Varoom Whoa, Inc., Plaintiff, v. 100 100 XYZ 100 (2026)

ORDER SUA SPONTE DISMISSING COMPLAINT FOR LACK OF SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION AND REJECTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

THIS CAUSE comes before the Court on a sua sponte review of the record to determine if this Court has jurisdiction and a review of the Report and Recommendation [ECF No. 10] (the “R&R”) which recommends granting Plaintiff's Ex Parte Application for Temporary Restraining Order, Seizure Order, and for an Order to Show Cause [ECF No. 4] (the “TRO Application”). For the reasons explained below, the Court finds that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction and, therefore, REJECTS the R&R [ECF No. 10], DENIES the TRO Application [ECF No. 4], and DISMISSES the Complaint [ECF No. 1] without prejudice, with thirty days leave to amend the Complaint.

Background

A. Facts

Plaintiff Varoom Whoa Inc. is a business entity that manages the performing musical artist Hayley Williams (“Artist”). ECF No. 1, at ¶ 2. “The Artist first achieved worldwide recognition as the lead vocalist, principal lyricist, and frontwoman of the Grammy Award-winning band Paramore, whose music has reached millions of listeners through bestselling albums, hit singles, extensive radio play, streaming services, and live performances throughout the United States and around the world.” Id. ¶ 10. The Artist “has also pursued a highly successful solo career as a singer-songwriter and recording artist.” Id. ¶ 12. Following the release of her third solo album, the Artist launched a world tour. Id. The tour will begin on September 3, 2026, with a concert in West Palm Beach, Florida. Id. ¶ 13. The Artist has scheduled nineteen domestic tour stops across several states followed by international stops in the Caribbean and Latin America. Id. ¶ 13.

Plaintiff owns the rights in and to the Artist's name, logos, likeness and a federally registered trademark (collectively, the “Trademark”). Id. ¶ 2. Plaintiff holds the exclusive rights to exploit the Trademark pertaining to the Artist, including the right to sell and distribute merchandise relating to her. Id. ¶ 2-3. Plaintiff plans to sell tour merchandise bearing its Trademark on t-shirts, hats, vinyl records, CDs, and other items. See id. ¶¶ 3, 15-16.

Plaintiff brings to the Court's attention a fan-made video posted on the social media platform known as TikTok depicting a fan outside the Artist's May 2026 concert at the Wiltern located in Los Angeles, California. See ECF 4-2, at ¶ 13. In the video, the fan says “you guys, the bootleg merch outside the Hayley Williams show is [expletive] good. It's like as good as the Sabrina Carpenter merch outside of crypto when that was happening.” Id. The fan then pans her camera showing approximately five individuals allegedly selling bootleg merchandise of the Artist. See id.; ECF 4-6. Because of the camera angle, the video shows the faces of only some of the alleged bootleggers. See id.

On at least three other occasions, staff associated with the Artist have allegedly observed bootlegging during the Artist's concerts. Ms. Melissa Hemingway, director of Merchandising for Plaintiff, attests that she has “personally witnessed a significant increase in Bootlegging at the Artist's recent concerts,” including at a “recent tour stop at Hammerstein Ballroom in New York City, New York on April 10, 2026.” ECF. 4-2, at ¶ 11. According to Ms. Hemingway, an unnamed manager for the Artist also “personally observed a significant number of Bootleggers selling Bootleg Merchandise” at tour stops in Manchester, England on June 22 and 23, 2026. Id. ¶ 12. Ms. Hemingway does not describe any of the individuals who were allegedly selling bootleg merchandise at these three concerts. Nor does the record contain any other evidence that could be used to identify them. Additionally, the record lacks any evidence tying the alleged bootleggers in New York City or Manchester to the alleged Los Angeles bootleggers depicted in the video.

B. Procedural History

On August 11, 2026, Plaintiff simultaneously filed a complaint and the TRO Application directed at unidentified defendants to enjoin them from selling counterfeit and infringing merchandise during the Artist's concerts scheduled on the upcoming tour. Id. ¶¶ 5-8; ECF No. 4-1, at 18. Defendants are fictitiously named John Does 1-100, Jane Does 1-100, and XYZ Companies 1-100 because “their true names and capacities are unknown at this time.” ECF No. 1, at ¶ 4. Plaintiff alleges Defendants plan to sell bootleg merchandise during the tour, constituting two alleged violations of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114, 1125. Id. ¶¶ 15, 24, 33. Plaintiff's fear that Defendants will sell or distribute bootleg merchandise during the Artist's upcoming tour is “based upon the immense popularity of the Artist” and the prior instances of bootlegging at the Artist's concerts. See ECF 4-1, at 2.

Plaintiff broadly defines the defendants in this case. They are all persons or entities that “will sell and distribute unauthorized, infringing, and counterfeit” bootleg merchandise “in the vicinity of the West Palm Beach Show before, during and after the performance, and at subsequent concerts during the Tour.” See ECF 1, at ¶ 15; ECF 4-7, at ¶ 13 (“These defendants do exist and they are specific people – they are the ones that appear at the concerts, sell their spurious goods and then disappear.”); ECF 4-7, at ¶ 27 (“these are real people who appear, and have already appeared, at the Artist's concerts, just as they have done during tours by similarly prominent performers”). Plaintiff alleges Defendants “are acting in concert and active participation with each other in committing the wrongful acts alleged.” ECF 1, at ¶ 7.

Plaintiff asks this Court to temporarily enjoin Defendants from “manufacturing, distributing, selling, offering for sale, holding for sale or advertising any products bearing the name, trademark, likeness, or other indicia of the Artist or any colorable variation thereof” and “representing that any article of merchandise manufactured, distributed, sold, held for sale or advertised by them is sponsored or authorized by Plaintiff or the Artist.” ECF 1, at 11. Plaintiff also requests, inter alia, that this Court “authorize agents of Plaintiff, the local and state police, and/or any persons acting under their supervision, to seize and impound any and all Bootleg Merchandise which the Defendants attempt to sell, distribute or hold for sale at, within, or in the vicinity of the West Palm Beach Show and the other U.S. concert performances on the current Tour, before, during and after said concerts.” Id.

Plaintiff argues an ex parte temporary restraining order is required because “[b]ootleggers are well aware of the illegal nature of their activities and therefore conceal their presence and intentions until just prior to the show, making it ․ difficult, if not impossible, to identify and provide notice to defendants.” ECF 4-1, at 11-12. In Plaintiff's view, providing relief “without notice to defendants is necessary to ensure that defendants do not evade this Court and continue their infringing activities elsewhere.” Id. at 10-11. Further, Plaintiff maintains that it will not know the identities of Defendants “until the time at which they are engaged in their unauthorized and illegal activity and they are actually served with a copy of the Complaint.” Id. at 11.

On August 12, 2026, the Court referred the TRO Application to U.S. Magistrate Judge Bruce E. Reinhart. On August 13, 2026, Judge Reinhart held a telephonic hearing and later issued the R&R that recommended that Plaintiff's TRO Application be granted. ECF 10. No party objected to the R&R.

Analysis

Article III of the U.S. Constitution “confines the federal judicial power to the resolution of ‘Cases’ and ‘Controversies.’ ” TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 594 U.S. 413, 423 (2021). “[I]t is elemental that there must be parties before there is a case or controversy.” Ellis v. Dyson, 421 U.S. 426, 434 (1975). “The case and controversy doctrine places a dual limitation upon federal courts which is termed ‘justiciability.’ ” Graham v. Butterworth, 5 F.3d 496, 498-99 (11th Cir. 1993). The doctrine of justiciability ensures that “federal courts address only questions presented in an adversarial context and that the judiciary will not encroach upon the powers of other branches of government.” Id. at 499. Without “actual parties involved in actual controversies,” there is no justiciable issue for a federal court to resolve. See Plant v. Doe, 19 F. Supp. 2d 1316, 1321 (S.D. Fla. 1998).

“The requirement of an identifiable defendant is also among the principles of equity that bind federal courts.” Stensrud, Inc. v. Does, 805 F. Supp. 3d 440, 444 (E.D.N.Y. 2025). “Consistent with historical practice, a federal court exercising its equitable authority may enjoin named defendants from taking specified unlawful actions. But under traditional equitable principles, no court may lawfully enjoin the world at large.” Whole Woman's Health v. Jackson, 595 U.S. 30, 44 (2021) (internal quotation and citations omitted); see also Trump v. CASA, Inc., 606 U.S. 831, 837 (2025) (holding that “universal injunctions” “likely exceed the equitable authority that Congress has granted to federal courts”).

Furthermore, “[a]s a general matter, fictitious-party pleading is not permitted in federal court,” but the Eleventh Circuit has “created a limited exception to this rule.” Richardson v. Johnson, 598 F.3d 734, 738 (11th Cir. 2010). Namely, the plaintiff's description of the defendant must be “sufficiently clear to allow service of process” on the correct individual. See Dean v. Barber, 951 F.2d 1210, 1216 (11th Cir. 1992). “In contrast, a plaintiff cannot simply use a ‘John Doe’ label to describe any person who engages in the future in the type of action that the plaintiff wishes to prohibit, because such use would enable the plaintiff to ‘enjoin the world at large.’ ” Stensrud, Inc., 805 F. Supp. 3d at 445 (quoting Whole Woman's Health, 595 U.S. at 44).

Plaintiff has failed to present to this Court a justiciable case or controversy because it did not sufficiently identify Defendants. Plaintiff is suing unnamed and unknown parties to prevent them from engaging in potentially illegal behavior in the future. Plaintiff broadly defined its adversaries as anyone or any entity who will sell or distribute bootleg merchandise at any of the Artist's scheduled concerts during the tour. See ECF 1, at ¶¶ 4-8; ECF 4-7, at ¶¶ 13, 25. But identifying Defendants by describing only the behavior that Plaintiff wants to stop is insufficient for purposes of presenting a case or controversy before an Article III court. Cf. Whole Woman's Health, 595 U.S. at 44.

While the TikTok video may ultimately help to identify some defendants, it is insufficient because Plaintiff provides no additional information about them. Moreover, Plaintiff does not limit itself to naming as defendants only those individuals who appear in the video, even if they were sufficiently identified. As to Ms. Hemingway's declaration, nothing she describes ties the alleged bootleggers in New York City or Manchester to any unnamed individual who plans to sell bootleg merchandise at the Artist's scheduled tour sites, located in cities hundreds, if not thousands, of miles away from the aforementioned locations. See ECF 4-2, at ¶¶11-12. In fact, the accounts of alleged bootlegging in New York City and Manchester are devoid of any identifying information that could assist this Court in determining whether Plaintiff has named actual parties. See id. “This sue-first-and-sort-out-the-defendant-later approach is not how litigation works in federal court.” Vielma v. Gruler, 808 F. App'x 872, 881 (11th Cir. 2020).

Plaintiff's assertion that past and future bootleggers are “acting in concert” does not help to identify unnamed defendants. See ECF 1, at ¶ 7; ECF 4-7, at ¶ 27. “Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). “[C]onclusory allegations that defendants acted ‘in concert,’ or ‘conspired’ without specific factual allegations to support such assertions are insufficient.” See Merritt v. Hawk, 153 F. Supp. 2d 1216, 1225 (D. Colo. 2001). Beyond a mere conclusory assertion, Plaintiff failed to provide any evidence that could give rise to a reasonable inference that actual parties who have allegedly bootlegged in the past are working with actual parties who plan to bootleg at the Artist's upcoming tour.

Without any additional identifying evidence, the Court concludes that Plaintiff has failed to name actual parties to the suit. Accordingly, “the instant action is not a justiciable one for purposes of ex parte injunctive relief.” Araca Merch. L.P. v. Does, 182 F. Supp. 3d 1290, 1293 (S.D. Fla. 2016).

This suit suffers from other procedural and jurisdictional issues. First, in order for Plaintiff to use fictious names for Defendants, Plaintiff's description must be specific enough to enable service of process on the correct individuals. See Dean, 951 F.2d at 1216. Plaintiff's verbal description of the five individuals in the TikTok video is the closest Plaintiff gets to describing actual parties. However, the description is limited to what these individuals allegedly did and where it happened—but nothing about their identities. As Plaintiff notes, the video took place during one of the Artist's concerts in Los Angeles, California “at The Wiltern in May of 2026.” ECF 4-2, ¶ 13. Plaintiff described the video as depicting one defendant “selling Bootleg Merchandise like t-shirts and sweatshirts” and later showing “four other Defendant Bootleggers selling counterfeit merchandise bearing the Trademark.” Id. Beyond this brief description, the only other evidence in the record that helps identify the individuals is the TikTok video which reveals their faces with varying levels of clarity. See id.

There is a dearth of caselaw addressing to what extent a single video and sparse verbal descriptions constitute an adequate description for purposes of fictitious-party pleading. See, e.g., Hoffmann v. McCray, No. 3:17-CV-361-J-39JRK, 2019 WL 3413536, at *12 (M.D. Fla. July 29, 2019) (finding that video evidence depicting a physical altercation in a correctional facility was enough to readily identify the John Doe officers). Unlike in Hoffmann, where there was a known and discrete set of employees who could possibly be the individuals in the video, here there are potentially countless individuals who look similar to the individuals depicted in the video. See id. In other words, the video is insufficient to help identify and serve the correct individuals.

Nonetheless, even if the video is enough to identify these five individuals, Plaintiff neither possesses standing to pursue claims against them nor presents claims ripe for review. The doctrines of standing and ripeness are jurisdictional requirements derived from Article III's case-or-controversy limitation. Fla. Fam. Pol'y Council v. Freeman, 561 F.3d 1246, 1253 (11th Cir. 2009). Federal courts lack subject-matter jurisdiction over parties who cannot prove standing or claims that are not yet ripe for review. See Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 475-76 (1982); Texas v. United States, 523 U.S. 296, 300 (1998). The standing doctrine requires a plaintiff to “demonstrate a personal stake in the outcome in order to assure that concrete adverseness ․ sharpens the presentation of issues.” City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 101 (1983) (internal quotations omitted). And “[t]he ripeness doctrine protects federal courts from engaging in speculation or wasting their resources through the review of potential or abstract disputes.” Digital Props., Inc. v. City of Plantation, 121 F.3d 586, 589 (11th Cir. 1997).

To prove one has standing to sue, a plaintiff must show that he has “(1) suffered an injury in fact, (2) that is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct of the defendant, and (3) that is likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.” Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330, 338 (2016). “Foremost among these requirements is injury in fact.” Gill v. Whitford, 585 U.S. 48, 65 (2018). An injury in fact is “an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized, and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.” Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (internal quotations and citations omitted).

Here, Plaintiff has failed to provide enough facts indicating that it will suffer an “imminent” injury. As mentioned, the TikTok video is the only evidence in the record that comes closest to identifying actual parties. But one instance of bootlegging concerning unnamed individuals during a concert from a different tour in a different state located thousands of miles away is too speculative to show that those unnamed individuals will likely injure Plaintiff in the future. Compare SKS Merch, LLC v. Barry, 233 F. Supp. 2d 841, 843 (E.D. Ky. 2002) (granting preliminary injunction where plaintiff “detail[ed] multiple instances of bootlegging at eleven” prior concert stops on the same tour, named several defendants, and “produced photographs depicting various persons allegedly engaged in selling bootleg merchandise at and around [the] concerts”), with Live Nation Merch., Inc. v. Does, No. 18CV2703-GPB(JLB), 2018 WL 6326321, at *4 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 4, 2018) (denying temporary restraining order where plaintiff relied on past instances of bootlegging on prior tours that occurred four and fifteen years ago); Bravado Int'l Grp. Merch. Servs., Inc. v. Does 1-100, No. 20-CV-113, 2020 WL 525149, at *2 (W.D.N.Y. Feb. 3, 2020) (denying temporary restraining order because plaintiff's “general descriptions of bootlegging activities” on past tours were insufficient and plaintiff failed to present “specific information for the Court to determine whether the bootleggers’ activities on this tour will irreparably harm” plaintiff); and Hybe Co. v. Does 1-100, 598 F. Supp. 3d 1005, 1008 (D. Nev. 2022) (denying temporary restraining order because plaintiffs’ motion was based on the dubious assumption that because “other unnamed people sold bootlegged merchandise at previous ․ shows in different cities in 2019 and 2021,” then bootlegging will occur in Las Vegas in April of 2022).

Without any additional information about the five individuals in the video, the connection between one prior instance of bootlegging and future bootlegging is too remote to infer that Plaintiff will suffer an imminent injury from those unnamed individuals. Without demonstrating an injury in fact, Plaintiff cannot prove standing. And without proving standing, this Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over the matter.

For similar reasons, the Court further finds that this case is not ripe for adjudication. “The ripeness inquiry requires a determination of (l) the fitness of the issues for judicial decision, and (2) the hardship to the parties of withholding court consideration.” Digital Props., Inc. v. City of Plantation, 121 F.3d 586, 589 (11th Cir. 1997). To analyze fitness for review, the Court asks “whether the parties raise an issue that [the Court] can decide without further factual development.” Club Madonna, Inc. v. City of Miami Beach, 924 F.3d 1370, 1380 (11th Cir. 2019). Here, the Court has been provided little factual evidence about actual parties who are likely to injure Plaintiff in the future. Beyond one video partially showing the faces of several unnamed individuals, Plaintiff's “allegations amount to mere speculation about contingent future events.” See Cheffer v. Reno, 55 F.3d 1517, 1524 (11th Cir. 1995). As to the hardship prong, the Court acknowledges “the difficulty in combatting bootleggers at high profile concerts,” but the Court cannot stretch the bounds of its Article III powers to accommodate those challenges. See Live Nation Merch., Inc., No. 18CV2703-GPB(JLB), 2018 WL 6326321, at *4.

Conclusion

This Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction because Plaintiff failed to present a justiciable issue involving actual parties. Wood v. Raffensperger, 981 F.3d 1307, 1313 (11th Cir. 2020) (“Because this case is not justiciable, we lack jurisdiction.”). Jurisdiction is also lacking because Plaintiff has failed to prove standing or present claims ripe for review. Fisheries Ass'n v. Gulf of Mexico Fishery Mgmt. Council, 364 F.3d 269, 273 (5th Cir. 2004) (“A plaintiff's failure to establish one of the three elements of Article III standing deprives federal courts of jurisdiction to hear the plaintiff's suit.”); Elend v. Basham, 471 F.3d 1199, 1204 (11th Cir. 2006) (ripeness is a “threshold jurisdictional question”).

Being fully advised, it is ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that,

1. The R&R [ECF No. 10] is REJECTED.

2. The TRO Application [ECF No. 4] is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

3. The Complaint [ECF No. 1] is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE for lack of justiciability and subject-matter jurisdiction, with thirty days leave to amend the Complaint.

DONE AND ORDERED in chambers in West Palm Beach, Florida, this 28th day of August 2026.

ED ARTAU UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE