual allegations,’ ․ it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555) (alteration added). Pleadings must contain “more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do[.]” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (alteration added; citation omitted). “[O]nly a complaint that states a plausible claim for relief survives a motion to dismiss.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (alteration added; citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).

To meet this “plausibility standard,” a plaintiff must “plead[ ] factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. at 678 (alteration added; citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “The mere possibility the defendant acted unlawfully is insufficient to survive a motion to dismiss.” Sinaltrainal v. Coca-Cola Co., 578 F.3d 1252, 1261 (11th Cir. 2009) (citing Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678), abrogated on other grounds by Mohamad v. Palestinian Auth., 566 U.S. 449 (2012). When considering a motion to dismiss, a court construes the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and accepts its factual allegations as true. See Brooks v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Fla., Inc., 116 F.3d 1364, 1369 (11th Cir. 1997) (citing SEC v. ESM Grp., Inc., 835 F.2d 270, 272 (11th Cir. 1988)).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Plaintiff's Amended Complaint is Not a Shotgun Pleading

Jefferson, Selva, Connor, Marshall, and Lockhart ⁴ (the “Individual Defendants”) argue that Plaintiff's Amended Complaint should be dismissed because it is a shotgun pleading that improperly lumps together allegations against all the Individual Defendants, pleads various theories of liability under one count, and incorporates factual allegations of preceding paragraphs. See (Jefferson Mot.; Selva Mot.; Connor Mot.; Marshall Mot.; Lockhart Mot.) Remarkably, as opposed to Plaintiff's Amended Complaint being a shotgun pleading, the Court today deals with shotgun motions to dismiss; that is, the motions to dismiss throw the spaghetti against the wall to see what sticks, but nothing does.

Under Rule 8(a)(2), a pleading must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief[.]” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) (alteration added). Under Rule 10(b), “[a] party must state its claims or defenses in numbered paragraphs, each limited as far as practicable to a single set of circumstances.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(b) (alteration added).

“Shotgun” pleadings are complaints that violate either Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), 10(b), or both. See Weiland v. Palm Beach Cnty. Sheriff's Off., 792 F.3d 1313, 1320 (11th Cir. 2015). There are four types of shotgun pleadings: (1) a “complaint containing multiple counts where each count adopts the allegations of all preceding counts”; (2) a complaint “replete with conclusory, vague, and immaterial facts not obviously connected to any particular cause of action”; (3) a complaint that does not separate each claim into a different count; and (4) a complaint that “assert[s] multiple claims against multiple defendants without specifying which of the defendants are responsible for which acts or omissions, or which of the defendants the claim is brought against.” Id. at 1321–23 (alteration added). Shotgun pleadings fail to give the defendants “adequate notice of the claims against them and the grounds upon which each claim rests.” Vibe Micro, Inc. v. Shabanets, 878 F.3d 1291, 1295 (11th Cir. 2018).

1. First Category

Jefferson, Selva, and Marshall assert that Plaintiff's Amended Complaint falls in the first category of shotgun pleadings because it incorporates paragraphs 1–145 at the start of Count III. See (Jefferson Mot. 4; Selva Mot. 8; Marshall Mot. 5). But paragraphs 1-145 set forth the factual background of the case, and Count One starts at paragraph 146. To say this argument is a misapplication of the first category is putting it kindly. As explained in Weiland, the first category of shotgun pleadings occurs only when “each count adopts the allegations of all preceding counts.” Weiland, 792 F.3d at 1321 (emphasis added). Here, the Amended Complaint incorporates only common factual allegations, not the allegations of preceding counts. See (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 145, 166, 183).

2. Second Category

Selva, Connor, and Marshall contend that the Amended Complaint falls in the second category of shotgun pleadings because it contains conclusory, vague, or immaterial facts not connected to any particular cause of action. See (Selva Mot. 8; Connor Mot. 5; Marshall Mot. 5).

Selva asserts that the Amended Complaint contains numerous conclusory allegations but fails to cite to any specific allegation that he finds objectionable, and rather generally argues that other officers’ statements about punishing Ronnie have no relevance to him. (Selva Mot. 9). This raises “a question of proof, not pleading.” Kyle K. v. Chapman, 208 F.3d 940, 944 (11th Cir. 2000). At this stage in proceedings, the Court accepts all well-pleaded allegations as true and therefore accepts the reasonable inference that Selva intended to cause Ronnie harm as he beat the mentally ill, handcuffed inmate in an unmonitored hallway alongside six other guards. See Brooks, 116 F.3d at 1369.

Connor points to the following allegations as vague or conclusory: “that officers ‘met in a room’ before escorting [Ronnie] (FAC ¶ 47 (alteration added)), that ‘possibly others’ were waiting in the breezeway (FAC ¶ 52), or that ‘other officers’ made statements afterward (FAC ¶ 64).” (Connor Mot. 5–6). When reviewing the paragraphs cited by Connor, there is nothing vague or conclusory about these allegations. Plaintiff specifically names the officers who “met in a room in the TCU” to plan Ronnie's punishment—and includes Connor. (Am. Compl. ¶ 47). While Plaintiff does not allege exactly when Connor arrived in the breezeway, he clearly alleges that Connor was present at some point during the beating. (Id. ¶ 52). Finally, the Amended Complaint does not state that “other officers” made statements, but rather quotes Marshall as saying, “This guy will never throw piss on anyone again.” (Id. ¶ 64).

Marshall argues that the Amended Complaint contains a “vague assertion that Captain Marshall was ‘present at the scene,’ despite multiple scenes being described throughout the First Amended Complaint[.]” (Marshall Mot. 7 (alteration added)). Marshall does not cite to a specific paragraph, so the Court cannot be certain what allegation Marshall is referencing. Moreover, the Amended Complaint contains over a dozen allegations describing Marshall's involvement. See (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 3, 47, 51, 58, 60–62, 64, 69, 77, 83, 91, 107, 188–89). The allegations are neither vague nor conclusory.

3. Third Category

Selva, Connor, and Marshall also argue that the Amended Complaint falls in the third category of shotgun pleadings because it asserts multiple theories of liability under one count. See (Selva Mot. 7–8; Connor Mot. 5; Marshall Mot. 6–7). But “[a] complaint is not always required to contain a separate count for each constitutional provision that the same set of facts is claimed to violate.” Weiland, 792 F.3d at 1325 n.18 (alteration added). Rule 10(b) states only that “[i]f doing so would promote clarity, each claim founded on a separate transaction or occurrence ․ must be stated in a separate count or defense.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(b) (alteration added). It does not state that one transaction or occurrence that violates multiple constitutional provisions or implicates multiple theories of liability must be stated in multiple counts. See Weiland, 792 F.3d at 1325 n.18 (“Multiplicity does not always equate with clarity.”).

A separate count for each theory of liability—all based on the same “transaction or occurrence”—would not “promote clarity” in this case. The Amended Complaint makes clear that “Defendants Rolon, Walton, Godbolt, Connor, Selva, Lockhart, and Jefferson maliciously and sadistically beat Ronnie for the purpose of causing harm to him.” (Am. Compl. ¶ 186). Defendants Lockhart, Jefferson, and Marshall each failed to intervene. (Id. ¶¶ 187–88). “All of the individual Defendants ․ failed to provide [Ronnie] with medical care” after the beatings. (Id. ¶ 191 (alteration added)). It is not necessary for Plaintiff to separate out each theory of liability into a separate claim.

4. Fourth Category

Finally, Jefferson, Selva, Connor, Marshall, and Lockhart argue that Count III of the Amended Complaint impermissibly lumps all individual defendants together. (Jefferson Mot 4; Selva Mot. 8; Connor Mot. 5; Marshall Mot. 6; Lockhart Mot. 4–5). The Individual Defendants do not cite any allegation within Count III that fails to specify which Defendant is liable for specific conduct.

“The fact that defendants are accused collectively does not render [a] complaint deficient.” Kyle K., 208 F.3d at 944 (alteration added). The problem arises only if the complaint fails to “specify[ ] which of the defendants are responsible for which acts or omissions[.]” Weiland, 792 F.3d at 1325 (alterations added). Here, the Amended Complaint makes separate allegations as to Jefferson, (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 3, 52–54, 78, 186–87), Selva (id. ¶¶ 3, 46, 52–53, 60, 103, 186), Connor (id. ¶¶ 3, 46–47, 52–53, 60, 78, 85, 186), Marshall (id. ¶¶ 3, 45, 47–48, 51, 58, 60–62, 64, 69, 77, 83, 91, 107, 188–89), and Lockhart (id. ¶¶ 3, 46, 49, 53–54, 60, 78, 186–87). There is no confusion as to which Defendant was involved in each step of the alleged attack on Ronnie and the alleged coverup. Thus, Plaintiff's Amended Complaint is not a shotgun pleading.

B. Count I – Violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act and Rehabilitation Act Against FDC

Title II of the ADA provides that “no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.” 42 U.S.C. § 12132. As the Rehabilitation Act (RA) provides identical protections, ADA and RA claims are evaluated under the same standards. Sutton v. Lader, 185 F.3d 1203, 1207 n.5 (11th Cir. 1999). To state a claim under the ADA or RA, Plaintiff must allege that: (1) Ronnie was a qualified individual with a disability, (2) he was either excluded from participation in or denied the benefits of a public entity's services, programs, or activities, or otherwise discriminated against by the public entity, and (3) the exclusion, denial of a benefit, or discrimination was because of Ronnie's disabilities. Bircoll v. Miami-Dade County, 480 F.3d 1072, 1083 (11th Cir. 2007).

Absent a state's consent, the Eleventh Amendment prohibits federal courts from hearing cases against a state or one of its agencies. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 99–100 (1984). The Eleventh Amendment is no bar, however, where Congress has properly abrogated the state's sovereign immunity. Id. The ADA contains “an unequivocal expression of Congress's intent to abrogate state sovereign immunity.” United States v. Georgia, 546 U.S. 151, 154 (2006) (“In enacting the ADA, Congress ‘invoke[d] the sweep of congressional authority, including the power to enforce the fourteenth amendment ․’ ” (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)) (alterations in original)). “[B]ecause the Fourteenth Amendment grants Congress the power to enforce its provisions, Title II of the ADA validly abrogates state sovereign immunity to the extent that it creates a cause of action for damages against states for conduct that violates the Fourteenth Amendment.” Redding v. Georgia, 557 Fed. Appx. 840, 844 (11th Cir. 2014) (citing Georgia, 546 U.S. at 158–59); see also Georgia, 546 U.S. at 157 (noting that the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates the Eighth Amendment against the states).

Eighth Amendment challenges to conditions of confinement are subject to a two-part analysis. Chandler v. Crosby, 379 F.3d 1278, 1289 (11th Cir. 2004). First is the “objective component,” requiring a prisoner to prove the condition they complain of is “sufficiently serious” to violate the Eighth Amendment, meaning that, at the very least, it presents an unreasonable risk of serious damage to his or her future health or safety. Id. The risk must be “so grave that it violates contemporary standards of decency to expose anyone unwillingly to such a risk.” Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 33 (1993). Second, the “subjective component” of the analysis requires the prisoner to show that the defendant prison officials acted with a culpable state of mind, judged under a “deliberate indifference” standard. Chandler, 379 F.3d at 1289. To prove deliberate indifference, a prisoner must show that the defendants had subjective knowledge of a risk of serious harm and disregarded that risk through conduct constituting more than gross negligence. Redding, 557 Fed. Appx. at 844 (citing Goodman v. Kimbrough, 718 F.3d 1325, 1332 (11th Cir. 2013)).

FDC argues that it is entitled to sovereign immunity because Plaintiff failed to allege that FDC violated the ADA or the Fourteenth Amendment. (FDC Mot. 7). Plaintiff responds that the ADA abrogates FDC's sovereign immunity and that he does sufficiently state an ADA claim and violation of the Eighth Amendment. See (DE [83], 3–7).

The Court will first address whether Plaintiff sufficiently alleged that FDC violated the ADA. First, FDC concedes that Ronnie was a qualified individual with a disability, satisfying the first element. (FDC Mot. 6). The Amended Complaint sufficiently alleges the second element by claiming that FDC guards “otherwise discriminated” against Ronnie by beating him to death for being mentally ill and as a punishment for his schizoaffective behavior. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 156–59). As to the third element, Plaintiff alleges that “Ronnie's act of throwing urine at Sergeant Godbolt was a manifestation of his schizoaffective disorder” (id. ¶ 90), and that the guards “intentionally discriminated against Ronnie ․ by punishing him for his schizoaffective behavior” (id. ¶¶ 47, 56, 64, 91). Thus, Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged the elements of an ADA/RA claim. See Sutton, 185 F.3d at 1207 n.5.

Next, FDC argues that Plaintiff is precluded from seeking compensatory damages under the ADA/RA because Plaintiff failed to allege that the FDC had actual knowledge that officers were intentionally discriminating against Ronnie. (FDC Mot. 10). FDC claims that Plaintiff attempts to plead a vicarious liability theory, which is not a permissible theory of recovery, because he does not allege that an individual with appropriate authority was aware of the discriminatory conduct. (See id.). Plaintiff responds that he is not precluded from seeking compensatory damages because he plausibly pleads deliberate indifference.

To secure compensatory damages against a public entity, the plaintiff must prove that the public entity engaged in intentional discrimination, which requires a showing of deliberate indifference. Ingram v. Kubik, 30 F.4th 1241, 1257 (11th Cir. 2022). A plaintiff must sufficiently allege “the deliberate indifference of ‘an official who at a minimum has authority to address the alleged discrimination and to institute corrective measures on the [organization's] behalf [and who] has actual knowledge of discrimination in the [organization's] programs and fails adequately to respond.’ ” Liese v. Indian River Cnty. Hosp. Dist., 701 F.3d 334, 349 (11th Cir. 2012) (quoting Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 290 (1998) (alterations and emphasis in original)). “The question of how far up the chain of command one must look to find an ‘official’ is necessarily a fact-intensive inquiry, since an official's role may vary from organization to organization.” Id. at 350. In the ADA/RA context, an official is someone who enjoys substantial supervisory authority within an organization's chain of command” and “had complete discretion at a ‘key decision point[.]’ ” Id. (finding that a reasonable juror could conclude that doctors at a public hospital were “officials” within the meaning of Gebser) (alterations added).

Here, FDC argues that FDC officers do not have authority to institute corrective measures on its behalf, and only the FDC Secretary has that authority. (See FDC Mot. 11). But “[n]owhere in the language of Gebser does the Court indicate that only those who are authorized to set an entity's policy may be officials.” Liese, 701 F.3d at 349. FDC officers can be considered officials within the meaning of Gebser if they enjoy substantial supervisory authority and had complete discretion at a key decision point. See id. at 350.

Plaintiff specifies five officials sufficiently high up within FDC's chain of command to have authority to correct the systemic abuse of inmates with mental disabilities: FDC's contract manager for Centurion's contract, FDC's Health Services Director, FDC's Psychological Services Director, the Warden at DCI, and the Assistant Warden at DCI. (Am. Compl. ¶ 144–45). Plaintiff alleges that through Contract Monitoring Reports and Correctional Medical Authority audits, these officials “who had substantial supervisory authority within their chain of command and had complete discretion at key decision points knew that harm to federally protected rights of incarcerated people with mental illnesses at [DCI] was substantially likely and failed to act on that likelihood.” (Id. ¶ 144). “They knew that it was substantially likely that programs, services, and activities were being rendered unavailable to those with mental disabilities at [DCI], and that such individuals would be excluded from them because of failure to accommodate or modify them to render them safe and accessible.” (Id.). As Plaintiff alleges that several FDC officials had substantial supervisory authority, had complete discretion at key decision points, knew of the harm to incarcerated people with mental illnesses, and failed to act, Plaintiff sufficiently alleges deliberate indifference.

Finally, FDC argues that Title II of the ADA as applied in the Eighth Amendment context to state prisons fails to meet the requirement of proportionality and congruence to abrogate its sovereign immunity. (FDC Mot. 9–10). FDC argues that abrogating FDC's sovereign immunity by applying the ADA to an Eighth Amendment violation “would substantively and materially rewrite the Eighth Amendment law and how it applies in the prison context as a whole.” (Id.). But as discussed supra, it is well-established that Congress intended for the ADA to prohibit Eighth Amendment violations, and Eighth Amendment violations can serve as the basis for an ADA/RA claim against state prisons. See Georgia, 546 U.S. at 157 (noting that the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates the Eighth Amendment against the states); see also Siskos v. Sec'y, Dep't of Corr., 817 Fed. Appx. 760, 766 (11th Cir. 2020) (noting that a prisoner sufficiently alleges conduct that “violated the Fourteenth Amendment” if he states “a viable claim under the Eighth Amendment”).

FDC argues in their reply that Plaintiff did not sufficiently allege the elements of an Eighth Amendment claim. See (DE [102] 2–5). Because FDC did not include this argument in its Motion, Plaintiff has not had an opportunity to respond. Pursuant to Local Rule 7.1(c), a “reply memorandum shall be strictly limited to rebuttal of matters raised in the memorandum in opposition.” S.D. Fla. L.R. 7.1(c). Consequently, in deciding FDC's Motion, the Court will not consider FDC's new argument.

Thus, FDC's Motion to Dismiss (DE [74]) is denied. Plaintiff sufficiently states a claim for violation of the ADA/RA and violation of the Eighth Amendment, and FDC is not entitled to sovereign immunity on Plaintiff's claim.

C. Count II—Violation of the Eighth Amendment Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. section 1983 Against Centurion

Centurion argues that Plaintiff's 1983 claim against it should be dismissed because Plaintiff did not sufficiently allege that Centurion's actions or inactions proximately caused Ronnie's death, Centurion failed to provide medical treatment after the beating, a Centurion policy or custom was the moving force behind a constitutional deprivation, and Centurion acted with indifference. (Centurion Mot. 7–18). Centurion also argues that the Fourteenth Amendment deliberate indifference claim should be dismissed because claims involving convicted prisoners flow from the Eighth Amendment. (Id. 18). Finally, Centurion argues that Plaintiff failed to allege specific facts regarding Centurion's failures with respect to Ronnie. (Id. 19–20). The Court will address each argument in turn.

1. Plaintiff Sufficiently Alleged Centurion's Practices Caused Ronnie's Death

Centurion first argues that Plaintiff “fails to demonstrate a causal connection between [Ronnie's] alleged injury and Centurion's actions.” (Centurion Mot. 7). Plaintiff responds that he explained how three of Centurion's “illegal longstanding practices caused Ronnie's death.” See (DE [84] 3).

While defendants in section 1983 cases “are, as in common law tort suits, responsible for the natural and foreseeable consequences of their actions,” the plaintiff must show causation. Jackson v. Sauls, 206 F.3d 1156, 1168 (11th Cir. 2000). To show that the defendant's action or inaction was the proximate cause of the injuries and damages claimed, a plaintiff must show that “the injury or damage was a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the [official's] act or omission.” Id. “If a reasonably prudent person could foresee that a harm like the one that the plaintiff suffered might result from his or her actions, then there is proximate causation.” Zivojinovich v. Barner, 525 F.3d 1059, 1069 (11th Cir. 2008).

Centurion argues that it could not be the proximate cause of Ronnie's death because the FDC officers’ actions were unforeseeable. (Centurion Mot. 7–9). “However, under Florida law, when an ‘independent intervening cause is a foreseeable and probable consequence of the wrongful actions of the defendant,’ the defendant can be liable.” Zivojinovich, 525 F.3d at 1069 (quoting Guice v. Enfinger, 389 So. 2d 270, 271 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980)). This principle includes a defendant's negligence that later results in injuries from police officers. See id.; see also Townsend v. Westside Dodge, Inc., 642 So. 2d 49 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994).

Plaintiff alleges that Ronnie's beating and death was a foreseeable consequence of Centurion's policies, practices, or customs. (Am. Compl. ¶ 180). First, Plaintiff alleges that Centurion's practice of failing to treat prisoners after use-of-force incidents deprived Ronnie of potentially life-saving treatment after the beatings. (Id. ¶ 178). Second, Plaintiff alleges that Centurion's policy of ignoring systemic abuse of TCU prisoners by guards allowed the beatings to occur in the first place. (Id. ¶ 177). Third, Plaintiff alleges that Centurion's deliberate indifference to the deterioration of TCU patients predictably causes mentally ill patients, like Ronnie, to become increasingly erratic, uncooperative, and defensive, triggering the beatings. (Id. ¶¶ 88–89).

Plaintiff also alleges that it was common knowledge that DCI guards “routinely punished prisoners informally with beatings” (id. ¶ 104), and that Centurion staff working at the TCU had actual knowledge that correctional officers were systemically abusing TCU prisoners (id. ¶ 115). Further, Plaintiff alleges that similar beatings were routine at the TCU. (Id. ¶¶ 95–100). These well-pleaded allegations, which the Court accepts as true at this stage of litigation, are sufficient to establish proximate cause.

2. Plaintiff Sufficiently Alleged Centurion's Failure to Provide Medical Treatment After the Beating

Next, Centurion argues that Plaintiff fails to allege that Centurion is liable for failing to treat Ronnie after the beating because “there is no allegation that any Centurion provider was aware of [Ronnie's] injury or need for medical treatment.” (Centurion Mot. 7). To the contrary, Plaintiff specifically alleges in his Amended Complaint that “Centurion employees were aware of Ronnie's beating on February 14, 2022. They did not examine him after that beating in accordance with Centurion's custom, policy, or practice of failing to conduct timely post-use-of-force examinations at [DCI].” (Am. Compl. ¶ 178). Plaintiff also cites to FDC reports that reveal, between 2021 and 2024, a “timely post use-of-force examination was conducted” at DCI “only 25% of the time following a use-of-force incident” to support the allegation that Centurion has a policy or custom of not treating inmates are use-of-force incidents. (Id. ¶ 123).

3. Plaintiff Plausibly Alleges That Centurion's Customs, Policies, or Practices Caused Ronnie's Death

As relevant here, 42 U.S.C. section 1983 imposes liability on “[e]very person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of any State,” violates “any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution ․” In Monell v. Department of Social Services of the City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), the Supreme Court held that municipalities and other local governmental bodies are ‘persons’ within the meaning of section 1983. A private entity, like Centurion, is subject to liability under section 1983 when it “performs a function traditionally within the exclusive prerogative of the state,” such as contracting with the county to provide medical services to inmates because it becomes “the functional equivalent of the municipality[.]” See Denham v. Corizon Health, Inc., 675 Fed Appx. 935, 940 (11th Cir. 2017) (quoting Craig v. Floyd Cnty., Ga., 643 F.3d 1306, 1310 (11th Cir. 2011)). To establish a Monell claim under a custom or policy theory, Plaintiff must show that (1) Ronnie's constitutional rights were violated, (2) Centurion had a custom or policy that constituted deliberate indifference to that constitutional right, and (3) the policy or custom caused the violation. Smothers v. Childers, 159 F.4th 922, 931 (11th Cir. 2025) (citing McDowell v. Brown, 392 F.3d 1283, 1289 (11th Cir. 2004)).

“Proof of a single incident of unconstitutional activity is not sufficient to impose liability” against a municipality. City of Okla. City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 823–24 (1985) (plurality opinion). A custom must be such “a longstanding and widespread practice [that it] is deemed authorized by the policymaking officials because they must have known about it but failed to stop it.” Brown v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 923 F.2d 1474, 1481 (11th Cir. 1991). “[A]n act performed pursuant to a ‘custom’ that has not been formally approved by an appropriate decisionmaker may fairly subject a municipality to liability on the theory that the relevant practice is so widespread as to have the force of law.” Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs of Bryan Cnty. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 404 (1997).

Centurion contends that the allegations do not plausibly state that a Centurion policy or custom was the moving force behind a constitutional deprivation for purposes of Monell liability. (Centurion Mot. 10–15). Plaintiff responds that he has alleged three customs, policies, or practices that caused Ronnie's death: (1) failing to timely treat prisoners after use-of-force incidents, (2) ignoring the systemic abuse suffered by TCU prisoners at the hands of DCI's guards, and (3) acting with deliberate indifference in the face of TCU patients’ deterioration. See (DE [84] 8–14).

a. Failing to conduct post use-of-force examinations

Plaintiff adequately alleges that Ronnie's death was caused by “Centurion's custom, policy, or practice of failing to conduct timely post use-of-force examinations at [DCI].” (Am. Compl. ¶ 178 (alteration added)). Plaintiff claims that Centurion has a written policy requiring timely examinations after use-of-force incidents (id. ¶ 123(b)), but that in practice Centurion has a widespread custom of failing to conduct post use-of-force examinations at DCI (id. ¶178). Plaintiff cites to the Contract Monitoring Report, which reveals that Centurion failed to conduct a timely post use-of-force examination in 75% of documented cases. (Id. ¶ 123). Plaintiff also cites to other performance measures that Centurion failed to reach. (Id. ¶ 125). Plaintiff alleges that these reports were transmitted to Centurion policymakers and officials with substantial supervisory authority who, despite their awareness, did nothing to change Centurion's “custom, policy or practice of failing to conduct timely post-use-of-force examinations” at DCI. (Id. ¶¶ 128, 144–45, 178). These claims plausibly allege that Centurion had a custom of failing to conduct post use-of-force examinations. As Ronnie did not receive any medical care for his serious medical needs because of this practice, Plaintiff sufficiently pleads a Monell claim.

b. Ignoring systemic abuse of TCU patients

Next, Plaintiff adequately alleges that Ronnie's beating was caused by Centurion's custom, policy, or practice of ignoring systemic abuse of TCU patients. See (Id. ¶ 180). Plaintiff alleges that “Centurion staff working the TCU had actual knowledge that correctional officers were systematically abusing TCU prisoners” (id. ¶ 115), and that Centurion supervisors and policymakers were aware of the abuse (id. ¶¶ 116–18). Plaintiff states that FDC guards beat a TCU prisoner in front of a Centurion nurse (id. ¶ 113), FDC guards had reputations of violence among Centurion staff (id. ¶ 107), and Ronnie's beating was reported over the radio, which Centurion staff would have heard (id. ¶ 44). Plaintiff further alleges that Centurion supervisory staff did nothing to report or investigate the allegations of abuse, and in fact, warned treatment staff not to speak out about abuse for fear of jeopardizing Centurion's status as FDC's preferred medical contractor. (Id.). Thus, Plaintiff sufficiently alleged that Centurion's unwritten policy of acquiescence was a moving force behind Ronnie's death.

c. Allowing mentally ill prisoners to deteriorate

Third, Plaintiff sufficiently alleged that Ronnie's beating resulted from Centurion's systemic “deliberate indifference in the face of TCU prisoners’ deterioration.” (Id. ¶ 172). Plaintiff alleged numerous systemic deficiencies through findings in the Contract Monitoring Reports and Correctional Medical Authority audits. (Id. ¶¶ 120–44). Plaintiff also connects the specific deficiencies to Ronnie (id. ¶¶ 35–38) and his worsening mental health symptoms and increasingly defensive behavior (id. ¶ 89). Plaintiff also connects Centurion's alleged knowledge that DCI guards beat TCU prisoners for exhibiting mental illness symptoms to the reasonable inference that it was predictable that Ronnie's mental deterioration would result in his physical harm at the hands of DCI's guards. (See id. ¶¶ 89, 112, 180). Thus, Centurion's systemic neglect of TCU patients’ mental health was a moving force behind Ronnie's injury.

4. Plaintiff Adequately Alleges That Centurion Acted with Indifference

“[D]eliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners violates the [Eighth] Amendment.” Helling, 509 U.S. at 32 (alterations added). Deliberate indifference can be shown by demonstrating systemic deficiencies that expose incarcerated people to “an unreasonable risk of serious damage to [their] future health[,]” even if the individual incidents themselves do not amount to Eighth Amendment violations. Id. at 35 (alterations added).

“In institutional level challenges to prison health care, systemic deficiencies can provide the basis for a finding of deliberate indifference. A series of incidents closely related in time may disclose a pattern of conduct amounting to deliberate indifference.” Rogers v. Evans, 792 F.2d 1052, 1058–59 (11th Cir. 1986). “The indifference can be manifested by prison doctors in taking the easier and less efficacious route in treating an inmate.” Id. at 1058 (citing Williams v. Vincent, 508 F.2d 541 (2d Cir. 1974)). Deliberate indifference can also be established if the “[m]edical care [is] so inappropriate as to evidence intentional maltreatment or a refusal to provide essential care ․” or if the plaintiff proves “[f]ailure to provide basic psychiatric and mental health care ․” Id. (alterations added).

Plaintiff's allegations meet these standards. Plaintiff alleges that through Contract Monitoring Reports and audits, Centurion officials knew that the conditions and care at DCI's TCU were deficient, and TCU patients were subjected to a substantial risk of serious harm. (Am Comp. ¶¶ 120–44). Plaintiff asserts that Centurion officials were specifically aware of the alleged customs, policies, and practices that were moving forces behind Ronnie's death, including Centurion's failure to conduct post use-of-force examinations, failure to report or intervene regarding the systemic abuse leveled at TCU patients, and widespread neglect of the mental health needs of TCU patients. (Id. ¶¶ 172, 178, 180). At this stage of the case, taking all Plaintiff's well-pleaded allegations as true, Plaintiff has plausibly alleged deliberate indifference against Centurion.

5. The Fourteenth Amendment Incorporates the Eighth Amendment Against State Actors

While Centurion argues that Count II's reference to the Fourteenth Amendment is improper because claims related to prison conditions are grounded in the Eighth Amendment (Centurion Mot. 18), the Eighth Amendment is applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. See Georgia, 546 U.S. at 157 (noting that the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates the Eighth Amendment against the states); see also Siskos, 817 Fed. Appx. at 766 (noting that a prisoner sufficiently alleges conduct that “violated the Fourteenth Amendment” if he states “a viable claim under the Eighth Amendment”). Thus, Count II properly invokes both the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.

6. Plaintiff Sufficiently Alleges Specific Facts Regarding Centurion's Failures with Respect To Ronnie

A defendant responsible for prison conditions may not “escape liability for deliberate indifference by showing that, while he was aware of an obvious, substantial risk to inmate safety, he did not know that the complainant was especially likely” to be injured. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 843 (1994). “[I]t does not matter ․ whether a prisoner faces an excessive risk ․ for reasons personal to him or because all prisoners in his situation face such a risk.” Id. (alterations added); see also Prison Legal News v. Sec'y, Fla. Dep't of Corr., 890 F.3d 954, 977 (11th Cir. 2018) (explaining that plaintiffs do not “have to hunt and peck throughout Florida's correctional system” to find an officer who knows them personally). Plaintiff's allegations meet these standards. Plaintiff alleges in detail Centurion's three systemic deficiencies that directly led to Ronnie's death and that each of those systemic deficiencies created an obvious, substantial risk to all the inmates’ safety. See (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 172, 178, 180). Therefore, Centurion's Motion to Dismiss (DE [78]) is denied. Plaintiff sufficiently states a claim for violation of the Eighth Amendment against Centurion.

D. Count III—Violation of the Eighth Amendment Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. section 1983 Against Individual Defendants

The Individual Defendants argue that Plaintiff's Amended Complaint should be dismissed because it fails to state a claim against them (see Jefferson Mot.; Selva Mot.; Connor Mot.; Marshall Mot.; Lockhart Mot.) and Jefferson, Connor, Selva, and Marshall additionally assert that they are entitled to qualified immunity (see Jefferson Mot., Selva Mot., Connor Mot., and Marshall Mot.).

1. Plaintiff Sufficiently States a Claim Against All Individual Defendants

The Eighth Amendment “imposes [a] dut[y] on [prison] officials” to “take reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of the inmates.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 832 (alterations added). Therefore, “[a] prison official's ‘deliberate indifference’ to a substantial risk of serious harm to an inmate violates the Eighth Amendment.” Id. at 828. Of course, “the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain” likewise constitutes “cruel and unusual punishment.” Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 5 (1992).

Here, Plaintiff sets forth a clear Eighth Amendment claim against Defendants Jefferson, Connor, and Selva based on excessive use of physical force. Plaintiff alleges that these individuals “maliciously beat [Ronnie] for up to 12 minutes” while his “hands were cuffed behind his back” and he “lay helplessly in the fetal position.” (Am. Compl. ¶ 53)

Plaintiff also specifically alleges that Jefferson, Marshall, and Lockhart failed to intervene in the beatings. (Id. ¶¶ 187–90). A failure-to-protect claim has three elements: “(1) a substantial risk of serious harm; (2) the defendants’ deliberate indifference to that risk; and (3) causation.” Goodman, 718 F.3d at 1331. A sustained beating by seven guards constitutes a substantial risk of serious harm, and ignoring that risk constitutes deliberate indifference. As for causation, any of the Individual Defendants could have prevented Ronnie's abuse by speaking out or intervening. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 187–88). Captain Marshall as “the highest-ranking supervisory officer present,” was in the optimal position to intervene. (Id. ¶ 188). Instead, he “condoned the beatings that led to Ronnie's death and participated in the attempted cover up.” (Id. ¶ 189). While Lockhart argues that Plaintiff fails to allege his actual knowledge of a substantial risk to Plaintiff or that Lockhart had a chance to prevent it (Lockhart Mot. 5–6) this is not accurate. Plaintiff specifically alleges that Lockhart “witnessed the abuse and did nothing to stop it” (Am. Compl. ¶ 187) and “acted with deliberate indifference to the substantial risk of harm Ronnie would suffer as a result of the repeated beatings” (id. ¶ 190).

Plaintiff also asserts that “[a]ll of the individual Defendants” are liable for acting with deliberate indifference in the face of Ronnie's need for medical care after the beating. (Id. ¶ 190). A deliberate indifference claim requires the plaintiff to allege (a) an objectively serious deprivation, and that (b) the “defendant actually knew that his conduct—his own acts or omissions—put the plaintiff at substantial risk of serious harm.” Wade v. McDade, 106 F.4th 1251, 1253 (11th Cir. 2024). It is not contestable that Ronnie had serious medical needs after the beating. (Am. Compl. ¶ 59 (Ronnie's feet dragging during the walk to the Admin Building), ¶ 66 (Ronnie unable to sit up without assistance)). As for the subjective component, all Individual Defendants were aware of Ronnie's injuries, because they directly inflicted them (Jefferson, Connor, Selva) (id. ¶ 53) or because they witnessed Ronnie's condition afterward (Marshall, Connor, Selva, Lockhart) (id. ¶¶ 58–60). Despite their awareness, each of the Individual Defendants “failed to provide [Ronnie] with medical care.” (Id. ¶ 191). “In so doing, they acted with deliberate indifference to the substantial risk of harm that Ronnie's condition would deteriorate without immediate medical attention.” (Id.) Accordingly, Plaintiff sufficiently states a claim against all Individual Defendants.

2. The Individual Defendants are Not Entitled to Qualified Immunity

Qualified immunity protects government officials “from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Richmond v. Badia, 47 F.4th 1172, 1179 (11th Cir. 2022) (quoting Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982))). “For qualified immunity to apply, a government official must initially establish that he was acting within his discretionary authority when the alleged wrongful acts occurred.” Id. “Once it has been determined that an official was acting with the scope of his discretionary authority, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to establish that qualified immunity is inappropriate. First, the plaintiff must show that the official's alleged conduct violated a constitutionally protected right. Second, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the right was clearly established at the time of the misconduct.” Id. (citations omitted).

For Jefferson, Connor, and Selva, the qualified immunity defense fails at the outset because none of them attempt to make a showing that they were exercising valid discretionary authority when they allegedly beat Ronnie with his hands cuffed behind his back. See (Jefferson Mot.; Connor Mot.; Selva Mot.).

Marshall asserts that it was within his “discretionary authority to decide whether to avoid a cell extraction by speaking with an inmate and whether to render medical care.” (Marshall Mot. 11). Plaintiff does not claim that Marshall speaking to Ronnie to avoid the cell extraction was a violation of Ronnie's constitutional rights. See generally (Am. Compl.). Rather, Plaintiff alleges that Marshall is liable for authorizing the beatings, failing to intervene as they were occurring, and assisting in the cover up. (Id. ¶¶ 88–89). Marshall does not argue that these actions were within his discretionary authority (see Marshall Mot.) and the Court finds that authorizing subordinates to beat an inmate to death, failing to intervene, and assisting in the cover up are not “legitimate job-related function[s].” See Smart v. England, 93 F.4th 1283, 1288 (11th Cir. 2024) (quoting Holloman ex rel. Holloman v. Harland, 370 F.3d 1252, 1265 (11th Cir. 2004)). As Jefferson, Connor, Selva, and Marshall have not proven that they were exercising valid discretionary authority, they are not entitled to qualified immunity.

The Individual Defendants’ primary argument as to why they are entitled to qualified immunity is that the Amended Complaint refers to the Individual Defendants in the collective. See (Jefferson Mot.; Selva Mot.; Connor Mot.; Marshall Mot.). But as discussed supra, Plaintiff's collective allegations are not improper because “[t]he fact that defendants are accused collectively does not render [a] complaint deficient.” Kyle K., 208 F.3d at 944 (alteration added). The Amended Complaint makes separate allegations as to Jefferson, (see Am. Compl. ¶¶ 3, 52–54, 78, 186–87), Selva (see id. ¶¶ 3, 46, 52–53, 60, 103, 186), Connor (see id. ¶¶ 3, 46–47, 52–53, 60, 78, 85, 186), Marshall (see id. ¶¶ 3, 45, 47–48, 51, 58, 60–62, 64, 69, 77, 83, 91, 107, 188–89), and Lockhart (see id. ¶¶ 3, 46, 49, 53–54, 60, 78, 186–87). There is no confusion as to which Defendant was involved in each step of the alleged attack on Ronnie and the alleged coverup. Thus, the Individual Defendants’ argument is unavailing.

As Plaintiff states claims against the Individual Defendants, and the Individual Defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity, the Individual Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss are denied. It is worth noting, the Eleventh Circuit has denied qualified immunity in numerous cases involving mentally ill defendants and law enforcement. See Castro-Reyes v. City of Opa-Locka, 2026 WL 318559 (11th Cir. February 6, 2026). And, to the extent that this Court has previously recognized that qualified immunity is a judicially created doctrine found nowhere in the text, history, or structure of codified laws, the qualified immunity argument on this murder case may be a good opportunity for the Court above to do away with the doctrine. See Roldan v. City of Hallandale Beach, 2023 WL 4489959 at *6 (S.D. Fla. July 12, 2023).

E. The Court Will Not Strike Plaintiff's Claim for Punitive Damages

Selva and Marshall argue that Plaintiff's requests for punitive damages should be stricken. (Selva Mot 11; Marshall Mot. 14). “[A] motion to strike is a drastic remedy and is disfavored by the courts.” Blake v. Batmasian, 318 F.R.D. 698, 700 (S.D. Fla. 2017). “If there is any doubt as to whether under any contingency the matter may raise an issue, the motion should be denied.” Id. Punitive damages are appropriate in a civil rights action if “the defendant was motivated by an evil motive or intent, or” acted with “reckless or callous indifference to federally protected rights.” Anderson v. City of Atlanta, 778 F.2d 678, 688 (11th Cir. 1985).

Selva asserts that the Amended Complaint “does not establish that Selva had the requisite evil intent ․ because it only pleads conclusory allegations and lumps him with others without establishing his evil intent separate and apart from others.” (Selva Mot. 11) The Court agrees with Plaintiff that Selva is raising “a question of proof, not pleading.” Kyle K., 208 F.3d at 944. Plaintiff alleges that Selva “maliciously beat [Ronnie] for up to 12 minutes” while his “hands were cuffed behind his back” (Am. Compl. ¶ 53) “for the purpose of causing harm to [Ronnie]” (Id. ¶ 186). While Selva certainly may contest these allegations, in his Motion, he does not argue that, if proven, these allegations fail to constitute “reckless or callous indifference to federally protected rights.” Anderson, 778 F.2d at 688. Therefore, it is not appropriate to strike Plaintiff's claim for punitive damages as to Selva.

Marshall similarly asserts that the Amended Complaint fails to sufficiently allege that he acted with evil intent or reckless indifference because he did not participate in the beating. (Marshall Mot. 15). But at this stage of litigation, Marshall's evil intent can reasonably be inferred through his actions and statements. Plaintiff alleges that “Captain Marshall condoned the repeated beatings that led to Ronnie's death and participated in the attempted cover up” (id. ¶ 189) and that Marshall said he wanted “ ‘a piece of [Ronnie]’ meaning that he wanted to beat Ronnie” (id. ¶ 47) and that after the beatings, “Captain Marshall said that Ronnie would never disrespect his staff again” (id. ¶ 62). (See also id. ¶ 69 (denying Ronnie's dying request for water); id. ¶ 91 (“Multiple officers testified that Captain Marshall stated both before and after the beating that his team would punish Ronnie ․ All officers understood that Captain Marshall meant that officers would beat him.”)). These allegations easily present a factual basis for a reasonable jury to award punitive damages against Marshall. Thus, it is not appropriate to strike Plaintiff's claim for punitive damages as to Marshall.

IV. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, it is ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that:

1. Defendant, Jamar Jefferson's Motion to Dismiss (DE [71]) is DENIED.

2. Defendant, Kevin Selva's Motion to Dismiss (DE [72]) is DENIED.

3. Defendant, Ronald Connor's Motion to Dismiss (DE [73]) is DENIED.

4. Defendant, Florida Department of Correction's Motion to Dismiss (DE [74]) is DENIED.

5. Defendant, Jairus Marshall's Motion to Dismiss (DE [75]) is DENIED.

6. Defendant, Centurion of Florida, LLC's Motion to Dismiss (DE [78]) is DENIED.

7. Defendant, Alfred Lockhart's Motion to Dismiss (DE [97]) is DENIED.

8. Defendants shall answer Plaintiff's Amended Complaint (DE [56]) on or before February 26, 2026.5

DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers, Fort Lauderdale, Florida, this 10th day of February 2026.

Copies furnished to counsel of record via CM/ECF

FOOTNOTES

2.   The Court will refer to Ronald Gene Ingram as Ronnie and Plaintiff, James L. Ingram, Jr. as Plaintiff.

3.   Interestingly, a search of the Florida Corrections Offender Network reveals that none of these felons—Godbolt, Rolon and Walton—are in custody within the Florida Prison System. https://pubapps.fdc.myflorida.com/OffenderSearch/Search.aspx (last accessed February 9, 2026).

4.   Godbolt, Rolon, and Walton have not responded to the Amended Complaint. As such, the Court's order will focus only on those Defendants who have filed Motions to Dismiss.

5.   Defendants are of course permitted to take an interlocutory appeal of the denial of qualified immunity. In such a case, this Court routinely grants a stay of the proceedings. Here, however, the case has already been stayed for nearly two years for a different reason. No one objected to that stay. The reasons to grant a stay upon an interlocutory appeal of a denial of qualified immunity are thus uniquely not present in this case.

RAAG SINGHAL UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE