MESADIEU v. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT (2026)

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

THIS CAUSE comes before the Court on Marckson Mesadieu’ (“Petitioner”) Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus (the “Petition”). [ECF No.1]. On February 22, 2024, Petitioner applied for admission at the Fort Lauderdale-Hollywood International Airport Port of Entry and was paroled into the United States. [ECF No. 5, Ex. A]. Petitioner was paroled for a temporary period not to exceed June 12, 2025. Id. On July 24, 2024, Petitioner filed an Application for Temporary Protected Status (“TPS”) with the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”) and was approved for TPS on September 24, 2024. Id. at Ex. B; Ex. C. On or about July 27, 2026, Petitioner's TPS was terminated. Id.

On August 25, 2026, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) Enforcement and Removal Operations (“ERO”) encountered Petitioner during a vehicle stop. ICE took Petitioner into custody after determining Petitioner did not have any lawful immigration statutes in the United States. Id. Petitioner has been detained since the vehicular stop, and now seeks relief from the Court, asking for release from custody or, in the alternate, a bond hearing. [ECF No. 1]. After careful review of the record and being otherwise fully advised in the premises, the Petition is DENIED.

Petitioner raises several arguments in the Petition that he claims entitle him to relief. First, Petitioner argues that their detention violates the INA because he is being detained under § 1226 when the applicable law is § 1225. The Eleventh Circuit has held that “§ 1225 applies to arriving aliens seeking entry at the border, whereas § 1226 applies to aliens unlawfully in the interior.” Hernandez Alvarez v. Warden, Fed. Det. Ctr. Miami, 175 F.4th 1258, 1276 (11th Cir. 2026). Pursuant to § 1225(b), arriving aliens are not entitled to bond hearings and are subject to mandatory detention. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A).

For temporary admissions of nonimmigrants, the government may at their discretion “parole into the United States temporarily under such conditions as he may prescribe only on a case-by-case basis for urgent humanitarian reasons or significant public benefit any alien applying for admission to the United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A). However, “such parole of such alien shall not be regarded as an admission of the alien and when the purposes of such parole ․ have been served the alien shall forthwith return or be returned to the custody from which he was paroled[.]” Id. It follows that the alien's “case shall continue to be dealt with in the same manner as that of any other applicant for admission to the United States.” Id.

The question the Court must resolve is whether the Petitioner is an arriving alien subject to § 1225 or an alien unlawfully in the interior and therefore subject to § 1226.¹ Petitioner cites to Hernandez Alvarez as guiding in this case, where the Eleventh Circuit held that noncitizens who enter the United States without inspection, but are later apprehended in the interior of the country are not subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). See Hernandez Alvarez v. Warden, Fed. Det. Ctr. Miami, 175 F.4th 1258, 1275-85 (11th Cir. 2026). It follows that this Court is bound by the Eleventh Circuit's holding that distinguishes between “an alien who is an applicant for admission” and “an alien seeking admission”. Id. at 1267-1275.

Petitioner seeks to stretch the holding in Hernandez Alvarez to the facts of this case. To be clear, Hernandez Alvarez never addresses the issue of aliens paroled under § 1182(d)(5)(A) who are later re-detained. See Id. In Hernandez Alvarez, the petitioners were never “arriving aliens” but instead entered the United States without inspection, were not applying for entry in any literal sense, and never took a “cognizable step” to obtain the rights and privileges of lawful entry. 175 F.4th at 1269. As it is well established, “[t]he holdings of a prior decision can reach only as far as the facts and circumstances presented to the Court in the case which produced that decision.” United States v. Aguillard, 217 F.3d 1319, 1321 (11th Cir. 2000) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Several courts addressing this issue have extended the reach of Hernandez Alvarez to include previously paroled aliens who are later re-detained. See generally, e.g., Sylvaince v. Warden, Miami Fed. Det. Ctr., No. 26-CV-23991-RAR, 2026 WL 2568522 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 31, 2026) (Ruiz, J.); see also Naumkin v. Warden, Krome N. Serv. Processing Ctr., No. 1:26-CV-23131-KMM, 2026 WL 1825735 (S.D. Fla. May 26, 2026) (Moore, J.); Martinez-Gil v. Warden, North Florida Detention Facility, et al., No. 3:26-CV-1642-JEP-SJH, 2026 WL 2130714 (M.D. Fla. July 24, 2026) (Pratt, J.). Other courts have held previously paroled alien detainees are arriving aliens subject to mandatory detention. See generally, e.g., Cabrera v. Ripa, No. 26-61857-CIV, 2026 WL 2253670 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 5, 2026) (Damian, J.); Flores v. Warden, No. 26-cv-60399, 2026 WL 1437166 (S.D. Fla. May 21, 2026) (Altman, J.).

If the Court were to accept Petitioner's framing, then arriving aliens would be able to elude the auspices of § 1225(b)(2)’s mandatory detention by simply overstaying their parole period. The text is unequivocally clear – when an alien's parole expires, he “shall ․ return or be returned to the custody from which he was paroled and thereafter his case shall continue to be dealt with in the same manner as that of any other applicant for admission to the United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A) (emphasis added); see 8 C.F.R. §§ 1.2, 1001.1(q) (“[a]n arriving alien remains an arriving alien even if paroled pursuant to section 212(d)(5) of the Act, and even after any such parole is terminated or revoked.”) Petitioner was classified as an arriving alien when he arrived at the United States, was subsequently paroled, and now has been returned to custody after the termination of their parole. Accordingly, the Petitioner remains an arriving alien, and per the Eleventh Circuit in Hernandez Alvarez, § 1225 applies to arriving aliens. 175 F.4th at 1277-78. For the Court to conclude otherwise would be to contravene the entirety of § 1182(d)(5)(A). Accordingly, it is

ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the Petition [ECF 1] is DENIED. All pending deadlines are TERMINATED, and any pending motions are DENIED as moot. The Clerk is directed to CLOSE this case.

DONE AND ORDERED in the Southern District of Florida on September 10th, 2026.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The Court addressed this same question in an order entered today at docket entry 6 in Perez v. Gonzalez, 26-cv-62467.

JEFFREY T. KUNTZ, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE