ANTHONY WALLACE v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (2026)

OMNIBUS ORDER

THIS CAUSE comes before the Court on Movant Anthony Wallace's (“Movant) pro se Motions to Vacate pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (the “Motions”) (DE [1], [5]), wherein he attacks the constitutionality of his conviction and sentence in United States v. Wallace, No. 0:22-60113-CR-AHS-1.¹ The Government (“Respondent”) filed a Response to the Motions (DE [3]), and Movant has filed his Reply, (DE [4]). Therefore, the matter is now ripe for review. For the following reasons, the Motions (DE [1], [5]) are DENIED.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Procedural Posture.

On May 26, 2022, the Government charged Movant by information with Conspiracy to Commit Wire Fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371, related to a fraudulent Paycheck Protection Program loan application Movant filed on behalf of his New Mexico-based company. CR (DE [1] at 1–7). The Government also sought forfeiture under 18 U.S.C. § 982(a)(2)(A). Id. at 7–8. On June 30, 2022, Movant pleaded guilty to Count 1 of the Information. CR (DE [16]). The Plea Agreement, which Movant and his attorney signed, explained the severity and elements of the crime, possible sentencing, and the meaning and consequences of forfeiture. See CR (DE [17] ¶¶ 3, 10, 15–16); see also Factual Proffer CR (DE [18]). On May 18, 2023, the Court entered judgment and sentenced ² Movant to eighteen months’ imprisonment, to be followed by thirty months of supervised release. CR (DE [39]). The Court ordered Movant to pay $1,253,143.00 in restitution and immediately pay a $100 special assessment. Id.

B. The September 19 Motion.

Almost thirty months later, on September 19, 2025, Movant filed this § 2255 Motion that borrows language from the sovereign citizen playbook. He posits that the Court does not have subject-matter jurisdiction over Movant, as his criminal matter was brought “under the corporate fiction styled ANTHONY WALLACE, without a valid sworn criminal complaint supported by an injured party with firsthand knowledge.” (DE [1] at 2). He argues that the government proceeded not against him, but a “corporate fiction” bearing his name. See id. at 3; but see CR (DE [1]) (charging document). Movant submits the judgment against him is consequently void. Id. at 2–3. Movant requests that the Court grant his Motion, vacate his criminal judgment, terminate his supervised release, expunge his record of “all collateral consequences[,]” and grant any other proper relief. (DE [1] at 4–5).

C. The December 29 Motion.

On December 29, 2025, Movant filed another § 2255 Motion, wherein he posits that the Government violated his Fifth Amendment due process rights by subjecting him “to a sentence or financial penalty based on materially false or misleading information.” (DE [5] at 2). Specifically, he asserts that the Government failed to disclose in the Presentence Investigation Report that it had already recouped more than $550,000.00 of the more-than $1.2 million Movant and his coconspirators defrauded. Id. at 1. This subterfuge inflated the restitution owed to the victims beyond what was necessary, argues Movant. See id. at 2. Accordingly, Movant demands that the Court vacate the restitution portion of his judgment and “[d]irect the government to produce a complete accounting of seized funds and their disposition.” Id. (emphasis deleted).

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Because collateral review is not a substitute for direct appeal, the grounds for collateral attack on final judgments under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 are limited. A prisoner is entitled to relief under § 2255 if the court imposed a sentence that (1) violated the Constitution or laws of the United States, (2) exceeded its jurisdiction, (3) exceeded the maximum authorized by law, or (4) is otherwise subject to collateral attack. See § 2255(a); McKay v. United States, 657 F.3d 1190, 1194 n.8 (11th Cir. 2011). Relief under § 2255 “is reserved for transgressions of constitutional rights and for that narrow compass of other injury that could not have been raised in direct appeal and would, if condoned, result in a complete miscarriage of justice.” Lynn v. United States, 365 F.3d 1225, 1232 (11th Cir. 2004) (citations omitted); see also United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 165 (1982) (collecting cases)).

III. DISCUSSION

A. The September 19 Motion is Frivolous.

Even under the more relaxed standards afforded to pro se litigants, Movant still does not meet his burden under § 2255. Specifically, his argument that the government proceeded “only against the corporate fiction ANTHONY WALLACE” as opposed to Anthony Wallace “the living man” finds zero support in fact or law. See, e.g., Trevino v. Fla., 687 Fed. Appx. 861, 862 (11th Cir. 2017) (per curiam) (argument that state court lacked jurisdiction because movant was a “natural born, free ․ [l]iving, breathing, flesh and blood human [being]” was “frivolous”); United States v. Sterling, 738 F.3d 228, 233 n.1 (11th Cir. 2013) (“Courts have been confronted repeatedly by [sovereign citizen] attempts to delay judicial proceedings and have summarily rejected their legal theories as frivolous.”); see also Fla. v. Caruthers, 2021 WL 2270563, at *2 (S.D. Fla. May 13, 2021) (“[T]he arguments and legal theories espoused by sovereign citizens have been consistently rejected as utterly frivolous, patently ludicrous, and a waste of the court's time, which is being paid by hard-earned tax dollars.” (citation modified)), report and recommendation adopted, 2021 WL 2255152 (S.D. Fla. June 3, 2021).

Furthermore, sovereign citizen arguments implicate another issue that has become increasingly important in America. By arguing that they are not subject to the laws and jurisdiction of the land, sovereign citizens acknowledge they do not meet the plain meaning citizenship requirements of the 14th Amendment. See U.S. Const., amend. XIV, § 1 (“All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside.”) (emphasis added). So, while sovereign citizens want the benefits of America without its obligations, they argue away their constitutional basis to invoke many of those rights. Moreover, if they are not citizens, they are due to be deported. Fortunately for Movant, the Court recognizes that he may—perhaps in all his confusion about the (nonexistent) “corporate fiction” version of himself—stop just short of wholly disclaiming the United States’ jurisdiction over him.³ The Court nevertheless cautions Movant that if he would like to retain U.S. citizenship and continue enjoying the rights and privileges associated therewith, it is in his best interest to disassociate from nonsensical—and dangerous—sovereign citizen arguments.

B. Section 2255 Does Not Recognize Challenges to Restitution

Our Circuit has held for almost the last three decades that “§ 2255 cannot be utilized by a federal prisoner who challenges only the restitution portion of his sentence because § 2255 affords relief only to those prisoners who claim the right to be released from custody.” Blaik v. United States, 161 F.3d 1341, 1343 (11th Cir. 1998) (alteration adopted; internal quotation marks omitted); accord United States v. Thiele, 314 F.3d 399, 402 n.3 (9th Cir. 2002) (collecting cases). Petitioner is no longer in custody and cannot use § 2255 as a vehicle to challenge the Court's restitution order. Therefore, his December 29 Motion is meritless.

C. Both Motions are Time-Barred.

Even if this Court were to look past the Motions’ lack of merit, it would nonetheless be subject to dismissal as time-barred. The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”) establishes a one-year limitation period for filing motions to vacate under § 2255. The one-year period runs from the latest of:

(1) the date on which the judgment of conviction becomes final;

(2) the date on which the impediment to making a motion created by governmental action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if the movant was prevented from making a motion by such governmental action;

(3) the date on which the right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if that right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or

(4) the date on which the facts supporting the claim or claims presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.

28 U.S.C. § 2255(f). The relevant provision set forth above is § 2255(f)(1) because the Motion does not satisfy the criteria of § 2255(f)(2)–(4). Movant's claims do not rely on a new right recognized by the Supreme Court, § 2255(f)(3), or newly discovered facts, § 2255(f)(4),⁴ and he does not allege that the Government created an unconstitutional impediment to filing the Motion, § 2255(f)(2).

“A conviction ordinarily becomes final when the opportunity for direct appeal of the judgment of conviction has been exhausted.” United States v. Burk, 2022 WL 595699, at *4 (11th Cir. Feb. 28, 2022) (quoting Akins v. United States, 204 F.3d 1086, 1089 n.1 (11th Cir. 2000)). “[A] [criminal] defendant must file a notice of appeal within 14 days after the entry of the order or judgment being appealed[.]” United States v. Gonzalez-Lauzan, 2025 WL 1733825, at *1 (11th Cir. June 23, 2025) (citing Fed. R. App. P. 4(b)(1)(A)(i)). In the § 2255 context, the one-year statute of limitations “starts to run when the time for seeking ․ review expires.” Clay v. United States, 537 U.S. 522, 532 (2003); see also Adams v. United States, 173 F.3d 1339, 1342 n.2 (11th Cir. 1999) (“[W]here a defendant does not pursue a direct appeal, the conviction becomes final when the time expires for filing a direct appeal.” (quoting Kapral v. United States, 166 F.3d 565, 575 (3d Cir. 1999)).

Here, the Court entered Movant's criminal judgment on May 18, 2023. See CR (DE [39]). When Movant did appeal, his judgment became final—and the AEDPA's one-year statute of limitations began to run—on June 1, 2023. Because Movant filed the Motions well after that deadline expired, his Motions are time barred. See (DE [4] at 2). Accordingly, it is hereby

ORDERED AND ADJUDGED as follows:

1. The Motions to Vacate under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (DE [1], [5]), are DENIED.

2. The Clerk is DIRECTED to CLOSE this case and CANCEL all hearings and deadlines;

3. All pending motions are DENIED AS MOOT.

DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers, Fort Lauderdale, Florida, this 18th day of May 2026.

FOOTNOTES

1.   References to docket entries in Movant's underlying criminal case are denoted with “CR (DE [No.]).”

2.   The Honorable Rodolfo A. Ruiz, II transferred this matter to the Undersigned on June 1, 2022. CR (DE [7]).

3.   To the extent Movant errantly argues he is not bound by the laws of the United States—including the 14th Amendment and the implied contract therein—he is always free to self deport.

4.   The Court notes Movant's reply argument that he did not learn that the government recouped $550,000 of defrauded funds until after he was sentenced. (DE [4] at 1–2). Critically, Movant fails to explain how he did not discover same whilst exercising due diligence, as required.

RAAG SINGHAL UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE